Diagnosing runtime violations of security and dependability properties by Tsigkritis, Theocharis
Tsigkritis, Theocharis (2010). Diagnosing runtime violations of security and dependability properties. 
(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London)
City Research Online
Original citation: Tsigkritis, Theocharis (2010). Diagnosing runtime violations of security and 
dependability properties. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London)
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1181/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
City University, London 
Department of Computing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnosing Runtime Violations of 
Security & Dependability Properties 
 
 
Theocharis Tsigkritis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Computing at City University, 
London, April 2010 
  
 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
      
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................ 4 
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................................................... 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 7 
DECLARATION .......................................................................................................................................... 9 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................10 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................11 
1.1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................11 
1.2 THE NEED FOR DIAGNOSIS ...........................................................................................................11 
1.3 DYNAMIC VERIFICATION AND DIAGNOSIS ..................................................................................12 
1.4 THE DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH ......................................................................................................14 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS..........................................................................................................................14 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS..............................................................................................................16 
CHAPTER 2: RELATED LITERATURE................................................................................................18 
2.1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................18 
2.2 DYNAMIC VERIFICATION OF S&D PROPERTIES ...........................................................................18 
2.2.1 Security and Dependability Properties:  An Overview..........................................................18 
2.2.2 Dynamic verification .............................................................................................................20 
2.3 ABDUCTIVE REASONING..............................................................................................................64 
2.3.1 Logic-Based Abduction..........................................................................................................64 
2.3.2 Temporal Abduction ..............................................................................................................66 
2.3.3 Selecting Abduced Explanations............................................................................................67 
CHAPTER 3: PRELIMINARIES..............................................................................................................74 
3.1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................74 
3.2 EVENT CALCULUS .......................................................................................................................74 
3.3 THE EVEREST MONITORING FRAMEWORK ................................................................................75 
3.3.1 Specification of monitoring rules and assumptions in EVEREST..........................................75 
3.3.2 Standard EVEREST assumptions...........................................................................................79 
3.4 THE DEMPSTER – SHAFER THEORY OF EVIDENCE .......................................................................80 
CHAPTER 4: EXTENDING EVEREST MONITORING FRAMEWORK FOR DIAGNOSIS .........85 
4.1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................85 
4.2 BASIC FORMULATION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC PROBLEM AND ASSUMPTIONS....................................85 
4.3 EC SPECIFICATIONS OF THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ATMS) MOTIVATING 
EXAMPLE...................................................................................................................................................89 
CHAPTER 5: THE DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH....................................................................................94 
5.1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................94 
5.2 GENERATION OF EXPLANATIONS ................................................................................................96 
5.2.1 The process of generating explanations ................................................................................96 
5.2.2 Examples of explanation generation....................................................................................102 
5.3 IDENTIFICATION OF EXPLANATION EFFECTS .............................................................................106 
5.3.1 The process of identifying explanation effects .....................................................................106 
5.3.2 Examples of explanation effects identification.....................................................................116 
5.4 PLAUSIBILITY ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................................123 
5.4.1 Foundations of the assessment ............................................................................................124 
5.4.2 Alternative explanations, expected consequences and search for supporting and refuting 
evidence for alternative explanations ................................................................................................128 
5.4.3 Event Genuineness...............................................................................................................131 
5.4.4 Efficiency of the Event Genuineness Assessment .................................................................132 
5.4.5 Reconsideration of Event Genuineness Formal Definition..................................................155 
5.4.6 Belief Functions ...................................................................................................................157 
   
 3
5.5 DIAGNOSIS GENERATION ..........................................................................................................175 
5.5.1 The diagnosis generation process........................................................................................175 
5.5.2 Examples of diagnosis generation .......................................................................................177 
5.6 MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THEOREMS IN CHAPTER 5 ..........................................177 
CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC PROTOTYPE............207 
6.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................207 
6.2 EXPERIMENTAL SET UP OF LABORATORY SIMULATIONS ..........................................................208 
6.2.1 Architecture of the EVEREST diagnostic prototype ............................................................208 
6.2.2 The monitored system ..........................................................................................................212 
6.2.3 The deployed simulator........................................................................................................218 
6.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND METRICS .......................................................................................222 
6.3.1 Correctness metrics .............................................................................................................223 
6.3.2 Responsiveness metrics........................................................................................................226 
6.4 EVALUATION EXPERIMENTS DESIGN..........................................................................................228 
6.4.1 The LBACS simulations .......................................................................................................229 
6.4.2 Experimental configurations and evaluation experiments sets............................................232 
6.5 EVALUATION EXPERIMENTS RESULTS ......................................................................................235 
6.5.1 ExplanationConfiguration1 Experiments Results ................................................................238 
6.5.2 ExplanationConfiguration2 Experiments Results ................................................................274 
CHAPTER 7: OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES AND FUTURE WORK ..................................................299 
7.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................299 
7.2 OPTIMIZATION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC PROTOTYPE .......................................................................301 
7.3 FURTHER EXPERIMENTATION....................................................................................................302 
7.3.1 Extended adversaries capabilities experiments ...................................................................302 
7.3.2 Extended belief function constants experiments ..................................................................303 
7.3.3 Extended underlying monitoring theory experiments ..........................................................304 
7.4 COMBINING DIAGNOSIS RESULTS .............................................................................................305 
7.5 OTHER OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES.................................................................................................308 
 CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................................................................310 
CHAPTER 8: .............................................................................................................................................310 
8.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................310 
8.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH WORK .........................................................................................310 
8.3 MAIN NOVELTIES ......................................................................................................................312 
8.4 LIMITATIONS .............................................................................................................................313 
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................315 
APPENDIX A: LOCATION BASED ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM MONITORING THEORY.331 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 4
List of Tables 
TABLE 2-1 - SUMMARY OF FORMAL LANGUAGES USED FOR DYNAMIC VERIFICATION ....................................34 
TABLE 2-2 – SUMMARY OF DYNAMIC VERIFICATION TOOLS .........................................................................63 
TABLE 3-1 – AXIOMS OF EVENT CALCULUS ...................................................................................................75 
TABLE 3-2 – MEDICAL PROBLEM DS BELIEF MEASUREMENTS .......................................................................84 
TABLE 5-1 - BELIEFS IN GENUINENESS OF VIOLATION OBSERVATIONS OF RULE ATMS.R1 .........................177 
TABLE 6-1 – TYPES OF SEED EVENTS GENERATED BY LBACS DEVICE ........................................................230 
TABLE 6-2 – INTER-EVENT DELAY RANGES FOR SIMULATED EVENTS ...........................................................231 
TABLE 6-3 – LBACS CONDUCTED EXPERIMENTS.........................................................................................235 
TABLE 6-4 – EXAMPLE TABLE OF EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS ................................................................236 
TABLE 6-5 EXAMPLE TABLE OF VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS .....................................................................238 
TABLE 6-6 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_1.5............................................239 
TABLE 6-7 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_1.5...............................................240 
TABLE 6-8 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_1.5 .......................242 
TABLE 6-9 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_2.3 ............................................243 
TABLE 6-10 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_2.3.............................................244 
TABLE 6-11 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_2.3 .....................245 
TABLE 6-12 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_2.5 ..........................................246 
TABLE 6-13 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_2.5.............................................248 
TABLE 6-14 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_2.5 .....................249 
TABLE 6-15 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_5 .............................................250 
TABLE 6-16 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_5................................................251 
TABLE 6-17 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_5 ........................252 
TABLE 6-18 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_7.5 ..........................................253 
TABLE 6-19 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_7.5.............................................254 
TABLE 6-20 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_7.5 .....................256 
TABLE 6-21 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_10 ...........................................257 
TABLE 6-22 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_10..............................................258 
TABLE 6-23 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_10 ......................259 
TABLE 6-24 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF2_10% ........................................275 
TABLE 6-25 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_10% ..........................................276 
TABLE 6-26 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF2_10%...................277 
TABLE 6-27 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF2_20% ........................................278 
TABLE 6-28 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_20% ..........................................280 
TABLE 6-29 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF2_20%...................281 
TABLE 6-30 - EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF2_30% ........................................282 
TABLE 6-31 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF1_30% ..........................................283 
TABLE 6-32 - EGBT AND VDT RESPONSIVENESS RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT EXPCONF2_20%...................284 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 5
List of Figures 
FIGURE 2-1 – CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR DYNAMIC VERIFICATION ................................................................22 
FIGURE 2-2 – TAXONOMY OF MONITOR AND EVENT GENERATION FEATURES...............................................23 
FIGURE 2-3 – TAXONOMY OF EVENT EMISSION METHODS.............................................................................35 
FIGURE 2-4 – CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION OF ASPECT WEAVING [90].....................................................37 
FIGURE 2-5 – A CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE [19] ....................................................................................42 
FIGURE 2-6 – PROXY ARCHITECTURE [19]......................................................................................................42 
FIGURE 2-7 - THE MODEL-CARRYING CODE FRAMEWORK [144] ...................................................................47 
FIGURE 2-8 – THE JPAX ARCHITECTURE [75].................................................................................................49 
FIGURE 2-9 – THE JAVA-MAC ARCHITECTURE [93] .......................................................................................53 
FIGURE 2-10 – THE ARCHITECTURE OF JASSDA FRAMEWORK [25] .................................................................55 
FIGURE 2-11 – THE JPF ARCHITECTURE [166] ...............................................................................................58 
FIGURE 2-12 – RUNTIME VERIFICATION IN JNUKE [13] ..................................................................................61 
FIGURE 2-13 – CLASSICAL APPROACH FOR DYNAMIC AND STATIC ANALYSIS [13] .........................................62 
FIGURE 2-14- GENERIC ANALYSIS FOR BOTH A STATIC & DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT [13] ...............................62 
FIGURE 3-1 – GRAMMAR FOR SPECIFYING BOUNDARIES OF TIME VARIABLES.................................................77 
FIGURE 5-1 – THE OVERALL PROCESS OF THE DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH...........................................................94 
FIGURE 5-2 - ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING EXPLANATIONS OF ATOMIC PREDICATES .................................100 
FIGURE 5-3 – EVENT LOG FOR ATMS ..........................................................................................................103 
FIGURE 5-4 – GRAPHICAL VIEW OF EXPLANATION GENERATION ..................................................................106 
FIGURE 5-5 - ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTING THE TRANSITIVE CLOSURE OF DEDUCTIONS FROM ABDUCED 
PREDICATES ........................................................................................................................................110 
FIGURE 5-6 – ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTING THE TRANSITIVE CLOSURE OF DEDUCTIONS FROM RECORDED 
EVENTS ...............................................................................................................................................114 
FIGURE 5-7 – STEP1 EXECUTED BY GENERATE_RE_CONSEQUENCES ..........................................................120 
FIGURE 5-8 – STEP2 EXECUTED BY GENERATE_RE_CONSEQUENCES ..........................................................121 
FIGURE 5-9 – STEP3 EXECUTED BY FLUENT MAINTENANCE MECHANISMS OF EVEREST.............................122 
FIGURE 5-10 – STEP4 EXECUTED BY GENERATE_AE_CONSEQUENCES ........................................................123 
FIGURE 5-11 – EVENTS AND EXPLANATIONS ................................................................................................134 
FIGURE 5-12 – ALGORITHM FOR HANDLING EFFICIENTLY EXPLANATIONS, CONSEQUENCES AND MATCHING 
RECORDED EVENTS .............................................................................................................................139 
FIGURE 5-13 – EVENT LOG FOR ATMS ........................................................................................................145 
FIGURE 5-14 – EXPLANATIONS/CONSEQUENCES TREE FOR EVENT E6..........................................................146 
FIGURE 5-15 – EXPLANATIONS/CONSEQUENCES TREE FOR EVENT E4 CONSIDERED AS MATCHING EVENT OF 
CONSEQUENCE C’E6,2,3.........................................................................................................................153 
FIGURE 5-16 - EXPLANATIONS/CONSEQUENCES TREE FOR EVENT E7 CONSIDERED AS MATCHING EVENT OF 
CONSEQUENCE C’E4,2,3.........................................................................................................................154 
FIGURE 5-17 – TIMELINE OF CAPTOR(EI) ......................................................................................................166 
FIGURE 5-18 – FINAL DIAGNOSIS GENERATION ALGORITHM.........................................................................176 
FIGURE 6-1 – OVERALL EVEREST DESIGN WITH RESPECT TO DIAGNOSTIC PROTOTYPE .............................209 
FIGURE 6-2 – EGBT ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................................................211 
FIGURE 6-3 – VDT ARCHITECTURE ..............................................................................................................211 
FIGURE 6-4 – LBACS ARCHITECTURE..........................................................................................................212 
FIGURE 6-5 – LBACS THEORY GRAPH PART I ..............................................................................................216 
FIGURE 6-6 - LBACS THEORY GRAPH PART II..............................................................................................217 
FIGURE 6-7 – LBACS SIMULATOR UML MODEL .........................................................................................220 
FIGURE 6-8 – LBACS SIMULATED COMPONENTS TOPOLOGY .......................................................................221 
FIGURE 6-9 – ER, MONITOR AND EGBT TIMELINES.....................................................................................227 
FIGURE 6-10 - MONITOR AND VDT TIMELINES ............................................................................................228 
FIGURE 6-11 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_1.5..............................................................240 
FIGURE 6-12 – VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_1.5................................................................241 
FIGURE 6-13 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_2.3..............................................................244 
FIGURE 6-14 – VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_2.3................................................................245 
FIGURE 6-15 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_2.5..............................................................247 
FIGURE 6-16 – VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_2.5................................................................248 
FIGURE 6-17 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_5.................................................................251 
FIGURE 6-18 – VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_5...................................................................252 
  
 6
FIGURE 6-19 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_7.5..............................................................254 
FIGURE 6-20 – VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_7.5................................................................255 
FIGURE 6-21 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_10...............................................................258 
FIGURE 6-22 – VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF1_10.................................................................259 
FIGURE 6-23 – EGBT_RECALLF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO LOW 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................261 
FIGURE 6-24 - EGBT_RECALLF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO HIGH 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................262 
FIGURE 6-25 - EGBT_PRECISIONF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO LOW 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................263 
FIGURE 6-26 - EGBT_PRECISIONF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO HIGH 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................264 
FIGURE 6-27 – EGBT_RECALLG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO LOW 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................265 
FIGURE 6-28 - EGBT_RECALLG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO HIGH 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................266 
FIGURE 6-29 - EGBT_PRECISIONG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO LOW 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................267 
FIGURE 6-30 - EGBT_PRECISIONG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO HIGH 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................268 
FIGURE 6-31 - VDT_RECALLF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS............................................269 
FIGURE 6-32 - VDT_PRECISIONF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS........................................270 
FIGURE 6-33 - VDT_RECALLG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS ...........................................271 
FIGURE 6-34 - VDT_PRECISIONG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS .......................................272 
FIGURE 6-35 – EGBT BELIEF COMPUTATIONAL MEAN TIMES FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS............273 
FIGURE 6-36 - VDT BELIEF COMPUTATIONAL MEAN TIMES FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS ..............273 
FIGURE 6-37 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF2_10% ...........................................................276 
FIGURE 6-38 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF2_10% ..............................................................277 
FIGURE 6-39 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF2_20% ...........................................................279 
FIGURE 6-40 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF2_20% ..............................................................280 
FIGURE 6-41 – EGBT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF2_30% ...........................................................283 
FIGURE 6-42 - VDT CORRECTNESS RESULTS FOR EXPCONF2_30% ..............................................................284 
FIGURE 6-43 – EGBT_RECALLF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DELAYED EVENTS PERCENTAGES WITH RESPECT TO 
LOW BELIEF RANGES ...........................................................................................................................286 
FIGURE 6-44 - EGBT_RECALLF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DELAYED EVENTS PERCENTAGES WITH RESPECT TO 
HIGH BELIEF RANGES ..........................................................................................................................287 
FIGURE 6-45 - EGBT_PRECISIONF FOR DIFFERENT DELAYED EVENTS PERCENTAGES WITH RESPECT TO LOW 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................288 
FIGURE 6-46 - EGBT_PRECISIONF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DELAYED EVENTS PERCENTAGES WITH RESPECT 
TO HIGH BELIEF RANGES .....................................................................................................................289 
FIGURE 6-47 – EGBT_RECALLG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DELAYED EVENTS PERCENTAGES WITH RESPECT TO 
LOW BELIEF RANGES ...........................................................................................................................290 
FIGURE 6-48 - EGBT_RECALLG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DELAYED EVENTS PERCENTAGES WITH RESPECT TO 
HIGH BELIEF RANGES ..........................................................................................................................290 
FIGURE 6-49 - EGBT_PRECISIONG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO LOW 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................291 
FIGURE 6-50 - EGBT_PRECISIONG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS WINDOWS WITH RESPECT TO HIGH 
BELIEF RANGES ...................................................................................................................................292 
FIGURE 6-51 - VDT_RECALLF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF DELAYED EVENTS .....................293 
FIGURE 6-52 - VDT_PRECISIONF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF DELAYED EVENTS .................294 
FIGURE 6-53 - VDT_RECALLG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF DELAYED EVENTS .....................295 
FIGURE 6-54 - VDT_PRECISIONG RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF DELAYED EVENTS .................296 
FIGURE 6-55 – EGBT BELIEF COMPUTATIONAL MEAN TIMES FOR DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF DELAYED 
EVENTS ...............................................................................................................................................297 
FIGURE 6-56 - VDT BELIEF COMPUTATIONAL MEAN TIMES FOR DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF DELAYED 
EVENTS ...............................................................................................................................................297 
 
 
   
 7
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is the result of a long going process which revealed the author’s weaknesses 
and sensitivity to external phenomena. Therefore, the author would like to thank the 
people that supported, encouraged and assisted him to overcome all the occurred 
obstacles. Without these people, the present thesis would have not been existed. 
Firstly, the author would like to extend his gratitude and appreciation to his supervisor 
and mentor, Professor George Spanoudakis. Professor G. Spanoudakis was constantly 
and patiently encouraging, supporting and revealing multiple ways for addressing any 
issues that happened to occur by respecting the author’s judgment and freedom of choice. 
His insistence and emphasis on analyzing, evolving and expanding thoughts and ideas 
was quite painful sometimes, however it was a way to awake the author’s focus and 
awareness when necessary. The discussions between Professor G. Spanoudakis and the 
author will be unforgettable for the author. For the short number of reasons mentioned 
above, author is honoured to have cooperated with Professor G. Spanoudakis.  
In addition to his supervisor, the author would like to express his appreciation to his 
co-supervisor Dr. Christos Kloukinas for his valuable advices, his constant support and 
his relaxing way to discuss any emerged issue. 
Two more people that the author would like to express his sincere thankfulness are 
Dr. Costas Lambrinoudakis and Dr. Stefanos Gkritzalis. Without their prompt and 
counsel, the author would have never embarked upon the adventure behind this thesis.  
The author would like also to give his thanks to Dr. Andrea Zisman for her support and 
concern especially in the last phase of the thesis preparation, and Dr. Artur d'Avila 
Garcez for his valuable comments during the initial stages of the research work presented 
in this thesis.  
The author would like to thank the School of Informatics for the financial support for 
this research, as well, as the members of the Technical Support Team (TST) in the School 
of Informatics for their constant and tireless services.  
In addition to the above people, there are numerous colleagues and friends who were 
extremely helpful over the years, each in their own way. These include Nikos 
Konstantoudakis, Dr. Khaled Mahbub, Dr. Waraporn Zirapathong, Dr. Gilberto 
  
 8
Cysneiros Filho, Dr. Shant Narsesian, Mark Firman, Amalia, Andreas and Eirini Spyrou, 
Dr. Kelly Androutsopoulos, Dr. Jameel Syed, Anestis Benavidis, Dr. Vasiliki Efstathiou, 
Anna Thanou, Leonidas Skoutas, Dr. Davide Lorenzoli, Dr. Marco Comuzzi, Ricardo 
Contreras, Dr. Igor Siveroni, Kostas Poulios, Dr. Eirini Nedelkopoulou, Stavros Fakanas, 
and Stelios Papakonstantinou. 
Besides all the aforementioned people, the author feels mostly obliged to his family. 
The author therefore is especially grateful to his parents, Athanasios and Loukia, for 
supporting him in any possible way, whether it was love or advice, wherever and 
whenever. Also, the author would like to express his sincere thankfulness to his brother 
and cousin, Petros T. and Petros P., whose joyfulness made author’s hard times smoother, 
and his aunt Marina, who hosted him in Kefallonia - a vitalising and rejuvenating piece of 
land for the author. It would be impossible for the author to overstate how valuable the 
contributions of his family were over these years.  
Given the chance, the author would like to dedicate this thesis to his grandparents, 
who are not with him in this life anymore. The author dedicates humbly and equally this 
piece of work to the memory of Petros and Anastasia expressing his true gratitude for 
everything that had lavishly given to him, and to the memory of Theocharis and Sofia, 
even if the author did not have the chance to meet them alive and live with them. Both 
couples of author’s grandparents are always in author’s mind considered as the very 
origin of his life.   
Last but not least, in addition to all people the author has thanked, the author would 
like to thank humbly God for all the strength and enlightenment He had revealed within 
the author during difficult times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 9
Declaration 
The author grants powers of discretion to the University Librarian to allow this thesis to 
be copied in whole or in part without further reference to me. This permission covers 
only single copies make for study purposes, subject to normal conditions of 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 10 
Abstract 
Monitoring the preservation of security and dependability (S&D) properties of complex 
software systems is widely accepted as a necessity. Basic monitoring can detect 
violations but does not always provide sufficient information for deciding what the 
appropriate response to a violation is. Such decisions often require additional diagnostic 
information that explains why a violation has occurred and can, therefore, indicate what 
would be an appropriate response action to it. In this thesis, we describe a diagnostic 
procedure for generating explanations of violations of S&D properties developed as 
extension of a runtime monitoring framewoek, called EVEREST. The procedure is based 
on a combination of abductive and evidential reasoning about violations of S&D 
properties which are expressed in Event Calculus. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Monitoring security and dependability (S&D) properties of software systems at runtime 
is widely accepted as a measure of increased resilience to dependability failures and 
security attacks, and several approaches have been developed to support it (see [99] for a 
survey). Whilst basic monitoring provides the core functionality for detecting violations 
of such properties, it cannot always provide the information that is necessary in order to 
understand the reasons that underpin the violation of a property and decide what would 
be an appropriate reaction to it.  
In this thesis, we present a diagnosis system that we have developed as extension of a 
monitoring framework [109, 153, 155], called EVEREST (EVEnt REaSoning Toolkit). 
EVEREST supports the specification and monitoring of properties expressed in Event 
Calculus (EC) [149] as rules. The provision of diagnostic information is based on the 
generation of alternative explanations for the events which are involved in the violations 
of rules, and the assessment of the plausibility of these explanations based on whether 
their effects correspond to events recorded during the operation of the monitored system 
as already presented in [162, 163, 164]. The key characteristic of our approach is the use 
of abductive reasoning [42, 122, 136] for the generation of explanations and belief based 
reasoning [146] for the assessment of explanation plausibility.  
1.2 The need for diagnosis 
To appreciate the need for diagnosing the reasons underpinning violations of security and 
dependability properties, consider an air traffic management system, referred to as ATMS 
in the following. ATMS uses different radars to monitor the trajectories of airplanes in 
different air spaces. It is also connected with a system that keeps a record of flight plans 
which are submitted by different planes ahead of flights to indicate the expected route of 
a flight and request flight permission. 
The operations of ATMS may be monitored at runtime to ensure the integrity of its 
components and the information generated by them. Monitoring, for example, may focus 
on properties related to: (i) the liveness of the radars connected to ATMS, and (ii) the 
generation of mutually consistent information by them. An example of property of this 
kind relates to cases where air spaces are covered by different radars or have overlapping 
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areas covered by different radars. In such cases, to check the integrity of the information 
that is provided by the different radars which cover an airspace, we can monitor a rule 
requiring that if one of these radars sends a signal indicating that an airplane is in the 
airspace, every other radar that covers the same space should also send a signal indicating 
the presence of the plane in it within a certain time period of time after the receipt of the 
initial signal. Such a rule is violated in all cases where the monitor receives a signal event 
by one of the radars of ATMS that cover a specific airspace but not the other. Clearly, 
whilst in such cases, knowing that the rule has been violated is important for the 
operation of ATMS but the violation report on its own is not sufficient for establishing 
the reasons why the second expected signal was not received and taking appropriate 
action (if possible). In fact, the violation may have been due to several reasons, including 
the following: 
• The radar that did not send the expected signal was malfunctioning (Cause 1). 
• The communication link between the radar that did not send the expected signal and 
the monitor was malfunctioning or an intruder captured the signal and prevented it 
from reaching the monitor (Cause 2). 
• The radar that sent the expected signal was malfunctioning or its identity was faked by 
an intruder that sent a fake signal to the monitor (Cause 3). 
Although the above list of possible causes is not exhaustive, it demonstrates that a 
decision about what would be an appropriate reaction to the violation depends on the rea- 
son(s) that have caused it and, therefore, the selection of the appropriate response action 
cannot be made solely on the basis of knowledge about the violation but requires 
additional diagnostic information. Therefore, identifying which of the above reasons has 
caused the violation is important for taking actions that would restore the integrity of the 
operation of ATMS. 
1.3 Dynamic Verification and Diagnosis 
Dynamic verification enables a software system to improve its dependability [14], by 
checking whether its behaviour satisfies specific dependability properties while it is 
running. On the other hand, diagnosis can be considered as the process whose aim is the 
identification of the causes of symptoms and observations might occur during the 
operation of an examined system. For instance, regarding the motivating example in 
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Section 1.2, dynamic verification solutions used in ATMS would be responsible to check 
at runtime the liveness of the radars connected to ATMS. In case that radar liveness 
violations are detected, diagnosis tools could be used for providing additional information 
by identifying the reasons have caused the detected violations.  
However, in the context of software system dynamic verification, there are many 
approaches [22, 66, 128, 139, 161] that consider diagnosis as the identification of system 
observations, which resulted to a failure, fault or violation. For instance, in [22, 66, 128, 
139, 161], synchronization of automata that model the expected behaviour of the 
monitored system and the generated event sets are used for carrying out diagnostic tasks. 
More specifically, Pencolé and Cordier [128] propose a decentralised fault diagnosis 
approach that synchronization of automata is performed for individual system 
components (fault detection at system components level), and then aggregated for the 
global system (fault detection at system level). Also, in both approaches given by 
Tripakis [161] and Bouyer et al. [22], the fault diagnosis problem is treated by generating 
algorithms (diagnosers) that act as fault detectors of internal faults for any given 
sequence of events generated by the system, which is modelled as a timed automaton [4].  
In the present thesis, we assume a distinct separation between the dynamic 
verification task and the diagnosis task. The goal of monitoring task is the detection of 
inconsistencies with respect to the intended behaviour of a system with respect to some 
dependability properties. Therefore, the approaches [22, 66, 128, 139, 161] mentioned 
above could be considered as possible solutions to the monitoring task. An extended set 
of approaches that focus on system runtime monitoring, as for instance the work by 
Spanoudakis et al. [109, 153, 155] that the diagnostic approach presented in this thesis is 
built upon, are discussed below in the document, in particular in Chapter 2. 
Upon inconsistencies with respect to the intended behaviour of the system detected by 
dynamic verification approaches, the diagnostic task comes to play for identifying the 
reasons that have caused the detected inconsistencies. As discussed in Section 1.1, it 
should be noted that the output of the diagnostic task is important for taking actions that 
would restore the integrity of the operation of the monitored system. Examples of 
research effort that focus on the diagnostic task, as the work by Console et al. [42] and 
Santos [140], are discussed again in Chapter 2. 
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1.4 The Diagnostic Approach  
The overall aim of the diagnostic approach this thesis presents is the identification of 
possible explanations for the violations of S&D properties [162, 163, 164] in order to aid 
the selection of appropriate reactions to these violations. To generate such explanations, 
the diagnostic mechanism uses abductive reasoning [42, 122, 136]. Then, following the 
identification of possible explanations, the diagnosis mechanism also assesses the 
plausibility of explanations by identifying any effects that they would have generated 
from the explanations and checking whether these effects correspond to observations that 
have occurred and are genuine. The assessment of the genuineness of the explanation 
effects and the validity of explanations is based on the computation of beliefs using 
functions that we have defined for this purpose. These functions have been defined using 
the axiomatic framework of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [146].       
The diagnostic framework has been designed as an extention of EVEREST monitoring 
framework described in [109, 153, 155]. EVEREST is able to monitor whether the 
behaviour of a system is consistent with tis intended behaviour in parallel with the 
operation of the monitored system without intervening with this operation in any form. In 
EVEREST, the properties to be checked are specified as rules and ssumptions in a 
language called EC-Assertion [109, 153, 155] that has its formal foundation in Event 
Calculus [149]. EVEREST finally provides the infrastructure for storing properties 
violations and other observations occurring during the operation of the monitored system 
that are necessary inputs for the diagnostic process.  
1.5 Contributions 
The diagnostic approach this thesis presents is the result of the research work that 
evolved as shown throughout our earlier publicatations [162, 163, 164]. In these 
publications, the concept of event genuineness, as a criterion for event trustworthiness, 
and its assemssment mechanisms have been introduced and presented to the outer 
research world, starting from our initial intuitions, thoughts and formulations regarding 
diagnosis via event trustworthiness assessment and evolving to concrete evidential 
mechanisms in the same direction. What is presented in this thesis is the latest version of 
the aforementioned concept and its assessment mechanism after reconsiderations and 
corrections have been made. The main contributions of our research work are as follows: 
• Design of a diagnostic framework for runtime S&D violations.  
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The diagnostic framework firstly presented in [162, 163, 164] and discussed in 
this thesis is designed to identify possible explanations for runtime S&D 
violations rules specified in Event Calculus [149] in order to aid the selection of 
appropriate reactions to these violations. The violations of S&D properties are 
detected by a non-intrusive monitoring1 framework [109, 153, 155] at the runtime 
of the monitored system. The diagnostic framework processes the detected 
violations by taking into account other observations from the monitored system. 
The diagnostic information that is produced refers to the cause of the detected 
violations in terms of belief measurements in the genunieness of explanations 
effects and the validity of explanations that were generated for the examined 
violations. 
• Abductive algorithm for generating explanations. 
To compute the possible explanations of runtime violations of S&D properties 
specified in Event Calculus [149], an algorithm that reasons abductively on the 
observations involved in the examined violations has been devised (see Section 
5.2.1 and [162, 163, 164]). Another key characteristic of the abductive algorithm 
is that it reasons on the temporal aspects of violation observations against the 
intended behaviour of the examined system by treating any occurring time 
constraint satisfaction problem as linear programming problem. The output of the 
algorithm is a list representing the alternative explanations for a particular 
violation observation.   
• Deductive algorithm for identifying expected consequences. 
To assess the plausibility and validity of the abductive explanations, the diagnosis 
process computes the explanations effects. For undertaking this task, a deductive 
algorithm that reasons on the abductive explanations against the intended 
behaviour of the system has been designed (see Section 5.3.1 and [162, 163, 
164]). The deductive algorithm reasons again on the temporal aspects of the 
abductive explanations by treating any occurring time constraint satisfaction 
problem as linear programming problem. The output of the algorithm consists of 
                                               
1 It should be noted that the term “non intrusive monitoring” here signifies a form of monitoring that is 
carried out by a computational entity that is external to the system that is being monitored, is carried out in 
parallel with the operation of this system and does not intervene with this operation in any form. 
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an exhaustive list of the observations that could be derived from the abductive 
explanations and the intended behaviour model of the system. 
• Plausibility assessment scheme based on evidential reasoning. 
An assessment scheme for observation genuineness based on the plausibility and 
correctness of the alternative explanations that are generated for a violation 
observation in the previous steps of the diagnostic process has been designed (see 
Section 5.4). As presented in [162, 163, 164], the assessment of explanation 
plausibility is based on the hypothesis that if the expected effects of an 
explanation match with observations that have occurred (and recorded) during the 
operation of the system that is being monitored, then there is evidence about the 
validity of the explanation. However, there is the possibility that we would not be 
able to confirm or disconfirm the validity of the explanation at the time that 
diagnostic process searches for evidence. To deal with this uncertainty, the 
diagnosis mechanism advocates an approximate reasoning approach which 
generates degrees of belief in the membership of observations in the log of the 
monitor and the existence of some valid explanation for it rather than strict logical 
truth values. These degrees of belief are computed by functions founded in the 
axiomatic framework of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [146]. 
• Implementation of a diagnostic prototype.  
A prototype based on the diagnostic framework this thesis presents has been 
implemented. The diagnostic prototype has been integrated with the underlying 
monitoring framework that is easy to set up and provides user flexibility in quite 
satisfying levels. The underlying monitoring framework extended with diagnostic 
capabilities allows the user to specify monitoring rules and assumptions of S&D 
properties and indicate whether diagnostic results are needed. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 provides the reader with an overview of security and dependability 
properties from the perspective of software system engineering and the technical 
background on security and dependability dynamic verification or runtime monitoring. 
This is important since the diagnosis approach discussed in this thesis focuses on security 
and dependability proeperties and is based on a runtime monitoring framework. Also, 
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Chapter 2 presents a short literature review on abductive reasoning, as our diagnosis 
approach uses abductive reasoning as a technique for generating explanations that are 
used as diagnostic information.    
Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical background that underpins our diagnosis 
approach. More specifically, Chapter 3 presents the language that the reasoning 
mechanisms of our diagnosis approach use. Also, the monitoring framework, which the 
diagnosis approach in based on, is discussed by highlighting the formal specifications the 
framework uses. Finally, a short overview of the axiomatic framework that the diagnosis 
approach uses for handling uncertainty with respect to possible explanations of S&D 
violations on the basis of the available evidence is also provided. 
Chapter 4 discusses the basic formulation of the diagnostic task as it is carried out by 
the presented diagnosis approach. The basic formulation is provided as formal 
specifications extensions to the monitoring framework that the diagnosis approach is 
based on. Having provided the basic formal characteristics of the diagnostic task, Chapter 
4 concludes by presenting the formal specifications of the ATMS motivating example 
that is discussed in Section 1.2. This example is used in following chapters in order to 
demonstrate the technical aspects of the diagnosis approach.  
In Chapter 5, a detailed description of our diagnostic approach is given. More 
specifically, we give an overview of the diagnosis process and describe in detail the 
algorithms and mathematical formulas used to carry out the forms of analysis which are 
used in the different stages of this process.  
Chapter 6 presents the set up and results of an experimental evaluation of the 
diagnostic prototype that was implemented as a proof of concept for our diagnostic 
approach. The experimental evaluation has been based on the monitoring of a simulated 
case study.  
Chapter 7 provides the reader with some of our insights regarding the open issues that 
emerged from our work in diagnosis of security and dependability properties violations. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with the summary of the diagnosis approach that is 
described in this thesis, the contributions of the research underpinning it, as well as some 
limitations of the diagnostic approach and the prototype that implements it. 
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Chapter 2: Related Literature 
2.1 Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to give an overview of the notions of security and 
dependability properties from the perspective of software engineering and provide the 
readers with the technical background on security and dependability dynamic verification 
or runtime monitoring. Secondly, this chapter presents a short state of the art on 
abductive reasoning as a technique for generating explanations.  
More specifically, Section 2.2 covers the technical background on dynamic 
verification or monitoring of system dependability and security by providing initially a 
short overview of the security and dependability properties themselves, mostly based on 
definitions given by Avizienis et al. [14]. Having provided definitions of security and 
dependability properties, we present critical analysis of current research on dynamic 
verification by presenting general purpose and security oriented dynamic verification 
approaches. We also present comparative discussion on the presented security and 
dependability dynamic verification lines of research.  
Section 2.3 provides an overview of research in the area of abductive reasoning that it 
is a key characteristic of the approach presented by the present thesis. Therefore, by 
highlighting the basic aspects of abductive reasoning and the recent relevant research 
approaches, Section 2.3 aims to enable the reader to understand the relationship of our 
approach to abductive reasoning as a technique for generating explanations.  
2.2 Dynamic Verification of S&D properties 
The objective of this section is twofold: firstly to discuss about the notions of security 
and dependability properties, and secondly to provide a review of the state of the art in 
security and dependability dynamic verification or monitoring.  
2.2.1 Security and Dependability Properties:  An Overview 
In order to be able to provide an overview of the security properties from the perspective 
of software engineering, it would be necessary and quite helpful to examine and discuss 
about the security requirements that appear across relevant bibliography [55, 62, 157]. 
According to [55, 62, 157], security requirements cover issues related to: 
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• Confidentiality is the ability to maintain the secrecy of data and the messages 
exchanged between a system and its collaborating actors over communication 
channels.  
• Integrity is the ability to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data stored 
and the messages exchanged by a system. Maintaining integrity involves allowing 
only authorised users to change or create data and messages and applying controls 
to ensure the correctness of these messages and data.  
• Availability is concerned with ensuring that access to a system is possible when 
required.  
• Non-repudiation is concerned with making it impossible for an entity that has 
participated in some communication with a system to deny this participation. In 
message exchange, for instance, non- repudiation guarantees that the sender and 
the receiver of a message cannot deny the dispatch and receipt of the message, 
respectively.  
• Authentication is the ability to determine whether an actor interacting with the 
system has the identity that it claims to have.  
• Authorization is concerned with the assignment of the right permissions to an 
already authenticated entity.  
• Privacy is the ability of a system to prevent personal information from becoming 
known to entities other than those which own the information or the information 
is about.  
Regarding dependability properties, Avizienis et al. [14] have defined dependability as 
"the ability of a (computer) system to avoid failures that are more frequent or more 
severe, and outage durations that are longer, than is acceptable to the user(s)" and 
"deliver service that can be justifiably trusted". The notion of service in this definition 
corresponds to the system behaviour as viewed by the user, who may be a human 
interacting with the system or another system. A service delivery is acceptable if it 
implements the required system behaviour and satisfies certain quality constraints while 
failures relate to events that make the service deviate from what is perceived to be a 
correct delivery. According to Avizienis et al. [14], some of the aforementioned security 
requirements (confidentiality, availability and integrity) are considered as attributes of 
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dependability. In the same context, we could generalise and consider that security 
properties are a subset of the dependability properties set, as the security properties of a 
system aim to prevent from unaccepted leak of private information (man in the middle 
attack [106]) and/or unaccepted delays in the deliverance of the provided services (denial 
of service attack [2]).        
An important element in the above definition of dependability is the notion of 
"justifiable trust" which requires the ability to objectively verify that the delivered system 
service does not deviate from the required system behaviour and associated quality 
constraints. The development of system verification capabilities (i.e., the ability to verify 
that a system satisfies certain properties) has been the focus of significant research over 
the last few decades and has resulted in the development of a wide spectrum of, typically 
tool-supported, methods that offer such capabilities. These methods are distinguished into 
static and dynamic.  
Static verification methods aim to show that the desired properties of a system will 
always hold based solely on the specification of the system without considering its actual 
run-time behaviour. Dynamic verification methods, on the other hand, aim to show that 
desired properties hold based on observation of the run-time behaviour of a system and 
its interactions with its operational environment.  
Due to the fact that static verification is not the main area of interest of this thesis, we 
are not providing an overview of methods that fall in this category. On the other hand, a 
brief overview of the dynamic verification of systems is following in the rest of the 
sections of the chapter. 
2.2.2 Dynamic verification 
Dynamic verification enables a software system to improve its dependability (and 
therefore security) [14], by checking whether its behaviour satisfies specific 
dependability and security properties while it is running. This can be accomplished by a 
software module, which monitors the execution of the system and checks its conformity 
with the specification of the relevant properties. This module can be either an external or 
an internal module of the monitored system.  
Software systems are increasingly becoming ubiquitous and heterogeneous and rely 
on technologies such as mobile code and components off the shelf (COTS). Static 
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verification and testing of dynamically adapted entities cannot provide adequate results, 
each one for different reasons. Static verification is a formal method and can prove that a 
system (or to be more accurate its model) is correct but is very time consuming and 
demands substantial education and experience from practitioners. Testing [101] on the 
other hand is an informal method which cannot prove a system correct since it can never 
offer a complete coverage of all its possible executions but can be easily applied even 
from inexperienced practitioners.  
Being situated somewhere between static verification and testing, dynamic 
verification techniques aim to achieve the benefits of both approaches, by merging testing 
and formal specification. Thus, dynamic verification is considered to be a formal method 
applied to the implementation of the system that avoids the pitfalls of ad hoc testing and 
the complexity of full blown static verification techniques (model checking, theorem 
proving).  
Dynamic system verification has been investigated in the context of different areas 
including requirements engineering, program verification, safety critical systems and 
service centric systems. 
According to literature on dynamic verification [20, 47, 75, 153], the basic stages of 
dynamic verification are: (i) the development of a formal specification of a system 
including various types of properties, like safety and security properties, (ii) the 
application of methods for capturing events of interest and (iii) checking for violations by 
a monitor which can verify whether the observed behaviour of a system satisfies the 
required properties.  
It should be noted that there are cases such as Aspect Oriented Programming [90] and 
Monitoring Oriented Programming [34] in which a monitor is generated automatically 
and inserted into the code that has to be monitored. Thus, in such cases, the second stage 
includes the monitor generation as well. On the other hand, in all the other cases, 
monitors are considered to be software modules, which have to be implemented [12, 75] 
separately from the monitored system. The monitor inputs are the formal specification of 
the system (product of first stage) and the flow of events generated during the execution 
of the system. The monitor then reasons about the conformance of the captured runtime 
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behaviour of the system (events flow) against the indented system behaviour (formal 
specification). 
 
Figure 2-1 – Conceptual Model for Dynamic Verification 
 
Figure 2-1 shows the conceptual model we have constructed to indicate the entities 
involved in dynamic verification. According to this model, the subject of dynamic 
verification that is signified by the class MonitorableEntity can be either a System or a 
System’s Environment. Dynamic verification is carried out by a Monitor which observes 
the Runtime Behaviour of a system or its environment. The RuntimeBehaviour is a set of 
events generated during the operation of the monitorable entities. These events are 
generated by one or more Event Generator according to different Event Emission 
Specifications. An event emission specification describes the particular Event Emission 
Method to be used and one or more Event Emission Descriptions, which describe the 
exact types of events which should be generated. The observation of the events in a 
Runtime Behaviour by the Monitor is carried out according to a specific Monitoring 
Policy which specifies the Monitoring Properties that should be verified at runtime and 
the set of Monitoring Actions the Monitor should perform to enable the system control 
and/or recover from violations of the monitoring properties.  
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Figure 2-2 presents a taxonomy of monitor and event generation features. This 
taxonomy has three layers which differentiate monitoring and event generation 
capabilities according to (a) the controlling capabilities of a monitor, (b) the time of the 
event emission with respect to the occurrence of the action described by the event, and (c) 
the communication type between the monitor and the system. 
 
Figure 2-2 – Taxonomy of Monitor and Event Generation Features 
 
More specifically at the first layer a distinction is made based on whether the monitor has 
observation only, observation and control or control only capabilities. These capabilities 
can be summarised as follows:  
• Observation (O): The monitor observes the runtime behaviour of the system by 
receiving the generated events and it checks whether the monitoring properties 
hold at runtime.  
• Observation and Control (OC): The monitor observes the runtime behaviour of 
the system by receiving the generated events, it checks whether the monitoring 
properties hold at runtime and forces the system to execute specific actions. These 
actions can be either preventive or perform recovery. This class is also known as 
closed-loop control.  
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• Control (C): The monitor forces the system to execute actions without needing to 
observe the actual state of the system. This class is also known as open-loop 
control.  
The second layer of the taxonomy presents a distinction according to the time of the 
event emission with respect to the occurrence of the action described by the event. 
According to the criterion, we can distinguish between two cases:  
• Emission preceding the action (pre): The event precedes the action which it 
describes. For example, the event generator sends an event to the monitor 
informing it that the system wishes to lock some resource before the system locks 
it.  
• Emission posterior to the action (post): The event follows the action which it 
describes. For example, the event generator sends an event to the monitor 
informing it that the system has completed some transaction.  
Finally, the third layer of the taxonomy refers to the type of the communication between 
the monitored system and the monitor. According to this criterion, we distinguish 
between the following two types of communication:  
• Synchronous communication (S): The event generator uses a blocking send 
primitive to communicate with the monitor, waiting for a reply from it. This is 
only used when the monitor can exert control over the system.  
• Asynchronous communication (A): The event generator uses a non-blocking send 
primitive to communicate with the monitor. It is mainly used when the monitor 
cannot exert any control over the system or when the control actions can be 
applied asynchronously. For example, the monitored system may notify the 
monitor that it will attempt to perform some action and start performing it without 
waiting for a permission to do so, as in optimistic transactions. If the monitor 
subsequently decides that this action is undesirable it can send a signal to the 
system to abort the action.  
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2.2.2.1 Formalisation of Properties for Dynamic Verification  
2.2.2.1.1 General Purpose Systems  
In most of cases, the formal specification of the requirements that are to be dynamically 
verified is based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [129] and variations of it including 
past and future time LTL (ptLTL and ftLTL respectively). Past and future time Linear 
Temporal Logics are modal logics for specifying properties of concurrent reactive 
systems and are used for analysing traces of execution of such systems. ptLTL provides 
temporal operators that refer to the past states of an execution trace, while ftLTL provides 
temporal operators that refer to the future/remaining part of an execution trace. In 
particular, the Temporal Rover (TR) tool [57] supports a future and past time Metric 
Temporal Logic (MTL). MTL [32] extends LTL with relative time and real time 
constraints. All four LTL future time operators can be constrained by relative time and 
real time constraints specifying the duration of the temporal operator. MTL constraints 
can specify lower bounds, upper bounds, and ranges for relative time and real time 
constraints.  
In the context of monitoring oriented programming (MoP), any monitoring formalism 
can be added to the system. ptLTL, ftLTL and extended regular expressions (ERE), 
which can express patterns in strings in a compact way [145], have been used to 
formalise properties to be monitored [34]. The proposed algorithms use binary transition 
tree finite state machines (BTT-FSMs) to monitor ftLTL properties [34], as well as, 
formulas written in a logic based on EREs [145]. 
Havelund et al. [72, 73, 74] have developed several algorithms, which are relative to 
temporal logic generation and monitoring. For instance, they propose algorithms for past 
time logic generation by using dynamic programming [74]. Also they have used the 
MAUDE rewriting engine [37], for monitoring future time logic [72, 73] and have 
proposed algorithms that generate Büchi automata adapted to finite trace LTL [64].  
Other logics/languages used for formalising properties are EAGLE [20] and HAWK 
[47]. EAGLE is a ruled-based language, which essentially extends the µ-calculus with 
data parameterization and past time logic. HAWK can be viewed as a specialization of 
EAGLE for JAVA, as it supports data binding and object reasoning. HAWK further 
extends EAGLE with event expressions, where events are restricted to method calls and 
returns. The integration of programming and logic as well as the notation and semantics 
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of event expressions are similar to those used in modal logics like the π-calculus. HAWK 
also supports extended regular expressions.  
According to the concept of Design by Contract (DBC) technique, introduced by 
Meyer [112] as a built-in feature of the Eiffel programming language, specifications of 
pre-conditions and post-conditions can be associated with a class in the form of assertions 
and invariants and subsequently be compiled into runtime checks. Jass [115] and 
jContractor [1] are two Java-based DBC systems. Jass is a pre-compiler, which turns the 
assertion comments into Java code. The JASS sub-language for specifying trace-
assertions is similar to CSP [78], and its syntax is more like a programming language. 
jContractor is implemented as a Java library which allows programmers to associate 
contracts, consisting of pre/post-conditions and invariants, with any Java class or 
interface.  
The Monitoring and Checking (MaC) framework [102] is based on a logic that 
combines a form of past time LTL and models real-time via explicit clock variables. 
JAVA MAC [93], a prototype implementation of the MaC framework for monitoring and 
controlling applications written in Java, defines an event-based language to describe 
monitors. Note that, in the context of the Java MaC framework, events refer to 
information that holds instantly during the system runtime, while conditions are defined 
to illustrate information that holds for a time period. The Java MaC framework is 
composed of two specification event-based languages: the Primitive Event Definition 
Language (PEDL) and the Meta Event Definition Language (MEDL). PEDL is used for 
writing low-level specifications and is tightly related to the programming language. As 
such it deals with primitive events and conditions that might occur during the program 
execution, which are defined using program entities such as variables and methods. The 
operations on events and conditions can be used to construct more complex events and 
conditions from the primitive ones. A MEDL specification then makes use of these 
primitive events and conditions in order to state high-level requirements. Using MEDL, a 
user can specify the correctness requirements declaratively, without worrying about 
operational issues related to the monitor. The MaC framework also supports the 
declaration of variables of primitive types which can be updated by user-defined 
assignment statements upon arrival of new events. These variables can be referred to in 
formulas.  
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Mahbub and Spanoudakis [109] have developed a framework for monitoring the 
behaviour of service centric systems which expresses the requirements to be verified 
against this behaviour in event calculus [149]. In this framework, event calculus is used 
to specify formulas describing behavioural and quality properties of service centric 
systems, which are either extracted automatically from the coordination process of such 
systems (this process is expressed in WS-BPEL) or are provided by the user.  
In the area of component based programming Barnett and Schulte [19] have proposed 
a framework which uses executable interface specifications and a monitor to check for 
behavioural equivalence between a component and its interface specification. In this 
framework, there is no need for recompiling, re-linking, or any sort of invasive 
instrumentation at all, due to the fact that a proxy module is used for event emission. The 
component’s interface specifications are written in the Abstract State Machine Language 
(AsmL) [70], which is based on Abstract State Machines (ASM) [69]. This language is 
executable and supports non-deterministic specifications. Having native COM 
connectivity, one can not only specify and simulate components in AsmL but also 
substitute low-level implementations by high-level specifications. Specifications written 
in AsmL are operational specifications of the behaviour expected of any implementation. 
They provide a minimal model by constraining implementations as little as possible.  
Robinson [137] has proposed a framework for requirements monitoring based on code 
instrumentation in which the high-level requirements to be monitored are expressed in 
KAOS. KAOS [48] is a framework for goal oriented requirements specification which is 
based on temporal logic. The KAOS modelling language can support all the phases of 
requirements acquisition and modelling, starting from initial functional and non-
functional goals, formalising the meaning of such goals using temporal logic formulas 
and assigning the responsibility for the achievement of these goals to potential agents 
which may signify the system in question, systems that interoperate with it, and human 
actors interacting with the system. KAOS has also been used by Feather et al [61] in a 
framework that they have developed to monitor system requirements at runtime and 
which incorporates some capabilities regarding the reconciliation of requirements with 
the runtime system behaviour. 
In the context of software system monitoring, diagnosis focuses on the detection of 
system failures. Diagnosis typically involves the identification of trajectories of system 
observations, which have led to a failure. By using automata that recognise faulty 
  
 28 
behaviour [22, 66, 128, 139, 161], diagnosis is carried through the synchronisation of 
automata modelling the expected behaviour of a monitored system and the events 
captured from it. Pencolé and Cordier [128] propose a similar but decentralised approach 
where synchronization is performed for individual system components and then 
aggregated for the global system.  
The problem of fault diagnosis, concerning time, has been studied and analysed by 
Tripakis [161] and Bouyer et al. [22], where the system is modelled as a timed 
automaton. Timed automata extend the finite state machine model with real time clocks 
[4]. In both [22] and [161], the goal is the devising of algorithms (diagnosers) that would 
function as efficient online fault detectors of internal faults for any given sequence of 
observable events generated by the system. Tripakis has worked on the diagnosability of 
a timed system (plant). In particular, Tripakis has shown that the problem of checking 
whether a given timed system is diagnosable or not is a decidable problem and a 
diagnoser can be constructed as an online algorithm in case that the system is indeed 
diagnosable. The ∆-diagnosability diagnosis algorithm proposed by Tripakis is based on 
state estimation in order to decide whether a fault has occurred and report the fault at 
most ∆ time units after its occurrence, for a given set of observations. In particular, the ∆-
diagnosability algorithm keeps track of several possible control states and time ranges 
(zones) that the clock values can be in. The ∆-diagnosability problem for timed automata 
is PSPACE-complete. The complexity to diagnose faults from an observation is doubly 
exponential with respect to the final states of the system and to the size of the 
observations. 
Due to the high complexity of the ∆-diagnosability algorithm by Tripakis [161], 
Bouyer et al. [22] describe a diagnoser, with lower complexity, more appropriate for 
online diagnosis. Bouyer et al. suggest two deterministic timed automata for realizing an 
efficient online diagnoser. On one hand, Bouyer et al. consider general deterministic 
timed automata (DTA) for realizing efficient online diagnosers. Bouyer et al. have proved 
that the problem of checking whether there is a realizable DTA diagnoser for a given 
timed system, provided that the number of clocks and the set of constants are well 
defined and available to the diagnoser, is a decidable problem and is 2EXPTIME-
complete. On the other hand, Bouyer et al. study the fault diagnosis problem considering 
a subclass of DTAs called Event Recording Automata (ERA) [4]. In the context of ERA, 
there is an implicit clock attached to each action. The problem of checking whether there 
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is a diagnoser realizable as an ERA, provided that the number of clocks and the set of 
constants are well defined and available to the diagnoser, is decidable and PSPACE-
complete.  
In [128], a decentralised model-based approach for diagnosing discrete event systems 
has been proposed. In particular, the proposed formal framework is based on 
communicating automata for computing online diagnosis of large discrete event systems. 
According to the authors, the diagnosis is defined as the identification of failure events 
and their propagations, which can explain the system observations. The system 
observations are split into temporal windows. For each temporal window, diagnosis 
(subsystem diagnosis) is performed for each well defined subsystem of the system. The 
subsystem diagnoses are, then, merged to build the overall diagnosis for the system 
(global diagnosis). Each subsystem is modelled as a communicating finite state machine. 
The explicit behaviour of each subsystem can be computed by using a synchronization 
operation, which is based on a transition system product [9] and applied to the component 
models of the subsystem. 
2.2.2.1.2 Security Oriented Systems  
Some of the logics and languages reviewed in the previous section have also been used 
either as they were initially proposed or with some semantic modifications and extensions 
for the formalisation of security properties. Naldurg et al [117], for instance, have 
proposed a framework for intrusion detection which takes advantage of the capabilities of 
the EAGLE language for specifying the attack-safe behaviour of a system. EAGLE is 
suitable for expressing temporal patterns that involve reasoning about the data values 
observed in individual events and thus it allows the description of attacks whose 
signatures appear to have statistical properties, e.g., password guessing or denial of 
service attacks. For such attacks there is no clear distinction between an intrusion and a 
normal behaviour and the detection of intrusions involves collecting statistics during 
runtime and using them to evaluate the probability of the occurrence of an attack.  
In the area of intrusion detection (see [99] for a survey), Ko et al [95] have proposed a 
specification-based approach, which uses dynamic verification techniques to detect 
exploitations of vulnerabilities in security-critical programs. According to this 
framework, one has to specify a trace policy which describes the intended behaviour of 
programs with regards to security properties. A trace policy determines security-valid 
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operation sequences of the execution of one or more programs. For specifying such trace 
policies, Ko et al. [95] have developed a grammar, called "parallel environment grammar 
(PE-grammar)" whose alphabet consists of system operations. A PE-grammar can 
express various classes of security trace policies, including behaviour related to access to 
system objects, synchronization, and operation sequencing and race conditions in 
concurrent or distributed programs.  
Schneider [143] has developed a system called Execution Monitoring (EM) which can 
monitor violations of security policies by monitoring the execution steps of a system. 
This system is based on the security automata of Alpern and Schneider [3], which are a 
special type of Büchi automata. EM also incorporates mechanisms that can terminate the 
system execution if it is about to violate its security policy. Following the same automata-
based formalism, Ligatti et al [104] extended the control capabilities of security automata 
by proposing edit automata, which can remove and add letters (i.e., system actions) to the 
words (i.e. execution traces) they recognise.  
Having proposed a security-policy enforcing model which follows the general 
dynamic verification approach, Bandara et al. [15] have specified a language based on 
Event Calculus to model the system behaviour and write security policy specifications. 
The form of EC, which is used in this work, was presented in [138] and consists of: (i) a 
set of time points (that can be mapped to the non-negative integers), (ii) a set of 
properties that can vary over the lifetime of the system (fluents), and (iii) a set of event 
types. System operations and domain-independent rules for policy enforcement were 
specified in this approach using these constructs. According to Bandara et al. [15], one 
can use EC to express system-models containing a combination of authorisation, 
obligation and refrain policies.  
Janicke et al [82] have proposed a security model that allows expressing dynamic 
access control policies, which can be either time or event-driven. A system’s overall 
security policy can then be composed out of smaller policies which capture specific 
requirements and which can be verified individually. The advantage of the access control 
model used in this work is that it allows expressing both parallel and sequential 
composition. Janicke et al. [82] based their security model on Interval Temporal Logic 
(ITL), a flexible notation for both propositional and first order reasoning about intervals 
of time. ITL allows expressing properties for safety, liveness and timeliness. The policy 
model of Janicke et al. [82] provides a wide range of operators, for example to allow the 
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dynamic addition/deletion of rules or to select different sub-policies based on to the 
occurrence of an event or a time-out. An important reason of choosing ITL was the 
availability of an executable subset of the logic, known as Tempura [116]. The use of 
ITL, together with its subset of Tempura, offers the benefits of traditional proof methods 
with the speed and convenience of computer-based testing through execution and 
simulation.  
Brisset [24] has worked on establishing and ensuring the correct operation of a Java 
platform security mechanism for runtime authorization of not trusted applications in 
remote hosts. The resulting Java security mechanism, which is called SecurityManager 
and belongs to the JAVA runtime library, essentially embodies the security policy of the 
virtual machine. The verification technique used a CTL-based language, which extends 
CTL with JVM-specific atomic propositions. Thus, JVM-specific atomic formulas can be 
used for runtime authorization of not trusted applications. In order to verify an 
application against these formulas its byte-code is translated into pre/post-condition 
generators for CTL formulas on-the-fly.  
Sekar et al. [144] presented an approach called model-carrying code (MCC) for 
mobile code security. The main components of MCC are: (a) a policy language for 
specifying security policies and a compiler for this language, (b) a language for 
specifying program behaviour models and techniques for extracting them, and (c) a 
policy refinement component which is based on model-checking techniques. Their 
language for policies and behaviour models is called Behaviour Monitoring Specification 
Language (BMSL) and it is compiled into extended finite state automata (EFSA). EFSA 
are standard finite state automata (FSA) augmented with the ability to store values in a 
fixed number of state variables. These state variables are capable of storing values over 
both finite and infinite domains. The state of the EFSA is then characterized by its control 
state (which has the same meaning as the notion of state in the case of FSA), plus the 
values of these state variables. Each transition in the EFSA is associated with an event, an 
enabling condition involving the event arguments and state variables, and a set of 
assignments to state variables. For a transition to be taken, the associated event must 
occur and the enabling condition must hold. The assignments associated with the 
transition are performed when the transition is taken. In usual behavioural models the 
event alphabet of the EFSA consists of system-call names. On the other hand, security 
policies need to refer to particular uses of such system calls and be able to examine their 
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respective arguments. These uses, for instance “read(sensitive_file)”, augment the 
alphabet of EFSA with parameters to the initial system call names event alphabet. The 
resulting language is therefore able to distinguish the difference between the opening of a 
temporary file and the opening of a password file. Moreover, EFSA can also represent 
properties that refer to the arguments to system calls in the past, e.g. a program opens a 
file, whose name was given as an argument in the command line in the past.  
For thoroughness we shall also mention certain higher-level languages and 
frameworks, which have been proposed for security requirements and policies. The 
KAOS framework, which we have already examined in the previous section on general-
purpose formalisms, has been extended for modelling, specifying and analysing security 
requirements [166] by including the classical security concepts:  
• Adversaries/attackers which are the malicious agents in the environment,  
• Threats which are obstacles (anti-goals) intentionally set up by adversaries, and 
• Assets, which must be protected against threats, are illustrated as passive or active 
objects.  
The Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Privacy, Authentication and Non-
repudiation requirements are sub-classes of the meta-class SecurityGoal in KAOS. 
Finally, the formal first-order, real-time, linear temporal logic of KAOS has been 
augmented with epistemic operators (Knows, Belief), which are needed in security-
related properties (e.g. Authorized, UnderControl, Integrity or Using predicates).  
Damianou et al. [46] have defined a declarative, object-oriented language, called 
Ponder, to specify security policies which can be monitored and applied at runtime. 
Ponder can be used to specify security policies regarding role-based access control to 
system resources, and general-purpose system management policies. Security policies are 
distinguished by Damianou et al. [46] in authorisation, obligation, refrain and delegation 
policies. Authorisation policies specify whether a subject is permitted to perform a 
particular action on a target; obligation policies specify management operations that must 
be performed when a particular event occurs and some supplementary guarding 
conditions are true; refrain policies allow system administrators to specify conditions 
under which certain operations should not be performed; and delegation policies specify 
which actions subjects are allowed to delegate to others. Ponder has been designed with 
the intention to be an extensible security policy specification language that would be able 
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to cater for future types of policies and, rather than assuming a particular implementation 
platform, it could map to, and co-exist with, different underlying platforms.  
In Service Oriented Computing, Baresi and Guinea [16] have proposed a framework 
for runtime monitoring of WS-BPEL processes. Monitoring rules are weaved at runtime 
into the process they must monitor and a proxy module supports their dynamic selection 
and execution [18]. Finally, they proposed a user-oriented language to integrate data 
acquisition and analysis into monitoring rules. Their monitoring rules define runtime 
constraints on WS-BPEL process executions and are expressed using the WSCoL 
language (Web Service Constraint Language). This development of this language has 
been inspired by the Java Modelling Language (JML) of Leavens, Baker and Ruby [100]. 
WS-CoL is a domain-independent policy assertion language for specifying user 
requirements (constraints) on the execution of Web services, which can be used within 
the framework of WS-Policy [142] and WS-Security [88]. WS-CoL is an assertion 
language augmented with features for allowing one to retrieve information that originates 
outside the process. It distinguishes between data collection and data analysis to 
differentiate the phase in which information is collected (data collection), from the phase 
in which this data is analysed (data analysis). Data can be collected from the process 
directly (e.g., values of internal variable) but they can also come from external sources 
(e.g., exchanged SOAP messages). An example of a monitoring rule in this language 
could specify that all exchanged messages must be encrypted using the 3DES encryption 
algorithm. 
2.2.2.1.3 Summary of specification languages for security and other system 
properties for dynamic verification  
Table 2-1 gives a summary of various formal notations which have been used by different 
dynamic verification methods to express the properties to be verified and other functional 
and non functional characteristics of the systems and identifies languages and notations 
that have been specifically developed for expressing and verifying security properties.  
As shown in the table most of the approaches deploy languages which are based on 
some form of temporal logic as these languages provide the necessary operators for 
expressing conditions about the temporal ordering and boundaries of occurrence of 
events which is required for the expression of most of the properties that need to be 
verified at runtime. The most popular formal notation for expressing security properties is 
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Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) or extensions of it and languages with similar expressive 
power such as Event Calculus. 
Table 2-1 - Summary of formal languages used for dynamic verification 
Languages for expressing security 
properties for dynamic verification 
Languages for expressing all types of  
properties for dynamic verification 
Behaviour Monitoring Specification 
Language (BMSL) and Extended finite 
state automata (EFSA) EAGLE and HAWK 
EAGLE CSP – like specification 
PE Grammar LTL and its extensions 
ITL PEDL and MEDL 
CTL (extended) AsmL 
 Security automata Event Calculus 
 Ponder Ponder 
 KAOS KAOS 
 Event Calculus EC-Assertion 
Some dynamic verification techniques reason about systems at both low and high level of 
abstraction, such as Primitive Event Definition Language (PEDL) and Meta Event 
Definition Language (MEDL) in Java Monitoring and Checking (JavaMaC) framework 
[102]. PEDL is used for writing low-level specifications and is tightly related to the 
programming language, while MEDL specification makes use of primitive events and 
conditions in order to state high-level requirements. 
2.2.2.2 Methods for Capturing Events  
In the second stage of the general dynamic verification process, the goal is to apply 
techniques so as to capture the real behaviour of the system during its execution.  
As shown in Figure 2-3, existing event emission methods can be divided into code 
modifying and non code modifying ones. Code modifying event emission methods require 
direct access to the source or binary code of a system in order to insert code statements 
that will generate the events of interest. Code instrumentation is an example of a code 
modifying event emission method in which event generation statements are inserted 
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manually into the code of a system. Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) has also been 
used to generate events (through the weaving of aspects into binary or source system 
code). AOP is a code modifying event emission method, which can be considered as a 
subcategory of code instrumentation. Monitoring Oriented Programming [34] and Design 
by Contract [112] are also code modifying event emission methods which can be 
regarded as subcategories of Aspect Oriented Programming [90].  
Non code modifying event emission methods generate events without altering the code 
of a system. Such methods access, modify and/or take advantage of capabilities of the 
general computational environment in which a system is executed, in order to generate 
the events flow. Reflective middleware approaches [30, 31, 110], proxy-based 
architectures [19] and the use of application programming interfaces (APIs) [12, 26, 109] 
constitute examples of event emission methods which belong to this category. 
 
Figure 2-3 – Taxonomy of Event Emission Methods 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Code-Modifying Event Capture Methods  
2.2.2.2.1.1 Code Instrumentation  
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The technique of code instrumentation can be described [137] as the insertion of 
statements into the system’s code (source or binary code) for monitoring purposes. 
Instrumentation can be done manually or automatically e.g. by using Jtrek-JSpy [65] or 
Joie [39] which automatically instrument Java byte code. During the execution of the 
instrumented code, an event stream is generated. The generated events can then be passed 
directly to external monitors or pre-processed before they reach the verification stage.  
A tool using code instrumentation for capturing events in Java-based systems is 
RMon [137]. In Rmon, requirements are initially expressed in the KAOS framework 
[48], which provides a goal-oriented formal specification language based on temporal 
logic. Requirements are thus specified as high level goals which must be achieved by the 
system. These goals must then be mapped onto low-level events which can be monitored 
at runtime. The system’s code is then instrumented in order to capture these low level 
events, using the Joie framework [39].  
In the initial phase of the Java MaC architecture [93], low-level specifications (written 
in PEDL) are inserted into the byte code of the monitored program through an automatic 
instrumentation procedure. Furthermore, in the MONID tool [117] system-level events 
are generated by appropriately instrumented source code. 
2.2.2.2.1.2 Aspect Oriented Programming 
Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) [90], also called Aspect Oriented Software 
Development (AOSD), was proposed to support the advanced identification, illustration 
and separation of non-functional concerns, which crosscut the system’s main 
functionality. Complex programs include various crosscutting concerns (properties of 
interest such as QoS, energy consumption, fault tolerance, and security). While object-
oriented programming abstracts out commonalities among classes in an inheritance tree, 
crosscutting concerns are scattered among different classes, complicating the 
development and maintenance of applications. As depicted in Figure 2-4, AOP enables 
the separation of crosscutting concerns during the development of the software. 
Specifically, the code implementing crosscutting concerns of the system, called aspects, 
is developed separately from other parts of the system. In AOP, locations in the program 
where aspect code can be woven, called pointcuts, are typically identified during 
development. Later, for example during compilation, an aspect weaver can be used to 
weave different aspects of the program together so as to form a program with new 
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behaviour. AOP proponents argue that disentangling crosscutting concerns leads to 
simpler development, maintenance, and evolution of software [90]. Examples of AOP 
approaches include AspectJ [91] and Hyper/J [159]. 
 
Figure 2-4 – Conceptual Representation of Aspect Weaving [90] 
AOP supports dynamic re-composition in three major ways. First, most adaptations 
are relative to some crosscutting concern, such as quality-of-service or fault tolerance. 
AOP enables the code associated with these aspects to be written and managed 
independently of the application code as well as other parts of the system, such as 
traditional middleware platforms. Such a separation is needed in order to dynamically 
replace one instantiation of a particular solution for a concern with another. Second, 
although compile-time aspect weaving produces a tangled executable that cannot easily 
be reconfigured, delaying the weaving process until runtime provides a systematic way to 
realize dynamic re-composition [77, 169]. Finally, if adaptability itself is considered as a 
“generic” aspect [49, 170], then runtime weaving can be used to enhance the program 
with adaptive behaviour, not necessarily anticipated during the original development (e.g. 
to tolerate newly discovered faults or to detect and respond to new security attacks). This 
kind of upgrading is especially important in situations where the application is required to 
run continuously and cannot be easily halted for upgrade. However, the need of a formal 
aspect specification written in a domain-specific knowledge language or using logic, 
rather than the host programming language itself, is expressed in [34]. The mapping from 
specification to implementation, with the support of automatic code generation can then 
be formally verified.  
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In particular, AspectJ [91] provides an approach to implementing cross-cutting 
features in Java. AspectJ provides a pattern mechanism, called pointcuts, for capturing 
groups of events, called joinpoints, that may occur during a program’s operation (such as 
method calls/receptions, constructor calls, field accesses, and exception events). The 
pattern matching mechanism includes regular expression matching, with wild-carding 
over fragments of method names, argument names, types etc. Extra code, called advices, 
can be associated with pointcuts, and is inserted by the AspectJ compiler into the join-
points. Advices can inspect and modify data that are available at joinpoint events (e.g. 
method-call arguments and return values), and can create new data dynamically that is 
only shared with other advice.  
For instance, Dingwall-Smith and Finkelstein [56] have developed an aspect oriented 
approach, in which system providers specify instrumentation code in separate classes, 
and define composition rules which determine how this code is to be merged with the 
application code, by using Hyper/J [159]. Also, Baresi and Guinea [17] have proposed a 
framework for runtime monitoring of WS-BPEL processes, in which monitoring rules are 
specified and weaved dynamically into the process they belong to. Furthermore, the 
instrumentation module of the JpaX framework performs a script-driven automated 
instrumentation of the program to be verified. JSpy [65] is the automated AOP 
environment package, which is used in JPaX [72, 75]. 
2.2.2.2.1.3 Design by Contract 
Design by Contract (DBC), as proposed by Meyer [112] for the object-oriented language 
Eiffel, is a practical approach to runtime checking in applications. DBC is a lightweight 
formal technique, which allows one to add semantic information to a program by 
specifying assertions regarding the program's runtime state. Then, checks for 
specification violations are carried out at runtime. Such a technique stresses the 
importance of explicitly specifying the constraints that hold before (pre-conditions) and 
after a program is executed (post-conditions). The technique’s name refers to a contract, 
which is made between the client and the supplier of a system module and defines 
conditions before and after the execution of the module. Thus, for monitoring reasons the 
entry and exit points of the module become the events that we want to observe. 
In the context of the Eiffel object-oriented language, specifications of pre/post-
conditions can be associated with a class in the form of assertions and invariants. 
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Subsequently, inserted specifications can be compiled into monitoring code. In the Java 
language, there are two approaches which are based on DBC. Jass [21] is a pre-compiler 
which turns the assertion comments into Java code. Properties in Jass are called trace 
assertions and they specify permissible sequences of method calls in a CSP-like notation. 
Thus, processes, parallelism, conditionals and data exchange among processes can also 
be expressed. However, the trace assertions are interpreted loosely; no formal semantics 
is provided. The Jass pre-compiler translates the trace assertions into runtime checks. 
2.2.2.2.1.4 Monitoring Oriented Programming 
Monitoring Oriented Programming (MoP) is a paradigm which combines a formal 
specification with an implementation in order to form a system. In particular, it provides 
a light-weight formal method for runtime specification checks against the behaviour of 
the implementation. By using MoP, logical statements can be inserted anywhere in the 
program. These statements are simply Boolean expressions which can refer to past and 
future states of the program. A MoP user can insert such statements for different reasons 
e.g. to guide the system’s execution, terminate the program or throw exceptions. Thus, 
MoP can increase the dependability of a system by monitoring its requirements at 
runtime and controlling it at the same time.  
In particular, the statements, which can be inserted as annotations into the code, can 
be divided into three parts. The first part consists of a keyword defining the logic in 
which the rest of the inserted statements are expressed in. The second part comprises the 
definitions of the predicates and the formula to be monitored. Finally, user defined code 
which will be executed in case the monitored formula is violated is included in the third 
part, called a violation handler.  
The general MoP paradigm is language and specification formalism independent. 
According to Chen and Rosu [34], a MoP environment should provide the capability of 
adding any logic framework on top of any target programming language via logic plug-
ins, which can be publicly accessed. A logic plug-in consists of two modules, namely the 
logic engine and the target language shell. Logic engines translate formulae into 
monitors, encoded in an abstract representation (pseudocode). Then the language shell 
transforms the monitor pseudocode into the target language code. Thus, the logic plug-in 
can be considered as the code generator of the monitor.  
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Moreover, a MoP environment allows users to specify whether the monitoring code 
will be executed using the resources of the monitored program (internal monitor) or 
within a different process (external monitor). In the first case, the inserted logic 
statements contain the monitor’s specifications which are replaced by the generated 
monitoring code in the end. Note that internal monitors, in general, cannot check for 
program deadlocks and unexpected terminations. In case that a monitor is executed as a 
different process, the inserted statements are replaced by instrumentation code which 
operates as an event generator. The user can specify whether the monitor should be 
executed synchronously or asynchronously with the monitored system and whether it 
should be executed on the same machine with the system or a different one. 
2.2.2.2.2 Non Code Modifying Event Capture Methods 
2.2.2.2.2.1 Reflective Middleware 
Middleware technologies [58] have been designed to support the development of 
distributed systems. Their success has been mainly due to their ability of making 
distribution transparent to both users and software engineers, so that systems appear as 
single integrated computing facilities. However, hiding the implementation details from 
the application completely is very difficult in a mobile setting and not even always 
desirable, since mobile systems need to quickly detect and adapt to changes in their 
environment. A new form of awareness is needed to allow application designers to 
inspect the execution context and adapt the behaviour of the middleware accordingly.  
Reflection and metadata can be successfully exploited to develop middleware targeted 
to mobile settings. By using metadata, we separate the middleware in two parts: what the 
middleware does and how the middleware does it. Reflection allows applications to 
inspect and adapt their metadata. In this way, applications can influence the way their 
middleware behaves, according to their current context of execution.  
Capra, Emmerich and Mascolo [31] proposed a framework designed to ease the 
adaptation of applications to changing execution conditions. The model considers 
different layers (operating system, middleware, application, and user), each of which is 
described using metadata in order to ease their interaction. When the application invokes 
a service, the middleware uses both the application metadata and the metadata reflecting 
the current execution conditions to decide how to offer the requested service. 
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Applications can also ask the middleware to be notified when specific execution 
conditions occur. This system allows for a fine adaptation of applications, but it requires 
that service calls be coded explicitly in the applications. However, a complete 
transparency is not possible if adaptation (which requires awareness) is desired.  
CARISMA [31] is a context-awareness based reflective middleware. It includes a 
reflective API, which allows applications to dynamically inspect their current 
configuration and alter it to best suit the current environment. CARISMA maintains a 
representation of the execution context by interacting with the underlying network 
operating system. Based upon this representation, the application may behave in different 
ways. For example, an application attempting to send messages in low bandwidth 
availability may compress messages before emitting them, whereas it would send them 
uncompressed when bandwidth availability is high. The behaviour of the middleware 
with respect to the application is referred to as an application profile. There are two main 
aspects of an application profile, services and policies. Services describe the services 
offered to the application and which the middleware can customize. Policies describe the 
different variations in which the services can be delivered. In the prior example, the 
service the application is using is sending messages, and the different policies to deliver 
the service are sending either compressed or uncompressed messages based upon the 
context environment (high or low bandwidth). In CARISMA, each time a service is 
invoked, the middleware examines the application profile. Based upon the context of the 
application, the middleware determines which policy is best suited for the current 
context. This relieves the application of the burden of determining how to optimise its 
own behaviour. 
XMIDDLE [110] is a middleware for mobile computing that focuses on the 
synchronization of replicated XML documents. In order to enable application-driven 
conflict detection and resolution, XMIDDLE supports the specification of conflict 
resolution policies through meta-data definitions using an XML schema.  
2.2.2.2.2.2 Proxy Architecture 
A proxy module acts as an intermediate between the monitored system and its 
environment, capturing their interaction and emitting the corresponding events. Thus, 
there is no need for code recompiling, re-linking or any other sort of invasive 
instrumentation at all. 
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Figure 2-5 – A client-server architecture [19] 
For component based programming, Barnett and Schulte [19] have proposed a 
framework which uses executable interface specifications and a monitor to check for 
behavioural equivalence between a component and its interface specification. Let us 
assume that a client–server architecture is used, like the one illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
 
Figure 2-6 – Proxy architecture [19] 
A component, P, which essentially operates as a proxy, is inserted between the client 
C and the server S as shown in Figure 2-6. Using a proxy allows the interaction of the 
client C and the server S to be observed without having to modify either component. P 
can be created automatically from the definition of the interfaces, which C and S use in 
order to interact. The proxy forks all of the calls made from C to S so that they are 
delivered to both S and the (AsmL specification based) model, M, managing the 
concurrent execution of M and S. Then P compares the results from components M and 
S. P checks at each interface whether the results agree in terms of their success/failure 
codes as well as any return values. As long as, the results are the same, they are sent to C. 
In any other case, S and M are deemed not to be behaviourally equivalent. 
2.2.2.2.2.3 API-based Event Capturing 
In the last non code modifying event emission subcategory, one finds approaches which 
make use of specific APIs for capturing and emitting events.  
For instance, the JNuke tool takes advantage of its virtual machine’s (VM) specific 
API in order to observe the runtime behaviour of the monitored system. In particular, the 
event-based runtime verification API of JNuke’s VM serves as a platform for various 
runtime algorithms. This API provides access to events occurring during program 
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execution. Event listeners can then query the VM for detailed data about its internal state 
and thus implement any runtime verification algorithm, including detection of high-level 
data races [10] or stale-value errors [11] (see Section 2.2.2.4.7 for more details).  
In the same family of event capturing methods is the prototype implementation of the 
specification based intrusion detection system, proposed by Ko et al. [95], which takes 
advantage of audit trails provided by the operating system. The prototype runs under the 
Solaris 2.4 operating system and uses the auditing services of the Sun BSM audit 
subsystem. The BSM audit subsystem provides a log of the activities that occur in the 
system. A BSM audit record contains information such as the process ID and the user ID 
of the process involved, as well as, the path name and the permission mode of the files 
being accessed. However, it does not contain information about the program the process 
is running. Therefore, an audit record pre-processor is used to associate the program 
identification with each audit record. The audit record pre-processor actually filters audit 
records that are irrelevant to the monitoring system and translates the BSM audit records 
into the format required by the monitoring system. 
2.2.2.3 Checking for violations 
The third stage of dynamic verification is concerned with the checks that a monitor 
carries out to identify whether the runtime behaviour of a system conforms to certain 
properties. According to the taxonomy of Figure 2-2, the monitors with the most 
advanced capabilities are the "OC−pre−S" monitors. This category describes monitors, 
which verify the system’s correct behaviour based on events describing the system’s state 
before the execution of some action. The check is carried out while the system is halted, 
waiting for the monitor’s reply. Once the monitor assures that the monitored properties 
hold, it allows the system to continue with its normal execution. If however a violation is 
reported, the monitor can force the system to execute some other action so as to remedy 
the current violation. 
2.2.2.3.1 Checks for Admission 
A widely used type of runtime checks is the check for admission. In this check a 
monitor checks an incoming request/application for admission, before actually 
honouring/executing it. In the following we shall examine some of the solutions for 
performing admission checks. 
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2.2.2.3.1.1 Signed Code 
Another technique for protecting a system, which is allowed to host mobile code, is by 
signing code with a digital signature. Using digital signatures, one can confirm the 
authenticity of the code, its origin, and its integrity. Typically the code signer is either the 
code producer or a trusted entity that has reviewed the code. Especially in mobile agents 
systems, where an agent can operate on behalf of an end-user or organization [158], the 
signature of an agent is used as an indication of the authority under which the agent 
operates.  
Code signing is tightly bound with public key cryptography, which relies on a pair of 
keys (private and public) associated with an entity. One key is kept private by the entity 
and the other is made publicly available. Digital signatures benefit greatly from the 
existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI), since certificates containing the identity of 
an entity and its public key (i.e., a public key certificate) can be readily located and 
verified. The code signer applies an irreversible hash function to the code. The result of 
this function is a unique message digest of the code, which the code producer encrypts 
with his private key, thus forming a digital signature of the code. Because the message 
digest is unique, and thus bound to the code, the resulting signature also serves as an 
integrity protection against any malicious code modifications. The produced signature 
and the public key certificate can then be sent along with the code to the code consumer. 
The code consumer can easily verify the source and authenticity of the code by using the 
same hash function and the appropriate decrypting mechanism, which the code producer 
used to sign the code. If the signature verification succeeds, the code consumer can 
execute the code.  
Note that the meaning of a signature may be different depending on the policy 
associated with the signature scheme and the party who signs. For example, the code 
producer, either an individual or an organization, may use a digital signature to indicate 
who produced the code, but not to guarantee that the code will be executed without faults.  
Microsoft's Authenticode [67], enables Java applets or Active X controls to be signed, 
ensuring consumers that the software has not been tampered with and that the identity of 
the code producer is verified. Moreover, JDK 1.1 introduced the capability to digitally 
sign Java byte code (at least byte code files placed in a Java archive, called a JAR file), 
which expanded more with Java 2 [111]. From a certificate authority perspective, 
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VeriSign provided a solution which addressed signed code issues for specific Netscape 
objects [167]. 
2.2.2.3.1.2 Proof Carrying Code 
Proof Carrying Code (PCC) [118] can be used to increase security in systems executing 
not-trusted, mobile code. With PCC, a program is supplied along with a proof of its 
correctness and this proof is in a form which can be easily verified mechanically before 
the program’s execution. Therefore, it is now the code producer’s responsibility to 
formally prove that the program will assure the safety properties specified by the code 
consumer, honouring the security policy of the underlying platform/system. Then, both 
the code and its proof are sent to the code consumer, where the safety properties are 
verified. A safety predicate is also generated directly from the native code to ensure that 
the accompanying proof does in fact correspond to the code sent. Once verified, the code 
can execute without any further checking. Any attempts to tamper with either the code or 
the safety proof result in a verification error.  
The PCC binary life-cycle includes three stages:  
• Certification: During this stage, the code producer compiles and generates a proof 
for the code, proving that the source program adheres to the safety policy of the 
code consumer. The proof can be produced by theorem proving.  
• Verification: This stage is performed in the code consumer side. The code 
consumer verifies the proof part of the PCC binary code. The verification is 
performed by a simple algorithm, which is trusted by the consumer.  
• Execution: The code consumer can execute the code without any further run-time 
checks.  
For expressing safety policies Necula [118] has used first-order predicate logic, 
extended with predicates for type-safety and memory-safety. The not-trusted code is in 
the form of machine code. For relating machine code to specifications they used a form 
of Floyd's verification-condition generator. Such a generator extracts the safety properties 
of a machine code program as a predicate in first-order logic. This predicate must then be 
proved by the code producer using axioms and inference rules supplied by the code 
consumer as part of the safety policy. For generating the safety proof, a theorem prover 
can be used, in the code producer’s side.  
  
 46 
Proof encoding can adequately be expressed using the Edinburgh Logical Framework 
(LF). LF is general and can easily encode a wide variety of logics, including higher-order 
logics. Another compact representation of proofs is a form of oracles, which guide a 
simple non-deterministic theorem prover in verifying the existence of the proof. For 
validating proofs encoded in LF, an LF type checker can be used. A non-deterministic 
logic interpreter can be used in the case that a proof is encoded as an oracle.  
Initial research has demonstrated the applicability of PCC for fine-grained memory 
safety and shown the potential of it for other types of safety policies, such as controlling 
resource use.  
PCC is based on principles from logic, type theory, and formal verification. There are, 
however, some potentially difficult problems to be solved before the approach is 
considered practical. These include a standard formalism for describing security policies, 
automated assistance for the generation of proofs and techniques for limiting the 
potentially large size of proofs that in theory can arise. In addition, the technique is tied to 
the hardware and operating environment of the code consumer, which may limit its 
applicability.  
Comparing PCC to signed code, PCC is a prevention technique, while code signing is 
an authentication and identification technique used to deter the execution of unsafe code. 
Furthermore, the proof is structured in such a way that simplifies its verification, since it 
must be carried out efficiently without using any external assistance. 
2.2.2.3.1.3 Model Carrying Code 
Model Carrying Code (MCC) is an approach for supporting the safe execution of not-
trusted mobile code [144]. The central idea of MCC is that the code producer sends the 
code along with a high-level model, which describes the code’s security-relevant 
behaviour. It should be noted that the generated model has to be usable by all code 
consumers. The automated model generation is based on model extraction via machine 
learning from execution traces. In the consumer’s side, the model is checked for 
compliance with the consumer’s security policy. If the security policy is satisfied, the 
code can be executed. In case there are conflicts, the consumer’s policy can be refined, 
taking into consideration the code’s functionality. When the code is executed, runtime 
verification methods are used to guarantee that the consumer’s (refined) policy is not 
violated by the code (Figure 2-7).  
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By these means, the model bridges the semantic gap between the low-level binary 
code and the high-level security policies of the consumer. Moreover, the code producer 
does not have to know the consumer’s security policies (as in PCC). Assuming that a 
model can be much less complex than the corresponding program, it is feasible for a 
consumer to automatically determine whether a model conforms to his security policies. 
 
Figure 2-7 - The Model-Carrying Code framework [144] 
2.2.2.3.1.4 Java Virtual Machine Byte-Code Verifier 
The basic Java Virtual Machine (JVM) security model provides the capability of carrying 
out checks for admission for not trusted code, via a byte-code verifier [105]. In general 
the basic JVM security model comprises three related parts, namely the byte-code 
verifier, the class loader and the security manager. The JVM verifies all byte-code before 
execution.  
The byte-code verifier reconstructs type information by inspecting the byte-code 
[171]. The types of all parameters of all byte-code instructions must be checked. The 
JVM specification lists what must be checked and what exceptions may result from a 
failed check. However, the JVM specification does not define when and how type 
verification should be done. Thus, while the process of verification in Java is defined to 
allow different implementations of the JVM, most Java implementations take a similar 
approach to verification. The most common verification process consists of byte-code 
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checks on the class file itself and runtime checks, which confirm whether the referenced 
classes, fields and methods are existing and compatible to their attempted use.  
The byte-code checks establish a basic level of security guarantees. In particular, the 
class file format is checked whether it is correct. This check is carried out with the class 
loader’s cooperation. The code is also verified for the correct hierarchical structure of its 
classes. Thus, every class must have a super-class, final classes cannot have subclasses, 
final methods cannot be overridden and all field and method references in the constant 
pool (a heterogeneous array composed of five primitive types) must have legal names and 
classes. Moreover, the byte-code is verified by using data-flow analysis. By this means, it 
can be ensured that the operand stack can not be overflowed or underflowed, variables 
are properly initialised, register access is checked for using the proper value type, that 
method calls are done with the appropriate number and type of arguments, fields are 
updated with the appropriate type and all opcodes have the proper type of arguments on 
the stack and in the registers.  
During the class execution runtime checks can occur, since some aspects of Java's 
type system cannot be statically checked, like dynamic linking. Java loads each class only 
when it is actually needed at runtime (dynamic linking). Thus, whenever an instruction 
calls a method, or modifies a field, the runtime checks ensure that the method or field 
exists, type-checks the call and checks that the executing method has the appropriate 
access privileges. 
2.2.2.3.2 Post – Mortem Checks 
Monitors which can only observe the runtime behaviour of a system (“O, pre, A” and “O, 
post, A”) perform post-mortem checks. Post-mortem checks deal with properties which 
might not be of high importance. Proposed monitoring architectures for this category of 
monitors, like AMOS [38] and FLEA [60] maintain event logs and offer proprietary 
event pattern specification languages, or store events in relational databases and deploy 
standard SQL querying for detecting requirement violations [137]. 
2.2.2.4 General Purpose Dynamic Verification Tools 
2.2.2.4.1 The Java PathExplorer (JPaX) framework 
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The Java PathExplorer (JPaX) is a tool for monitoring systems at their runtime [72, 75]. 
By using JPaX one can automatically instrument code and observe the system’s runtime 
behavior. It can be used during development to provide more robust verification. It can 
also be used in an operational setting, to help optimize and maintain systems as they 
mature. Figure 2-8  illustrates an overview of JPaX architecture.  
 
Figure 2-8 – The JPaX architecture [75] 
JPaX consists of three modules:  
1. Instrumentation module: It performs a script-driven automated instrumentation 
of the program to be verified, through which the byte-code is automatically 
instrumented.  
2. Interconnection module: Its responsibility is to receive events about potential 
errors and transmit them to the observer module.  
3. Observer module: It performs two kinds of verification:  
• Checks events against a user-provided requirement specification 
written in Maude, a formal, modularized specification and verification 
language. JPaX supports linear temporal logic (LTL), for both future 
and past time. Future time LTL uses execution traces as an underlying 
model making it convenient for program monitoring. Past time is 
useful for verification of safety properties.  
• Carries out error pattern analysis by exploring an execution trace and 
detecting potential problems such as error-prone programming 
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techniques, e.g. locking practices that may lead to data races and/or 
deadlocks. The important and appealing capability of the error pattern 
analysis algorithms is that they can find potential errors, even in the 
case where errors do not explicitly occur in the examined execution 
trace. However, error pattern analysis may sometimes find errors 
which cannot exist. Two algorithms focusing on concurrency errors are 
implemented for JPaX:  
I. The “Eraser” data race analysis algorithm. A data race occurs 
when two or more concurrent threads access a shared variable 
simultaneously without any locking mechanism and at least one 
thread intends to write in the variable. The “Eraser” keeps track 
of thread locks and variables to find data race conditions.  
II. Deadlock analysis algorithm. Deadlocks occur when multiple 
threads take locks in different order. For example, a deadlock 
condition occurs when:  
 Thread A acquires Lock 1 while Thread B acquires 
Lock 2  
 Thread A retains Lock 1 and asks for Lock 2 while 
Thread B retains Lock 2 and asks for Lock 1. JPaX 
monitors locks during program execution to find 
potential deadlocks.  
Using JPaX, a Java program byte-code is automatically instrumented using instructions 
from a user-provided script. This script defines what kind of error pattern detection 
algorithms should be activated and what kind of logic-based monitoring should be 
performed. The automated instrumentation tool, which is used in JPaX, is JSpy [65]. 
JSpy can be seen as an Aspect Oriented Programming tool in the sense that it is guided 
by rules, or aspects, which specify how a program should be transformed to achieve 
additional functionality. However, the main purpose of these aspects is to extract 
information from a running program. JSpy itself is built on top of the low-level JTrek 
instrumentation package [40].  
As aforementioned, JPaX makes use of the Maude system [37]. Maude is a 
specification and verification system which supports rewriting logic. Rewriting logic is 
   
 51 
appropriate for expressing concurrent changes, which can naturally deal with state and 
with concurrent computations. Therefore, rewriting logic can be used like a universal 
logic, due to the fact that the syntax and operational semantics of other logics (such as 
temporal logics) can be expressed in rewriting logic.  
The Maude rewriting engine can be used as:  
• A monitoring engine during program execution. In JPaX, execution events are 
submitted to the Maude program that evaluates them against the requirements 
specification.  
• Translation engine before execution. In JPaX, the specification is translated into a 
data structure optimised for program monitoring. This data structure is then used 
within the Java program to check the events at runtime.  
JPaX produces either no output (when no errors are found) or a set of warnings. The 
warnings deal not only with runtime violations of high-level requirements written in 
temporal logic formulae but also with low-level error-detection procedures like 
concurrency related problems such as deadlock and data race algorithms.  
The JPaX Java instrumentation module can be replaced with a C++ module to 
monitor C++ code. Experiments were conducted by the NASA Ames Robotic group on 
C++ code to check for deadlocks. JPaX located a potential deadlock that had not been 
previously detected during other testing [23].  
To conclude, JPaX can also find potential errors, even in the case where errors do not 
explicitly occur in the examined execution trace. However, its logic-based monitoring 
adds an overhead to the normal execution of programs. Moreover, its error pattern 
runtime analysis can detect problems that do not really exist (called false positives). 
2.2.2.4.2 The Java Monitoring and Controlling Framework (Java-MaC) 
The Java Monitoring and Controlling (Java-MaC) framework uses formally specified 
properties to monitor Java programs at runtime [93]. Its architecture is shown in Figure 
2-9. It can be divided in two main parts: the static phase (before a monitored entity runs) 
and the runtime phase (while the monitored entity is executing). During the static phase, 
the runtime modules, namely a filter (event generator), an event recognizer (event 
processing module), and a run-time checker (external monitor), are automatically 
generated from a formal requirements specification. During the runtime phase, events 
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from the execution of the monitored program are collected and checked against the given 
requirements specifications.  
The static phase of the Java-MaC architecture starts with a formal requirements 
specification, which is written in both high-level and low-level specifications. Java-MaC 
makes use of two event-based formal languages, the Primitive and the Meta Event 
Definition Languages (PEDL and MEDL), which are used for writing low and high level 
specifications respectively. PEDL is tightly related to the programming language. 
Specifications written in PEDL contain the definitions of primitive events and conditions 
expressed using these events. Such definitions are given in terms of program entities such 
as program variables and program methods and their purpose is to assign meanings to the 
program entities. MEDL specifications consist of required safety properties. Primitive 
events and conditions are used to express these safety properties. Intuitively, a condition 
is a state predicate and an event is an instantaneous state change. The reporting 
capabilities of the runtime checker are described in the MEDL specifications, as well. 
MEDL uses alarms to express a violation of a property. An alarm is an event that should 
not occur during an execution. If an alarm fires during an execution, then a user 
notification is issued.  
Once the specifications are written, the next step is the generation of the runtime 
modules. Low-level specifications generate a filter that is inserted into the byte-code of 
the monitored program using an automatic instrumentation procedure. An event 
recognizer is also generated automatically by translating the PEDL specification. 
Similarly, a runtime checker is generated automatically from the higher-level MEDL 
specification. 
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Figure 2-9 – The Java-MaC architecture [93] 
During the runtime phase, the instrumented program is been monitored and checked 
against the requirements specification. The filter keeps track of changes of monitored 
objects and sends relevant information about the execution trace to the event recogniser. 
The event recognizer detects events from the state information received by the filter. An 
event can be either a primitive event (such as a method call) or a change in the state of a 
condition. Recognized events are sent to the run-time checker, which determines whether 
or not the current execution trace satisfies the requirements specification and raises an 
alarm if a violation is detected. 
2.2.2.4.3 The Java Monitoring-Oriented Programming Framework (Java-
MoP) 
Chen and Rosu [34] proposed a development and analysis framework for Java, the Java 
Monitoring-Oriented Programming (Java-MoP). Java-MoP follows the MOP paradigm 
and thus monitoring is one of its fundamental principles. It also provides the capability of 
recovering from errors (specification violations) at runtime.  
According to its proposed distributed architecture, annotations formally describing 
requirements on past, current and future states, have first to be inserted into the monitored 
Java source code, in the client side. Java annotation processors send these annotations to 
the appropriate logic plug-ins, which reside at the server side. Essentially, each of the 
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logic plug-ins implements an algorithm for synthesising monitoring code for a specific 
formalism. Logic plug-ins support past and future time variants of temporal logics, as 
well as, extended regular expressions. Furthermore, Jass [21, 115] and JML [100] 
annotations can be used. These specific annotations do not require a special logic plug-in, 
only a Java shell to transform them into Java executable code. 
Once the annotations have been transformed into Java executable code at the server 
side, they are sent to the client side. Java assertion processors integrate the received code 
in the system, according to the configuration attributes of the monitor. In addition, the 
client side modules are also responsible for the system’s code instrumentation for 
emitting events, in case of an external monitor. In this Java-MoP implementation, 
AspectJ [91] is used as the instrumentation mechanism.  
The checks, which can be carried out by using Java-MoP, depend on the monitoring 
properties. Thus, a monitor implemented in Java-MoP can check for class invariants at 
every change of class state or for method pre/post-conditions. Also, a monitor can be 
configured to halt the program’s execution while it carries out specific checks which deal 
with critical properties (synchronised keyword). In case that a non-critical property must 
be checked, a monitor’s reply may not be important, so the system keeps running during 
the check (not synchronised keyword).  
MOP allows one to control the execution of a monitored program. By allowing users 
to specify handlers for the violation or validation of monitored properties, Java-MoP can 
support the runtime control and recovery of a monitored Java program. These handlers 
can either simply report errors and throw exceptions or take more complicated actions, 
like resetting states and performing alternative, error-correcting computations. 
2.2.2.4.4 The Jassda Framework 
As an alternative approach to Jass [21, 115], Jassda framework [25, 26] checks assertions 
on traces by observing the events generated for debuggers through the Java Debug 
Interface (JDI). An obvious shortcoming of this alternative is that the monitored program 
must be running in the debugging mode.  
The Jassda tool allows the dynamic verification of a system written in Java against a 
CSP-like specification. The events from the monitored system are obtained through a 
general event extraction and dispatching facility, the Jassda framework [25, 26]. This 
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framework can also be used for other purposes, e.g., to log events or to stimulate a 
program for testing purposes. 
 
Figure 2-10 – The architecture of Jassda framework [25] 
The architecture of the Jassda framework is shown in Figure 2-10. At the lowest level 
JVMs execute the monitored system’s code (debuggees). These debuggees are connected 
to the Broker, which is the central component of the Jassda framework. The “Registry” 
database, an optional graphical user interface and the Broker build the Jassda core. Other 
Jassda modules connect to this core requesting and consuming events. The connection 
between the debuggees and the Jassda core transports the events that we want to observe. 
This connection is established by using the Java Platform Debugger Architecture (JPDA). 
The Jassda tool development aimed to achieve a method for monitoring Java programs 
which would be as less code intrusive as possible. The Java Debug Interface (JDI) [157] 
was used for this purpose.  
During runtime the debuggees can be configured to generate events for several 
situations, e.g. a method has started or terminated, an exception has occurred, a 
breakpoint is reached, a class is loaded/unloaded, read/write access to a variable, a thread 
was started/stopped. After having emitted an event, the debugging VM can be configured 
to suspend execution and thus allow a deep view into the VM. For example, for each 
currently running thread its stack trace can be analyzed or for each class its inner 
structure (like super-classes and implemented interfaces) can be read. Even the byte-code 
of every method can be accessed for further analysis.  
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The Logger module logs the execution of a Java system by writing its sequence of 
events into a file. The amount of information that can be derived from an event as well as 
the alphabet of events can be configured by an XML-based configuration file. The most 
important event listening module is the Jassda Trace–Checker. The Trace–Checker reads 
one or more trace specifications written in CSPJassda and builds an internal process 
representation for the set of legal traces. With every received event the Trace–Checker 
will ensure that this actual sequence of events is a legal trace of the specification’s 
process representation or stop the program and inform the user about the violation. 
2.2.2.4.5 The Temporal Rover Toolset 
The Temporal Rover [57] is a commercial toolset, which performs dynamic 
verification of temporal properties over programs written in Java, C, C++, VHDL, 
Verilog, and ADA. This is achieved by adding extra LTL/MTL assertions to the program 
source code. These assertions are embedded as comments into the source code. The 
Temporal Rover parser converts program files into new files, which are identical to the 
original files except for the assertions that are now implemented in source code.  
The Temporal Rover adopts a coarse-grained view of the state model. A state 
constitutes the values of variables within the scope of a given method. Method execution 
is viewed as an event that causes transition between states, and properties are evaluated 
only at the completion of a method execution. Clearly, it misses invalid states that may 
occur during the execution of a method. Properties are written inside methods and 
predicates map to the variables within the scope of the method. Consequently, each 
property has a unique perspective of the environment that it is validating and properties 
may not be composed. For example, even though one would imagine that two 
contradicting properties could be composed and reduced to “false”, this is not the case 
under the Temporal Rover’s state model. A property’s notion of time refers to the next 
execution of the method containing it. Two properties may therefore carry different 
semantics for the next-state operator. Another limitation of Temporal Rover is that under 
its state model one can not reason about control intensive properties such as method x 
must never execute after method y. The DBRover is a distributed-monitor version of the 
Temporal Rover where assertions are monitored on a remote machine, using HTTP, 
sockets or serial communication with the underlying target application. 
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2.2.2.4.6  The Java PathFinder (JPF) Framework 
Java PathFinder (JPF) [168] is a model checker for Java byte code. More specifically, it 
is a specialized Java Virtual Machine (JVMJPF), which runs on top of the underlying 
host JVM. In contrast to the standard JVM, JVMJPF executes the program in all possible 
ways. The state space of a program is thus the resulting computational tree, whose 
branches are determined by the threads’ instructions and possible values of input data. 
JPF supports depth-first, breadth-first as well as heuristic search strategies to guide the 
model checker’s search in cases where the state explosion problem is too severe [168]. 
JPF contains no mechanism of its own to specify user-defined properties, but rather 
integrates with the Bandera toolset [44] and accepts the Bandera Specification Language 
(BSL) [43]. Even though JPF carries an elaborate state model (being able to capture 
every state of the JVM), temporal property specification is limited to the capabilities of 
BSL. Figure 2-11 depicts the JPF architecture.  
Like other model checkers for concurrent programs, JPF supports the partial order 
reduction (POR) [36]. The purpose of this technique is to lower the state space size via 
including in the state space only one interleaving of instructions that are both independent 
and executed by different threads. The consequence is that JPF actually traverses a 
reduced state space where each state is associated with one of the following events 
(“points”) in the byte code execution:  
• Scheduling point: The current instruction is thread scheduling relevant (e.g. it 
accesses a shared variable, starts/stops a thread, blocks a thread, etc.)  
• Value point: A value selection takes place. 
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Figure 2-11 – The JPF Architecture [168] 
In order to check a code unit (e.g. a method) for different values of input data, JPF 
contains a static class Verify which provides methods for a systematic selection of values 
of virtually any type. The methods of Verify are to be called in the checked code. For 
example, if the checked code unit executes Verify.random(3), an integer value from the 
range 0..3 is selected. However, after reaching an end state, JPF backtracks up to the 
Verify.random(3) call and selects another value from 0..3; this is repeated until all the 
values from this interval have been used for execution. By employing methods of Verify 
the state space size increases since each selected value creates a different branch in the 
state space.  
By default, JPF searches the state space of the checked program for “low-level” 
properties like deadlocks, unhandled exceptions and failed assertions. However it is 
extensible via the publisher/listener pattern and as such it allows for observing more 
general properties. Since Java code assertions must always hold, temporal properties 
specified outside of BSL can be checked as well. This way, listeners can check for 
specific state-based properties.  
Each state of a checked program in JPF consists of the heap, static area and stacks of 
all threads. When traversing the state space, JPF checks whether the current state has 
already been visited. If this is so, it backtracks to the nearest scheduling/value point, for 
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which an unexplored branch exists and continues along that. This backtracking is based 
on keeping a stack representing the currently explored path in the state space (an item in 
the stack determines the list of yet unvisited branches).  
The Bandera toolset [71] is a collection of program analysis, transformation, and 
visualization components designed to allow experimentation with model-checking of 
Java programs. Bandera takes as input a Java source code and a program specification 
written in Bandera’s temporal Specification Language (BSL), and produces a program 
model and a specification as input to model-checking applications, like Spin [80] and 
Java PathFinder [168]. Then, Bandera uses the corresponding model-checker to prove 
whether the model satisfies the required specification (i.e. whether the Java program 
satisfies the BSL specification). If the specification is not satisfied, then a counter 
example trace is returned. Bandera uses this to show the problematic execution path 
directly in the original Java code. Bandera deals with the state explosion problem and the 
fact that the program state models must be finite by providing data abstraction and 
program slicing methods when customizing the model. These features help produce a 
much smaller finite state model of the Java program.  
In particular, Bandera consists of five major components:  
• Property specification is supported in Bandera through the use of global 
properties (e.g., deadlock) and application specific properties (e.g., assertions and 
temporal logic formulas). Users define observations of the execution state of a 
Java program, as predicates over program locations and data values in the 
program. Assertions and temporal formulas are then defined in terms of those 
observations.  
• Program slicer: Automates the elimination of program components that are 
irrelevant for the property under analysis. Slicing criteria are automatically 
extracted from the observable predicates that are referenced in the property. 
Bandera’s Java slicer treats multi-threaded programs [71] and is based on 
calculation of the program’s data dependence graph.  
• Program abstraction which can be summarized as: (i) definition of an abstraction 
mapping, which is appropriate for the property being verified, (ii) use of the 
abstraction mapping to transform the temporal property into an abstract property, 
(iii) use of the abstraction mapping to transform the concrete program into an 
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abstract program, (iv) checking whether the abstract program satisfies the abstract 
property, (v) reasoning about the satisfaction of the concrete property by the 
concrete program.  
• Verification code generator: Transforms the sliced, abstracted program into the 
input format of a selected model checker. This component is also responsible for 
establishing the correspondence between the states of the produced model and the 
states of the original program.  
• Counter-example interpreter: Involves the mapping of low-level, verifier-specific 
counter-examples back to the Java source code. Facilities for navigating through 
the counter-example and displaying the values of both stack and heap allocated 
data are provided through a debugger-like interface.  
2.2.2.4.7 The JNuke Tool 
JNuke is a framework for static and dynamic analysis of Java programs [12, 13]. It was 
originally designed for dynamic analysis, including explicit-state software model 
checking and runtime verification.  
JNuke’s virtual machine (VM) is the core element of the framework. For generic 
runtime verification, the engine executes only the program once according to a given 
scheduling algorithm. The VM API allows for event-based runtime verification through 
various runtime algorithms. This API provides access to events occurring during the 
program execution. Event listeners can, then, query the VM for detailed data about its 
internal state and thus implement any runtime verification algorithm, including detection 
of high-level data races [10] and stale-value errors [11].  
Before the execution of the monitored program, the class loader transforms the Java 
byte code into a simplified form containing only 27 instructions, which is then 
transformed into a register-based version [13]. Execution of the program generates an 
event trace. During execution, the runtime verification API allows event listeners to 
capture this event trace. These listeners are used to implement scheduling policies and 
runtime verification algorithms, like Eraser [141] and detection of high-level data races 
[10]. The verification algorithm is responsible to copy data it needs for later 
investigation, as the VM is not directly affected by the listeners and thus may choose to 
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free data not used anymore. Figure 2-12 presents an overview of the JNuke VM and how 
a runtime verification algorithm can be executed by using callback functions in the VM. 
 
Figure 2-12 – Runtime verification in JNuke [13] 
JNuke was expanded with static analysis capabilities at a later stage. Static analysis is 
usually faster than dynamic analysis but less precise, approximating the set of possible 
program states. In static analysis, iterations over these approximated states are carried out 
until a fix point of them is computed [45]. Properties checked with static analysis require 
summary information of dependent methods or modules. Figure 2-13 illustrates the 
separate classical approaches for dynamic and static analysis.  
On the other hand, dynamic analysis examines properties against an event trace 
originating from a program execution. By using a free data flow analysis graph [113] 
static analysis can work similarly to the dynamic execution. Analysis algorithms based on 
such a graph can allow for non-deterministic control-flow and use sets of states rather 
than single states in its abstract interpretation [13]. Moreover, in such a graph data 
locality is improved because an entire path of computation is followed as long as valid 
new successor states are discovered. Thus, all Java methods can be executed, allowing for 
a generic analysis algorithm to be executed under both static and dynamic analyses. The 
chosen analysis algorithm runs until an abortion criterion is met or the full abstract state 
space is exhausted. 
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Figure 2-13 – Classical approach for dynamic and static analysis [13] 
A generic analysis represents a single program state or a set of program states at a 
single program location. It also includes a number of event handlers, which model the 
semantics of byte code operations. Both static analysis and runtime analysis trigger an 
intermediate layer, which evaluates the events. The environment hides its actual nature 
(static or dynamic) from the generic algorithm and maintains a representation of the 
program state that is suitably detailed. 
Figure 2-14 shows the generic analysis principle. Run-time verification is driven by a 
trace, a series of events e emitted by the runtime verification API. An event represents a 
method entry or exit, or execution of an instruction at location l. Runtime analysis 
examines these events directly. The dynamic environment, on one hand, uses the event 
information to maintain a context c of algorithm-specific data before relaying the event to 
the generic analysis. This context is used to maintain state information s that cannot be 
updated uniformly for the static and dynamic case. It is updated similarly by the static 
environment, which also receives events e, determining the successor states at location l 
which are to be computed. The key difference for the static environment is that it updates 
c with sets of states S. Sets of states are also stored in components used by the generic 
algorithm. Operations on states (such as comparisons) are performed through delegation 
to component members. Therefore the “true nature” of state components, whether they 
embody single concrete states or sets of abstract states, is transparent to the generic 
analysis algorithm, which can thus be used either statically or dynamically. 
 
Figure 2-14- Generic analysis for both a static & dynamic environment [13] 
The abstract domain for the static analysis is chosen based on the features required by 
the generic analysis algorithm to evaluate given properties. Both the domain and the 
properties are implemented as an observer algorithm in JNuke. Future algorithms may 
include an interpreter for logics such as LTL. Interpretation of events with respect to 
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temporal properties would then be encoded in the generic analysis while the event 
generation would be implemented by the static and dynamic environment, respectively. 
2.2.2.4.8 Summary of Dynamic Verification Tools 
The following table summarizes the surveyed verification tools in terms of the general 
dynamic verification approach steps of Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2 – Summary of Dynamic Verification Tools 
 
Tool 
Language for 
Properties 
Formalization 
 
Methods for 
Events Emission 
 
Monitor 
 
Category 
JPaX Temporal logic 
in Maude 
rewriting tool  
Automated 
instrumentation by 
using JSpy 
(modified JVM) 
Observer O, pre/post, A 
Java-MaC Past-time 
interval 
temporal logic 
Automated 
instrumentation 
(instrumentor) 
Runtime 
Checker 
O, pre/post, A 
JMoP ptLTL, ftLTL, 
EREs 
Automated 
instrumentation by 
using AspectJ 
Embedded in 
code or parallel 
process to the 
system on the 
same or 
different 
machine 
OC, pre/post, 
S/A 
Jassda CSPJassda API based (from 
JVMs by using the 
Java Debug 
Interface) 
Trace checker OC, pre/post, 
A 
Temporal 
Rover 
LTL/MTL 
assertions 
Instrumentation Embedded 
(using 
alternating 
finite automata) 
OC, pre/post, S 
JPF User defined 
assertions, LTL 
(by using 
BANDERA) 
BANDERA 
abstraction 
capability 
JVMJPF OC, A 
JNuke - API based (JNuke 
VM with RV API) 
Runtime 
verification 
algorithm 
O, post, A 
  
 64 
 
2.3 Abductive reasoning 
A key characteristic of the approach that has been undertaken for the generation of 
diagnostic information for S&D violations is the use of abductive reasoning. Thus, in this 
section we provide an overview of research in this area and highlight the basic aspects of 
this research to enable the reader understand the relationship of our approach to it.  
Abduction in general is defined as the reasoning process of generating explanations 
for a set of observations and searching among them to find the best one. According to 
Peirce [127], abduction is an inference process from effect to cause. In the context of 
artificial intelligence, the standard formalization of abduction defines an explanation as a 
set of assumptions/hypotheses, which, along with the underlying knowledge, logically 
entails a set of observations [33]. Therefore, if ϕ explains ω, in connection with the 
underlying theory T in an abductive fashion, then ω must be derivable from  ϕ  ∪ T. 
Our overview of the related work related to abduction focuses on the logic based 
approaches to abduction, including temporal logic based abduction, and the selection 
criteria that have been proposed in the literature in order to make selections of 
explanations produced by abduction in cases where more than one such explanations are 
generated. This is because research in these areas is most closely related to the approach 
that has been described above.  
2.3.1 Logic-Based Abduction 
Abduction based on models expressed in some logic-based language is the most widely 
accepted approach by the researchers in the field of abduction [33, 59, 86, 87, 97, 122, 
135]. In this approach, the knowledge, which is represented in any logical language for 
deductive reasoning purposes, is also used in abductive reasoning. A logic-based 
representation for abduction consists of a theory T, which is defined in some logic 
language. The set of predicates or sentences or symbols, which can be accepted as 
explanations to observations, are called abducibles [41, 135] and abducibles can only be 
members of the body of the underlying theory formulas. 
If the abductive process results in a sentence ϕ  as an explanation of observation ω, 
the following conditions must be satisfied: 
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• T ∪ ϕ  |- ω 
• T ∪ ϕ  to be consistent, and 
• ϕ  contains an abducible predicate or a set of abducible predicates  
In the context of abduction, the relationship between ϕ  and ω is considered as some kind 
of causal relationship including for example interpretations of the form “ϕ  is the reason 
for ω being true”. However, as Levesque has shown [103], abduction is not concerned 
exclusively with relationships between causes and effects. Levesque [103] suggests the 
extension of the notion of explanation in order to grasp that ϕ is sufficient, and not only 
necessary, to sanction a belief in the proposition ω. Consequently, there must not be a 
direct causal relationship between both ϕ and ω, but, in connection with the domain 
theory, ϕ  is enough for ω to be true. 
Generally, a basic abductive reasoning procedure operates as follows according to 
[148]. The underlying domain knowledge is formulated in a set of clauses in some logic 
language (a theory representation). For a given conjunction of input literals/sentences, 
which have to be explained, the abductive inference procedure computes all the possible 
abducibles by backward chaining on the input literals/sentences, using the clauses of the 
underlying theory. This procedure is similar to the way that proofs are computed in 
Prolog. In case that there is no fact or consequent of a rule in the underlying theory, 
which can be unified with a sub-goal of the current proof, the proof does not fail. On the 
contrary, the abductive reasoning procedure provides the choice of flagging that sub-goal 
as an assumption/explanation, assuming that there are not any consistency implications. 
The abductive reasoning procedure gives a proof of the conjunction of the input literals 
using the rules and facts of the underlying theory, together with a set of 
assumptions/hypotheses. Briefly, an abductive proof is considered as an explanation of 
the input literals in connection with the logically encoded underlying knowledge.    
In the context of logic programming with integrity constraints, Eshgi and Kowalski 
[59] have also considered abduction as an alternative framework to the principle of 
negation as failure (NAF). More specifically, these authors have shown that if negative 
conditions are considered as abducibles and appropriate denials and disjunctions are 
imposed as integrity constraints, negation as failure can be successfully simulated by 
abductive reasoning. In this approach, logic programs using negation as failure are 
converted into an abductive framework, where integrity constraints that are more general 
than denials can be defined. For this reason, an abductive formulation includes a Horn 
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clause theory (T) without denials (i.e., negated predicates), a set of integrity constraints 
(I) and a set of abducible predicates (A). In this context, an explanation set E is an 
abductive solution for the query q if and only if E consists of a set of variable free 
abducible predicates, T ∪ E |= q and T ∪ E ∪ I is satisfiable. Note that in this approach, 
integrity constraints can be considered as a selection criterion for alternative explanations 
that are produced by abductive reasoning.According to this criterion, abduced 
hypotheses, which do not satisfy the integrity constraints, are ruled out.  
The transformation of NAF-formulation into an abductive formulation can be done in 
three steps. Firstly, all negative atoms ¬n are replaced by new atoms n*. Subsequently 
integrity constraints of the form “ n*(x) ∧ n(x)” are added to the theory. The newly 
added integrity constraints ensure that both n(x) and n*(x) cannot be true simultaneously 
for each value of x, as n* has replaced ¬n. Finally, all n* have to be declared as 
abducibles. The above conversion procedure succeeds in eliminating all negative atoms 
by introducing new unambiguous abducible atoms for them. Also, instead of testing the 
provability of negated conditions by negation as failure, the consistency of abducible 
predicates is checked.    
2.3.2 Temporal Abduction 
Temporal abduction refers to cases where the observations, which should be explained, 
are associated with temporal information, as in the case of the diagnostic framework. 
Console et al. [41] describe temporal abduction as a type of reasoning for “generating 
explanations, which do not only account for the presence of observations, but also for 
temporal information on them, based on temporal knowledge in the domain theory”. In 
temporal abduction problems, temporal knowledge can be expressed as temporal 
constraints [28, 41], which are associated to the rules of the underlying domain theory. 
Such temporal constraints must be satisfied by the temporal information associated to the 
generated explanation. On the other hand, in cases where the underlying theory is 
expressed in some temporal language, like Event Calculus, temporal knowledge can be 
represented as information embedded in the underlying theory formulas.  
Console et al. [41] have proposed a temporal abduction approach, which makes use of 
temporal constraints associated with the observations and the formulation of the 
underlying domain theory. The temporal consistency check of each candidate explanatory 
formula, which could lead to a plausible explanation, is used as a pruning criterion for the 
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set of the accepted candidates, in every step of the abductive backward chaining 
procedure. Thus, only the temporal consistent candidates are used for building a plausible 
explanation. Since the temporal consistency checks required in each step of the abductive 
procedure can be computationally expensive, the Simple Temporal Problem framework 
(STP) [51] was used in this approach. The STP framework treats the temporal checks as a 
constraint satisfaction problem. More specifically, in the STP framework, each of the 
binary constraints, which represent time dependencies between the actual times of events, 
contains only one time interval. In particular Console et al. [41] used LATER [29], which 
is a general purpose temporal reasoning system dealing with special classes of temporal 
constraints as the aforementioned ones.  
The main differences between the work in model based diagnosis and our abduction 
based explanation process are that our process is based on Event Calculus, treats the time 
constraint satisfaction problem as a linear programming problem, generates all the 
possible alternative explanations for the observations (whereas others’ frameworks 
generate a single explanation), and provides overall beliefs in the validity of explanations 
by looking at the consequences of such explanations. These beliefs are also used in order 
to rank explanations and select some of them as the most plausible ones. 
2.3.3 Selecting Abduced Explanations 
Generally, the evaluation and selection of one or more explanations from the entire set of 
explanations, which an abductive reasoning process can generate, is one of the main 
problems in abductive reasoning. The problem is how to choose effectively among the 
alternative explanations, which might have been generated by abductive inference for a 
given observation. In the relevant literature, there are several criteria that have been 
proposed in order to assess and select the most preferred abductive explanation. 
Generally, these criteria fall into two categories. The first of these categories includes 
criteria, which require the logical and syntactic simplicity of the abductive explanations 
[87, 122]. The second category includes criteria which favour the explanation specificity 
in the selection process [8, 120]. In the following, we review each of these categories in 
more detail. 
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2.3.3.1 Logical and Syntactic Simplicity Criteria 
In the context of abductive reasoning, “simplicity” is generally interpreted as logical 
simplicity. Logical simplicity means that the preferred assumptions/hypotheses are those 
that contain the fewest different abducibles. Therefore, the preferred explanations are 
those that require the fewest additional assumptions/hypotheses to what has been 
observed.  
The basic criteria that underpin syntactic simplicity in the literature are the criteria of 
“non-triviality”, “basicness”, and “minimality”. To appreciate the basic criteria, which 
underpin syntactic simplicity, suppose that T is a first-order theory (knowledge base) and 
E is a set of hypotheses/explanations for an observation Ω. According to the simplicity 
criteria, e can be considered as an accepted explanation, if it belongs to E and satisfies the 
following conditions: 
• T ∪ e must be consistent (i.e. a “consistency” criterion that is present in most 
logic-based approaches to abduction) 
• The observation Ω must not be a direct consequence of the hypothesis e. (this 
condition precludes that Ω itself can be considered as a feasible explanation of 
Ω (“non-triviality” criterion) 
• Every consistent explanation e must be trivial, i.e., there must be no other 
explanation for the explanation itself. This criterion favours the most specific 
explanation (“basicness” criterion) 
• There must not exist any more general explanations for Ω than e 
(“minimality” criterion) 
Although the importance of logical simplicity is stressed other forms of simplicity 
have also been proposed in the literature. Peirce [127], for example, has proposed the use 
of “psychological simplicity”. The criterion of “psychological simplicity” suggests the 
selection of an explanation hypothesis if this hypothesis is the one that would be 
intuitively preferred. Current research, though, favours logical simplicity selection 
criteria, due to the fact that “psychological simplicity” is hard to define and implement.  
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2.3.3.2 Specificity Selection Criteria  
Following the logic simplicity criteria, someone may still end up with more than one 
alternative explanations of an observation. Thus, additional selection criteria are often 
required in order to reduce the set of alternative hypotheses. An additional criterion used 
for this purpose is a criterion that requires the explanation to have a certain level of 
specificity.  Relevant approaches for selecting the preferred abductive explanation, which 
focus on a certain level of specificity, have been classified into two groups by Appelt and 
Pollack [8], namely the global and local criteria.  
2.3.3.2.1 Global criteria 
Global criteria are heuristics, which can be applied for directing the selection procedure 
to the most preferred abductive explanation, by considering entire sets of explanations. 
Appelt and Pollack [8] have distinguished some selection criteria, which are global 
criteria, namely: cardinality based criteria, least presumptive or least specific abduction 
and most specific abduction.  
Cardinality comparisons were first introduced in diagnosis applications to ensure that 
the preferred explanations imply the failure of the smallest number of components of the 
under examination system. In diagnosis applications in particular, the system which is 
under examination is considered as a set of distinguishable components whose intended 
input and output behaviour is completely specified in terms of a base theory. The 
diagnostic task in this setting involves an abductive inference procedure reasoning for the 
faulty system behaviour, as it has been observed during the system’s runtime. The output 
of the abductive procedure is an explanation set, which explains the captured faulty 
behaviour of the system. More specifically, the explanation set identifies groups of 
system components, which have failed, and whose failure could account for the faulty 
behaviour of the system. The accepted explanation set, under the evaluation criterion of 
this approach, should imply the failure of the smallest number of components. As Appelt 
and Pollack note in [8], the cardinality comparison criterion cannot be generally applied, 
due to the fact that it assumes that the system that is the subject of diagnosis always has a 
set of distinguishable and enumerable components. However, in other contexts, for 
example natural language understanding and plan recognition systems, the notion of 
distinguishable and enumerable components is difficult to define.  
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The “less presumptive explanation” criterion was suggested by Poole in [130], as an 
alternative to the cardinality criterion. According to it, given two alternative sets of 
explanation E1 and E2 and a logical theory T, E1 is less presumptive than E2 if and only 
if T ∪ E2 |= E1. An abductive inference procedure, which is called “least specific 
abduction” and realizes the aforementioned selection criterion, has been proposed by 
Stickel in [156]. Note that the less presumptive or least specific explanations provide the 
most general explanation. Thus, least specific abduction is not necessarily an appropriate 
strategy for diagnostic tasks, which require very detailed knowledge about the origin of 
failures and there are diagnostic tasks, as the ones that we are dealing with, where the 
most specific explanation criterion is considered more adequate.  
2.3.3.2.2 Local Criteria 
Local criteria are considered as an alternative to global criteria for evaluating alternative 
abductive explanation sets [8]. Generally, this category of criteria assumes that weights 
are associated with the rules of the underlying theory. Each explanation set, then, is 
evaluated by combining the weights of the rules, which were used to derive the members 
of the set. Appelt and Pollack [8] distinguish further local criteria into: weighted 
abduction, cost-based abduction and Bayesian statistical methods. 
2.3.3.2.2.1 Weighted Abduction 
Appelt and Pollack [8] have proposed another approach, called “weighted abduction”, for 
assessing alternative explanations. This approach introduces the concept of explanations 
costs during the abductive inference procedure.   
Assuming that T is a theory used in abduction, an underlying preference order on the 
models of T is assumed. In weighted abduction, one set of hypotheses/explanations A1 is 
better than an alternative A2, if A1 restricts the models of T to a more highly valued 
subset than A2 does. The weights, which are assigned on the literals/atoms of the rules of 
T, impose implicitly constraints on the assumed preference order. For instance, a rule pα 
⊃ q with a weighted literal p in its body (α<1) reflects that there is a preference order of 
the models, which satisfy q. The models, which are more preferred than every model 
satisfying q, are those satisfying p as well. By this means, if p is satisfied by a model then 
that model provides an explanation for q.  
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In general, in the context of weighted abduction, assuming that there is an abduction 
problem with goal φ, an underlying theory T and a set of explanations A, an abductive 
proof would be the search for a set of explanations A such that the preferred models of T 
∪ {φ} to satisfy T ∪ A. Regarding the goal φ, the set of explanations A must be adequate 
(T ∪ A |- φ), consistent (T ∪ A |/- ¬φ) and syntactically minimal (if ψ∈A then T ∪ A – 
{ψ} |/- φ). The explanation set A, also, must satisfy a “semantic greatest lower bound” 
condition requiring that the model which entails T ∪ A must be the most preferable one. 
Finally, the A set must not entail the negation of its elements at a cost that is less than that 
of the A set itself (i.e., the “defeat” condition).   
According to the algorithm proposed in [8], all the explanation sets for a goal φ are 
generated by using the theory rules, which are Horn clauses whose body literals are 
associated with a weighting factor (i.e. rules of the form p1w1 ∧ …∧ pnwn ⇒ q). The goal 
φ can be either assumed at its predefined assumption cost or unified with a fact in the 
knowledge base (zero cost proof), or unified with another atom that has already been 
assumed, or proved by applying backward chaining using a rule p1w1 ∧ …∧ pnwn ⇒ q. In 
the latter case, the proof cost of the goal matched with q is computed by multiplying the 
weights wi of the conditions pi in the body of the rule. In this process, the best solution of 
the abduction problem is the explanation set with the lowest cost proof. The algorithm 
also filters out explanation sets, which do not satisfy the consistency and the defeat 
conditions.  
The weighted abduction approach has some computational difficulties as pointed out 
by Appelt and Pollack which arise due to the need to determine a candidate set at a 
minimal cost, as well as, guarantee that all candidate explanations are consistent with the 
underlying theory. In particular, the detection of the minimal cost explanation requires 
the computation all possible explanations with a direct effect in the computational cost of 
the overall process. Regarding the consistency of the abduced explanations with the base 
theory, it has been claimed that in some domains an incomplete inconsistency check, 
focusing only on specific points, could be applicable. For instance, in the context of 
TACITUS text understanding system [79], most of the inconsistencies result from the 
erroneous identification of two distinct individuals. Thus, most of the inconsistencies can 
be detected by checking variable typing constraints for the assumed literals. An 
incomplete consistency check can be computed relatively quickly and thus, where 
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applicable, it is more preferable than the exhaustive detection of all the inconsistencies 
that could arise. 
Moreover, regarding the assignment of weighting factors on the literals/atoms of the 
rules of the underlying theory, two issues have been identified in [8]. The first issue is 
that, the encoding of preference as weighting factors assigned on the atoms of the theory 
rules is difficult, because the rules might not provide the right collection of atoms for 
attaching the weights.  The second issue is that, the assignment of weight factors on a 
particular rule may have an effect on the set of preferences as a whole. Thus, the 
difficulty of the preference encoding process is that all the preferences introduced by 
each rule must be considered in connection with all the other rules in the underlying 
theory. 
2.3.3.2.2.2 Cost-based Abduction 
Ng and Mooney [120] have suggested a metric for assessing the quality of the abductive 
explanations, called “explanatory coherence metric”. Briefly, explanatory coherence 
controls the choice of the hypotheses, in a fashion that, the preferred hypotheses have the 
more connections between any pair of observations in the proof graph. The explanations 
generated by the coherence criterions, as Ng and Mooney [120] point out, are usually 
syntactically simple explanations, due to the fact that tight connections between the 
observations and explanations are preferred. In contrast with the weighted abduction 
approach, the explanatory coherence is a more concrete criterion than rule weights, due to 
the fact that the rule weights can be chosen arbitrarily. On the other hand, in order to cope 
with incomplete information, the use of both coherence and likelihood knowledge has 
also been considered.  
2.3.3.2.2.3 Bayesian Inference Methods 
Due to the fact that uncertainty is an inherent feature of abductive reasoning, the 
likelihood of truthness of abducible explanations, can play significant role in the selection 
of the most preferable abductive explanation. Thus, probabilistic models and, in 
particular, Bayesian models [50, 83, 84, 85, 96, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 132] have been 
used to identify the “most probable” abductive explanation. The use of Bayesian models 
imposes some limitations in the generality of logic-based abductive reasoning. In 
particular, the set of possible hypotheses must be determined in advance. Moreover, an a 
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priori probability must be assigned to each of the possible hypothesis in advance, as well 
as, the conditional probabilities of consequences, given particular assumptions, must be 
predetermined. When these prerequisites are met, the Bayes’ theorem can be applied in 
order to compute the conditional probabilities of the predefined possible hypotheses, 
given the observations to be explained. Based on the outputs of the Bayes’s rule, the most 
possible combination of hypotheses, which jointly explain the observations, is selected. 
An approach, which addresses the diagnostic problem under the notions of abduction, 
time and uncertainty, was proposed by Santos [140], Santos presents an extended model 
of Bayesian networks, which except for abductive and uncertain reasoning; temporal 
reasoning is considered as well. Also, Santos provides a description of a general 
computation method for the proposed model, which is based on linear constraint 
satisfaction that determines the least weighted explanation. The proposed model uses an 
interval representation of time based on Allen’s interval algebra, while uncertainty is 
expressed as a probability (weight) assigned to each rule in the knowledge base like in 
Bayesian networks. In particular, the underlying domain knowledge is modelled as a 
directed acyclic graph whereby nodes represent propositions/events that can be true or 
false. Each node is associated with a time range in which the node is true or false due to 
its truth-value. The nodes are connected with directed arcs, which illustrate the 
logical/causal and temporal dependency between the connected nodes. Abductive 
explanations can typically considered nodes without parents. 
Our approach also uses a probabilistic explanation assessment approach. However, 
our approach is not based on Bayesian abduction. The reason for this is to avoid the need 
to elicit the a-priori and conditional probability measures which are required by this 
approach. Furthermore, as also discussed in [162, 163, 164], the choice of the Dempster 
Shafer theory of evidence [146] as the framework for calculating the likelihoods of 
abduced explanations has been dictated by the need to represent the uncertainty regarding 
the confirmation of the consequences of these explanations as we are discussing in 
following section (see Section 5.4) and reason in the presence of this uncertainty.  
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Chapter 3: Preliminaries 
3.1 Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the underpinning 
theoretical background of our approach. As already mentioned, our diagnostic approach 
has been structured upon an event reasoning monitoring framework [109, 153, 154] that 
is based on Event Caclulus [149]. Therefore, Section 3.2 provides a short overview on 
Event Calculus.  
Section 3.3 provides an extended discussion of the monitoring framework 
highlighting on the formal specifications it uses.  Finally, Section 3.4 covers the 
principles of the Dempster Shafer theory of evidence [146] that underpins our 
explanation validity assessment process.     
3.2 Event Calculus 
The event calculus (EC) [149] is a first-order temporal formal language that can be 
used to specify properties of dynamic systems, which change over time. Such properties 
are specified in terms of events and fluents. 
An event in EC is something that occurs at a specific instance of time (e.g., invocation 
of an operation), has instantaneous duration and may change the state of a system. 
Fluents are conditions regarding the state of a system and are initiated and terminated by 
events. A fluent may, for example, signify that a specific system variable has a particular 
value at a specific instance of time. The occurrence of an event is represented by the 
predicate Happens(e,t). This predicate signifies that an instantaneous event e occurs at 
some time t.  
The initiation of a fluent is signified by the EC predicate Initiates(e,f,t) whose 
meaning is that a fluent f starts to hold after the event e at time t. The termination of a 
fluent is signified by the EC predicate Terminates(e,f,t) whose meaning is that a fluent f 
ceases to hold after the event e occurs at time t. An EC formula may also use the 
predicates Initially(f) and HoldsAt(f,t) to signify that a fluent f holds at the start of the 
operation of a system and that f holds at time t, respectively. 
   
 75 
Event calculus defines a set of axioms that can be used to determine when a fluent 
holds based on initiation and termination events which may have occurred regarding this 
fluent. These axioms are listed in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 – Axioms of Event Calculus 
(EC-A1) (∃e,t) Happens(e,t) ∧ t1<t<t2 ∧ Terminates(e,f,t) ⇒ Clipped(t1,f,t2) 
 
(EC-A2)  Initially(f) ∧  ¬Clipped(0,f,t) ⇒ HoldsAt(f,t) 
 
(EC-A3) (∃e,t1) Happens(e,t1) ∧ t1<t ∧  Initiates(e,f,t1) ∧ ¬Clipped(t1,f,t) ⇒   
       
        HoldsAt(f,t)  
The axiom EC-A1 in Table 3-1 states that a fluent f is clipped (i.e., ceases to hold) 
within the time range from t1 to t2, if an event e occurs at some time point t within this 
range and e terminates f. The axiom EC-A2 states that a fluent f holds at time t, if it held 
at time 0 and has not been terminated between 0 and t. Finally, the axiom EC-A3 states 
that a fluent f holds at time t, if an event e has occurred at some time point t1 before t 
which initiated f at t1 and f has not been clipped between t1 and t. 
3.3 The EVEREST monitoring framework 
In this section, we present the EVEREST (EVEnt REaSoning Toolkit) monitoring 
framework [153, 154].  
3.3.1 Specification of monitoring rules and assumptions in 
EVEREST  
In this section, we give an overview of the EC-Assertion language [109, 153, 155] that is 
used by EVEREST monitoring framework in order to express properties (a.k.a. formulas) 
to be checked at runtime.  
As it has been discussed in [109, 153, 155], EVEREST uses two different types of 
formulas during monitoring, namely monitoring rules and assumptions. The formulas of 
the former of these types (i.e., monitoring rules) express the properties that need to be 
checked at runtime. The formulas of the latter type (i.e., assumptions) are used in order to 
derive information about the state of the system that is being monitored based on 
observations of its behaviour and/or the state of the monitoring process itself. 
Furthermore, as we will see later in the following chapters, in the context of diagnosis, 
assumptions may also be used in order to express basic causal relations that can help the 
identification of the possible causes of the violations of monitoring rules. 
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Despite their different roles in the monitoring process, both monitoring rules and 
assumptions are specified in EC-Assertion [109, 153, 155] a language that is based on 
Event Calculus (EC) [149]. EC is a first-order temporal logic language, which can be 
used for representing and reasoning about events and their effects over time. 
As mentioned above, an event in EC is an occurrence that takes place at a specific 
instance of time (e.g., invocation of a system operation, receipt or dispatch of a message) 
and may have an effect. The effects of events in EC are represented by fluents, i.e., 
conditions which may change over time. A fluent may, for example, specify that a state 
indicating that a system has received a message has been reached or that following the 
receipt of a message a system variable is set to a specific value. In Event Calculus, fluents 
are initiated and/or terminated by event occurrences.  
The occurrence of an event in EC-Assertion is represented by the predicate 
Happens(e,t,ℜ(lb,ub)). Happens(e,t,ℜ(lb,ub))denotes that an event e of 
instantaneous duration occurs at some time t within the time range ℜ(lb,ub) (i.e., lb ≤ t ≤ 
ub). Exending standard EC, EC-Assertion Happens predicate definition includes the time 
range ℜ(lb,ub) for the time variable t due to uniformity and compactness purposes. More 
specifically, by including the time range for the time variable of the Happens predicate 
within the predicate signature, we aim to have all the information (i.e., event e, time 
variable t, and time constraints expressed by ℜ(lb,ub)) that is relevant to the Happens 
predicate defined in a single predicate. It should be noted that the uniqueness of an event 
e is based on its occurrence time represented by the time variable t constrained by 
ℜ(lb,ub). Therefore, EVEREST is designed to treat and reason for an event as a set of 
information that includes temporal constraints for its occurrence. EVEREST uses 
temporal reasoning as a significant part of its event reasoning strategy. Moreover, 
considering that ℜ(lb,ub) is equivalent to the inequality expression  lb ≤ t ≤ ub that can be 
specified as relational predicates, by using the ℜ(lb,ub) notation, we succedd in reducing 
the number of predicates specified in EC-Assertion formulas. The boundaries lb and ub 
that define time ranges are specified as expressions over time variables of the other 
predicates in an EC-Assertion formula and time durations following the BNF grammar of 
Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 – Grammar for specifying boundaries of time variables 
Thus, the boundary expressions for ub and lb are linear expressions of the form: 
lb = l0 + l1 t1 + l2 t2 + … + ln  tn 
ub = u0 + u1 t1 + u2 t2 + … + un tn 
where ti (i=1, ..., n). 
Whilst the standard Event Calculus supports the specification of arbitrary events and 
fluents, EC-Assertion that we use for the specification of monitoring rules and 
assumptions can use only specific types of events and fluents. More specifically, events 
represent invocations of system operations, responses from such operations, or exchanges 
of messages between different system components and are specified using the following 
form: 
event(_id, _sender, _receiver, _status, _sig, _source) 
In this form: 
• _id is a unique identifier of the event 
• _sender is the identifier of the system component that sends the message 
represented by the event 
• _receiver is the identifier of the system component that receives the message 
represented by the event 
• _status represents the processing status of an event. This status is: (i) REQ-B 
(REQuest-Before), if the event is a request for the invocation of an operation or a 
message that has been received but whose processing has not started yet; (ii) 
<boundaryExp> ::= <timeVar> | <constant> | <boundaryExp> [“+”|“-”] 
<durationExp> 
 
<durationExp> ::= <pDuration> | <pDuration> “+” <pDuration> | 
        <pDuration> “−” <pDuration> | <coeff> “*” <pDuration> | 
   <constant> 
 
<pDuration>  ::= <timeVar> “−” <timeVar> 
 
<timeVar>   ::=  “t1” | “t2”  | … | “tn”   
 
<constant>   ::=  <REAL> 
 
<coeff>    ::=  <REAL> 
 
Note: Numeric tokens are represented by <REAL> 
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REQ-A (REQuest-After), if the event is a request for the invocation of an 
operation or a message that has been received and whose processing has started; 
(iii) RES-B (RESult-Before), if the event is a response generated upon the 
completion of an operation that has not been dispatched yet; or (iv) RES-A 
(RESult-After), if the event is a response generated upon the completion of an 
operation that has already been dispatched. 
• _sig is the signature of the dispatched message, or the operation invocation or 
response that is represented by the event. 
• _source is the identifier of the component where the event was captured.  
 
Fluents also have a restricted form in EC-Assertion and are defined as relations between 
objects of the following form:  
relation(Object1, …, Objectn) 
where relation is the name of a relation which associates n objects, namely Object1, …, 
and Objectn.  
The initiation or termination of a fluent f due to the occurrence of an event e at time t 
is denoted by the predicates Initiates(e,f,t) and Terminates(e,f,t), respectively. 
A formula may also use the predicates Initially(f,t0) and HoldsAt(f,t) to denote 
that a fluent f holds at t0 i.e. the start of the execution of a system, and at any time t, 
respectively.  
The assumptions and monitoring rules are specified in terms of the aforementioned 
predicates and have the general form 
body ⇒ head 
If a formula of the above form expresses a rule, the meaning of a rule is that if its body 
evaluates to True, its head must eventually evaluate to True. A formula of the above form 
that represents an assumption has the meaning that if body of the formula evaluates to 
True then it can be deduced that its head evaluates to True. 
Further to the above, it should be noted that the monitoring language requires that 
only one of the Happens predicates in a rule or assumption can have unconstrained lower 
and upper time boundaries. The predicate with the non constrained time variable in a 
formula is called “unconstrained” predicate. Unconstrained predicates should always 
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appear in the body of the formula. During the monitoring process, rules are activated by 
events that can be unified with the unconstrained Happens predicates in their bodies. 
When this unification is possible, the monitor generates a rule instance to represent the 
partially unified rule and keeps this instance active until all the other predicates in it have 
been successfully unified with events and fluents of appropriate types or it is deduced that 
no further unifications are impossible. In the latter case, the rule instance is deleted. 
When a rule instance is fully unified, the monitor checks if the particular instantiation 
that it expresses is satisfied.  
An example of a rule that can be expressed in the monitoring language is given by the 
formula below: 
∀ _eID1,_C1,_C3:String; t1:Time 
 Happens(e(_eID1,_C3,_C1, REQ-A, op(), _C3),t1,ℜ(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
∃ _eID2:String ;t2:Time Happens(e(_eID2,_C3,_C1, RES-A, op(), 
_C1),t2,ℜ(t1+1,t1+k)) 
The property expressed by this rule is that an event e(_eID1,_C3,_C1, REQ-A, op(), _C3) 
representing the dispatch of a request for the invocation of the execution of the operation 
op() in the component _C3 of a system must be followed by another event 
e(_eID2,_C3,_C1, RES-A, op(), _C1) representing the receipt of the result of the 
execution of the operation op() in the component _C3 by _C1 and that the latter event 
must be captured at the _C1 component in no more than k time units after the dispatch of 
the result by _C3. Thus, this rule expresses a bounded availability property for the 
communication channel between the components _C3 and _C1 since it requires that 
results generated by _C3 are transmitted within a bounded time period. 
3.3.2 Standard EVEREST assumptions 
Given the EC-based language that is used in EVEREST framework for specifying 
monitoring rules and assumptions, we should note that are some standard EVEREST 
assumptions with regards to the conditions that any given fluent holds. In the following, 
we provide the specifications of the standard EVEREST assumptions.     
SA1. Initiates(_e1,_f,t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
¬∃_e2,t2. Terminates(_e2,_f,t2) ∧ 
t2 ≥ t1 ∧ t3 ≥ t1  ⇒ 
HoldsAt(_f,t3)   
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SA2. Initially(_f,t0) ∧  
¬∃_e1,t1. Terminates(_e1,_f,t1) ∧  
t1 ≥ t0 ⇒  
HoldsAt(_f,t1)   
The first standard EVEREST assumption (SA1) states that if there is an event e1 that 
initiates the fluent f at time point t1 and there is not an event e2 that terminates f at time 
point t2, where t2 is greater than or equal to t1, then f holds at any time point t3, where t3 
is greater than or equal to t1. In other words, to check whether a fluent f holds at some 
time point t1, EVEREST is implemented to check whether an initiation of fluent f before 
or at t1 is stored in EVEREST’s relevant data base. If there is such an initiation, 
EVEREST then checks whether there is a termination of f at or after t1. If such a 
termination does not exist, EVEREST considers that f holds at any time point after t1. 
Similarly, the second standard EVEREST assumption (SA2) states that if the fluent f 
holds since the start of the execution of the system being monitored and there is not an 
event e1 that terminates f at time point t1, then f holds at time point t1.   
3.4 The Dempster – Shafer Theory of Evidence 
The key characteristic of the Dempster-Shafer theory that underpins our approach is that 
provides a framework for handling ignorance when assessing the likelihood of a 
proposition and its negation on the basis of the available evidence [146]. More 
specifically, the Dempster-Shafer theory allows the assignment of likelihood measures m, 
called “basic probability assignments” or “mass”, to a proposition P and its negation ¬ P 
for which it might hold that m(P) + m(¬P) ≤ 13. A basic probability assignment or mass 
function in the Dempster-Shafer theory is a function from the powerset of a set  of 
mutually exclusive propositions θ called "frame of discernment" to the range [0…1] or, 
equivalently, a function m of the following form: 
Axiom 1. m: ℘(θ) → [0…1] 
                                               
3 In contrast, the axioms of the classic probability theory require that condition Prob(P) + 
Prob(¬P) = 1 for all valid probability functions Prob and propositions P.   
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A function m of this form provides a measure of belief in the truth of the disjunction of 
the propositions in different subsets of θ (i.e., elements of its powerset ℘(θ)) which 
cannot be attributed directly (split) to any of these propositions individually. Formally, a 
function m of the above form is a basic probability assignment only if it also satisfies the 
following two axioms: 
Axiom 2. m(∅) = 0, and 
Axiom 3. 1)( =∑ ⊆θP Pm  
The first of these axioms prevents basic probability assignments from assigning a non-
zero basic probability measure to an empty proposition set. The second axiom requires 
that the sum of the basic probability measures which are assigned by a function m to 
different subsets of a frame of discernment θ must be equal to 1. The subsets P of θ for 
which m(P) > 0 are called “focals” of m and the union of these subsets is called “core” of 
m. Each basic probability assignment function m in the Dempster-Shafer theory induces a 
unique “belief” function Bel, which is defined as: 
Axiom 4. Bel: ℘(θ) → [0…1], and 
Axiom 5. ∑ ⊆= AB BmABel )()(  
A belief function Bel measures the total belief that is committed to the set of propositions 
P by accumulating the basic probability measures which are committed to the different 
subsets of P. Belief functions must also satisfy the following axioms: 
Axiom 6. Bel(∅) = 0 
Axiom 7. Bel(θ) = 1 
Axiom 8. ∑ ≠⊆ =∈
+ ∪≤∩−θIandnI iniiIi
I PBelPBel},...,1{ ,...,1
1|| )()()1(
 
             niandPnwhere ,...,1|,)(| =⊆℘= θθ  
In the Dempster-Shafer theory, two basic probability assignments m1 and m2 can be 
combined according to the rule of the "orthogonal sum": 
Axiom 9. m1 ⊕ m2 (P) = (ΣX ∩ Y = P m1(X) × m2(Y)) / (1 – k0) 
           where k0 = ΣV ∩ W = ∅ and V ⊆ θ and W ⊆  θ m1(V) × m2(W)  
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In this formula, k0 is a normalising parameter used to increase the belief assigned to the 
non-empty intersections of the focals of m1 and m2 in proportion to the belief that would 
be assigned to the empty intersections of these focals. 
The rule of the “orthogonal sum” can be applied as long as:  
m1(A)m 2 (B)A ∩ B ≠ ∅, A⊆θ and B⊆θ∑ < 1 
This condition precludes the combination of conflicting basic probability assignments(i.e. 
assignments, one of which provides a degree of support of 1 to some proposition, while 
the other provides an equal degree to the negation of this proposition). The total belief 
about a proposition P, Bel(P) does not reflect the extent to which some- body fails to 
doubt P. This is given by a third measure called “upper probability” (or “plausibility” 
[146]), defined as: 
Axiom 10. Pl(P) = 1 − Bel(P) = m(B) − m(A)
A ⊆P∑ = m(B)B ∩ P ≠ ∅∑B⊆θ∑  
 
Since m(B)
B ⊆ P
∑ ≤ m(B)
B ∩ P ≠ ∅∑  , it also holds that Pl(P ) ≥ Bel (P) .Hence, for 
each proposition P, there is a range [Bel(P), Pl(P)] which its belief falls within. 
Essentially, Pl(P) reflects the total belief which has not been assigned to the negation of 
P.  
To clarify the above definitions consider the following example. In a medical diagnosis 
problem, there are four mutually exclusive hypotheses:  
C(cold), F(flu), M(meningitis) and NP(no problem).  
Thus, a frame θ discerning the potential dignosis of the medical problem is as follows:   
θ ={C, F, M, NP).  
Let assume that based on studies of relevant medical cases it is known that fever is a 
symptom of C and F in the 40% of the examined cases, while fever occurs in the 30% of 
M examined cases. Therefore, let assume that there is a basic probability assignment 
(BPA) m1 specified as follows: 
 
 
 
0.4, if P = {C, F} 
0.3, if P = {M} 
0.3, otherwise or if P=θ  
m1(P) = 
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Assume also that nausea is a symptom of C, F and M in the 80% of the examined cases. 
Therefore, there is a BPA m2 specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let assume that a diagnosis for a patient experiencing fever and nausea is requested. To 
compute the combination of m1 and m2 BPAs, the orthogonal sum given in Axiom 9 can 
be used .It should be noted that the only intersection of given sets that yields to empty set 
is {M}∩{C,F,NP}. Therefore, for k0 it holds that: 
k0 = 0.3*0.8 =0.24  
For instance, for {C, F}, it holds that: 
m1 ⊕ m2 ({C,F}) = (ΣX ∩ Y = {C,F} m1(X) × m2(Y)) / (1 – k0) 
  = 0.32 + 0.08 / 1 - 0.24  
  = 0.526 
The degree of belief that the combination of m1 and m2 assigns to the rest of the sets are 
shown in  
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2. Also, in  
 
 
 
0.8, if P = {C, F, M} 
 
0.2, otherwise or if P=θ  
m2(P) = 
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Table 3-2, the total belief and plausibility of the considered sets are shown. By taking 
into account the belief and plausibility measures of  
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2, the patient of our case possibly experiences C or F or NP with a possibility 
that ranges within [0.842, 0.921], while there is a weak belief for the M cause that lies 
within [0.079, 0.158].  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2 – Medical problem DS belief measurements 
             Sets 
BPAs 
 
{C,F} 
 
{M} 
 
{C, F, NP} 
 
θ 
m1 0.4 0.3 0 0.3 
m2 0 0 0.8 0.2 
m1⊕ m2 0.526 0.079 0.316 0.079 
Bel 0.526 0.079 0.842  
Pl 0.921 0.158 0.921  
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Chapter 4: Extending EVEREST 
Monitoring Framework for 
Diagnosis 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses how the EVEREST monitoring framework extended to support the 
basic formalization of the diagnostic task. In particular, Section 4.2 provides the basic 
formulation of the diagnostic task and the relevant assumptions that should be taken into 
account. Essentially, Section 4.2 provides the definitions of predicate sets necessary for 
the formalization of the diagnostic task in the context of EC-Assertion. 
Having given the basic formal characteristics of the diagnostic task in Section 4.2, 
Section 4.3 provides the reader with the EC-Assertion specifications of the motivating 
example of the ATMS discussed in the introductory chapter. More specifically, the 
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example in Section 4.3 highlights the categorization of predicates that are used to specify 
assumptions necessary for the undertaking of the diagnostic task according to our 
approach.  
4.2 Basic formulation of the diagnostic problem and 
assumptions 
The generation of explanations of individual events in the diagnosis process is based on 
abductive reasoning. As defined in [122], the purpose of abductive reasoning is to find a 
set of atomic formulas Φ, which in conjunction with a theory TH entail a set of 
observations Ω. Formally, Φ is a set of atomic formulas that satisfy the following 
conditions: 
• TH ∪ Φ |- Ω,        (Condition 1) 
• ∀ f in Φ: predicates(f) ⊆ APreds     (Condition 2)  
In the above conditions, predicates(f) denotes the predicates of formula f (i.e., a 
singleton set as Φ is assumed to be an atomic formula) and APreds is a set of abducible 
predicates. Given that the above conditions are satisfied, the set of formulae Φ can be 
seen as a possible cause of Ω or, in other words, as a possible explanation (or hypothesis) 
of why Ω has happened. 
The basis of abductive reasoning is the derivation of the precondition a of a logical 
implication 
a ⇒ b 
when the consequence b of the implication is known to be true. Obviously this derivation 
is only a conjecture, as the meaning of “a ⇒ b” is that b is true when a is true but not vice 
versa or, in other words, that a is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of b but not a 
necessary condition. Thus, b may have been the consequence of a different cause and the 
derivation of a from b may be incorrect even if a is consistent with a broader logical 
theory (i.e., it satisfies Condition 1 above). However, despite this widely discussed 
logical fallacy of abductive reasoning, the use of it as a heuristic form of searching for 
possible causes of effects is useful in the absence of any other alternatives and when the 
likelihood of the derivations that can be generated by it can be assessed against further 
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evidence. To this end, abductive reasoning has been used as one of the main approaches 
for providing fault diagnosis [41]. 
In fault diagnosis, abduction is used to derive the faults that appear to be the likely 
cause of the problem, given a theory that relates the faults with their effects and a set of 
effects that have been observed. This idea also underpins the use of abductive reasoning 
for diagnosis but the exact use of this form of reasoning has some key differences from 
other approaches. In the following, we will discuss in more detail these differences and 
the measures taken to assess the plausibility of the derivations obtained by abductive 
reasoning in the diagnosis process. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to establish 
the correspondences between the sets of formulas in the abstract formulation of abductive 
reasoning and the key artefacts in the monitoring process. 
More specifically, the sets of formulas in Condition 1 and Condition 2 above have the 
following meanings:  
• Ω is the set of the runtime (also referred as recorded or logged) events and 
fluents which are involved in the violation of a monitoring rule. More 
specifically, runtime events are atomic formulas that contain fully instantiated 
Happens predicates. In the same manner, runtime fluents are atomic formulas 
that contain fully instantiated HoldsAt predicates. In EVEREST context, a 
predicate is considered as fully instantiated if all of the terms of the predicate 
are ground. For instance, considering the ATMS scenario, we have specified 
the following Happens predicate:  
Happens(e(_id2,_r2,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r2,_a,_s),    
        _source2),t2,R(t1, t1+5)) 
A fully instantiated predicate of the above type is as follows:  
Happens(e(E14,Radar112,HLTAirBase,RES-A,  
        signal(Radar112,BA3768,HLT_East), 
        HLTAirBaseSource), 13,R(12,17))  
while a partially instantiated one is the following:  
Happens(e(_id,_r,_receiver,RES-A,signal(_r,BA3768,   
        _s),_source),t2,R(12,17)) 
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• TH is the set of the assumptions specified for the system that is being 
monitored and the events that have been recorded in the log of the monitoring 
framework at the time t when the generation of an abductive explanation is 
required excluding the runtime events, which belong to Ω. Since TH might 
have different elements depending on the time point when the generation of an 
abductive explanation is required in the rest of this report we will refer to it as 
TH(t)
 
to signify the time t of enquiring for an explanation explicitly. 
• APreds is a predefined set of the predicates that can only appear in the leaves 
of the different abductive trees, which can potentially be generated by the 
given assumptions of theory TH. Esentially, the members of APreds (called 
abducibles henceforth) can appear only as body predicates of the assumptions 
of the underlying theory TH.   
We should also note some further assumptions that we make about the formulas (i.e., 
assumptions and monitoring rules) and the events used in the monitoring framework. 
More specifically, if the set of the assumptions for a system that is being monitored is 
denoted by AS and the set of all the events of this system that have been recorded in the 
log of the monitoring framework at some time point t is denoted by RE(t), we assume 
that: 
• TH(t) = AS ∪ (RE(t) −  Ω)     (Condition 3) 
We also assume that the predicates used in the assumptions and monitoring rules 
belong to one of the following three sets [162, 163, 164]: 
• The set of observable predicates OPreds. A predicate is observable if it can be 
unified with an event, which is generated during the operation of the system 
being monitored, is captured by the captors of the EVEREST framework and 
is finally recorded in the event log of the EVEREST framework. The truth 
value of the observable predicates can be established by the successful 
unification process of the predicates themselves with runtime events or by 
deduction on the assumptions of the system being monitored based on 
recorded events of the event log of the EVEREST framework and other 
previously derived predicates. 
•  The set of derived predicates DPreds. A predicate is derived if it can be 
grounded only by applying unification and deductive reasoning on the 
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assumptions of the system being monitored based on recorded events of the 
event log of the EVEREST framework and other previously derived 
predicates. Regarding the evaluation of the truth value of the derived 
predicates, the truth value of this kind of predicates can be established by 
deductive reasoning.  
• The set of abducible predicates APreds has been defined above. The truth 
value of abducibles can be established by abductive reasoning on the 
assumptions of the system being monitored based on recorded events of the 
event log of the EVEREST framework and other previously derived 
predicates. 
Finally, we assume that: 
• The standard Event Calculus predicate Initially, whose formal specification 
contain fluent, is considered as observable predicate or formally: 
Initially ∈ OPreds       (Condition 4) 
• The remaining standard Event Calculus predicates Initiates, Terminates and 
HoldsAt, whose formal specifications contain fluents, are always derived 
predicates. Assuming that FluentContainersPreds = {Initiates, 
Terminates, HoldsAt}, we formally have: 
FluentContainersPreds ⊆ DPreds     (Condition 5) 
• The set DPreds have no elements is common with APreds, while OPreds and 
may have common elements with DPreds and APreds or formally: 
DPreds ∩ APreds = ∅         (Condition 6) 
(DPreds ∩ OPreds ≠ ∅) ∨ (DPreds ∩ OPreds = ∅)  (Condition 7) 
(APreds ∩ OPreds ≠ ∅) ∨ (APreds ∩ OPreds = ∅)    (Condition 8) 
• The assumptions, which are used for generating abductive explanations, are 
formulated as Horn clauses [7]. 
• The set of assumptions, which is used for generating abductive explanations, 
is hierarchical. This means that the dependency graph of the theory, i.e. the 
graph connecting two assumptions A1 and A2 with an arc from A1 to A2 if a 
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predicate in the head of A1 appears also in the body of A2, is acyclic (see 
[33]). 
 
4.3 EC Specifications of the Air Traffic Management System 
(ATMS) Motivating Example  
As an example of cases where monitoring information needs to be enhanced by 
diagnostic explanations, consider an air traffic management system, referred to as 
“ATMS” in the following. ATMS uses different radars to monitor the trajectories of 
airplanes in different air spaces. It is also connected with a system that keeps a record of 
flight plans which are submitted by different planes ahead of flights to indicate the 
expected route of a flight and request flight permission. 
The operations of ATMS may be monitored at runtime to ensure the integrity of its 
components and the information generated by them. Monitoring, for example, may focus 
on properties related to: (i) the liveness of the radars connected to ATMS, and (ii) the 
generation of mutually consistent information by them. An example of a property of this 
kind relates to cases where air spaces are covered by different radars or have overlapping 
areas covered by different radars. In such cases, to check the integrity of the information 
that is provided by the different radars which cover an airspace, we can monitor a rule 
requiring that if one of these radars sends a signal indicating that an airplane is in the 
airspace, every other radar that covers the same space should also send a signal indicating 
the presence of the plane in it within a certain period of time after the receipt of the initial 
signal. Such a rule can be specified in the monitoring language of EVEREST framework 
as follows: 
ATMS.R1. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_r1∈Radars, ∀_receiver1,  
         ∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∀_r2∈Radars, ∀_source1. 
Happens(e(_id1,_r1,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r1, _a, _s),    
        _source1),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
HoldsAt(covers(_r1,_s),t1) ∧ 
HoldsAt(covers(_r2,_s), t1) ∧ 
_r2 ≠ _r1 ⇒ 
Happens(e(_id2,_r2,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r2, _a, _s),  
  _source1),t2,R(t1, t1+5))   
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Rule ATMS.R1 is violated in all cases where the monitor receives a signal event by 
one of the radars of ATMS that covers a specific airspace but not the other. Clearly, 
whilst in such cases, knowing that the rule has been violated is important for the 
operation of ATMS. However, the violation report on its own is not sufficient for 
establishing the reasons why the second expected signal was not received and taking 
appropriate action (if possible). In fact, the violation may have been due to several 
reasons, including the following: 
• The radar that did not send the expected signal was malfunctioning (Cause 1). 
• The communication link between the radar that did not send the expected 
signal and the monitor was malfunctioning or an intruder captured the signal 
and prevented it from reaching the monitor (Cause 2). 
• The radar that sent the expected signal was malfunctioning or its identity was 
faked by an intruder that sent a fake signal to the monitor (Cause 3). 
Identifying which of the above reasons has caused the violation is important for 
taking actions that would restore the integrity of the operation of ATMS. 
The assumptions of ATMS are as follows: 
ATMS.A1. Initially(covers(R1,S1),t0) 
ATMS.A2. Initially(covers(R2,S1),t0) 
The first two assumptions ATMS.A1 and ATMS.A2 state that radars R1 and R2 cover 
airspace S1 since the start of the execution of ATMS.  
ATMS.A3. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2, 
∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_r∈Radars. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender1,_receiver2,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
      _source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
              HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_r,_receiver2,RES-A,signal(_r,_a,_s),   
      _source2),t2,R(t1,t1+5)) 
Assumption ATMS.A3 states that if there is an airplane _a moving in airspace _s at 
some time point t1 and it holds that radar _r covers _s at t1, then it is expected that there 
is a signal from _r notifying that _a moves in _s at some time point t2 within t1 and 5 
time units after t1. Please note that the predicate Happens(e(_id1,_sender1, 
_receiver2, RES-A, inspace(_a,_s), _captor2), t1, R(t1,t1)) is an abducible 
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predicate, while the predicate Happens(e(_id2, _r, _receiver2, RES-A, 
signal(_r,_a,_s), _captor2), t2, R(t1,t1+5)) is an observable predicate. 
ATMS.A4. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2, 
∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender1,_receiver2,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
      _source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒  
              Happens(e(_id2,_a,_receiver2,RES-A,permissionRequest(_a,    
      _s),_source2),t2,R(t1-20,t1-1)) 
Assumption ATMS.A4 states that if there is an airplane _a moving in airspace _s at 
some time point t1, then it was expected that _a has requested permission for entering _s 
at some time point t2 within 20 and 1 time units before t1. 
ATMS.A5. ∀t1∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes, 
∀_s∈Airspaces. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
      _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
              Initiates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a, 
     _s), _source), inairspace(_a,_s),t1) 
Assumption ATMS.A5 states that if there is an airplane _a moving in airspace _s at 
some time point t1, then the fluent inairspace is initiated at t1. 
ATMS.A6. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes, 
∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_airportX∈Airports. 
              Initiates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a, 
_s),_source),inairspace(_a,_s),t1) ∧ 
              HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_a,_receiver,RES-A, 
      landingRequest(_a,_airportX),_source),t2,  
      R(t1-10,t1)) 
Assumption ATMS.A6 states that the fluent inairspace is initiated at t1 by an airplane 
_a moving in airspace _s at t1 and it holds that the landing airspace for_airportX is _s at 
t1, then it was expected that _a has requested landing permission from the control base of 
_airportX at some time point t2 within 10 time units before t1 and t1.   
ATMS.A7. ∀t1∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes, 
∀_airportX∈Airports, ∃_s∈Airspaces.  
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,             
   
 93 
                      changeOfLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),          
                _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
  Initiates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,  
     changeOfLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),_source), 
     landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) 
Assumption ATMS.A7 states that if there is an event that changes the landing 
approach of _airportX to _s at t1, then the fluent, which specifies that airspace _s is the 
landing airspace of _airportX is initiated at t1. 
ATMS.A8. ∀t1∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes, 
∀_airportX∈Airports, ∃_s∈Airspaces.  
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,             
                      removeLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),          
                _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
  Terminates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,  
     removeLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),_source), 
     landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) 
Assumption ATMS.A8 states that if there is an event that reconfigures the ATMS by 
setting airspace _s as a no longer valid landing approach of _airportX at t1, then the 
fluent, which specifies that airspace _s is the landing airspace of _airportX, is terminated 
at t1. 
In terms of the predicate sets APreds, DPreds and OPreds, which are defined in 
Section 4.1, the membership of the predicates of the ATMS theory (i.e. the set of ATMS 
rule and assumptions) is as follows: 
APreds = {Happens(e(_id,_r,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
                  _source2),t,R(t,t))                                     
        } 
Dpreds = { HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t),  
         Initiates(e(_id,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a, 
             _s), _source), inairspace(_a,_s),t), 
         HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t), 
         Initiates(e(_id,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,  
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        changeOfLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),_source), 
             landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t) 
        } 
OPreds = { Initially(covers(R1,S1),t0), Initially(covers(R2,S1),t0), 
          Happens(e(_id,_r,_receiver,RES-A,signal(_r, _a, _s),    
                  _source),t,R(t,t)), 
          Happens(e(id,_a,_receiver,RES-A,permissionRequest(_a,    
                  _s),_source),t,R(t,t)), 
          Happens(e(_id,_a,_receiver,RES-A,  
                  landingRequest(_a,_airportX),_source),t,R(t,t)), 
          Happens(e(_id,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,                      
                                   changeOfLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),      
                  _source),t,R(t,t)) 
                } 
 
Chapter 5: The Diagnostic Approach 
5.1 Overview 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with a detailed description of our 
diagnostic approach. As a roadmap for the content of this chapter, we initially provide a 
high level overview of the diagnostic process.  
The overall process of diagnosing the causes of S&D monitoring rule violations has four 
main stages as discussed in [162, 163, 164]. As shown in Figure 5-1, these stages are: 
1. Explanation generation 
2. Explanation effect identification  
3. Explanation plausibility assessment 
4. Diagnosis generation 
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Figure 5-1 – The overall process of the diagnostic approach 
 
 
In the first of these stages (i.e., explanation generation), the diagnosis process generates 
all the possible explanations for the individual events which have caused an S&D 
monitoring rule violation. These events are referred to as “violation observations” in the 
following. The possible explanations of violation related observations are generated from 
assumptions that have been given to the monitor regarding the operation of the system 
that is being monitored using abductive reasoning. The explanations generation step is 
discussed in details in Section 5.2. 
After generating explanations for the individual violation observations, the diagnosis 
process enters its second stage, namely the stage of explanation effect identification, 
which is discussed in Section 5.3. This stage is concerned with the identification of all the 
possible consequences of the explanations of the individual violation observations if 
these explanations were valid. Whilst the generation of individual explanations from the 
observation violations are generated by abductive reasoning, the effects of individual 
explanations are derived by deduction using the assumptions specified in S&D patterns. 
Following the identification of the effects of individual explanations, the diagnosis 
process enters its third stage. At this stage, the process assesses the likelihood of the 
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validity of the individual event explanations. To do so, the expected effects of the 
individual explanations are checked against the event log of the EVEREST monitoring 
framework to find if there are events in the log that match the expected effects. Every 
match that is found between an expected effect and an event in the log casts confirming 
evidence to the explanation associated with the effect. On the other hand, the absence of a 
matching event for an effect casts disfavouring evidence to the explanation. Based on the 
confirming and disconfirming elements of evidence which are identified during this 
stage, the diagnosis process estimates a belief and a plausibility measure for each 
individual explanation. The diagnosis process third step details are worked out in Section 
5.4. 
Finally, at the fourth stage of the diagnosis process, namely the stage of diagnosis 
generation which is discussed in Section 5.5, the diagnosis framework constructes 
alternative aggregated explanations for the S&D rule violation from the explanations of 
the individual violation observations and computes beliefs in the validity of these 
aggregate explanations. Using these beliefs the framework also identifies the most 
plausible aggregate explanation for the violation.  
In the rest of this chapter, we discuss each of the above stages in detail presenting the 
reasoning mechanisms which are deployed in them and giving examples of applying 
these mechanisms.  
5.2 Generation of Explanations 
5.2.1 The process of generating explanations 
Abductive reasoning is used only in the first stage of the diagnosis process, as a 
mechanism of trying to find possible causes of the runtime events that have caused a 
violation of an S&D monitoring rule. Establishing the possible causes of the events which 
are involved in a rule violation has a dual role in the diagnosis process: first it provides a 
possible explanation of the individual events and fluents which have caused the violation, 
and second it provides confirmatory evidence that these events have indeed taken place 
and have not been the result of some attack or malfunctioning in the monitoring 
framework and/or the system(s) being monitored by it. The latter role of individual event 
explanations is very significant as the possibility of attacks in the monitoring framework 
and the systems, which are being monitored by it, cannot be precluded. In the scenario 
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that we introduced in Section 0, for instance, received radar signals may be the result of a 
radar malfunctioning or an attack by an intruder who has faked the identity of a radar R 
and sends signals which appear to have been sent by R. 
The explanations of the events, which are involved in the violation of an S&D 
monitoring rule, are generated by backward chaining. More specifically, when the 
diagnostic framework is given a specific event E to find an explanation for, it searches 
through the assumptions, which are known about the system that is being monitored to 
see if they have a predicate P in their head that can be unified with E. This check is 
performed in two steps. For every assumption A that has such a predicate, the framework 
checks if the unification between P and E covers all the non time variables of A (i.e., it 
provides bindings for all these variables) and, if it does, it tries to generate an explanation 
for E using A. More specifically, the framework checks if the time constraints which are 
imposed by the event E on the instantiated predicates (conditions) in the body of A, can 
lead to concrete and feasible time ranges for these predicates. To do this, the framework 
retrieves the constraints that relate the time variable of the predicate P in the head of A 
that was matched with E and the time variables of each of the predicates in the body of A, 
replaces the time variable tp of P with the time stamp of the event E that needs to be 
explained and calculates the maximum and minimum possible values for the time 
variables of the predicates in the body of A. 
The calculation of the minimum and maximum values of the time variables of the 
predicates in the body of A is treated as a linear programming problem. This is possible 
due to the way in which constraints for time variables are specified in the monitoring rule 
(note that the same language is used to specify both monitoring rules and assumptions. 
As we discussed in Section 3.3, according to this language, each Event Calculus formula 
that specifies a monitoring rule or assumption must define an upper and a lower boundary 
for the time variables of all the predicates in the formula. 
Thus, the upper and lower boundaries ub and lb of a time variable t of a predicate in a 
formula become effectively linear expressions of the form: 
lb = l0 + l1 t1 + l2 t2 + … + ln  tn 
ub = u0 + u1 t1 + u2 t2 + … + un tn 
where ti (i=1, ..., n) are other time variables in the formula and the constraints related to t 
are of the form: 
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l0 + l1 t1 + l2 t2 + … + ln  tn ≤ TE  (C1) 
TE ≤  u0 + u1 t1 + u2 t2 + … + un tn  (C2) 
Then from the above formulas, it might be possible to compute the minimum and 
maximum possible values of any variable ti (i=1, ..., n) in them by solving the linear 
optimization problems max(1ti + ∑j=1,…,n, j≠i 0*tj) and min(1ti + ∑j=1,…,n, j≠i 0*tj) subject to 
the constraints C1 and C2. An evident candidate method for solving these problems is 
George Dantzig’s classic Simplex method, which is revisited in [63]. By solving these 
problems for each of the time variables of the predicates in the body of an assumption A, 
it can be established if a concrete and feasible time range exists for these variables. 
In cases that such ranges exist, the explanation generation procedure applies the most 
general unifier of E and P to the predicates in the body of A and checks if the instantiated 
predicates which result in the body of A are abducible predicates or can be matched with 
events already recorded in the event log of the monitor. In both sub-cases, the instantiated 
abducible predicates in the body of A are added to the ongoing explanation. In sub-cases 
where an instantiated predicate in the body of A is neither an abducible predicate nor 
does it correspond to a recorded event, backward chaining is applied again on it to try to 
find other assumptions which have predicates in their head that can be unified with it. 
Such predicates are retrieved and the process is repeated for the predicates in the bodies 
of the relevant assumptions. In the case of an assumption that has been retrieved for 
constructing an explanation for an event E but has some predicate P’ in its body that does 
not correspond to abducible predicate or a recorded event and, furthermore, cannot be 
explained through other assumptions, the assumption is abandoned and no explanation is 
constructed from it E. 
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Explain(e, tmin(e), tmax(e), finit) 
1. // let Φe be a list keeping the disjunction of possible explanations of atomic predicate e  
2. Φe = [  ]OR   
3. // e is an abducible atom; add e to the current explanation    
4. If e ∈ ABD Then  
5.     Φe = append(Φe , [(e, tmin(e), tmax(e))]) 
6.     //let AbductivePathe[ ] be the list keeping the identifiers of f that were visited for abducing e 
7.     append(AbductivePathe[ ], finit)   
8. // e is not an abducible atom; find explanations for it  
9. Else      
10.     // try all alternative explanations by reasoning on all f that belong to the assumptions set AS    
11.     For all f ∈ AS Do 
12.         // let function mgu return the most general unifier of e and a predicate p if this unifier exists     
13.         u = mgu(head(f), e)  
14.         If u ≠ ∅ and u covers all non time variables in body(f) Then 
15.             // let CNDf be a list keeping the body predicates of formula f (conditions of f henceforth) 
16.        Copy body(f) into CNDf     
17.   FormulaFailed = False 
18.             // let Φf  be a list keeping a conjunction of elements explaining the conditions of f 
19.   Φf  = []AND  
20.   While FormulaFailed = False and CNDf ≠ ∅ DO     
21.       Remove some condition C from CNDf   
22.       Compute the min and max possible values tmin(C), tmax(C) of C based on tmin(e) and tmax(e) 
23.                // tmin(C), tmax(C) are not undeterminable 
24.       If tmin(C) ≠ NULL and tmax(C) ≠ NULL Then  
25.           Cu = ApplyUnification(u, C) 
26.       // C is an abducible atom; add it to current explanation 
27.                     If C ∈ ABD Then     
28.           Φf  = append (Φf , [(Cu, tmin(C), tmax(C))]ABD ) 
29.                          append(AbductivePathCu[ ], f) 
30.       // C is not an abducible atom 
31.                     Else  
32.           find a derived or recorded predicate ec such that: ec can be unified with Cu and  
33.                                                                                                        tmin(ec) ≥ tmin(C) and t(ec) ≤ tmax(C) 
34.      // no recorded or derived predicate matching C has been found  
35.                         If ec = NULL Then  
36.          ΦC = Explain(C, tmin(C), tmax(C), f) 
37.      If ΦC is empty Then 
38.          FormulaFailed = True 
39.          Else 
40.          Φf = append(Φf , ΦC) 
41.                             End If 
42.          End If 
43.      End If 
44.          End If 
45.      End While  
46.      If FormulaFailed = False Then Φe = append (Φe,Φf)  End if 
47.       End if 
48.    End For 
49. End If 
50. return(Φe) 
END Explain 
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Figure 5-2 - Algorithm for generating explanations of atomic predicates  
The algorithm for generating explanations for an atomic predicate E is called Explain and 
is listed in Figure 5-2. This algorithm generates a list representing the alternative 
explanations for a particular atomic predicate. In general there might be zero or more 
alternative explanations for an atomic predicate and each of these explanations consist of 
abduced atomic formulas. 
The algorithm starts by getting as input an atomic predicate e for which an 
explanation is required and the boundaries of the time range of this predicate tmin(e) and 
tmax(e). It also has a fourth input parameter, called finit, which represents the initial 
formula that is to be used for generating explanations. This parameter is not used in the 
initial invocation of Explain since the objective of the process is to find all the possible 
alternative explanations of the input predicate. In subsequent recursive invocations of the 
algorithm, however, it is used to indicate the identifier of the last formula that was used in 
the generation of an ongoing explanation since along with explanations the algorithm 
records the backward chaining path through which the abduced atomic predicates of each 
explanation were generated (see lines 7 and 29 in Figure 5-2). Given an input predicate e 
that is to be explained, if the predicate symbol of e is an abducible predicate, a pair of the 
predicate e and its time range (i.e., (e, tmin(e), tmax(e))) is added to the current list of 
explanations (i.e., list Φe) and the algorithm terminates by returning this list of 
explanations (see lines 4, 5 and 50 in Figure 5-2). If, however, e is not an abducible 
predicate, Explain checks through the known assumptions of the system that is being 
monitored (i.e., the elements of the set AS) to find those whose head could be unified 
with e. The unification test is performed by calling the function mgu that returns the most 
general unifier of two formulas [94]. In general, the general unifier can be considered as a 
list containing value bindings for all the variables of the two input formulas. However, 
the mgu function adaptation in EVEREST returns value bindings for all the non-time 
variables of the input formulas. Thus, if a non empty unifier is found between e and a 
predicate in the head of an assumption f, the algorithm checks if the unification covers all 
the predicates in the body of the assumption and, if it does, it creates a condition list 
(called CNDf) with the predicates of the body of the assumption and tries to explain each 
of these predicates (see lines 14-16 in Figure 5-2). More specifically, for each of these 
predicates, the algorithm computes initially the minimum and maximum possible values 
(tmin(C), tmax(C)). This computation is based on the Simplex algorithm [63] using as 
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constraints the constraints defined by all the particular assumption f between the time 
variable of the current body predicate and the time variable of the predicate P in the head 
of f that was unified with e and two more constraints to ensure that the time variable of P 
is within the time range tmin(e) and tmax(e) of  e (see line 22 in Figure 5-2). If this 
optimisation problem has a solution and the boundaries for the time variable of the 
predicate in the body of f can be identified, the Explain algorithm applies the detected 
unification between f and e to the current predicate in the body of f in order to instantiate 
it (see line 25 in Figure 5-2), and checks if the instantiated predicate is an abducible 
predicate (see line 27 in Figure 5-2). If the current instantiated predicate in the body of f 
is an abducible predicate, it is added to a temporary explanation list for the assumption 
(Φf) along with its time range, while the list that keeps the abductive path of the predicate 
(AbductivePathCu[ ]) is updated with the identifier f of the assumption from which it has 
been abduced (see lines 28 and 29 in Figure 5-2). Please note that the id of the event of 
each atomic formula, which is added to the explanation list, is set to ABD. Otherwise, if 
the current predicate is not an abducible predicate, the algorithm checks if there is a 
runtime event matching it and if it cannot find such an event it tries to generate an 
explanation of the predicate by abduction by calling itself recursively (see lines 31−36 in 
Figure 5-2). If this recursive call succeeds in generating an explanation of the current 
predicate by abduction, this explanation is added to the current explanation list and the 
algorithm proceeds by investigating the next condition of f. 
The iteration over the conditions of f continues until either all the predicates in the 
body of f have been successfully explained or correspond to runtime events or until the 
algorithm encounters a predicate that cannot be explained. In this case, it terminates 
unsuccessfully for f. 
The Explain algorithm is called for all the atomic predicates, which are involved in 
the violation of an S&D monitoring rule in order to generate all the possible explanations 
that can be found for these predicates. If an atomic predicate appears in a negated form in 
an S&D violation and the invocation of the algorithm Explain does not produce any 
explanations for the negated form of the predicate, the algorithm is invoked to produce 
explanations for the non-negated form of the predicate.  
In the following section, we give an example of using the Explain algorithm to 
generate possible explanations for atomic predicates. 
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5.2.2 Examples of explanation generation 
As an example of how the algorithm Explains works consider the generation of 
explanations for runtime events that cause a violation of Rule ATMS.R1, which was 
introduced in Sections 1.2 and 4.3 and is specified as follows: 
ATMS.R1∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_r1∈Radars, ∀_receiver1,  
         ∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∀_r2∈Radars, ∀_source1. 
Happens(e(_id1,_r1,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r1, _a, _s),    
        _soure1),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
HoldsAt(covers(_r1,_s),t1) ∧ 
HoldsAt(covers(_r2,_s), t1) ∧ 
_r2 ≠ _r1 ⇒ 
Happens(e(_id2,_r2,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r2, _a, _s),  
       _source1),t2,R(t1, t1+5)) 
Assuming that the monitor has received the events shown in the log of Figure 5-3, Rule 
ATMS.R1 is violated by: 
• the event (E4) (i.e., Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7))) in the event log of Figure 5-3  
• the atomic formula  Happens(e(NF,R2,AirBase,signal(R2,A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),t,R(7,12)), which signifies the absence of a signal from 
radar R2 within the time period expected by Rule ATMS.R1 given the signal of 
radar R1, and 
• the atomic formulas HoldsAt(covers(R1,S1),7)  and 
HoldsAt(covers(R2,S1),7) 
Event Log for ATMS: 
(E1) Happens(e(E1,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-  
            a,S2),AirBaseCaptor),0,R(0,0)) 
(E2) Happens(e(E2,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A2,S2),AirBaseCaptor),1,  
            R(1,1)) 
(E3) Happens(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR- 
            a,S1),AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)) 
(E4) Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,  
            R(7,7))  
(E5) Happens(e(E5,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A5,S1),AirBaseControl),13,   
            R(13,13)) 
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Figure 5-3 – Event log for ATMS 
The truth value of the atomic formula Happens(e(NF,R2,AirBase,signal(R2,A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),t,R(7,12)) has been evaluated to False by virtue of the principle of 
negation as failure due to the fact that the monitor has received the events (E2) and (E5) 
from radar R2 at the time points T=1 and T=13 but no other event from the same radar 
between these two points. Also, the atomic formulas HoldsAt(covers(R1,S1), 7)  and 
HoldsAt(covers(R2,S1), 7) are deduced by the monitor from: 
• the standard EVEREST assumption SA2 that is specified as follows: 
Initially(_f,t0) ∧ 
¬∃_e1,t1. Terminates(_e1,_f,t1) ∧ 
t1 ≥ t0  ⇒ 
HoldsAt(_f,t1) 
• the Initially ground predicates of  assumptions ATMS.A1 and ATMS.A2, which 
signify that radars R1 and R2 cover the airspace S1 since the start of the execution 
of the ATMS, and 
• the absence of any event that signifies the repositioning of any of the two radars 
until the time point T=7, when the monitor receives the signal for the presence of 
aircraft A1 in S1 from R1, and could essentially terminate the ground fluents 
covers(R1,S1) and covers(R2,S1) before time point T=7  
Before describing the explanation generation process based on the given theory and 
event log, it would not be harmful to the understanding of the process itself to interpret 
the information, which is provided by the given theory and log event, about the ATMS. 
Firstly, as we have discussed above, the assumptions ATMS.A1 and ATMS.A2 along 
with the absence of any event that signifies the repositioning of any of the two radars 
until the time point T=7 signify that the airspace S1 is under the surveillance of the 
ATMS, and more specifically is covered by the radars R1 and R2.  
By interpreting event (E1), it is signified that, besides airspace S1, airspace S2 and 
airport AR-a is under the surveillance of the ATMS. Additionally, given the assumption 
ATMS.A7 and the standard EVEREST assumption SA2, it holds that S2 is the airspace 
used for landing approach to AR-a at time point T=0 onwards, until the time point when 
an event, which can terminate this condition according to assumption ATMS.A8, occurs. 
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Similarly, event (E3) informs that airspace S1 can also be used for landing approach to 
AR-a at time point T=2 onwards, until again an event that can terminate this condition 
according to assumptions ATMS.A8 occurs. Moreover, event (E1) and (E3) introduce the 
system components AirBase and AirBaseCaptor, as the sender and receiver, and captor 
arguments of their signature respectively.  
Events (E2), (E4) and (E5) signify the actual runtime information about the moving 
objects within the sections of airspace that is under surveillance of the ATMS. More 
specifically, by interpreting (E2), it is signified that there was a signal, which was 
generated by radar R2 and informs that airplane A2 was in airspace S2 at time point T=1. 
Also, from (E4), we understand that there was a signal, which was generated by radar R1 
and informs that the airplane A1 was in airspace S1 at time point T=7. Finally, event (E5) 
signifies that there was a signal, which was generated by radar R2 and informs that the 
airplane A5 was in airspace S1 at time point T=13. It is notable that the three events do 
not introduce any new knowledge regarding the ATMS components.  
The explanation generation process starts by trying to generate explanations for the 
formulae that signify the existence and absence of events involved in the violation of 
Rule ATMS.R1, namely Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)) and 
Happens(e(NF,R2,AirBase,signal(R2,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t,R(7,12)). As we have 
discussed in Section 3.3.2 and 4.3, the following assumptions are also part of the 
formulas given to the diagnosis tool:  
SA1   Initiates(_e1,_f,t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
¬∃_e2,t2. Terminates(_e2,_f,t2) ∧ 
t2 ≥ t1 ⇒ 
HoldsAt(_f,t2)   
SA2  Initially(_f,t0) ∧  
¬∃_e1,t1. Terminates(_e1,_f,t1) ∧ 
t1 ≥ t0 ⇒  
HoldsAt(_f,t1) 
ATMS.A1 Initially(covers(R1,S1),t0) 
ATMS.A2 Initially(covers(R2,S1),t0) 
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ATMS.A3   ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2,    
          ∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_r∈Radars. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender1,_receiver2,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
      _source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
              HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_r,_receiver2,RES-A,signal(_r,_a,_s),   
           _source2),t2,R(t1,t1+5)) 
Given the assumptions above, when given the atomic formula 
Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)) to explain, 
the Explain algorithm detects that the formula can be unified with the predicate 
Happens(e(_id2, _r, _receiver2, RES-A, signal(_r,_a,_s), _captor2), t2, 
R(t1,t1+5)) in the head of assumption ATMS.A3, and the most general unifier of the 
two formulae (i.e., {_id2/E4, _r/R1, _receiver2/AirBase, _a/A1, _s/S1, 
_captor2/AirBaseCaptor}) covers all the non time variables which appear in the body 
of this assumption. Furthermore, the linear constraint system that is generated from the 
definition of the boundaries of the time variable t2 in ATMS.A3 after substituting the 
timestamp T=7 of the event Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)) for this variable consists of the 
constraints  t1  ≤ 7 and 7 ≤ t1 + 5. From these two constraints, it is easy to see that the time 
range for the time variable t1 is [2, 7]. Thus, the conditions of Explain are satisfied and 
the algorithm generates the atomic formula Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)) as a possible explanation of 
Happens(e(E4, R1, AirBase, RES-A, signal(R1,A1,S1), AirBaseCaptor), 
7,R(7,7)). Due to the fact that the predicate Happens(e(_id,_r,_receiver,RES-
A,inspace(_a,_s),_source2),t,R(t,t))belongs to the set of the abducible predicates 
APreds (see Section 4.2) this intermediary explanation needs no further elaboration and 
can be used as an abduced explanation. Note, however, that as the explanation 
Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)) 
has been generated by the assumption ATMS.A3, the candidate explanation will be 
maintained only if the other instantiated predicate of the body of ATMS.A3, namely 
HoldsAt(covers(R1,S1),t1), holds when t1 takes values in the range R(2,7). The 
validity of this predicate, however, can be deduced from the standard EVEREST 
assumption SA2, the assumption ATMS.A3 and the absence of an event that could 
reposition R1 and therefore needs no further exploration by backward chaining. Hence, 
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the Explains algorithm will return the atomic formula Happens(e(ABD, 
R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7))as an explanation 
of the event Happens(e(E4, R1, AirBase, RES-A, signal(R1,A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor), 7,R(7,7)). Figure 5-4 shows graphically the reasoning path through 
which the explanation of this event is generated and the list of explanations returned by 
the algorithm Explain in this case. 
 
Figure 5-4 – Graphical view of explanation generation 
5.3 Identification of Explanation Effects 
5.3.1 The process of identifying explanation effects 
After the generation of the possible explanations for the events involved in the violation 
of a rule, the diagnosis process identifies the expected effects of these explanations and 
uses them to assess the plausibility of the explanations. The assessment of explanation 
plausibility is based on the hypothesis that if the expected effects of an explanation match 
with events that have occurred (and recorded) during the operation of the system that is 
being monitored, then there is evidence about the validity of the explanation. This is 
Happens(e(_id2,_r,_receiver2,RES-A,signal(_r,_a,_s),  
                _captor2),t2, R(t1,t1+5)) 
SA2 
HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t1) 
 
Happens(e(_id1,_sender1,_receiver2,RES-    
                       A,inspace(_a,_s),_captor2),t1,R(t1,t1))  
Event to be explained: 
Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseControl),7,R(7,7)) 
Initially(covers(_r,_s),t0) 
 
ATMS.A3 
¬Terminates(e,covers(_r,_s),t1) 
 
Unification with unifiers =  
{_id2/E4, _r/R1,   
_receiver2/AirBase,      
_a/A1, _s/S1,   
_captor2/AirBaseCaptor} 
 
Deductive reasoning path 
 
Abductive reasoning path 
Explanations =  [Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-A,  
                           signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)),    
                         [[(Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,     
                            inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),  
                            t1,R(2,7)))]ABD]AND]OR 
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because the recorded events that match the expected effects of the explanation may have 
also been caused by the explanation itself. In case that any constituent abduced predicate 
of an explanation can be occurred or formally belongs to the OPreds set (see Section 4.2), 
it casts positive evidence to the plausibility of the explanation that is part of. It should be 
noted that under the same hypothesis the violation observation (event) that the 
explanation was generated for also casts positive evidence for the explanation. However, 
only the evidence that arises from this event is disregarded to avoid cycles in the 
reasoning process.  
The identification of the expected effects of explanations is based on deductive 
reasoning. More specifically, given an explanation Exp = P1 ∧…∧ Pn that is expressed as 
a conjunction of abduced predicates, the diagnosis process iterates over its constituent 
predicates Pi. In case that any Pi is an observable predicate (i.e. belongs to the OPreds set 
(see Section 4.1)), then Pi itself is considered as expected consequence of explanation 
Exp. For each Pi, the diagnosis process finds the system assumptions B1 ∧ … ∧ Bn ⇒ H 
that have a predicate Bj in their body which can be unified with Pi and the rest of the 
predicates Bu (u = 1,…,n and u ≠ j) in it are True. For such assumptions, if the predicate 
H in the head of the assumption is fully instantiated and its time range is determined, H is 
derived as a possible consequence of Pi. Then, if H is an observable predicate, i.e., a 
predicate that can be matched with recorded events, H is added to the expected effects of 
Exp. If H, however, is not an observable predicate, the effect identification process tries 
to generate the consequences of H recursively and, if it finds any such consequences that 
correspond to observable events, it adds them to the set of the expected effects of Exp. In 
this way, the diagnosis process computes the transitive closure of the effects of Exp. 
To clarify the basis of this principle, assume that explanations of an event E1, which 
has been involved in the violation of a rule, need to be found based on the following set 
of assumptions: 
(A1) A ∧ B ⇒ E1 
(A2) C ⇒ E1 
(A3) C ⇒ E2 
(A4) A ⇒ E3 
(A5) B ⇒ E4 
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Given the assumptions (A1) - (A5) and assuming that A, B and C are abducible 
atomic formulae, while C belongs to the OPreds set too, the algorithm Explain would 
generate the following two alternative explanations for E1: 
[E1, [[[(A3:A)]ABD, [(A3:B)]ABD ]AND,[[(A4:C)]ABD ]]OR 
or, equivalently in a logical form, the explanations are as follows: 
Exp1(E1)∨ Exp2(E1)  
         where: 
Exp1(E1) = A ∧ B, and  
        Exp2(E1) = C 
To assess the plausibility of each of these explanations, we can identify the 
consequences that the individual atomic formulae that constitute them would have. 
Following this line of exploration, we can identify that 
• if A had occurred it should have caused E3 due to assumption (A4) 
• if B had occurred it should have caused E4 due to assumption (A5), and 
• if C had occurred, there are two expected effects: 
ATMS.A1'. C should be included in the event log, due to the fact that C is 
observable predicate, and   
ATMS.A2'. C would have caused E2 due to assumption (A3) 
Subsequently, if we assume that the event log of the monitoring infrastructure 
includes the events E1, E2, C, E3 and E5, the occurrence of C and E2 would cast 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that C is true or, equivalently, that Exp2(E1) is 
valid. This evidence would be casted by the event E2. Similarly, E3 would cast some 
evidence that A is true and the absence of an event E4 in the log would provide some 
evidence that B is not true. Thus, there would be conflicting evidence for explanation 
Exp1(E1). 
The assessment of the plausibility of alternative explanations in the diagnostic 
framework is based on this principle of collecting evidence about the truth of the abduced 
atomic formulae in explanations by searching for events in the log of the monitoring 
infrastructure that confirm or disconfirm the expected consequences of these abduced 
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formulae. This evidence is then used to compute belief measures in the existence of 
explanations using the Dempster Shafer theory of evidence [146] as we explain in 
Section 5.4. 
Before, however, looking into the estimation of such beliefs, we present the process 
of generating the expected consequences of explanations. The generation of such 
consequences is based on the algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences, which is shown in 
Figure 5-5. 
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Figure 5-5 - Algorithm for computing the transitive closure of deductions from 
abduced predicates 
The algorithm shown in Figure 5-5 takes as input the set of the abduced ground 
predicates Pi (i=1,…,n) of the conjunctive formula P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn that constitutes an 
explanation (i.e. the AF input parameter) and finds all the grounded observable predicates 
Generate_AE_consequences(AF: Set of Grounded Atomic Formulas, TLIST: List of Assumption Templates, 
CNS: Set of Consequences) 
1. CNS = { } 
2. TLIST’ = copy of TLIST 
3.  For each atomic formula Pi ∈  AF Do 
4.           If Pi is observable Then 
5.               CNS = CNS ∪ { Pi }  
6.           End If    
7.   For each assumption template T in TLIST’ Do 
8.    For each predicate Q ∈ body(T) Do 
9.     If mgu(Pi,Q) ≠∅ and CompatibleTimeRange(Pi,Q) Then 
10.      T’ := copy of T 
11.      Apply mgu(Pi,Q) onto T’ 
12.      Set the truth value of Q in T’ to True 
13.          Update time ranges of other predicates in T’ based on the time range of Pi 
14.     If for all predicates R ∈ Body(T’) such that R≠Q, R is true Then 
15.      If head(T’) is fully instantiated Then 
16.       If head(T’) is observable Then 
17.        CNS = CNS ∪ { (T.id, head(T’)) } 
18.        delete T’ 
19.       Else /*head(T’) is a derived predicate */ 
20.        CNS’ = { } 
21.        Generate_consequences({head(T’)}, TLIST’, CNS’) 
22.        CNS = CNS ∪ CNS’ 
23.       End If 
24.      End If 
25.     Else /* there is a predicate R in Body(T’) whose truth value is unknown */ 
26.      If for all predicates R ∈ Body(T’) such that R≠Q and  
27.                                                                                               R is not true and  
28.                                                                                               R is an abducible predicate Then 
29.       TLIST’ = append (T’, TLIST’) 
30.      End If 
31.     End If 
32.    End If 
33.   End For 
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(i.e. the returned CNS input parameter) that could be derived from them. The 
computation of consequences is based on the assumptions specified for the system 
involved. The algorithm uses a set of templates of the given system assumptions (i.e., the 
input parameter TLIST). Let a template of any given assumption be a copy of the 
assumption formula. Please note that the aforementioned informal definition of a 
template implies implicitly that there is a process, which creates and deletes copies of any 
given assumption formula. During the reasoning process, a template can be partially or 
fully instantiated as result of the unification process that may take place.  
To derive the possible consequences, the algorithm iterates over the input predicates 
Pi. For each Pi, in case that any Pi is an observable predicate (i.e. belongs to the OPreds 
set (see Section 4.2)) (see lines 3−6 in Figure 5-5), the algorithm adds Pi to the CNS set. 
Subsequently, the algorithm tries to find which of the partially instantiated assumption 
templates of the form A: Body ⇒ Head have a predicate P in Body that can be unified 
with Pi and has a compatible time range with it (see lines 7-9 in Figure 5-5). For each 
assumption template that has such a predicate Q, the algorithm creates a new copy T’ of it 
in order to represent the update (further instantiation) of the template with Pi and, in the 
new copy T’, it applies the unification found between Q and Pi to all the predicates of T’, 
sets the truth value of the predicate Q that was unified with Pi to True and updates the 
time ranges of all the predicates in T’ based on the time range of Pi (see lines 10-13 in 
Figure 5-5). The creation of a new copy of the assumption template at this stage is 
necessary in order to ensure the completeness of the reasoning process. More specifically, 
by creating a new copy of the assumption template, there will be an opportunity to match 
the original assumption instance that is represented by the template T with some other 
predicate Pj in the conjunctive formula P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn, when the algorithm visits Pj. 
Following the creation of the new template instance T’ for Pi, the algorithm 
Generate_AE_Consequences checks whether the rest of the predicates in the body T’ (if 
there are any) are also satisfied, i.e., they are grounded predicates and their truth value is 
True (see line 14 in Figure 5-5). For a Happens, Initiates or Terminates predicate R, this 
test is realized by checking the truth value of the predicate that is stored in the template 
since in cases where a grounded observable or derived predicate has already been unified 
with R, the truth value of R must have been set to True. For HoldsAt predicates, however, 
the test is a query to the fluent initiation and termination database of the monitoring 
framework that checks whether the condition expressed by the standard EVEREST 
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assumption SA1 and SA2 (see Section 3.3.2) is satisfied for the HoldsAt predicate at the 
required time point.  Following this test, if the truth value of all the predicates R in the 
assumption template is True and, furthermore, the predicate head(T’) in the head of T’ is 
fully instantiated (i.e., all of head(T’) variables have concrete values after the application 
of mgu(Pi,Q) on T’) and the exact boundaries of its time range can be determined, the 
algorithm checks whether predicate head(T’) that can been deduced from T’ is an 
observable predicate (see line 16 in Figure 5-5). If head(T’) is observable predicate, the 
algorithm adds it along with the identifier of the assumption that it used to derive it, to the 
possible consequences of the explanation P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn (see line 17 in Figure 5-5). In 
this case, the algorithm also deletes T’ as this fully instantiated predicate will be not 
useful to reasoning. If, however, the predicate head(T’)is not an observable predicate, the 
algorithm still treats it as a derived predicate and recursively tries to identify the 
consequences of head(T’) by invoking itself having head(T’) as input (see line 21 in 
Figure 5-5). If the recursive invocation finds any consequences of head(T’), it adds them 
to the set of the expected consequences of the explanation (see line 22 in Figure 5-5). In 
this way, Generate_AE_Consequences computes the transitive closure of all the possible 
consequences of the abduced conjunctive explanation formula P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn, which 
could be matched with recorded events. These consequences are used in the next stage of 
the diagnosis process in order to find which of them indeed match with recorded events 
and which do not and calculate the likelihood of P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn. 
Note that if, during the execution of the Generate_AE_Consequences algorithm, an 
input ground atomic formula can be unified with a predicate in the body of an assumption 
template T’ but the rest of the body predicates of T’ whose truth values cannot be 
established yet, the algorithm stops exploring T’ further in the current iteration. However, 
T’ is appended to the list of templates TLIST’ in case that the predicates in the body of T’ 
whose truth values cannot be established yet are abducible predicates (see lines 26-29 in 
Figure 5-5). By appending T’ to TLIST’, we succeed in making T’ available for 
consideration at a next iteration when another input atomic formula in AF (or, 
equivalently, in P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn) is considered. This is not necessary in the case of 
partially instantiated templates that have body predicates, which are not evaluated yet but 
correspond to derived or observable predicates. Such templates are not appended to 
TLIST’ due to the fact that the truth value of derived or observable predicates is not 
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changing until the end of the execution of the current invocation of 
Generate_AE_Consequences (this point is discussed further below). 
The specification of the algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences assumes that, when 
the algorithm is invoked, the set of the assumption templates TLIST encodes the 
following: 
• any event (i.e ground observable predicate), which has been recorded and 
stored in the log of the EVEREST monitoring framework up to the invocation 
time of the algorithm, and  
• any ground derived predicate, which can be generated from the recorded 
events up to the time of the invocation of the algorithm.  
The above assumption is valid since as soon as a new recorded event arrives at the 
monitoring framework. Any new recorded event, en, is checked against the set of the 
assumption templates, which exist up to that point, to identify if there are body predicates 
of the existing templates, which en could be unified with. If there are such templates, en is 
unified with them, and all the head predicates of the templates, which can be derived 
following this unification, are generated. The algorithm, which processes recorded events 
in order to update the assumption template list and generate the transitive closure of the 
predicates that can be derived from recorded events, is shown in Figure 5-6. This 
algorithm is called Generate_RE_Consequences and operates based on the same forward 
reasoning process as Generate_AE_Consequences.  
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Figure 5-6 – Algorithm for computing the transitive closure of deductions from 
recorded events 
 
The differences between the Generate_RE_Consequences and 
Generate_AE_Consequences are that:  
1. Generate_RE_Consequences is invoked to process ground observable predicates 
that represent recorded events whilst Generate_AE_Consequences is invoked to 
process ground abducible predicates representing abduced explanations, and  
Generate_RE_consequences(AF: Set of Grounded Atomic Formulas, TLIST: List of Assumption 
Templates, CNS: Set of Consequences) 
1. CNS = { } 
2. For each atomic formula Pi ∈  AF Do 
3.  For each assumption template T in TLIST Do 
4.   For each predicate Q ∈ body(T) Do 
5.    If mgu(Pi,Q) ≠∅ and CompatibleTimeRange(Pi,Q) Then 
6.     T’ := copy of T 
7.     Apply mgu(Pi,Q) onto T’ 
8.     Set the truth value of Q in T’ to True 
9.     Update time ranges of other predicates in T’ based on the time range of Pi 
10.     If for all predicates R ∈ Body(T’) such that R≠Q, R is true Then 
11.      If head(T’) is fully instantiated Then 
12.       If head(T’) is observable Then 
13.        CNS = CNS ∪ { (T.id, head(T’)) } 
14.        delete T’ 
15.       Else /*head(T’) is a derived predicate */ 
16.        CNS’ = { } 
17.        Generate_consequences({head(T’)}, TLIST, CNS’) 
18.        CNS = CNS ∪ CNS’ 
19.       End If 
20.      End If 
21.     Else /* there is a predicate R in Body(T’) whose truth value is unknown */ 
22.      TLIST = append (T’, TLIST) 
23.     End If 
24.    End If 
25.   End For 
26.  End For 
27.  Return (CNS) 
END Generate_RE_consequences 
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2. Instead of operating on a copy of the assumption template list (TLIST) as 
Generate_AE_Consequences does, Generate_RE_Consequences operates on this 
list directly and updates it when possible (see lines 21−23 in Figure 5-6).  
Thus, at the end of an invocation of Generate_RE_Consequences, any templates, which 
remain partially instantiated after the unification process with a recorded or derived 
predicate, are made available for further updates. Further updates can be done either by 
the same algorithm, Generate_RE_Consequences, when a new recorded event occurs and 
the algorithm is invoked to process it or by Generate_AE_Consequences when the latter 
algorithm is called to generate consequences of abduced explanations.  
It should be noted that the Generate_RE_Consequences algorithm is invoked every 
time that a new recorded event arrives to the monitoring framework and its results are 
required for the normal monitoring process since derived predicates are also necessary in 
detecting violations with respect to derived and recorded events. 
Generate_AE_Consequences, on the other hand, is invoked every time that a request for 
the diagnosis of a rule violation is made by the user of the monitoring framework. When 
any of the two algorithms is invoked, it obtains a lock over the current set of assumption 
templates (TLIST) to ensure that the other algorithm cannot process TLIST. 
We should also note that the set of the consequences, which is produced by the 
algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences, does not include all the possible consequences, 
which could be produced from the abduced predicates P1 ∧ P2 ∧ … ∧ Pn constituting an 
explanation. It includes only the complete set of consequences that can be derived based 
on the knowledge of the system (i.e., the set of the ground observabe and derived 
predicates) at the time of the algorithm’s invocation. This set of consequences is 
generally a subset of the set of all potential consequences, which could have been 
generated by using the available relevant knowledge. This can be explained, as we 
mentioned above, due to the fact that there might be assumption templates, whose body 
predicates that can be instantiated with recorded and derived events are not known yet at 
the time of the invocation of  Generate_AE_Consequences algorithm. Such templates 
cannot be used for deriving any consequences 
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5.3.2 Examples of explanation effects identification 
To elaborate on the process of generating explanation consequences, let us consider the 
ATMS example and more specifically the diagnosis of the violation of rule ATMS.R1, 
which was initially introduced in Section 4.3 and whose specifications is as follows:   
ATMS.R1 ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_r1∈Radars, ∀_receiver1,  
         ∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∀_r2∈Radars, ∀_source1. 
Happens(e(_id1,_r1,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r1, _a, _s),    
        _soure1),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
HoldsAt(covers(_r1,_s),t1) ∧ 
HoldsAt(covers(_r2,_s), t1) ∧ 
_r2 ≠ _r1 ⇒ 
Happens(e(_id2,_r2,_receiver1,RES-A,signal(_r2, _a, _s),  
                    _source1),t2,R(t1, t1+5) 
Assuming that the monitor has received the events shown in the log of Figure 5-3, the 
rule ATMS.R1 is violated by: 
• the event (E4) (i.e., Happens(e(E6, R1, AirBase, RES-A, signal(R1, A1, 
S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7, 7)))in the event log of Figure 5-3 
• the atomic formula  Happens(e(NF,R2,AirBase,signal(R2,A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),t,R(7,12)), which signifies the absence of a signal from 
radar R2 within the time period expected by ATMS.R1 given the signal of radar 
R1, and 
• the atomic formulas HoldsAt(covers(R1,S1),7)  and 
HoldsAt(covers(R2,S1),7) 
Also, as it is shown in Section 5.2.2, the computed explanation of event (E4) is as 
follows: 
[Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-A, signal(R1,A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)),    
[ 
    [(Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),  
                             t1,R(2,7)))]ABD 
         
]AND 
]OR 
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Recall, also, that the following assumptions are considered for the ATMS example in 
Section 4.3: 
ATMS.A5 ∀t1∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes,    
         ∀_s∈Airspaces. 
             Happens(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
     _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
             Initiates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a, 
         _s), _source), inairspace(_a,_s),t1 
ATMS.A6 ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes,  
          ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_airportX∈Airports. 
              Initiates(e(_id1,_a,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a, 
_s),_source),inairspace(_a,_s),t1) ∧ 
              HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_a,_receiver,RES-A, 
      landingRequest(_a,_airportX),_source),t2,  
      R(t1-10,t1)) 
ATMS.A7   ∀t1∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes,                   
          ∀_airportX∈Airports, ∃_s∈Airspaces.  
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,             
                      changeOfLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),          
                _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
  Initiates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,  
          changeOfLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),_source), 
        landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) 
ATMS.A8   ∀t1∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_source, ∀_a∈Airplanes,  
          ∀_airportX∈Airports, ∃_s∈Airspaces.  
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,             
                      removeLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),          
                _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
  Terminates(e(_id1,_sender,_receiver,RES-A,  
     removeLandingApproach(_airportX,_s),_source), 
     landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) 
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Recalling the meaning of the above assumptions, assumption ATMS.A5 states that 
when an event that signifies the entrance of an aircraft _a in an airspace _s becomes 
known, and at that timepoint a fluent called inairspace(_a,_s)should be initiated to 
signify the presence of the aircraft in the particular airspace. The second assumption (i.e., 
assumption ATMS.A6) states that when an aircraft _a enters an airspace _s that is used 
for approaching the final landing route to an airport then the aircraft _s must have made a 
landing request for the particular airport within the last 10 time units before entering _s. 
In this assumption, the airspace that is used as the landing approach for an airport is 
indicated by the fluent landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX) and landing requests 
are expressed by operations of the form landingRequest(_a, _airportX). Finally the 
third and fourth assumptions above, namely ATMS.A7 and ATMS.A8, are used for 
setting the airspace that is used as the landing approach for an airport. This is done by 
initiating and terminating respectively the fluent landing_airspace_for(_s, 
_airportX) every time operations of the form changeOfLandingApproach( 
_airportX, _s)and removeLandingApproach(_airportX, _s) are called.  
Using the assumptions ATMS.A5 and ATMS.A6, we can derive certain expected 
consequences for the abduced formula Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7))) that was generated as a possible 
explanation of the event Happens(e(E4, R1, AirBase, RES-A, signal(R1, A1, 
S1),AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)) in the way we described in Section 5.2.2. In summary, 
if we assume that the airspace S1 is the landing airspace of the airport AR-a, then the 
entrance of the aircraft A1 into S1 would make us expect that there should be some 
request from A1 to land in AR-a or, equivalently, that a runtime event  
Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a), AirBaseCaptor), 
t2, R(0,6)) should have occurred. This runtime event would, thus, be an expected 
consequence of the abduced explanation Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7))). 
The reasoning path for deriving Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-
A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a), AirBaseCaptor), t2, R(0,6)) is as follows: 
1. Step-1: From the event (E3) in the log of Figure 5-3 (i.e., 
Happens(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a, 
S1),AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)) and the assumption ATMS.A7 we can derive 
the fluent initiation formula: 
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Initiates(e(E5,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach 
(AR-a,S1),AirBaseCaptor),landing_airspace_for(AR-a,S2),2) (DP1) 
2. Step-2: From the atomic formula Happens(e(ABD, R1, AirBase, RES-A, 
inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7))) that was abduced as an 
explanation of Happens(e(E4, R1, AirBase, RES-A, signal(R1, A1, S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)) and assumption ATMS.A5, we can derive the 
fluent initiation formula: 
        Initiates(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),   
                    AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)),inairspace(A1,S1),    
                    t1,R(2,7)))       (DP2) 
• Step-3: From (DP1), the standard EVEREST assumption SA1, and the absence of 
any event e generated by the call of operation 
removeLandingApproach(_airportX,_s), which could terminate the fluent 
landing_airspace_for(AR-a,S2) due to assumption ATMS.A8, within the 
time range [2,7], we can deduce the atomic formula DP3 that is given below. 
Please note that the check whether DP3 is True for t in [2, 7] is done by a query 
to the fluent initiation and termination database of EVEREST. 
       ∀t∈[2,7].HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a),t)   (DP3) 
3. Step-4: From (DP3), (DP2) and ATMS.A6, we can deduce the formula: 
       Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a),   
            AirBaseCaptor),t2,R(0,6))     (DP4) 
At this point we explain how the algorithms Generate_RE_Consequences and 
Generate_AE_Consequences will take the steps of the above reasoning path. Step-1 
(Figure 5-7) will be executed first by the algorithm Generate_RE_Consequences when 
the event Happens(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a, 
S1),AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)) occurs at time t=2 and Generate_RE_Consequences 
is invoked to process it. To generate the formula (DP1) that is derived in this step, 
Generate_RE_Consequences will: 
i) create a new template of the formula ATMS.A7,  
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ii) unify the runtime event Happens(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-
A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a, S1), AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)) with 
the only predicate in the body of the template, and  
iii)  create the derived predicate Initiates(e(E3, AirBase, AirBase, RES-A, 
changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a, S1), AirBaseCaptor), 2, R(2, 2)), 
landing_airspace_for(S1, AR-a), 2) as an instantiation of the head of the 
template. 
 
Figure 5-7 – Step1 executed by Generate_RE_Consequences 
 
Subsequently, Step-2 (Figure 5-8) will be executed by the algorithm 
Generate_AE_Consequences at some time point following the time point t=10 when the 
violation of ATMS.R1 is detected and the generation of a diagnosis of this violation is 
requested. Suppose that Generate_AE_Consequences is invoked to generate the 
consequences of the abduced explanation Happens(e(ABD, R1, AirBase, RES-A, 
inspace(A1, S1), AirBaseCaptor), t1, R(2,7))) immediately of the detection of 
the violation of ATMS.R1 at t=11. Upon its invocation, Generate_AE_Consequences 
will: 
i) create a new template of the formula ATMS.A5,  
Happens(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a,S1),AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)) 
Initiates(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a,S1),AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)),     
               landing_airspace_for(S1, AR-a), 2) (DP1) 
ATMS.7 
 
Deductive reasoning path 
 
Observed predicate (aka runtime 
event) 
 
Derived predicate 
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ii) unify Happens(e(ABD, R1, AirBase, RES-A, inspace(A1, S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7))) with the single predicate in the body of this 
template, and  
iii) generate the derived predicate Initiates(e(ABD, R1, AirBase, RES-A, 
inspace(A1, S1), AirBaseCaptor), t1, R(2,7)), inairspace(A1, S1), 
t1, R(2, 7))) as an instantiation of the head of the  template.  
 
Figure 5-8 – Step2 executed by Generate_RE_Consequences 
 
Following this, since Initiates(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)),inairspace(A1,S1), t1,R(2,7)) is not an observable 
predicate, Generate_AE_Consequences will invoke itself recursively to generate further 
consequences from this predicate. Thus, at this point, Generate_AE_Consequences will 
execute Step-4.  
In order to execute Step-4, Generate_AE_Consequences will identify that the derived 
predicate Initiates(e(ABD, R1, AirBase, RES-A,inspace(A1, 
S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)),inairspace(A1,S1),t1,R(2,7)) can be unified 
with a predicate in the body of the assumption ATMS.A6. Thus, it will create a new 
template of ATMS.A6 by unifying the derived predicate 
Initiates(inspace(A1,S1),t1,R(2,7)), inairspace(A1,S1),t1,R(2,7))) with 
this template. Following this, it will check if the remaining predicates in the body of the 
newly created assumption template (i.e., HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-
Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase, RES-A, inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7))) 
ATMS.A5 
 
Deductive reasoning path 
 
Abduced predicate 
 
Derived predicate 
Initiates(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)),inairspace(A1,S1),t1,R(2,7)) (DP2) 
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a),t) for all t in [2,7]) is True. As this predicate is a HoldsAt predicate, 
Generate_AE_Consequences will query the fluent database of the monitoring framework 
to check if the HoldsAt predicate is true. During the execution of this query, the 
monitoring framework will execute Step-3 (Figure 5-9), and to check the truthness of the 
HoldsAt predicate.  
 
Figure 5-9 – Step3 executed by fluent maintenance mechanisms of EVEREST 
 
When it is verified that the HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a),t) is True 
for t in [2,7], Generate_AE_Consequences will derive the consequence 
Happens(landingRequest(A1,AR-a), t2, R(0,6)) as an instantiation of the head of 
the formula ATMS.A6 (Figure 5-10). 
SA1 
HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a),t),  t∈[2,7]  (DP3) 
 
¬∃e. Terminates(e, landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a), t) ∧ 
         (t ≥ 2)  ∧ (7 ≥ t)   
Initiates(e(E3,AirBase,AirBase,RES-A,changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a,S1),AirBaseCaptor),2,R(2,2)),     
               landing_airspace_for(S1, AR-a), 2) (DP1) 
Deductive reasoning path 
 
Derived predicate 
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Figure 5-10 – Step4 executed by Generate_AE_Consequences 
 
As we discussed earlier, the algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences might fail to 
generate all the possible consequences of a given explanation if certain runtime events 
required for them have not arrived yet. Assume, for instance, that in the above example 
the event Happens(changeOfLandingApproach(AR-a,S1),2,R(2,2)) had not arrived 
at the monitoring framework until the time point T=14 due to a delay in the 
communication channel between the event captor that captures events of these type and 
the monitoring framework. In this case, Generate_RE_Consequences would not have 
executed Step-1, when the algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences was invoked. 
Therefore, Generate_AE_Consequences algorithm would not be able to find that the 
predicate HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(S2,AR-a),t) was True for all t in [2, 7]. 
Thus, in this case it would also be unable to deduce the formula 
Happens(landingRequest(A1,AR-a), t2, R(0,6)) from ATMS.A6. 
5.4 Plausibility Assessment  
In this section, we describe the next step of the diagnostic process that is namely the 
assessment of the genuineness of the events involved in S&D rule violations. Goal of this 
step is to provide an assessment scheme for event genuineness based on the plausibility 
and correctness of the alternative explanations that are generated for an event in the 
previous steps of the diagnostic process.  
ATMS.A6 
Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a),  AirBaseCaptor),t2,R(0,6)) (DP4) 
Initiates(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,7)),inairspace(A1,S1),t1,R(2,7)) (DP2) 
 
HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a),t),  t∈[2,7]  (DP3) 
Deductive reasoning path 
 
Derived predicate 
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5.4.1 Foundations of the assessment  
The goal of the diagnostic process is to provide the most plausible cause of S&D 
violations. The causes of violations are provided in terms of genuineness of the violation 
observations and other correlated events. Let events be the set of the ground observables 
predicates. All the events are associated with a timestamp and a time range. In case 
events do not have a specific value for their timestamp, let them be called parametric 
events. On the other hand let the events that have a specific value for their timestamp be 
called fully specified events. Consequently, the events recorded in the log of the 
monitoring framework are fully specified. It should also be noted that the time range 
boundaries of any parametric event are different numbers, while the corresponding ones 
of any fully specified event are both equal to the timestamp of the event. Our initial 
hypothesis for event genuineness considers that: 
• An event is genuine, if it has occurred and is a result of the monitored system’s 
intended behaviour and not of an attack or fault  (Hypothesis 1)  
5.4.1.1 Event occurrence 
Evaluating whether an event has occurred is based on the log of the monitoring 
framework. More specifically, if an event ei, with timestamp tei and time range [teiLB, 
tei
UB], can be matched with an event recorded in the log of the monitoring framework, we 
assume that ei has occurred. A match between a recorded event elog in the log, which has 
been produced by an event captor Captor(elog) and has a timestamp telog, and an event ei, 
whose occurrence is under question is detected only if the following three conditions are 
satisfied: 
• e
log
 has been produced by the same event captor as the captor that ei  is expected to 
be produced from or, formally, if Captor(elog) = Captor(ei)  (Condition 9) 
• e
log
 can be unified with ei or formally mgu(elog, ei) ≠∅  (Condition 10) 
• The timestamp of the event elog is equal to the timestamp of ei in case that ei is 
fully specified (i.e., telog = tei ) or falls within the time range of ei  in case that ei is 
parametric(i.e., teiLB ≤ telog and telog ≤  teiUB)    (Condition 11) 
The absence of a matching recorded event for an event ei at the time of the search 
does not necessarily mean that such an event has not occurred. The absence of a matching 
   
 125
recorded event could have been caused by delays in the “channel” between the event 
captors and the monitoring framework. 
More specifically, there might be cases where, although a recorded event that satisfies 
the conditions 9 - 11 above may have occurred, this event might not have arrived at the 
event log of the monitoring framework yet, due to communication delays in the 
“channel” between the event captor, which captured the event, and the framework. To 
cope with this possibility, in cases where no matching recorded event is found at the time 
of the initial search, the search process should take into account the time of the last 
recorded event that has been received from the captor of ei. If this time is less than the 
upper boundary teiUB of the time variable of ei, the search process should wait until either 
a recorded event that matches ei or a not matching recorded event with a timestamp that 
is greater than teiUB arrives from the relevant captor. The arrival of the first recorded event 
e’ from the captor of ei which does not match ei and has a timestamp that is greater than 
tei
UB
 would be sufficient to establish with certainty that no recorded event matching ei has 
occurred so far. The reason that the arrival of such a recorded event would be sufficient 
for establishing the absence of any match for ei is that we assume that the communication 
connections between event captors and the monitoring framework realise the TCP/IP 
protocol and, therefore, the events which are generated by a specific captor arrive at the 
monitoring framework in exactly the same order as the order in which they were captured 
and dispatched. Thus, it is valid to assume that if there was a recorded event matching ei 
that had been captured and dispatched before e’, this event should have arrived at the 
monitoring framework before e’. 
It should be appreciated, however, that although a “wait” search process would allow 
assessing with more certainty whether an expected consequence of an explanation has 
been confirmed or not by recorded events, the adoption of this approach could create two 
problems. The first problem is that it could delay the diagnosis generation process 
significantly, depending on the amount of traffic in the communication channels between 
the captors that generate the expected events and the monitoring framework and the 
speed of these channels. Such a delay might not be desirable in cases where a timely 
diagnosis is necessary in order to decide how to react to an S&D rule violation. The 
second potential problem of a “wait” search process is that if an event captor and/or the 
communication channel between it and the monitoring framework become unavailable, 
the diagnosis process could also be stalled. 
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To avoid these potential problems, the search for the occurrence of ei in the log 
establishes the negation of ei that is expected to have been produced by the captor 
Captor(ei) if: 
• there is no recorded event e satisfying Conditions 9-11 above at the time of the 
search, and 
• the last known value of the clock of Captor(ei) (i.e., the timestamp of the last 
event in the log that has arrived from this captor) is greater than teiUB.  
However, there is also a possibility that we would not be able to confirm or 
disconfirm the occurrence of an event or observable predicate at the time of the search. 
These would events ei for which no matching recorded event satisfying the Conditions 9-
11 could be found at the time of the search and the last received event from the relevant 
captor had a timestamp that was less than or equal to their upper time boundary (i.e., 
lastTimestamp(Captor(ei)) ≤ teiUB). To cope with this uncertainty, we have decided to use 
the Dempster Shafer theory of evidence [146] (see Section 3.4 for a brief theory 
introduction) for assessing whether an event has been occurred based on the log of the 
monitoring framework, and therefore whether can be considered genuine. 
5.4.1.2 Event as a result of intended system’s behaviour 
In order to evaluate whether an event ei results from the system intended behaviour 
can be based on the co-occurrence of other events ej (j ≠ i) that can be related to ei 
according to the specifications of the underlying monitoring theory. Let the events ej (j ≠ 
i) be the set of correlated events of ei due to theory T. Particularly, in EVEREST, an 
underlying monitoring theory T includes a partial model of the intended behaviour of the 
monitored system (assumptions) that specifies causal relations between events. Thus, the 
occurrence of an event ei can follow, as a consequence of, or be followed by, as a cause 
of the occurrence of its correlated events ej (j ≠ i). In the former case, backwards chaining 
can be applied on the assumptions of the underlying theory T by starting from ei and 
reaching members of ej that could potentially explain the occurrence of ei. Similarly, 
regarding the latter case, forward chaining can be applied on the assumptions of the 
underlying theory T by starting from ei and reaching members of ej that, according to the 
assumptions of T, can be considered logical consequences of the occurrence of ei. In 
order to traverse backward and forward through the assumptions of T, we devised 
algorithms based on abduction (see Section 2.3 for the underpinning theory of abductive 
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reasoning and 5.2.1 for the devised algorithm) and deduction (see Section 5.3 for the 
devised algorithm). For instance, assume the theory that includes the five formulas as 
follows:  
F1. E1 ⇒ E2 
F2. E3  ∧ E4 ⇒ E2 
F3. E1 ⇒ E5 
F4. E5  ⇒ E6 
F5. E3 ⇒ E7 
From F1 and F2, E2 is specified as a consequence of E1 and the conjunction of E3 
and E4 respectively. Thus, in case that E2 occurs, then we can consider the hypothesis 
that the occurrence of either E1 or E3 and E4 could explain the occurrence of E2. In F3, 
E1 is specified as a possible explanation of E5, and thus if E1 occurs, E5 should occur as 
well. Similarly, formula F4 specifies that E6 is a (direct) consequence of E5. Please, also, 
note that E6 can be deductively inferred as an (indirect) consequence of E1 as well due to 
F3 and F4. Finally, formula F5 specifies that E7 is a (direct) consequence of E3.  
By using abductive reasoning, we can only generate hypotheses for the occurrence of 
other events ej (j ≠ i) that could potentially explain the occurrence of an event ei. Thus, 
the abductive explanations should be checked for their correctness and plausibility. The 
correctness and plausibility of abductive explanations could be validated by the 
occurrence of their expected consequences, which can be generated by deductive 
reasoning on the assumptions of the underlying theory T.  Particularly, it is the 
occurrence of the consequences that can validate an explanation. Thus, the expected 
consequences of an explanation, which are generated by deduction, should match with 
events recorded in the log of EVEREST in order that the explanation could be considered 
plausible and correct, and therefore valid. Also, in cases that a generated explanation can 
be matched with an event recorded in the log of EVEREST, the explanation itself can be 
considered as a consequence of itself due to deduction (i.e., A ⇒ A is true for any A). 
However, the recorded events that match to the generated consequences, as any other 
recorded event, should be questioned whether they result from the intended behaviour of 
the system, or equivalently whether they are genuine.     
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5.4.1.3 Underpinning principles for event genuineness 
After taking into consideration the above remarks, our initial hypothesis (Hypothesis 
1) was reconsidered, and finally the following hypotheses have been concluded:  
• An event is genuine if it has occurred, i.e. is recorded in the log of the monitoring 
framework, and all of its explanations are valid    (Hypothesis 2)  
• An explanation is valid, i.e. plausible and correct, if all of its expected consequences 
match with events recorded in the log of the monitoring framework, which are genuine 
themselves         (Hypothesis 3) 
As a prerequisite for providing the formal framework of the assessment of event 
genuineness, the definition of the alternative explanations of an event and the search of 
supporting and refuting evidence for the generated alternative explanations are provided 
in the next section. 
5.4.2 Alternative explanations, expected consequences and search 
for supporting and refuting evidence for alternative 
explanations 
Following the identification of the expected consequences of alternative explanations 
of events, the diagnosis process searches the event log of the monitoring framework to 
find recorded events that can match these consequences, and therefore, cast evidence to 
the validity of the alternative explanations.  
Let the set of alternative explanations of an event ei is formally be defined as follows: 
Definition 1: The explanation set of an event ei is defined as follows: 
EXP(ei) = {Φi1, …, ΦiN} 
where,  
• Φij (j=1,…,N) is a conjunction of abduced events of the form Pij1 ∧ … ∧ PijK that 
constitute a possible explanation of ei and has been produced by the algorithm 
Explain (Figure 5-2). 
At this point, it should be noted that in case that ei belongs to APreds ∩ OPreds (i.e. ei 
is an abducible and observable predicate), no explanation can be generated for ei, thus, 
EXP(ei) = ∅. 
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Definition 2: The set of the expected consequences of the exlanation Φij of an event ei is 
defined as follows: 
CONS(ei,Φij) = {Cij1, …, CijL} 
where, 
1. Cij1,…,CijL are atomic formulae, which can be derived from the conjunction of the 
abduced atomic formulae Pij1 ∧ … ∧ PijK  that constitute the explanation Φij and 
indicate parametric events that would have been caused by Φij, if explanation Φij 
had indeed occurred. The set {Cij1,…,CijL} is formally defined as: 
{Cij1,…,CijL} = Consequences({Pij1,…,PijK})  
where Consequences(S) is the set of expected consequences that is generated 
from a set of atomic formulas S by the algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences 
(Figure 5-5). 
Please note that, given the algorithm Generate_AE_Consequences (Figure 5-5), 
ΦijC includes the parametric events whose derivation path involves at least one of 
the abduced atomic formulae Pij1,…,PijK. The consequences of each subset of the 
set of the abduced atomic formulas Pij1,…, PijK are considered consequences of the 
explanation Φij due to the fact that  
Pij1 ∧ … ∧ PijK ⇒ ∧ S⊆Φij and Px∈S Px  
Based on the above definition, assume that we have the following three explanations 
of an event ei that is involved in an S&D rule violation: 
Φi1 = Happens(AE1,t1,R(0,5)) 
Φi2 = Happens(AE1,t1,R(0,5)) ∧ Happens(AE2,t2,R(5,5)) 
Φi3 = Happens(AE2,t1,R(12,12)) 
Also, assume that AE2 belongs to the observable predicates set OPreds and the following 
assumptions constitute the underlying theory: 
Assumption A. Happens(AE1,t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ Happens(E1,t1,R(t1+1,t1+1)) 
Assumption B. Happens(AE1,t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ Happens(DE1,t2,R(t1,t1+1))  
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Assumption C. Happens(DE1,t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ Happens(AE2,t2,R(t1,t1+1)) ⇒  
Happens(E2,t3,R(t2,t2)) 
Assumption D. Happens(AE2,t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ Happens(E3,t1,R(t1,t1)) 
The set of the consequences of the abduced explanation Φi2, CONS(ei,Φi2), will include 
the atomic formulae (i.e. events) Happens(AE2,t1,R(12,12)), Happens(E2, t3, 
R(6, 6)), Happens(E1, t1, R(1, 6)) and Happens(E3, t1, R(5, 5)). More 
specifically, CONS(ei,Φi2) includes the event Happens(AE2,t1,R(12,12)) due to the 
fact that it is observable predicate. CONS(ei,Φi2) also includes the consequences whose 
derivation path includes both atomic formulas of Φi2, Happens(AE1, t1, R(0, 5)) and 
Happens(AE2, t2, R(5, 5)). Thus, the event Happens(E2,t3,R(6,6)) is included in 
CONS(ei,Φi2) as its derivation fits the criterion of Definition 1 since: 
• from Assumption B and Happens(AE1,t1,R(0,5)) we derive 
Happens(DE1,t2,R(0,6)), and 
• from Happens(DE1,t2,R(0,6)), Happens(AE2,t2,R(5,5)) and Assumption C 
we derive Happens(E2,t3,R(6,6)).  
Moreover, the event Happens(E1,t1,R(0,6)) is included in CONS(ei,Φi2) since: 
• from Assumption A and Happens(AE1,t1,R(0,5)) we derive 
Happens(E1,t1,R(1,6)). 
Finally, Happens(E3, t1, R(t1, t1)) is also included in CONS(ei,Φi2) since: 
• from Assumption D and Happens(AE2,t2,R(5,5)) we derive Happens(E3, t1, 
R(5, 5)) 
After deriving the expected consequences of an explanation Φij, the diagnostic 
process searches the log of the monitoring framework to find recorded events that can 
match these consequences, as it will be shown in the folloing. It should be also noted that, 
as discussed in Section 5.4.1.1, a match between an event e in the log
 
and a consequence 
Cijk (k=1,…,K) is detected only if the Conditions 9-11 are satisfied.  
However, as discussed in Section 5.4.1.1, there is also a possibility that we may not 
be able to confirm or disconfirm some of the expected consequences of an explanation at 
the time of the search. These will be consequences Cijk, with time range [tijklB,tijkUB], for 
which no matching event satisfying the Conditions 9-11 (Section 5.4.1.1) could be found 
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at the time of the search and the last received event from the relevant captor had a 
timestamp that was less than or equal to their upper time boundary (i.e., 
lastTimestamp(Captor(Cijk)) ≤ tijkUB). As in the case of the uncertainty that appears in the 
occurrence of an event (discussed in Section 5.4.1.1), the use of Dempster Shafer theory 
of evidence [146] (see also Section 3.4) would be sufficient to cope with the uncertainty 
regarding the search for evidence for the validity of the generated explanations. 
5.4.3 Event Genuineness  
Based on Hypotheses 2 and 3, and Definition 1, the event genuineness is defined as 
follows: 
Definition 2:  The genuineness of an event e is defined as: 
Genuine(e) =
 
∧ei ∈U(e) (Explainable(ei)) 
where, 
• U(e) is the set of the events that are recorded in the log of the monitoring 
framework and can be matched with e
 
according to Conditions 9-11 or formally: 
U(e) = { ei |ei ∈ EventLog  and Captor(e)  = Captor(ei) and mgu(e, ei) ≠ ∅ and   
     teLB ≤ tei  and tei ≤  teUB } 
where, 
o EventLog  is the set of the events in the log of the monitor  
o mgu(X,Y)
 
is the most general unifier of the events X and Y
 
 [94], and  
o Captor(X) is the captor that produced X, in case that X is a fully specified 
event, or it is the expected captor to produce X, in case that X is a 
parametric event  
o teLB and teUB are the lower and upper boundary of the specified time range 
of e
 
 (or is expected to occur)4 
 
                                               
4  teLB and teUB are both equal to the timestamp te of e, if e is a fully specified event stored in the log of the 
monitor. 
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• Explainable(ei) is a proposition denoting that the all of the explanations of event ei 
are valid and is formally defined as: 
Explainable(ei) = ∧Φj∈EXP(ei)Valid(Φj) 
     where, 
o EXP(ei) is the set of the alternative explanations that can be generated for the 
event ei  
o Valid(Φj) is a proposition denoting that the explanation Φj is valid and is 
defined as: 
Valid(Φj) = ∧ eq ∈ CONS(ei,Φj )Genuine(eq) 
where, 
 CONS(ei,Φj)  is the set of the expected consequences of Φj (see Section 
5.4.2) 
5.4.4 Efficiency of the Event Genuineness Assessment 
In this section, the factors that might impact the efficiency of an assessment process 
based on Definition 2 are discussed. More specifically, due to the fact that the event 
genuineness is recursively defined, the number of the recorded events that are stored in 
the log of the monitoring infrastructure and are taken into account by the assessment 
process, as well as, the circles that might occur during reasoning, are considered critical 
for the efficiency of the assessment process. In the following, more details and 
optimization suggestions are provided. 
5.4.4.1 Diagnosis  window 
An assessment process for the genuineness of events based on Definition 2 takes into 
account all the events recorded in the log of the monitoring framework until the time of 
the assessment. Although such an assessment would be more precise with respect to the 
recorded behaviour of the system, the adoption of this approach could be problematic 
regarding the efficiency of the diagnosis generation process. More specifically, the 
recursive definition of event genuineness would lead to an exhaustive search of the entire 
log of the monitor, and therefore the completion time of the diagnosis generation process 
would increase significantly. As discussed in Section 5.4.1.1, such completion times 
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might not be desirable in cases where a timely diagnosis is necessary in order to decide 
how to react to an S&D rule violation.  
To address this potential issue, we restrict the space where the search for matching 
events is done by imposing time boundaries for the accepted matching events and, 
therefore, for evidence for the event genuineness that is to be assessed [164]. More 
specifically, the time period over which the genuineness of an event is assessed is defined 
by the absolute time range TR = [Tmin,Tmax]. This range is determined by the constant w, 
which is called diagnosis window and required in any particular monitoring setting, and 
the timestamp of the original event ei, whose occurrence was used as confirming 
evidence for the detection of a monitoring rule violation by EVEREST, by using the 
formulas:  
Tmin = ti − w/2, and 
Tmax = ti + w/2 
It should be noted that the diagnosis window is set by the user of EVEREST and 
determines the time boundaries within which the search for evidence for events 
genuineness is performed. For instance, consider the events of Figure 5-11. Let the 
diagnosis window be equal to 130 sec and assume that the timestamp of the event e2, 
whose occurrence was used as confirming evidence for the detection of a monitoring rule 
violation that is under diagnosis by EVEREST, is equal to 4500 sec. Also, assume that 
the genuineness of e2 is being assessed. According to above formulas, the defined time 
range within which the search of evidence should be performed is TR = [4435, 4565] 
(because Tmin = 4500 – 130/2 = 4435 and Tmax = 4500 +130/2 = 4565). Also, assume 
that the time range of e1, which is the expected consequence of the explanation Φ21 of e2, 
is computed to be equal to TR(e1) = [4400, 4500] by the Generate_AE_consequences 
algorithm (see Section 5.3.1). However, by taking into account the diagnosis time range, 
the diagnostic process searches for recorded events that match e1 within the time range 
TR(e1)’= TR(e1) ∩ TR = [4400, 4500] ∩ [4435, 4565] = [4435, 4500]. Thus, any 
recorded event ex, which matches to e1, and therefore, cast positive evidence to the 
validity of explanation of Φ21 of e2 and its timestamp is within [4435, 4500], is taken into 
account by the assessment process.  
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Figure 5-11 – Events and explanations 
At this point, it should be also noted that nor do we impose time boundaries on neither 
do we exclude generated explanations due to diagnosis window. The reason we do not 
filter out generated explanations due to diagnosis window is that abduced events, which 
are members of a generated explanation and are specified partially or completely out of 
the diagnosis time range TR = [Tmin,Tmax], can have consequences within the diagnosis 
time range according to the temporal constraints of the underlying theory, i.e., the 
temporal constraints of the assumptions that are used during the abductive and deductive 
stages of the diagnostic process. For instance, assume that we have the following 
assumptions: 
A1: Happens(AE1,t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ Happens(E1,t1,R(t1+5,t1+7)) 
A2: Happens(AE1,t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ Happens(DE1,t2,R(t1,t1+8)) 
Also, assume that the genuineness of an event E1 occurred at t=25 is assessed, while the 
diagnosis window is set to w=2. Therefore the diagnosis time range is TR=[24,26]. From 
A1, the explanations set of E1 includes only the abduced event 
Happens(AE1,t1,R(18,20)), whose time range is specified completely out of TR as 
[18,20] ∩ [24,26] = ∅. From A2 the derived event Happens(DE1,t1,R(18,28)) can be 
identified as expected consequence of the above explanation. Thus, while the explanation 
of our example is specified out of TR, an expected consequence of this explanation is 
specified partially within TR, as [18,28] ∩ [24,26] = [24,26]. 
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5.4.4.2 Circles occurrence 
As any recursive process, the event genuineness assessment process of an event es is 
prone to circles occurrence. In particular, any recorded event that is reached and 
processed more than once, an infinite loop occurs in the assessment process of es. 
However, there is another factor that must be taken into account. In case that a recorded 
event er can cast evidence to the validity of n alternative explanations Φi1,…, Φin of an 
event ei, which is processed during the assessment of es, the evidence of er should be 
equally distributed to the aforementioned explanations. Thus, as loops must be avoided, it 
is also significant for the assessment process to distribute equally the evidence of any 
recorded event that is repeatedly reached as actual consequence of alternative 
explanations of the same event ei.  
To address the above issues, our diagnostic process assesses any recorded event only 
once, while it keeps the number of times that recorded event are reached as consequences 
of alternative explanations of the same event ei. More specifically, any recorded event 
that is taken into account by our process is assessed only the first time that is reached, 
amd the result of the assessment is stored in the memory of diagnostic process. For 
understanding whether a recorded event has been already reached before, the diagnostic 
process keeps in its memory the following two lists, UTotal and Uo. The diagnostic process 
stores in the list UTotal the lists of matching recorded events for each event ei, U(ei) (see 
Section 5.4.3), during all the recursive invocations for the assessment of es.  
On the other hand, the list Uo contains lists for the recorded events that have been 
reached at least once during the assessment process of es. Except for the reached recorded 
event ei, each sub-list of Uo contains the number of times (occurenceTimes(ei)) that ei was 
reached as a consequence of alternative explanations of the same event ex, two Boolean 
variables to flag whether ei has been already explained (isExplained(ei)) and whether the 
process has assessed the explainability of event ei (isExplainabilityComputed(ei)), and 
two placeholders for the assessment result of the explanability of ei 
(assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) and assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei))). It should be noted 
that isExplained(ei) flag is updated with regards to, once the diagnostic process finds 
explanations for ei, while the isExplainabilityComputed(ei) flag and the two placeholders 
assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) and assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)) are updated when the 
process assesses the explainability of ei for the first time. Also, the reason we have two 
placeholders for the assessment result in the explainability of ei, and how Uo is updated 
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with regards to these two placeholders is discussed below in Section 5.4.6. The Uo is 
formally specified as:  
If UTotal ≠∅, then ∀ U(e) ∈ UTotal and ∀ ei ∈ U(e) ∃ sublistUo(ei) ∈ Uo such that: 
sublistUo(ei) = [ei,occurrenceTimes(ei),isExplained(ei), isExplainabilityComputed(ei),  
                        assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)), assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei))]  
Regarding the identification of an already considered recorded event, it should be 
reminded that the recorded events are fully specified events. Thus, if UTotal is not empty, a 
recorded event ex is an already considered recorded event iff there is a recorded event ey, 
which belongs to a sub-list U(e) of UTotal, it holds that ey can be unified with ex and the 
timestamps of ey and ex are equal, or formally ex is an already considered recorded event 
iff: 
UTotal ≠∅ and ∃ U(ey) ∈ UTotal and ey ∈ EventLog and mgu(ex, ey)≠∅ and tx = ty  
The means that the lists Uo and UTotal are populated with respect to the diagnosis 
window and used by the assessment process are dicussed below, in Sections 5.4.4.3 and 
5.4.6, respectively. It should be noted that Uo and UTotal are set equal to the empty list in 
the beginning of the assessment of es. 
It should be also noted that unless there was a repeated recorded event, it is unlikely 
that repeated generated explanations and expected consequences would occur. Before 
arguing on the reason why it is unlikely to have repeated explanations and consequences 
without processing an already processed event, it should be reminded that a generated 
explanation is a set of abduced parametric events, while an expected consequence is a 
derived parametric event. Also, as discussed in Section 5.4.4.1, the time ranges of the 
parametric events that consist the generated explanations or the expected consequenes are 
not restricted by the diagnosis window. Thus, the time ranges of generated explanations 
and consequences can be as wide as the time constraints of the underlying theory 
assumptions allow.  Therefore, there are two cases that repeated explanations or 
consequences can occur. The first case presumes that an already considered recorded 
event is processed again, and therefore already considered explanations and 
consequences occur in the line of reasoning. However, this case is avoided by the means 
we have shown in the beginning of the section. 
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The second case presumes that two conditions should be satisfied for having repeated 
explanations and consequences. These two conditions are as follows:  
i) The underlying theory includes at least two assumtpions Ai and Aj, whose body 
predicates and both body and head time constraints are the same, but their head 
predicates are different. Assume that pi and pj are the head predicates of Ai and Aj 
respectively. 
ii) While there is an already considered recorded event ei, i.e., belongs to UTotal, that 
can be unified with pi, there is a recorded event ej that respectively can be unified 
with pj and has occurred at the same timepoint as ei had occurred, i.e., their 
timestamps are equal tj=ti.  
However, due to the fact that the recorded events timestamps are measured in msec, it is 
very unlikely that two different events can have equal timestamps. Thus, without harming 
the generality of our approach, assume that two different events cannot occur at the exact 
same point, and therefore their timestamps are not equal. By these means, the 
aforementioned condition can never be satisfied.  
5.4.4.3  Handling efficiently explanations, conequences and matching 
recorded events  
At this point, we describe how the diagnostic process handles explanations, 
consequences, and matching recored events by taking into account the diagnosis window 
and the already considered recorded events for avoiding loops. The algorithm for 
handling efficiently the generated explanations, the expected consequences and the 
matching recorded events that may appear during the genuineness assessment of an event 
e is a breadth-first search algorithm and is called Preprocess. The Preprocess algorithm 
is listed as follows:  
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Figure 5-12 – Algorithm for handling efficiently explanations, consequences and 
matching recorded events  
It should be noted that the Preprocess algorithm is invoked by the diagnostic process 
before the assessment of the genuineness belief of e starts. The primary objective of the 
algorithm is to generate a set of the recorded events, Uo, that are taken into account 
during the genuineness assessment of a given event e, as firstly introduced in Section 
5.4.4.2. Uo also contains the number of times that a recorded event is reached as a 
consequence of the same event, as well as, a placeholder for the assessment result for 
each considered recorded event. On the other hand, the secondary objective is to compute 
all the necessary explanations, consequences and matching recorded events that may 
appear during the genuineness assessment of e. As soon as all the necessary explanations, 
consequences and matching recorded events are compiled by the Preprocess algorithm, 
the diagnostic process can use them for the actual genuineness assessment of e. For this 
reason, the algorithm is called Preprocess. Finally, as a convention, in the algorithmic 
specifications in Figure 5-12, it should be noted that the expression x ∈ y means that 
element x is a member of y, in case that y is a list of elements of type x, or x is a member 
of any sublist of elements of type x of y, in case that y is a complex construct of 
multilevel lists. Similarly, assume the corresponding interpretation for the expression x ∉ 
y.  
The Preprocess algorithm starts by getting as input: 
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• a list of events. It should be noted that when the genuineness of an event e is 
questioned, thus the diagnostic process invokes the Preprocess algorithm for 
first time for the event e, the list toBeProcessed contains only the event e.  
• the diagnostic time range TR, whose boundaries are computed as discussed in 
Section 5.4.4.1,  
• the list of considered recorded events Uo, as discussed above, and  
• the lists UTotal, EXPTotal and CONSTotal, which the diagnostic process uses to 
store the matching recorded events, the generated explanations, and the 
expected consequences,  respectively, for each event ei that may appear during 
the recursive invocations of the assessment process of e  
For the given list toBeProcessed, the algorithm creates a new empty list 
U(toBeProcessed,TR) (see line 1 in Figure 5-12), which is used for storing the recorded 
events that match with the events in the list toBeProcessed. Thus, for each event e in list 
toBeProcessed, the algorithm creates a new empty list U(e,TR) (see lines 2-3 in Figure 
5-12), which is used for storing the matching recorded events of e. For each event ei that 
is recorded in the event log of EVEREST and is occurred within TR(e) (see line 4 in 
Figure 5-12), the algorithm checks whether ei can be unified with e (see line 5 in Figure 
5-12). If false, the algorithm disregards ei. Otherwise, it is checked whether ei has been 
already taken into account in previous recursive invocations of the algorithm, i.e., 
whether ei belongs to UTotal list (see line 6 in Figure 5-12). If true, the algorithm again 
disregards ei. Otherwise, the algorithm checks whether ei has been already considered 
during the current invocaton of the algorithm, by checking whether Uo contains a sublist 
with regards to occeurrences of ei. In case that ei belongs to Uo, the algorithm updates Uo, 
by increasing by one the occurrence times of ei (see lines 8-9 in Figure 5-12). On the 
other hand, in case that ei has not been considered yet, the algorithm updates the already 
matching recorded events list Uo with the information regarding the first occurrence of ei 
(see lines 11-13 in Figure 5-12). Once Uo has been updated for the current occurrence of 
ei, the algorithm appends ei in U(e,TR) (see line 15 in Figure 5-12). As soon as there is no 
other event occurred within TR(e) and recorded in the event log, thus, the algorithm has 
compiled the matching recorded event list U(e,TR) for e, the algorithm appends U(e,TR) 
to U(toBeProcessed,TR) (see line 19 in Figure 5-12). Also, when all events in 
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toBeProcessed have been considered, the algorithm appeands all elements of 
toBeProcessed to UTotal  (see line 21 in Figure 5-12).  
Having compiled the list U(toBeProcessed,TR), the algorithm focuses on the 
explanations that are related to the events of U(toBeProcessed,TR). Thus, the algorithm 
creates a new empty list, EXP(toBeProcessed), for storing the aforementioned 
explanations (see line 22 in Figure 5-12). More specifically, for each non empty U(e,TR) 
in U(toBeProcessed,TR), the algorithm creates a new empty list, EXPRel(e), for storing 
relevant explanations of e (see lines 23-25 in Figure 5-12). As relevant explanations to e, 
the algorithm considers the explanations, which can be generated for each matching event 
of e, em, only if em has not been already explained during the current recursive invocation, 
i.e., isExplained(em) is currently False (see lines 26-27 in Figure 5-12). Consequently, the 
algorithm generates an explanation list for each em in U(e,TR), EXP(em), by invoking the 
Explain algorithm (discussed in Section 5.2.1) for each em, and it appends EXP(em) to 
EXPRel(e), while updates Uo that em has now been explained (see lines 28-31 in Figure 
5-12). Finally, when all matching recorded events relevant to e have been considered, the 
algorithm appends EXPRel(e) to EXP(toBeProcessed) and EXPTotal (see line 34-35 in 
Figure 5-12).   
The algorithm resumes by compiling all the expected consequences that are related to 
any event e in the list toBeProcessed. Therefore, a new empty list CONS(toBeProcessed, 
TR) is created (see line 38 in Figure 5-12). Thus, for each EXPRel(e) in 
EXP(toBeProcessed), the algorithm continues by creating a new empty list CONSRel(e, 
TR) for storing the consequences of the explanations contained in EXPRel(e) (see lines 39-
40 in Figure 5-12). As discussed below in this paragraph, the algorithm focuses only on 
consequences of the explanations of the matching events of e, which are identified within 
the diagnosis time range TR, while any other consequence is disregarded. Thus, if 
EXPRel(e) is not empty, for each non empty explanation list EXP(em) in EXPRel(e), and for 
each explanation Φe in EXP(em), the algorithm identifies consequences for Φe by 
invoking the Generate_AE_consequences algorithm and stores them in a consequences 
list CONS(Φe) (see lines 41-45 in Figure 5-12). However, due to the fact that our focus is 
only on consequences, which are identified within the diagnosis time range TR, and 
because the Generate_AE_consequences algorithm identifies consequences without 
taking into account TR, the Preprocess algorithm transforms the list CONS(Φe) into the 
list CONS(Φe, TR), which contains only consequences with respect to TR (see lines 46-52 
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in Figure 5-12). Each new CONS(Φe, TR) is checked whether is empty. If true, the 
algorithm sets CONS(Φe, TR) equal to a list [CNULL] that contains only the item CNULL 
(see lines 54-56 in Figure 5-12). CNULL is a special event, which denotes that no 
consequences can be identified. Once the last check is finished, the algorithm appends 
CONS(Φe, TR) to CONSRel(e, TR) (see line 57 in Figure 5-12). As soon as all explanations 
of matching recorded events of e have been considered, the algorithm appends 
CONSRel(e, TR) to CONS(toBeProcessed, TR) and CONSTotal (see lines 62-63 in Figure 
5-12).  
Having obtained the list CONS(toBeProcessed, TR) by compiling the lists CONSRel(e, 
TR), which contain the consequences of the explanations of the matching recorded events 
of any e in toBeProcessed list with respect to TR, the Preprocess algorithm invokes itself 
for a new list, called toPreprocess (see line 65 in Figure 5-12). The toPreprocess list 
contains all the identified consequences stored in the lists CONS(e, TR). In particular, for 
each non empty CONSRel(e, TR) (see lines 66-67 in Figure 5-12), the algorithm goes 
through each consequences lists CONSe of CONSRel(e, TR) (see line 68 in Figure 5-12). 
Then, if CONSe is not equal to [CNULL], for each consequence of CONSe, Ck, the 
algorithm appends Ck to toPreprocess (see lines 69-73 in Figure 5-12). When all 
individual consequences, related to e, have been taken into account, and if toPreprocess 
list is not empty, the algorithm invokes itself (see lines 75-77 in Figure 5-12). Finally, as 
soon as no other recursive invocations can be made, the algorithm returns Uo (see line 79 
in Figure 5-12), by having also compiled the lists UTotal, EXPTotal, and CONSTotal. 
 
5.4.4.3.1 Example of handling efficiently explanations, conequences and 
matching recorded events 
As an example of handling efficiently explanations, consequences and matching recorded 
events by using the Preprocess algorithm (Figure 5-12) consider the violation of rule 
ATMS.R1 (see Section 4.3). For sake of compactness, the following indicative example 
of the Preprocess algorithm is not based on the set of ATMS assumptions, which was 
firstly introduced in Section 4.3 due to the extended number of assumtpions.  Instead, the 
example is based on a more compact set of assumptions. The compact ATMS 
assumptions set consists of the following assumptions:  
ATMS.A1'. Initially(covers(R1,S1),t0) 
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ATMS.A2'. Initially(covers(R2,S1),t0) 
ATMS.A3'. Initially(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a),t0) 
ATMS.A4'. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2, 
∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_r∈Radars. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender1,_receiver2,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
      _source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
              HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_r,_receiver2,RES-A,signal(_r,_a,_s),     
                      _source2),t2,R(t1,t1+5)) 
ATMS.A5'. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2, 
∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_sender1,_receiver2,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
      _source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒  
              Happens(e(_id2,_a,_receiver2,RES-A,permissionRequest(_a,    
      _s),_source2),t2,R(t1-20,t1-1)) 
ATMS.A6'. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2, 
∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_r∈Radars. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_a,_receiver2,RES-A,landingRequest(_a, 
                      _airportX),_source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
  HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) ∧ 
  HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_r,_receiver2,RES-A,signal(_r,_a,_s),   
                      _source2),t2,R(t1,t1+5)) 
ATMS.A7'. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender1, ∀_receiver2, ∀_source2, 
∀_a∈Airplanes, ∀_s∈Airspaces, ∃_r∈Radars. 
              Happens(e(_id1,_a,_receiver2,RES-A,landingRequest(_a, 
                      _airportX),_source2),t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
  HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t1) ⇒ 
              Happens(e(_id2,_a,_receiver2,RES-A,permissionRequest(_a,    
                     _s),_source2),t2,R(t1-10,t1-2)) 
In particular, the first four assumptions, ATMS.A1', ATMS.A2', ATMS.A4', and 
ATMS.A5', are the same as the assumptions, ATMS.A1, ATMS.A2, ATMS.A3, and 
ATMS.A4 respectively, which have been already discussed in Section 4.3. Assumption 
ATMS.A3' specifies that the landing airspace for airport AR_a is airspace S1 since the 
start of the execution of ATMS. Assumption ATMS.A6' states that if an airplane _a 
requests a permission to land at airport _airportX at some timepoint t1, and it holds that 
the landing airspace for_airportX is airspace _s and radar _r covers airspace _s at t1, then 
it is expected that there should be a signal from _r notifying that _a moves in _s at some 
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time point t2 within t1 and 5 time units after t1. Similarly, assumption ATMS.A7' 
specifies that if an airplane _a requests a permission to land at airport _airportX at some 
timepoint t1, and it holds that the landing airspace for_airportX is _s at t1, then it was 
expected that _a has requested permission for entering _s at some time point t2 within 10 
and 2 time units before t1. In terms of the predicate sets APreds’, DPreds’ and OPreds’, 
which are defined in Section 4.1, the membership of the predicates of the above compact 
ATMS theory is as follows: 
APreds’ = {Happens(e(_id,_r,_receiver,RES-A,inspace(_a,_s),  
                  _source2),t,R(t,t)), 
 Happens(e(_id1,_a,_receiver2,RES-A,landingRequest(_a, 
                  _airportX),_source2),t,R(t,t))                                    
         } 
Dpreds’ = { HoldsAt(covers(_r,_s),t),  
          HoldsAt(landing_airspace_for(_s,_airportX),t) 
        } 
OPreds’ = { Initially(covers(R1,S1),t0), Initially(covers(R2,S1),t0),  
           Initially(landing_airspace_for(S1,AR-a),t0), 
           Happens(e(_id,_r,_receiver,RES-A,signal(_r, _a, _s),    
                  _source),t,R(t,t)), 
           Happens(e(id,_a,_receiver,RES-A,permissionRequest(_a,    
                  _s),_source),t,R(t,t)), 
           Happens(e(_id,_a,_receiver,RES-A,  
                  landingRequest(_a,_airportX),_source),t,R(t,t)) 
         } 
Suppose also that the following events have taken place and been received by EVEREST 
at time t=25 when a request for diagnosing the violation of ATMS.R1, which has been 
caused by the events Happens(e(E7,R1,AirBase,RES-
A,signal(R1,A1,S1),R1Captor),17,R(17,17)) (referred as E6 henceforth) and 
Happens(e(NF,R2,AirBase,signal(R2,A1,S1),R2Captor),t,R(17,22)), is requested: 
Event Log for ATMS: 
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E1 Happens(e(E1,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A2,S2),R2Captor),1,  
            R(1,1))  
E2 Happens(e(E2,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A2,S2),R2Captor),5,  
            R(5,5))  
E3 Happens(e(E3,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A2,S2),R2Captor),8,  
            R(8,8)) 
E4 Happens(e(E4,A1,AirBase,RES-A,permissionRequest(A1,S1),  
          AirBaseCaptor),10,R(10,10)) 
E5 Happens(e(E5,A1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a),  
          AirBaseCaptor),13,R(13,13)) 
E6 Happens(e(E7,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),R1Captor),17,  
            R(17,17))  
E7 Happens(e(E8,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A5,S1),R2Captor),23,   
            R(23,23)) 
Figure 5-13 – Event log for ATMS 
 
Assuming that the genuineness of E6 is being assessed, and therefore the Preprocess 
algorithm is invoked for E6, let the diagnosis window, w, be equal to 26. Thus, due to the 
fact that the event E7 (Figure 5-13) was used as the confirming evidence for the detection 
of ATMS.R1 violation by EVEREST, the diagnosis time range, TR, is computed as 
follows: 
TR = [tE7 – w/2, tE7 + w/2] = [23-13, 13+13] = [10, 36]  
Initial invocation: Phase of seach for matching recorded events 
For the initial invocation of the Preprocess algorithm, while the lists Uo, UTotal, 
EXPTotal, and CONSTotal are empty, the algorithm processes the list toBeProcessedo = 
[E6]. Figure 5-14 illustrates the generated explanations/consequences tree that the initial 
invocation of Preprocess algorithm generated for event E6.  
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Figure 5-14 – Explanations/Consequences tree for event E6 
The algorithm starts by compiling the list U(toBeProcessedo,TR). For populating the 
aforementioned list, the algorithm compiles the list U(E6,TR). Once all matching recoded 
events for E6 are found by searching the event log, illustrated in Figure 5-13, with respect 
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to the diagnosis time range and to already considered recorded events in the current and 
previous recursive invocations, the algorithm updates the lists Uo, U(toBeProcessedo,TR), 
and UTotal. The aforementioned lists are currently compiled as follows:  
U(E6,TR) = [E6] 
Uo = [[E6,1,null]]  
U(toBeProcessedo,TR) = [[U(E6,TR) : E6]] 
UTotal = [[U(E6,TR) : E6]]  
 
Initial invocation: Phase of explanation generation 
The algorithm resumes by compling the EXP(toBeProcessedo). For compiling the 
aforementioned list, the algorithm searches for explanations for each U(e,TR) in 
U(toBeProcessedo,TR). At this point, there is only U(E6,TR) in U(toBeProcessedo,TR), as 
well as, U(E6,TR) contains only E6. Thus, the algorithm compiles the lists EXP(E6) and 
EXPRel(E6) after the invocation of the Explain algorithm for each matching recorded 
event of the given event E6, and updates EXP(toBeProcessedo) and EXPTotal as illustrated 
in Figure 5-14 and as follows:  
EXP(E6) = [[ΦE6,1]AND, [ΦE6,2]AND]OR], 
where  
ΦE6,1: Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,inspace(A1,S1),AirBaseCaptor), 
           t1,R(12,17)) 
ΦE6,2: Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a),  
           AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(12,17))   
EXPRel(E6) = [EXP(E6): [[ΦE6,1]AND, [ΦE6,2]AND]OR]] 
EXP(toBeProcessedo) = [ EXPRel(E6) : [ EXP(E6): [[ΦE6,1]AND, [ΦE6,2]AND]OR] ] ] 
EXPTotal = [ EXPRel(E6) : [ EXP(E6): [[ΦE6,1]AND, [ΦE6,2]AND]OR] ] ]  
 
Initial invocation: Phase of consequence identification 
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After the EXP(toBeProcessedo) is populated, the algorithm resumes by compiling the list 
CONS(toBeProcessedo,TR), which should contain all the expected consequences of all 
the alternative explanations of E6 with respect to the diagnosis window. For populating 
the aforementioned list, the algorithm constructs the list CONSRel(E6,TR). The algorithm 
populates the list CONSRel(E6,TR) by compiling the list CONS(E6,TR), which contains 
the the identified consequences of the only matching event for E6. The expected 
consequences CONS(ΦE6,1) and CONS(ΦE6,2) of the alternative explanations of E6, ΦE6,1 
and ΦE6,2 respectively, are identified with two invocations of the 
Generate_AE_consequences algorithm for each of alternative explanations. The 
Preprocess algorithm, then, transforms the lists CONS(ΦE6,1) and CONS(ΦE6,2) to 
CONS(ΦE6,1,TR) and CONS(ΦE6,2,TR) respectively, by disregarding any individual 
consequence that is identified out of the diagnosis time range TR. All the aforementioned 
lists, along with the the lists CONS(toBeProcessedo,TR) and CONSTotal are computed as 
follows (see also Figure 5-14): 
CONS(ΦE6,1) = [CE6,1,1, CE6,1,2, CE6,1,3],  
where  
CE6,1,1: Happens(e(DER,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),R1Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22))  
CE6,1,2: Happens(e(DER,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A1,S1),R2Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22)) 
CE6,1,3: Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,permissionRequest(A1,S1),    
            AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(0,11))  
CONS(ΦE6,1,TR) = [C’E6,1,1, C’E6,1,2, C’E6,1,3],  
where  
C’E6,1,1: Happens(e(DER,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),R1Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22))  
C’E6,1,2: Happens(e(DER,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A1,S1),R2Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22)) 
C’E6,1,3: Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,permissionRequest(A1,S1),    
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            AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(10,11)) 
CONS(ΦE6,2) = [CE6,2,1, CE6,2,2, CE6,2,3, CE6,2,4],  
where  
CE6,2,1: Happens(e(DER,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),R1Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22))  
CE6,2,2: Happens(e(DER,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A1,S1),R2Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22)) 
CE6,2,3: Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,permissionRequest(A1,S1),    
            AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(2,10)) 
CE6,2,4: Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a),  
           AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(12,17))5    
CONS(ΦE6,2,TR) = [C’E6,2,1, C’E6,2,2, C’E6,2,3, C’E6,2,4],  
where  
C’E6,2,1: Happens(e(DER,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1),R1Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22))  
C’E6,2,2: Happens(e(DER,R2,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R2,A1,S1),R2Captor),t1,  
            R(12,22)) 
C’E6,2,3: Happens(e(DER,A1,AirBase,RES-A,permissionRequest(A1,S1),    
            AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(10,10)) 
C’E6,2,4: Happens(e(ABD,R1,AirBase,RES-A,landingRequest(A1,AR-a),  
               AirBaseCaptor),t1,R(12,17)) 
CONS(E6,TR) = [ [CONS(ΦE6,1,TR): C’E6,1,1, C’E6,1,2, C’E6,1,3],  
                              [CONS(ΦE6,1,TR): C’E6,2,1, C’E6,2,2, C’E6,2,3, C’E6,2,4] ]  
CONSRel(E6,TR) = [CONS(E6,TR)]  
CONS(toBeProcessedo,TR) = [CONSRel(E6,TR) ] 
                                               
5 It should be noted that ΦE6,2 is included as a consequence of itself (CE6,2,4), as the landingRequest 
events are abducible and observable, i.e., they belong to the intersection of APreds and OPreds. 
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CONSTotal = [CONSRel(E6,TR) ] 
  
Initial invocation: Phase of self-invocation preparation  
Once the list CONS(toBeProcessedo,TR) is compiled, the algorithm prepares the list 
toPreprocesso for invoking itself. Recall that the toPreprocesso list should contain all the 
expected consequences of the alternative explanations of all the matching events of E6, 
which are not equall to CNULL. At this point, there is no CNULL identified, thus the 
toPreprocesso list is compiled as follows as follows:  
toPreprocesso = [C’E6,1,1, C’E6,1,2, C’E6,1,3, C’E6,2,1, C’E6,2,2, C’E6,2,3, C’E6,2,4] 
 
1st self-invocation: Phase of seach for matching recorded events  
The algorithm compiles the U(toBeProcessed1,TR) list by processing each event in 
toPreprocesso list with respect to the already considered events in the initial invocation. 
As illustrated in Figure 5-14, we have for: 
C’E6,1,1:   
U(C’E6,1,1,TR) = [], as E6 that is the only recorded event and can match with C’E6,1,1 has 
been already considered in the previous invocation, i.e., E6 is already in UTotal. Thus, Uo 
is not updated, while U(toBeProcessedo,TR) becomes: 
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ] ] 
 
C’E6,1,2:   
U(C’E6,1,2,TR) = [] 
Thus, Uo and U(toBeProcessedo,TR) become:  
Uo = [ [E6,1,null] ] 
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) : ]  ] 
 
C’E6,1,3:   
U(C’E6,1,3,TR) = [E4] 
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Thus, Uo and U(toBeProcessedo,TR) become:  
Uo = [ [E6,1,null], [E4,1,null] ] 
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) :],  
                                           [U(C’E6,1,3,TR) : E4]  ] 
 
C’E6,2,1:   
U(C’E6,2,1,TR) = [], as E6 that is the only recorded event and can match with C’E6,2,1 has 
been already considered in the previous invocation, i.e., E6 is already in UTotal. Thus, Uo 
is not updated, while U(toBeProcessedo,TR) becomes:  
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) :],  
                                           [U(C’E6,1,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E6,2,1,TR) : ]  ] 
 
C’E6,2,2:   
U(C’E6,2,2,TR) = [].  
Uo = [ [E6,1,null], [E4,1,null] ] 
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) :],  
                                           [U(C’E6,1,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E6,2,1,TR) : ],  
                                           [U(C’E6,2,2,TR) : ]  ] 
 
C’E6,2,3:   
U(C’E7,1,3,TR) = [E4]  
At this point, it should be noted that although E4 can match C’E6,1,3, the algorithm takes 
into account E4 as a matching recorded event of C’E6,2,3 as well, due to the fact that both 
consequences are processed in the same recursive invocation. In other words, the 
permission request from airplane A1 (denoted by E4) can cast evidence in the validity of 
both alternaive explanations that state that the airplane A1 moves in airspace S1 within 
12 and 17 (denoted by ΦE6,1) or the airplane A1 has requested permission to land at 
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airport AR-a again within 12 and 17 (denoted by ΦE6,2). Thus, the algorithm updates the 
occurrence times variable of E4 in list Uo, while U(toBeProcessedo,TR) becomes:  
Uo = [ [E6,1,null], [E4,2,null]] 
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) : ],  
                                           [U(C’E6,1,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E6,2,1,TR) : ],  
                                           [U(C’E6,2,2,TR) :], [U(C’E6,2,3,TR) : E4]  ] 
 
Finally, for C’E6,2,4, we have:   
U(C’E6,2,4,TR) = [E5] 
Thus, Uo and U(toBeProcessedo,TR) become:  
Uo = [ [E6,1,null], [E4,2,null], [E5,1,null] ] 
U(toBeProcessed1,TR) = [ [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) : ],  
                                           [U(C’E6,1,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E6,2,1,TR) : ],  
                                           [U(C’E6,2,2,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,2,3,TR) : E4], 
                                           [U(C’E6,2,4,TR) : E5]  ] 
As soon as, matching recorded events for all in toBeProcessed1 are found, the algorithm 
appends all elements of U(toBeProcessed1,TR) to UTotal. Thus, UTotal becomes: 
UTotal = [ [U(E6,TR) : E6], [U(C’E6,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,1,2,TR) :], 
               [U(C’E6,1,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E6,2,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E6,2,2,TR) :],  
               [U(C’E6,2,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E6,2,4,TR) : E5] ]  
Invocating similarly the Prerpocess algorithm for event E4 which is considered as the 
only matching event of consequence C’E6,2,3, the explanations/consequences tree pictured 
in Figure 5-15 is generated.  
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Figure 5-15 – Explanations/Consequences tree for event E4 considered as matching 
event of consequence C’E6,2,3 
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Similarly, Figure 5-16 illustrates the explanations/consequences tree for event E7 
considered as matching event of consequence C’E4,2,3. 
 
Figure 5-16 - Explanations/Consequences tree for event E7 considered as matching 
event of consequence C’E4,2,3 
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By resuming the algorithm, we can observe that Uo does not change furthermore. For 
this reason, and due to the fact that, although we have taken into consideration a compact 
ATMS theory and the small event set of Figure 5-13, the example over-expands, we 
provide you the final list Uo, and the initial parts of the final lists UTotal, EXPTotal, and 
CONSTotal, as generated for E6 by the Preprocess algorithm. The output lists are as 
follows: 
Uo = [ [E7,1,null], [E6,2,null], [E4,2,null], [E5,1,null] ] 
UTotal = [ [U(E7,TR) : E7], [U(C’E7,1,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E7,1,2,TR) : E6], 
                     [U(C’E7,1,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E7,2,1,TR) : ], [U(C’E7,2,2,TR) : E6],  
               [U(C’E7,2,3,TR) : E4], [U(C’E7,2,4,TR) : E5],… ]  
EXPTotal = [ [EXPRel(E7) : [ EXP(E7): [[ΦE7,1]AND, [ΦE7,2]AND]OR] ],… ]  
CONSTotal = [ [ [CONS(ΦE7,1,TR): C’E7,1,1, C’E7,1,2, C’E7,1,3],  
                         [CONS(ΦE7,1,TR): C’E7,2,1, C’E7,2,2, C’E7,2,3, C’E7,2,4] ],… ] 
5.4.5 Reconsideration of Event Genuineness Formal Definition  
Based on the remarks regarding the efficiency of the event genuineness assessment 
discussed in the previous section, the definition of event genuineness is reconsidered by 
taking into account the necessity of introducing a window to restrict the search space of 
the event genuineness assessment and excluding already considered recorded events. 
Therefore, the reconsidered version of the event genuineness definition is based on the set 
Uo, UTotal, EXPTotal, and CONSTotal as they are introducesd in Section 5.4.4.3 and is given 
as follows: 
Definition 3:  The genuineness of an event e given the sets of already considered 
matching recorded events, Uo, and a diagnostic time range of interest TR = [Tmin, Tmax] is 
defined as: 
Genuine(e,Uo,TR) = ∨ei∈U(e,TR)(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) 
where, 
• U(e,TR) is an element of UTotal, and contains events that are recorded in the log of 
the monitoring framework with respect to TR, and can be unified with e
 
(see also 
Sections 5.4.4.2 and 5.4.4.3), or formally: 
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U(e,TR) ∈ UTotal, and 
U(e,TR) = { ei |ei ∈ EventLogTR  and Captor(e)  = Captor(ei) and mgu(e, ei) ≠ ∅  
                 and  teLB ≤ tei  and tei ≤  teUB } 
where, 
o EventLogTR is the part of monitor log that contains recorded events whose 
timestamps are within TR, or formally: 
∀x
 
∈ EventLogTR , tx ∈ TR 
o Captor(X) is the captor that produced X, in case that X is a fully specified 
event, or it is the expected captor to produce X, in case that X is a 
parametric event  
o mgu(X,Y)
 
is the most general unifier of the events X and Y
 
 [94] 
o tx is the timestamp of the event x 
o tx
UB
 and txLB is the upper and lower boundary of the time range TR(x) that 
event x is specified within 
o UTotal is the list that the diagnostic process uses to store the matching 
recorded events for each event x that may appear during the recursive 
invocations of the assessment process of y and is compiled by the 
Preprocess algorithm (as discussed in Section 5.4.4.3) 
 
• Explainable(ei, Uo, TR) is a proposition denoting that the event ej has at least one 
valid explanation. The proposition is formally defined as: 
Explainable(ei, Uo, TR) =∨Φj∈EXP(ei)Valid(ei,Φj, Uo, TR)  
where, 
o EXP(ei) is an element of EXPTotal, and contains the alternative explanations 
that can be generated for the event ei (see also Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.4.3) 
o EXPTotal is the list which the diagnostic process uses to store the generated 
explanations for each event x that may appear during the recursive 
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invocations of the assessment process of y, and is compiled by the 
Preprocess algorithm (as discussed in Section 5.4.4.3) 
o Valid(ei,Φj, Uo, TR) is a proposition denoting that explanation Φj of event 
ei is valid within the time range of interest TR = [Tmin,Tmax]. This 
proposition is defined as: 
Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) =∨eq ∈CONS(Φj,TR)Genuine(eq,Uo,TR) 
  where, 
 CONS(Φj,TR) is is an element of CONSTotal, and contains the expected 
consequences of the explanation Φj, which occurred within TR = 
[Tmin,Tmax] (see also Section 5.4.4.3)  
 CONSTotal is the list which the diagnostic process uses to store the 
expected consequences of all generated explanations for each event x 
that may appear during the recursive invocations of the assessment 
process of y, and is compiled by the Preprocess algorithm (as 
discussed in Section 5.4.4.3) 
It should be noted that even though our hypotheses about event genuineness (Hypotheses 
2-3) consider an event as genuine if all of its explanations are valid and an explanation as 
valid if all of its consequences are genuine events, Definition 3 specifies an event as 
genuine if at least one of its explanations is valid and an explanation as valid if at least 
one of its consequences is genuine event. This is a relaxation of our initial hypotheses 
regarding event genuineness, which is introduced due to the introduction of the diagnosis 
time window and the exclusion of already considered recorded events. By using the 
diagnosis time window and the concept of already considered recorded events, there is 
the possibility that no actual explanations, consequences or matching recorded events 
could be generated, identified and found, respectively, at any recursive invocation of the 
genuineness assessment of an event. 
5.4.6 Belief Functions 
Definition 3 establishes the logical criteria for the assessment of event genuineness. As 
discussed in Section 5.4.1.1, during the diagnosis process there might be uncertainty 
regarding the occurrence, and therefore the genuineness of the involved events. To deal 
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with this uncertainty, the diagnosis mechanism does not use strict logical values for the 
genuineness of an event. On the contrary, the diagnosis process advocates an approximate 
reasoning approach, which generates a degree of belief in the genuineness of an event by 
computing intermediate degrees of belief in the membership of an event in the log of the 
monitor and the existence of some valid explanation for the event. These degrees of 
belief are computed by combining partial beliefs to genuineness, explainability and 
validity that are assigned by basic probability assignments or mass functions founded in 
the axiomatic framework of the Dempster Shafer theory of evidence [146] (denoted as 
DS Theory in the following). The three basic probability assignemnts or mass functions 
that are used by the diagnostic process for computing the degree of belief in the 
genuineness of an event are as follows:  
• the function mGN, which measures the likelihood that an event e is genuine with 
respect to the diagnostic time range of interest TR and previously considered 
recorded events Uo, i.e., the likelihood of the proposition denoted by 
Genuine(e,Uo,TR) = ∨ei ∈U(e,TR)(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), 
• the function miEX, which measures the likelihood that an event ei is explainable 
with respect to the diagnostic time range of interest TR and previously considered 
recorded events Uo, i.e., the likelihood of the proposition denoted by 
Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) =∨Φj∈EXP(ei)Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR), and  
• the function mjVL, which measures the likelihood that an explanation Φj of an 
event ei is valid with respect to the diagnostic time range of interest TR and 
previously considered recorded events Uo, i.e., the likelihood of the proposition 
denoted by Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) =∨eq∈CONS(Φ,TR)Genuine(eq,Uo,TR) 
It should be noted that the above mass functions are used in order to assess the 
genuineness of the events involved in runtime S&D violations. More specifically, the 
above functions viewed as an individual mechanism process other genuine events in 
EVEREST event log in order to check whether they can cast confirming or refuting 
evidence to the violations observations genuineness. The genuineness of events is 
assessed based on their explainability, the validity of their explanations, and the 
genuineness of the expected effects of their explanations. The way how the concepts of 
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event genuineness, event explainability and explanation validity have been evolved to 
reach the definitions we are presenting in this thesis can be tracked in the series of our 
earlier publications [162, 163, 164]. The motivation throughout this research line of work 
has been the limitation of existing runtime monitoring and diagnosis approaches, as 
presented in Chapter 2, to perform runtime checks based on runtime events that they 
receive and analyse from the monitored system without assessing the trustworthiness of 
these events. Therefore, our approach has been devised to provide a mechainsm that 
assesses the trustworthiness of streams of events used for runtime monitoring by 
considering and using the concept of event genuineness as a term to model the event 
trustworthiness. 
 
5.4.6.1 Frames of discerment 
In accordance to the DS Theory, a prerequisite for defining formally and combining the 
above functions is the introduction of frames of discernment, i.e., sets of mutually 
exclusive propositions representing exhaustively the properties that the functions assign 
belief to. For defining the frames of discernment for the above functions suppose that the 
belief in the genuineness of event es is questioned. Thus, we have: 
Definition 5: The frame of discernment θes discerns the genuineness property of event es. 
Therefore, θes describes the propositions Genuine(es,Uo,TR) and ¬Genuine(es,Uo,TR). 
Assuming for simplicity that these propositions are denoted as GNs and ¬GNs, 
respectively, then the frame of discernment θes can be defined as a set of vectors of 
Boolean variable of the form [Gs] where, in each vector, the Boolean variable Gs denotes 
whether es is genuine or not by taking the values True or False respectively. The frame of 
discernment θes will contain 2 vectors. Given the above assumptions about the 
construction of the frame of discernment θes, the propositions Gs, ¬Gs and Gs ∨ ¬Gs will 
correspond to the following subsets of θes: 
• GNs will correspond to {[Gs = True]} referred to as GNs henceforth 
• ¬GNs will correspond to {[Gs = False]} referred to as GNs’ henceforth 
• GNs ∨ ¬ GNs will correspond to {[Gs = True or False]} which is equal to θes 
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Definition 6: The frame of discernment θesEX discerns the explainability property of the 
matching recorded events of event es that consist the set U(es,TR). Therefore, θesEX 
describes the propositions Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) and ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR), where ei ∈ 
U(es,TR). Assuming for simplicity that these propositions are denoted as EXi and ¬EXi, 
respectively, then the frame of discernment θesEX can be defined as a set of vectors of 
Boolean variables of the form [E1, E2, …, En], where n = |U(es,TR)| and the Boolean 
variable Ei in each vector denotes whether the recorded event ei is explainable or not by 
taking the values True or False respectively. Furthermore, suppose that by convention a 
vector denotes the conjunction of the propositions expressed by its variables and a set of 
vectors denotes the disjunction of the propositions that are represented by its elements. 
The frame of discernment θesEX will contain 2n vectors to denote all the different 
combinations of values of E1, E2, …, En. Given the above assumptions about the 
construction of the frame of discernment θesEX, the propositions EXi, ¬EXi and EXi ∨ 
¬EXi will correspond to the following subsets of θesEX: 
• EXi will correspond to {[E1, …, En] | Ei = True} referred to as EXi henceforth 
• ¬EXi will correspond to {[E1, …, En] | Ei = False} referred to as EXi’ henceforth 
• EXi ∨ ¬EXi will correspond to {[E1, …, En] | Ei = True or Ei =False} which is 
equal to θesEX 
Definition 7: The frame of discernment θesVL discerns the validity property of the 
alternative explanations of a matching recorded event ei of event es that consist the set  
EXP(ei). Therefore, θesVL describes the propositions Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) and 
¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR), where Φj ∈ EXP(ei). Assuming for simplicity that these 
propositions are denoted as VLj and ¬VLj, respectively, then the frame of discernment 
θesVL can be defined as a set of vectors of Boolean variables of the form [V1, V2,…, Vm], 
where m = |EXP(ei)| and the Boolean variable Vj in each vector denotes whether the 
alternative explanation Φj is valid or not by taking the values True or False respectively. 
Furthermore, suppose that by convention a vector denotes the conjunction of the 
propositions expressed by its variables and a set of vectors denotes the disjunction of the 
propositions that are represented by its elements. The frame of discernment θesVL will 
contain 2m vectors to denote all the different combinations of values of V1, V2,…, Vm. 
Given the above assumptions about the construction of the frame of discernment θesVL, 
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the propositions VLj, ¬VLj and VLj ∨ ¬VLj will correspond to the following subsets of 
θesVL: 
• VLj will correspond to {[V1,V2,…,Vm] | Vj = True} referred to as VLj henceforth 
• ¬VLj will correspond to {[V1,V2,…,Vm] | Vj=False} referred to as VLj’ henceforth 
• VLj ∨ ¬VLj will correspond to {[V1,V2,…,Vm] | Vj = True or Vj =False} which is 
equal to θesVL  
Definition 8: The frame of discernment θesGN discerns the genuineness property of the 
expected consequences of an alternative explanation Φj of a matching recorded event ei 
of event es that consist the set  
CONS(Φj,TR). Therefore, θesGN describes the propositions Genuine(eq,Uo,TR) and 
¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR), where eq ∈ CONS(Φj,TR). Assuming for simplicity that these 
propositions are denoted as GNq and ¬GNq, respectively, then the frame of discernment 
θesGN can be defined as a set of vectors of Boolean variables of the form [G1, G2,…, Gr], 
where r = |CONS(Φj,TR)| and the Boolean variable Gq in each vector denotes whether 
the expected consequence eq is valid or not by taking the values True or False 
respectively. Furthermore, suppose that by convention a vector denotes the conjunction 
of the propositions expressed by its variables and a set of vectors denotes the disjunction 
of the propositions that are represented by its elements. The frame of discernment θesGN 
will contain 2r vectors to denote all the different combinations of values of G1, G2,…, Gr. 
Given the above assumptions about the construction of the frame of discernment θesGN, 
the propositions GNq, ¬GNq and GNq ∨ ¬GNq will correspond to the following subsets of 
θesGN: 
• GNq will correspond to {[G1,G2,…,Gr] | Gq = True} referred to as GNq henceforth 
• ¬GNq will correspond to {[G1,G2,…,Gr]|Gq=False} referred to as GNq’ henceforth 
• GNq ∨ ¬GNq will correspond to {[G1,G2,…,Gr] |Gq = True or Gq =False} which is 
equal to θesGN 
5.4.6.2 Definitions of basic probability assignments 
In this section, having defined the frames θes, θesEX, θesV, that discerns the genuineness, 
explainability and validity properties of individual events and sets of events that may 
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appear during the assessment of the belief in genuineness of the event es, we provide the 
definitions of the functions mGN, miEX, and mjVL that assigns partial belief to subsets of the 
aforementioned frames. The proof of the theorems that are used in the definitions of the 
functions below can be found in Section 5.5. 
Definition 9: mGN is a function measuring the basic probability of the genuineness and 
non-genuineness of the event e, by assigning basic probability to the propositions 
Genuine(e,Uo,TR) and ¬Genuine(e,Uo,TR) that are denoted as GN and ¬GN in the 
following and are described by subsets of θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 
repectively in Section 5.4.6.1), and is defined as: 
1. If U(e,TR) ≠ ∅, i.e. according to Conditions 9 -11, there are matching recorded 
events for e in the event log with respect to the diagnosis time range TR and 
previously considered recorded events Uo, we have the following cases: 
i) If e
 
= CNULL, i.e., CNULL is a special event introduced to denote that all of the 
identified consequences of an explanation are not accepted due to the diagnosis 
time range TR (see Section 5.4.4.3), we have for mGN: 
mGN(GN) = α2  
m
GN(¬GN) = 1 - α2   
mGN(GN ∨¬ GN) = 1 - mGN(GN) - msGN(¬GN) = 0 
     where,  
• α2 is a belief value within 0 and 1 that is predetermined by the user of the 
diagnostic framework  
As the following theorem indicates for this case, mGN is a basic probability 
assignment to   the genuineness of an event e, according to the axiomatic 
definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence with respect to θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 repectively in 
Section 5.4.6.1). 
  Theorem 5.1: The evidence measure mGN defined as:  
 
α2, if P = Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
1 - α2, if P = ¬ Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
0, otherwise 
m
GN(P) = 
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where α2 is a value within 0 and 1, is a DS basic probability assignment with   
respect to frames of discerment θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 
repectively  in Section 5.4.6.1).  
ii) Otherwise, we have for  mGN: 
mGN(GN)  = Bel(∨i=1,…, |U(e,TR)| Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))  
m
GN(¬GN) = Bel(∧i=1,…, |U(e,TR)| ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))  
mGN(GN∨¬GN) = 1 - mGN(GN) - mGN(¬GN)  
where, as the following theorem indicates,  
• Bel(∨i=1,…, |U(e,TR)| Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) = 
= ΣI⊆U(ei,TR) and I≠∅(−1)|I|+1{Πi∈I miEX(Explainable (ei,Uo,TR))}  
• Bel(∧i=1,…, |U(e,TR)| ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) =  
= Πei∈ U(e,TR){miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR))} 
Theorem 5.2: If e is an event and U(e,TR) is the set of the events that are 
recorded in the log of the monitoring framework and can be unified with e, 
and it holds that U(e,TR)≠∅ with n = |U(e,TR)|, i.e. the number of the 
members of U(e,TR), the belief in the explainability of at least one recorded 
event in U(e,TR), Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), and in the explainability 
of none of the events in U(e,TR),
 
Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), are 
measured by the following functions: 
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Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) = 
= ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))} 
      Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))  = 
= Π
 i=1,…,n {miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR)) }  
where miEX (i=1,…, n)  is the basic probability assignment associated with the 
event ei.  
Furthermore, as the following theorem indicates for this case, mGN is a basic 
probability assignment to   the genuineness of an event e, according to the 
axiomatic definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence with respect to θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 
repectively in Section 5.4.6.1). 
  Theorem 5.3: The evidence measure mGN defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where n = |U(e,TR)|, i.e., the number of the matching recorded events of e, is a 
DS basic probability assignment with respect to frames of discerment θes and 
θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 repectively  in Section 5.4.6.1).  
2. Else, if U(e,TR) = ∅, i.e., no recorded events matching with e were found in the 
event log with respect to the diagnosis time range TR and previously considered 
recorded events either because the matcing recorded events for e are already 
considered during previous recursive invocations of the Preprocess algorithm (see 
Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), if P = Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), if P = ¬ Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
1 - Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) - Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), 
otherwise 
m
GN(P) = 
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Section 5.4.4.3) or because no such events are stored in the event log, we have the 
following cases: 
i) If the last known value of the clock of Captor(e), i.e., the timestamp of the last 
event in the log that has produced by Captor(e) at the time of the search is 
greater than the upper boundary of the time range that is specified for e, or 
formally lastTimestamp(Captor(e)) > teUB, we have for mGN: 
mGN(GN) = Bel(∧i=1,…, |A(e)| ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))  
    mGN(¬GN) = Bel(∨i=1,…, |A(e)| Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) 
mGN(GN ∨¬ GN) = 1 - mGN(GN) - mGN(¬GN) 
where, 
• A(e) contains the recorded events, eA, which have been produced by 
Captor(e), cannot be unified with e, and their timestamps, teA, are within a 
time range whose lower boundary is open and equal to the upper boundary 
of e, teUB, while the upper boundary is close and equal to the sum of teUB 
and lastTimestamp(Captor(e)), or formally: 
A(e) = { eA | eA ∈ EventLog and mgu(e, eA) = ∅ and  
            Captor(e) = Captor(eA) and teA> teUB and  
            teA ≤ lastTimestamp(Captor(e))}  
• and from Theorem 5.2 and by replacing U(e,TR) with A(e), it holds that:  
 Bel(∧i=1,…, |A(ei)| ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) =  
= Πei∈ A(ei){miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR))}  
 Bel(∨i=1,…, |A(ei)| Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))  
=ΣI⊆ A(ei) and I≠∅(−1)|I|+1{Πi∈I miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)}   
Furthermore, from Theorem 5.3 and by replacing again U(e,TR) with A(e), mGN 
is a basic probability assignment to the genuineness of an event e, according to 
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the axiomatic definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence with respect to θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 
repectively in Section 5.4.6.1).  
To give a picture of the above case, Figure 5-17 illustrates some time points on 
the timeline of Captor(ei), which are significant for the aforementioned case. 
These significant time points are the lower and upper boundaries, teiLB and 
tei
UB
, which ei is specified within, and the upper boundary, 
lastTimestamp(Captor(ei)), that the search for events for A(ei) should respect. 
For being fair in cases as the above, the belief function mGN defines that the 
belief in the not genuineness of ei depends on the explainability of recorded 
events that have produced by Captor(ei) and occurred at timepoints within teiUB 
and lastTimestamp(Captor(ei)). On the other hand, mGN defines that the belief 
in the genuineness of ei depends on recorded events that again have produced 
by Captor(ei) and occurred at timepoints within teiUB and 
lastTimestamp(Captor(ei)) but cannot be explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17 – Timeline of Captor(ei)   
ii) Else, if the last known value of the clock of Captor(ei), i.e., the timestamp of 
the last event in the log that has produced by Captor(ei) at the time of the 
search is less than or equal to the upper boundary of the time range that is 
specified for ei, or formally lastTimestamp(Captor(ei)) ≤ teiUB, we have for 
m
GN: 
mGN(GN) = 0.5  
m
GN(¬GN) = 0.5 
  
Timeline(Captor(ei)) 
tei
LB
 tei
UB
 
lastTimestamp(Captor(ei)) 
Search space for  A(ei)  
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mGN(GN∨¬GN) = 1 - mGN(GN) - mGN(¬GN) = 0 
 
It should be noted that, from Theorem 5.1 and by setting α2 equal to 0.5, mGN is 
a basic probability assignment to the genuineness of an event e, according to 
the axiomatic definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence with respect to θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 
repectively in Section 5.4.6.1). 
iii) Else, the last known value of the clock of Captor(ei) is null, i.e., there is no 
recorded event that is produced from Captor(ei), we have for mGN: 
mGN(GN) = 0  
mGN(¬GN) = 0
  
mGN(GN ∨¬ GN) = 1 - mGN(GN) - mGN(¬GN)  = 1  
Similarly, from Theorem 5.1 and by setting α2 equal to 0 for this case, mGN is a 
basic probability assignment to the genuineness of an event e, according to the 
axiomatic definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence with respect to θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 and 8 
repectively in Section 5.4.6.1). 
It should be noted that such case could occur in the beginning of the 
monitoring session for the underlying system. More specifically, the fact that 
no recorded events produced from Captor(ei) can be found, it might not mean 
necessarily that there is a system behaviour that deviates from the intended 
system behaviour. On the contray, it might mean that Captor(ei) has not 
correctly produced yet any event according to systems specifications. 
Definition 10: miEX is a function measuring the degree of belief in the existence of a valid 
explanation for an event ei by assigning basic probability to the propositions 
Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) and ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) that are denoted as EXi and ¬EXi in 
the following and are described by subsets of θesEX (see Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1), 
and is defined as: 
• If isExplainabilityComputed(ei) =False, where isExplainabilityComputed(ei) is a 
Boolean flag stored in the sublist for ei in Uo and denotes that the process has not 
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assessed the explainability of event ei in previous recursive invocation, and 
therefore, the variables assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) and 
assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)) have still null values (see also in Sections 5.4.4.2 
and 5.4.4.3), we have the following cases: 
i) If EXP(ei) = ∅  , i.e., no explanations can be generated for ei due to the fact 
that  ei is abducible and observable predicate (see also Definition 1 in Section 
5.4.2), we have that: 
mi
EX(EXi) = α1  
mi
EX(¬EXi) = 1 - α1  
mi
EX(EXi ∨¬ EXi) = 1 - miEX(EXi) - miEX(¬EXi) = 0 
   where, 
α1 is a belief value within 0 and 1 that is predetermined by the user of the 
diagnostic framework  
As the following theorem indicates for this case, miEX is a basic probability 
assignment to the explanablity of an event ei, according to the axiomatic 
definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence with respect to θesEX (see Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1). 
  Theorem 5.4: The evidence measure miEX defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
where α1 is a value within 0 and 1, is a DS basic probability assignment with   
respect to frame of discerment θesEX (see Definitions 6 in Section 5.4.6.1). 
ii) Else if EXP(ei) ≠∅, we have that: 
mi
EX(EXi)  = Bel(∨j=1,…, |EXP(ei)| Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))     
a1, if P = Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
1 – α1, if P = ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
0, otherwise 
mi
EX
 (P) = 
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    mi
EX(¬EXi) = Bel(∧j=1,…, |EXP(ei)| ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))) 
mi
EX(EXi ∨¬ EXi) = 1 - miEX(EXi) - miEX(¬EXi)  
where, as the following theorem indicates,  
• Bel(∨j=1,…, |EXP(ei)| Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) =  
=ΣJ⊆EXP(ei) and J≠∅(−1)|J|+1{Πj∈J m jVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)))}  
• Bel(∧j=1,…, |EXP(ei)| ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))) =  
=ΠΦj∈EXP(ei){ m jVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)))}  
Theorem 5.5: If ei is an event and EXP(ei) is the set of the alternative 
explanations that are generated for ei, and it holds that EXP(ei)≠∅ with m = 
|EXP(ei)|, i.e. the number of the members of EXP(ei), the belief in the validity 
of at least one alternative explanation in EXP(ei), Bel(∨j=1,…,m 
Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), and in the validity of none of the alternative explanations 
in EXP(ei), Bel(∧j=1,…,m ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), are measured by the following 
functions: 
Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) = 
= ΣJ ⊆{1,…,m} and J≠Ø(−1)|J|+1{Πj∈J mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))} 
     Bel(∧j=1,…,m ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))  = 
= Π
 j=1,…,m {mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))}  
where mjVL (j=1,…, n)  is the basic probability assignment associated with the 
alternative explanation Φj of ei.  
Furthermore, as the following theorem indicates for this case, miEX is a basic 
probability assignment to the explainability of an event ei, according to the 
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axiomatic definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence with respect to θesEX (see Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1). 
  Theorem 5.6: The evidence measure miEX defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where m = |EXP(ei)|, i.e., the number of alternative explanations of ei, is a DS 
basic probability assignment with respect to frame of discerment θesEX (see 
Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1). 
As soon as the assessment process finishes the computation of the belief in the 
explainability of ei for first time, the process updates the sublist of ei in Uo (see 
Section 5.4.4.2). In particular, the process sets the Boolean flag 
isExplainabilityComputed(ei) to True, and  sets values to the two placeholders for 
the assessment result of the explanability of ei, assessmentOf(Explainable(ei))  
and assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)), as follows: 
isExplainabilityComputed(ei) = True  
assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) = miEX(EXi)  
assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)) = miEX(¬EXi)  
2. If isExplainabilityComputed(ei) =True, we have for miEX:  
mi
EX(EXi) = assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) / occurrenceTimes(ei) 
mi
EX(¬EXi)  = assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)) / occurrenceTimes(ei) 
mEX(EXi∨¬EXi) = 1 - miEX(EXi) - miEX(¬EXi) 
It should be noted that by these means the assessment process distributes equally 
the evidence of any recorded event that is repeatedly reached as actual 
Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), if P = Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), if P = ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
1-Bel(∨j=1,…,mValid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))-Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)),   
otherwise 
  mi
EX(P) = 
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consequence of alternative explanations of the same event ex. Moreover, we 
observe that occurrenceTimes(ei) is always equal to or greater than 1. Also, the 
values assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) and assessmentOf(Explainable(¬ei)), which 
are respectively equal to miEX(EXi) and miEX(¬EXi), are within 0 and 1 as miEX 
satisfies Axiom 1 of DS Theory (see Section 3.4) shown in Theorem 5.6. Based on 
the aforementioned observations, the following theorem indicates that miEX is a 
basic probability assignment to the explainability of an event ei, according to the 
axiomatic definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence with respect to θesEX (see Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1).  
 
 
 
Theorem 5.7: The evidence measure miEX defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where occurrenceTimes(ei)≥1 , i.e., the number of times that ei was reached as a 
consequence of alternative explanations of the same event es, and the values 
assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) and assessmentOf(Explainable(¬ei)) are within 0 
and 1, is a DS basic probability assignment with respect to frame of discerment 
θesEX (see Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1). 
Definition 11: mjVL is a function measuring the degree of belief in the existence of a 
genuine consequence of an explanation Φj generated for an event ei by assigning basic 
probability to the propositions Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) and ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) that are 
assessmentOf(Explainable(ei))/occurrenceTimes(ei),                                     
if P = Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei))/occurrenceTimes(ei),                  
if P = ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
1-[assessmentOf(Explainable(ei))+assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)) 
/occurrenceTimes(ei))],   otherwise 
  mi
EX(P) = 
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denoted as VLj and ¬VLj in the following and are described by subsets of θesVL (see 
Definition 7 in Section 5.4.6.1), and is defined as:  
mjVL(VLj) = Bel(∨q=1,…, |CONS(Φj,TR)| Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) 
mjVL(¬VLj) = Bel(∧q=1,…, |CONS(Φj,TR)|  ¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))  
mjVL(VLj∨¬VLj) = 1 - mjVL(VLj) - mjVL(¬VLj)  
where, as the following theorem indicates,  
Bel(∨q=1,…, |CONS(Φj,TR)| Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))    
=ΣQ⊆CONS(Φj,TR) and Q≠∅(−1)|Q|+1{Πq∈Q mqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))} 
Bel(∧q=1,…, |CONS(Φj,TR)|  ¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) 
=Πeq ∈ CONS(Φj,TR){ mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}  
Theorem 5.8: If Φj is an alternative explanation of ei and CONS(Φj,TR) is the set of the 
expected consequences that are identified for Φj, and it holds that CONS(Φj,TR)≠∅ with 
r = |CONS(Φj,TR)|, i.e. the number of the members of CONS(Φj,TR), the belief in the 
genuineness of at least one expected consequence in CONS(Φj,TR), Bel(∨q=1,…,r 
Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), and in the genuineness of none of the expected consequences in 
CONS(Φj,TR), Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), are measured by the following 
functions: 
Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) = 
= ΣQ⊆CONS(Φj,TR) and Q≠∅(−1)|Q|+1{Πq∈Q mqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))} 
     Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))  = 
=Πeq ∈ CONS(Φj,TR){ mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}  
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where mqGN (q=1,…, r)  is the basic probability assignment associated with the expected 
consequence eq of the alternative explanation Φj of ei.  
Furthermore, as the following theorem indicates for this case, mjVL is a basic probability 
assignment to the validity of an alternative explanation Φj, according to the axiomatic 
definition of such assignments in the context of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
with respect to θesVL (see Definition 7 in Section 5.4.6.1). 
Theorem 5.9: The evidence measure mjVL defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where r = |CONS(Φj,TR)|, i.e., the number of expected consequences of the Φj, is a DS 
basic probability assignment with respect to frame of discerment θesVL (see Definition 7 in 
Section 5.4.6.1). 
As indicated in case 1.i) of Definition 9, mGN assigns a predetermined belief value α2 
to null consequences. Whilst the reasoning principle underpinning the diagnosis 
framework favours explanations, which are confirmed by the fact that they have 
consequences matched by genuine events other than the event that they were generated 
for, it would be unfair to disregard entirely explanations that have no other such 
consequences. Cases of such explanations are more likely to arise when the diagnosis 
window is narrow and, therefore, it may be possible to end up with explanations with no 
further consequences falling within the given diagnosis window. For such explanations, it 
is important to assign some belief measure in their validity but at the same time keep this 
measure low to reflect the absence of any evidence of runtime event in the given 
diagnosis interval. The definition of the belief function mGN introduces the parameter α2 
to define the belief measure that should be used in such cases and leaves the choice of its 
exact value to the user of the framework. The expectation, however, is that this value will 
Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), if P = Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) 
Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), if P = ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) 
1-Bel(∨q=1,…,rGenuine(eq,Uo,TR))-Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)),   
otherwise 
  mj
VL(P) = 
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be a number close to zero to ensure that explanations with no consequences cannot affect 
significantly the overall belief in the genuineness of events.  
Similarly, as indicated in case .i) of Definition 10, mEX
 
assigns some belief α1 in the 
genuineness of events which have no explanations. This is a relaxation of the logical 
definition of event genuineness in Definition 3 that is introduced for the following reason. 
An event ei with no explanations of its own may be required to provide confirmatory 
evidence for a consequence of an explanation of another event ej. If this were the case, 
the assignment of a zero belief in the explainability of ei (due to the absence of an 
explanation for it) would reduce or even make equal to zero the basic probability of the 
genuineness of the event ej whose explanation had to be confirmed by ei. The stance 
reflected by Definition 5 in this case is that the very presence of ei in the log of the 
monitoring infrastructure should provide some evidence for the validity of the 
explanation of ej even though ei is not explainable itself and that the belief in the validity 
of this explanation should be higher than in cases where none of its consequences were 
matching with events in the log of the monitoring infrastructure. Thus, mEX assigns a 
small belief in the genuineness of events with no explanation that is determined by the 
parameter α1, which exact value is chosen by the user of the framework. The value of this 
parameter should be set very close to zero, in order to provide a close approximation of 
the logical definition of explainability (Definition 3) in cases where an event does not 
have any explanation. It should be noted that the predetermined measures, α1 and α2, 
must respect an order, which ensures that the effect of these values on the final 
assessment result is fair and reasonable. In particular, α1 must be less than α2 to ensure 
that null explanations affect less the assessment result by being compared to null 
consequences that may occur due to diagnosis window.  
As a final remark regading the sets of belief values we have selected for mGN in the 
cases 1.ii) and 1.iii) of Definition 9, both sets represent uncertainty. In 1.ii), mGN is a 
Bayesian function, i.e., the sum of mGN(Genuine(ei,Uo,TR)) and mGN(¬Genuine(ei,Uo,TR)) 
equals to 1 [146], that provides a model regarding the uncertainty for the genuineness of 
ei, which restricts ei to be either genuine or not, given the evidence that Captor(ei) is 
operable and produces events according to the monitored system specifications. On the 
other hand, in 1.iii), mGN represents a model of total uncertainty for the genuineness of ei, 
and therefore the occurrence of ei, as no confirming or refuting evidence have been  
produced by Captor(ei). Thus, in 1.iii), the correct behaviour of Captor(ei) could be 
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questioned as well. Of course, as a future line of work, it would be interesting to explore 
uncertainty models in terms of belief functions that could be more appropriate for 
answering plausibly the different questions that may appear in both cases. 
5.5 Diagnosis Generation 
5.5.1 The diagnosis generation process 
The last phase of the diagnosis process is concerned with the generation of a final 
diagnosis of a violation based on the beliefs computed for the genuineness of the 
individual events involved in it. This final diagnosis is a report of the confirmed and 
unconfirmed predicates, which are involved in the violation that is generated as shown in 
the algorithm of Figure 5-18.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generate_Violation_Explanation(R: Instance of Violated Rule) 
1. For each predicate P in R Do 
2.      If P is negated Then 
3.         Explanations(P) = explain(¬P, tmin(P), tmax(P), NULL) 
4.          Generate_AE_Consequences(Explanations(P), Assumptions, P_Consequences) 
5.     Else 
6.         Explanations(P) = explain(P, tmin(P), tmax(P), NULL) 
7.         Generate_AE_Consequences(Explanations(P), Assumptions, P_Consequences) 
8.      End If 
9.      [Bel(P), Pls(P)] = ComputeBeliefRange(P, Explanations(P), P_Consequences) 
10.      If 1-Pls(P) < Bel(P) Then 
11.          If P is negated Then 
12.           UnconfirmedPredicates = UnconfirmedPredicates ∪ {P} 
13.       Else 
14.           ConfirmedPredicates = ConfirmedPredicates ∪ {P} 
15.       End if  
16.       End if 
17.   End For 
18.    For all P in ConfirmedPredicates Do report P as a confirmed predicate End for 
19.    For all P in UnconfirmedPredicares Do report P as unconfirmed predicate End for 
END 
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Figure 5-18 – Final diagnosis generation algorithm 
More specifically, this algorithm takes as input a template that represents an in-
stantiation of an S&D monitoring rule that has been violated and generates explanations 
for the individual predicates which are involved in the violation by calling the Explain 
algorithm initially (see lines 3 and 6 in Figure Figure 5-18). In the case of negated 
predicates, the explanations are generated for the positive form of the predicate. This is 
because negated predicates cannot appear in the head of assumptions and, therefore, it is 
not possible to generate explanations for them directly. By virtue, however, of attempting 
to generate an explanation for the positive form of a negated predicate, the diagnosis 
process can still establish beliefs in the genuineness of the event represented by the 
predicate as we discussed above. It should also be noted that, as they do not appear in 
assumption heads, negated predicates cannot have been generated by deduction from 
assumptions during the monitoring process. Thus, their presence in violated rule 
instances is established by the principle of negation as failure when the expected 
predicate has not been seen in the event log of the monitoring system within the time 
range that it is expected to occur. Thus, an attempt to generate an explanation for the 
positive form of the predicate during the diagnosis process provides a means of 
confirming or not whether the application of the principle of negation as failure was 
reasonable given evidence from other events in the event log. 
Having generated explanations for the individual predicates, the Gener-
ate_Violation_Explanation algorithm computes a belief range for the event repre-sented 
by each predicate and classifies the predicate as confirmed or unconfirmed depending on 
whether the belief in the genuineness of the event represented by it exceeds the belief in 
the non genuineness of this event. More specifically, a non negated predicate P will be 
classified as a confirmed predicate if Bel(P) ≥ Bel(¬P)6. A negated predicate ¬P, will be 
classified as a unconfirmed predicate if Bel(P) ≤ Bel(¬P). Finally, the algorithm reports 
the classifications of individual predicates as confirmed or unconfirmed to the user (see 
lines 18-19 in Figure 5-18). 
                                               
6 Bel(P) and Bel(¬P) represent the proposition Bel(Genuine(e,Uo,TR)) and Bel(¬Genuine(e,Uo,TR)) respectively.   
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5.5.2 Examples of diagnosis generation 
In the case of the example regarding the violation of Rule ATMS.R1, the algorithm will 
report P1: Happens(e(E4,R1,AirBase,RES-A,signal(R1,A1,S1), 
AirBaseCaptor),7,R(7,7)) as a confirmed predicate and P2: 
Happens(e(NF,R2,AirBase,signal(R2,A1,S1), AirBaseCaptor),t,R(7,12)) as an 
unconfirmed predicate. This will be due to the beliefs in the genuineness and non 
genuineness of the events unified with these predicates which are shown in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1 - Beliefs in genuineness of violation observations of Rule ATMS.R1 
Predicate 
(P) 
Bel(Genuine(P,Uo,TR)) Bel(¬Genuine(P,Uo,TR)) Confirmed 
P1 2α1 - α12 0 YES 
P2 0 2α1 - α12 NO 
 
It should be noted that in order to calculate the belief and disbelief in the genuineness of 
P2, the algorithm calculates the belief and disbelief in the genuineness of ¬P2 assuming 
that there is an event of signal sent from the radar R2 at some time point from t=7 to t=12 
in the event log. 
5.6 Mathematical Appendix: Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 5 
 
Theorem 5.1: The evidence measure mGN defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 - α2, if P = ¬ Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
0, otherwise 
m
GN(P) = 
α2, if P = Genuine(e,Uo,TR ) 
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where α2 is a value within 0 and 1, is a DS basic probability assignment with respect to 
frame of discerment θes and θesGN (see Definitions 5 nad 8 repectively  in Section 5.4.6.1).  
Proof: To prove that mGN is a DS basic probability assignment it is sufficient that mGN 
satisfies the axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3 of DS Theory (see Section 3.4).  
(Axiom 1): Regarding θes, Axiom 1 is satisfied since:  
If P = GNs, msGN(P) = α2 where 0 < α2 < 1.  
If P = ¬GNs, msGN(P) = 1 - α2 with  0 < 1 - α2 < 1 since 0 < α2 < 1.  
If P ≠ GNs or P ≠ ¬GNs, msGN(P) = 0 by definition.  
Similarly, Axiom 1 is satisfied with respect to θesGN since:  
If P = GNq, mqGN(P) = α2 where 0 < α2 < 1.  
If P = ¬GNq, mqGN(P) = 1 - α2 with  0 < 1 - α2 < 1 since 0 < α2 < 1.  
If P ≠ GNq or P ≠ ¬GNq, mqGN(P) = 0 by definition.  
(Axiom 2): Regarding θes, Axiom 2 is satisfied by msGN since its focals GNs and GNs’ are 
non empty sets by definition of θes: 
GNs ={[Gs = True]} ≠ ∅ and  
GNs’ ={[Gs = False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by msGN is msGN(∅) = 0  
Similarly, Axiom 2 is satisfied by msGN with respect to θesGN since its focals GNq and 
GNq’ are non empty sets by definition of θesGN: 
GNq ={[G1,G2,…,Gr] | Gq = True}≠ ∅ and  
GNq’ ={[G1,G2,…,Gr] | Gq = False} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by mqGN is mqGN(∅) = 0 
(Axiom 3): Regarding θes, Axiom 3 is satisfied since:  
ms
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es
∑ = ms
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es and P ≠GNs and P ≠¬GNs
∑ + ms
GN (GNs) + msGN (¬GNs)
=0 + a2 +1 − a2 =1
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Similarly, Axiom 3 is satisfied with respect to θesGN since:  
mq
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es
GN∑ = mq
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es
GN
and P ≠GNq and P ≠¬GNq
∑ + mq
GN (GNq ) + mqGN (¬GNq )
=0 + a2 +1− a2 =1
 
♦  
 
Lemma 5.1: If Pi and ¬Pi ( i=1,…,n) are propositions, which denote whether some 
property P holds for some element Li of set S, with n=|S|, and are described by subsets of 
the frame of discernment θ, and according to Dempster-Shafer Theory there are m1,…, 
mn functions, which assign basic probability to the property of elements L1,…,Ln, and 
therefore to the subsets of θ that describe Pi,…, Pn respectively, and can be combined 
using the rule of the orthogonal sum with k0 = 0, the total belief in the disjunction of Pi, 
i.e., in the truth of one at least Pi, Bel(∨i=1,…,n Pi), and in the conjunction of Pi, i.e., in the 
non truth of all Pi, Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Pi), are measured by the following functions: 
Bel(∨i=1,…,n Pi) =ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I mi(Pi)} 
Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬ Pi)  =Π i=1,…,n {mi(¬Pi) }  
Proof: The belief function Bel in the lemma must be obtained by combining the BPAs 
m1, …, mn
 which are associated with P1, …, Pn. The combination of the basic probability 
assignments mi (i=1,…,n) requires their mapping on a common frame of discernment. 
Assume that the common frame of discernment for combining m1, …, mn is θ. Suppose 
also that θ is defined as a set of vectors of Boolean variables of the form [p1, p2, …, pn], 
where the Boolean variable pi in each vector denotes whether property Pi holds for  
element ei or does not by taking the values True or False respectively. Furthermore, 
suppose that by convention a vector denotes the conjunction of the propositions 
expressed by its variables and a set of vectors denotes the disjunction of the propositions 
that are represented by its elements. The frame of discernment θ will contain 2n vectors to 
denote all the different combinations of values of p1, p2, …, pn.  
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Given the assumptions about the construction of the frame of discernment θ, the focals Pi, 
¬Pi and Pi ∨ ¬Pi of each of the basic probability assignments mi will correspond to the 
following subsets of θ: 
• Pi will correspond to {[p1, …, pn] | pi = True} referred to as Pi henceforth 
• ¬Pi will correspond to {[p1, …, pn] | pi = False} referred to as Pi’ henceforth 
• Pi ∨ ¬Pi will correspond to {[p1, …, pn] | pi = True or pi =False} which is equal to 
θ 
Having established the common frame of discernment θ for combining m1, …, mn, and 
assuming that m1, …, mn can be combined by using the simplified version of the rule of 
the orthogonal sum with k0 = 0:  
m(P) = mi⊕ mj(P) = Σ X ∩ Y = P mi(X) × mj(Y)                
(T5.1.1)  
we can now prove this lemma by induction on n or, equivalently, by proving first the case 
for n=2, assuming that the lemma holds for n=k and proving finally that the lemma also 
holds for n=k+1. 
For n=2, we have that: 
Given the frame of discernement θ that we introduced above, the focals of the BPAs m1 
and m2 and the basic probability measures that m1 and m2 will assign to them will be: 
m1:  
P1= {[p1, p2] | p1=True} with basic probability measure m1(P1) 
P1’= {[p1, p2] | p1=False} with basic probability measure m1 (P1’) 
P1 ∪ P1’ = {[p1, p2] | p1=True or p1 = False} with basic probability measure  
m1(P1∪P1’)=(1−m1(P1) −m1(P1’)) 
m2:  
P2= {[p1, p2] | p2=True} with basic probability measure m2(P2) 
P2’= {[p1, p2] | p2=False} with basic probability measure m2(P2’) 
P2 ∪ P2’ = {[p1, p2] | p2=True or p2 = False} with basic probability measure  
   
 181
m2(P2∪P2’) = (1−m2(P2)- m2(P2’))   
Thus from (T5.1.1), we have that the combination of m1 and m2 will provide basic 
probability assignments to the following subsets of θ: 
P1  ∩ P2    : m1(P1) × m2(P2) 
P1  ∩ P2’    : m1(P1) × m2(P2’)  
P1  ∩ (P2 ∪ P2’) = P1  : m1(P1) × (1 − m2(P2) − m2(P2’))  
P1’ ∩ P2    : m1(P1’) × m2(P2) 
P1’∩ P2’   : m1(P1’) × m2(P2’)  
P1’∩ (P2 ∪ P2’) = P1’  : m1(P1’) × (1 − m2(P2) − m2(P2’)) 
(P1 ∪ P1’)  ∩ P2 = P2  : (1 − m1(P1) − m1(P1’)) × m2(P2)  
(P1 ∪ P1’) ∩ P2’ = P2’  : (1 − m1(P1) − m1(P1’)) × m2(P2’) 
(P1∪P1’) ∩ (P2∪P2’)  = θ  : (1 − m1(P1) − m1(P1’)) × (1 − m2(P2) − m2(P2’)) 
Having obtained the focals of m1⊕m2, we then obtain Bel(EX1 ∨ EX2) or, equivalently, 
Bel(EX1 ∪ EX2) from  axiom Axiom 5 of the Dempster Shafer theory (Section 3.4), i.e. 
the formula Bel(A) = ΣB ⊆ A m(B). By applying this formula, we will have (assuming that 
m = m1⊕m2): 
Bel(P1 ∪ P2)  = ΣB where B ⊆ (P1 ∪ P2) m1⊕m2 (B)             
= m(P1∩ P2) + m(P1 ∩P2’) + m(P1) + m(P1’ ∩ P2) + m(P2) 
= m1(P1) × m2 (P2) + 
   m1(P1) × m2(P2’) + 
   m1(P1) × (1 − m2(P2) − m2(P2’)) + 
   m1(P1’) × m2(P2) + 
   ((1 − m1(P1) − m1(P1’)) × m2(P2) 
= m1(P1) × m2(P2) + 
   m1(P1) × m2(P2’) + 
   m1(P1) − m1(P1) × m2(P2) − m1(P1) × m2(P2’)) + 
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   m1(P1’) × m2(P2) + 
   m2(P2) − m1(P1) × m2(P2) − m1(P1’) × m2(P2) 
= m1(P1) + m2(P2) − m1(P1) × m2(P2) 
Also,  
Bel(P1’∩ P2’)  = ΣB where B ⊆ (P1’∩ P2’) m1⊕m2(B) 
  = m(P1’∩ P2’) 
= m1(P1’) × m2(P2’)  
Thus the lemma holds for n=2. 
For n=k, we assume that the lemma holds or, equivalently, that 
Bel(∨i=1,…,kPi)  = Bel (∪i=1,…,k Pi)  
               =ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø(-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{mi(Pi)}} 
and 
Bel(∧i=1,…,k¬Pi) = Bel(∩i=1,…,k Pi’)  
            = Πi ∈{1,…,k}{mi(Pi’)} 
 
Then, for n=k+1, the lemma can be proven as follows. 
From Theorem 3.4 in [146] (p. 63), we have that the combination of BPAs m1⊕ 
m2⊕… ⊕ mk⊕ mk+1 = (m1⊕ m2⊕ … ⊕ mk) ⊕ mk+1. Thus, if we assume that mTk = m1⊕ 
m2⊕ … ⊕mk there will be that m1⊕ m2⊕… ⊕ mk⊕ mk+1 = mTk ⊕ mk+1. To combine mTk 
and mk+1, we can consider the intersections of the focal elements of interest of the two 
functions. Let also PTk = {∪i=1,…,k (Pi)} and PTk’ = {∩i=1,…,k (Pi’)}. Then the 
combinations of the focals of interest of mTk and mk+1EX will be: 
PTk  ∩ Pk+1     : mTk(PTk) × mk+1(Pk+1) 
PTk  ∩ Pk+1’   : mTk(PTk) × mk+1(Pk+1’)  
PTk ∩ (Pk+1∪ Pk+1’) = PTk  : mTk(PTk) × (1 − mk+1(Pk+1) − mijk+1(Pijk+1’))  
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PTk’  ∩ Pk+1   : mTk(PTk’) × mk+1(Pk+1) 
PTk’  ∩ Pk+1’    : mTk(PTk’) × mk+1(Pk+1’)  
PTk’  ∩ (Pk+1 ∪ Pk+1’) = PTk’ : mTk(PTk’) × (1 − mk+1(Pk+1) − mk+1(Pk+1’)) 
(PTk ∪ PTk’)  ∩ Pk+1= Pk+1  : (1 − mTk(PTk) − mTk(PTk’)) × mk+1(Pk+1)  
(PTk ∪ PTk’) ∩ Pk+1’ = Pk+1’ : (1 − mTk(PTk) − mTk(PTk’)) × mk+1(Pk+1’) 
(PTk∪PTk’) ∩(Pk+1∪ Pk+1’)=θ  : (1 − mTk(PTk) − mTk(PTk’)) ×  
  (1 − mk+1(Pk+1) − mk+1(Pk+1’)) 
Thus, for Bel(∨i=1,…,k+1 EXi) we will have that: 
Bel(∨i=1,…,k+1Pi)  = Bel(∪i=1,…,k+1 Pi)  
= Bel({∪i=1,…,k Pi } ∪ Pk+1) 
   = Bel(PTk ∪ Pk+1) 
            = Σ B where B ⊆ (PTk ∪ Pk+1)
 
mT
k
 ⊕ mk+1(B) 
              = mT
k(PTk) × mk+1(Pk+1) + 
                   mT
k(PTk) × mk+1(Pk+1’) + 
                    mT
k(PTk) × (1 − mk+1(Pk+1) − mk+1(Pk+1’)) + 
                 mT
k(PTk’)  × mk+1(Pk+1) + 
                 ((1 − mTk(PTk) − mTk(PTk’) ) × mk+1(Pk+1) 
             = mT
k(PTk) + mk+1(Pk+1) − mTk(PTk) × mk+1(Pk+1) 
Then, since  
mT
k(PTk) = mTk({∪i=1,…,k (Pi)})   
      =  ΣI⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø(-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} 
we will have that, 
Bel(∨i=1,…,k+1Pi) =  
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= Σi⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} + mk+1(Pk+1) −    
       ΣI⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}}× mk+1(Pk+1) 
= ΣI⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} + 
       ΣI={k+1}(-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} − 
  ΣI⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mk+1(Pk+1) × mi(Pi)}}  
= ΣI⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} + 
       ΣI={k+1}(-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} −  
         ΣI’=I ∪{k+1} and I⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I ∪{k+1}|+1{Π i∈I’ { mi(Pi)}}  
In the above sum however,  
• the item ΣI⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} covers all the subsets of 
{1,…,k+1} that do not include the element k+1 
• the item ΣI={k+1}(-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}} covers only the singleton subset 
{k+1} of  {1,…,k+1} 
• finally, the item ΣI’=I ∪{k+1} and I⊆{1,…,k} and I ≠ Ø (-1)|I ∪{k+1}|+1{Π i∈I’ { mi(Pi)}} 
covers all the subsets of {1,…,k+1} that include the element k+1 except from 
the singleton set {k+1} 
Thus,  
Bel(∨i=1,…,k+1Pi) = Bel(∪i=1,…,k+1 Pi) 
= ΣI⊆{1,…,k+1}and I≠∅(-1)|I|+1{Πi∈I{ mi(Pi)}}  
Also for Bel(∧i=1,…,k+1Pi’) we will have that 
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Bel(∧i=1,…,k+1Pi’) = Bel(∩i=1,…,k+1 Pi’) 
   = Bel(PTk’  ∩ Pk+1’)  
= Σ B where B ⊆ (PTk‘ ∩ Pk+1’)
 
mT
k
 ⊕ mk+1(B) 
= mT
k
 (PTk’) × mk+1(Pk+1’) 
Then since,  
mT
k(PTk’) = mTk({∩i=1,…,kPi’})   
      =  Πi ∈{1,…,k} { mi(Pi’)} 
we will have that, 
Bel(∧i=1,…,k+1Pi’) = Π i ∈{1,…,k}{ mi(Pi’)}× m(+1(Pk+1’) 
   = Πi ∈{1,…,k+1}{ mi(Pi’)} 
Thus,  
Bel(∧i=1,…,k+1Pi’) = Bel(∩i=1,…,k+1 Pi’) 
    = Πi∈{1,…,k+1}{ mi(¬Pi’)}  
♦ 
 
Theorem 5.2: If e is an event and U(e,TR) is the set of the events that are recorded in the 
log of the monitoring framework and can be unified with e, and it holds that U(e,TR)≠∅ 
with n = |U(e,TR)|, i.e. the number of the members of U(e,TR), the belief in the 
explainability of at least one recorded event in U(e,TR), Bel(∨i=1,…,n 
Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), and in the explainability of none of the events in U(e,TR), 
Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), are measured by the following functions: 
Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) = 
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= ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))} 
      Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))  = 
= Π
 i=1,…,n {miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR)) }  
where miEX (i=1,…, n)  is the basic probability assignment associated with the event ei.  
Proof: The belief function Bel in the theorem must be obtained by combining the BPAs 
m1
EX
,
 
…, mn
 EX
 which are associated with e1, …, en. The combination of the basic 
probability assignments miEX (i=1,…,n) requires their mapping on a common frame of 
discernment, i.e., a set of mutually exclusive propositions representing exhaustively the 
properties that miEX assign belief to. This common frame of discernment has been defined 
as θesEX (see Definition 6) in Section 5.4.6.1. 
Given the assumptions about the construction of the frame of discernment θesEX, the 
focals EXi, ¬EXi and EXi ∨ ¬EXi of each of the basic probability assignments miEX will 
correspond to the following subsets of θesEX: 
• EXi will correspond to {[E1, …, En] | Ei = True} referred to as EXi henceforth 
• ¬EXi will correspond to {[E1, …, En] | Ei = False} referred to as EXi’ henceforth 
• EXi ∨ ¬EXi will correspond to {[E1, …, En] | Ei = True or Ei =False} which is 
equal to θesEX 
 
Thus, the core (see page 40 in [146]) of each miEX will be Ci = EXi ∪ EXi’ ∪ θesEX = θesEX 
for all i (i=1, …, n) and:  
∩i=1,…,nCi = θesEX ≠ ∅                  (T5.2.1) 
Due to (T5.2.1) and Theorem 3.2 (see page 40 in [146]), it follows that the basic 
probability assignments miEX (i=1,…,n) can be combined.  
Furthermore assuming that Si
+
 represents the focal set EXi of the basic probability 
assignment miEX, we observe that  
∀ I ⊆ {1,2,…,n} ∩iεISi+ = {[E1, …, E|I|] | ∀ i ∈ I Ei=True} ≠ ∅ 
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Similarly, assuming that Si
-
 represents the focal set EXi’ of the basic probability 
assignment miEX, we observe that  
∀ I ⊆ {1,2,…,n} ∩iεISi- = {[E1, …, E|I|] | ∀ i ∈ I Ei=False} ≠ ∅ 
Finally, assuming that Si
θ
 represents the focal set EXi ∨ ¬EXi of the basic probability 
assignment miEX, we observe that  
∀ I ⊆ {1,2,…,n} ∩iεISiθ = θesEX ≠ ∅ 
Thus, in general, assuming that Si represents one of the three possible focal sets of the 
basic probability assignment miEX we will also have that 
∀ I ⊆ {1,2,…,n} ∩iεISi ≠ ∅                 (T5.2.2) 
Subsequently from (T5.2.2), we have that: 
ΣiεI , jεI, i ≠ jΣSi ∩ Sj=Ø mi(Si) × mj(Sj) = 0                (T5.2.3) 
Therefore, according to Theorem 3.1 (see page 60 in [146]), the basic probability 
assignments miEX can be combined using the rule of the orthogonal sum (defined by 
Axiom 9 in Section 3.4) which, since k0 = 0 due to (T5.2.3) above, is simplified to the 
following formula: 
mEX(P) = miEX⊕ mjEX(P) = Σ X ∩ Y = P miEX(X) × mjEX(Y)             (T5.2.4) 
Having established the common frame of discernment for combining m1EX, …, mnEX , and 
the simplified version of the rule of the orthogonal sum for obtaining the combination 
m1
EX⊕
 
m2
EX⊕…⊕mnEX, the theorem holds due to Lemma 5.1, by using the following 
substitutions in Lemma 5.1: S := U(e,TR), Li := ei, Pi := Explainable(ei,Uo,TR), ¬Pi := 
¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR), θ := θesEX, pi := Ei, and mi := miEX. 
♦  
 
Lemma 5.2: If ∀ i ∈ {1,2,…,n}, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, it holds that  
      0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } ≤ 1 
Proof: This lemma can be proven by induction on n. 
For n=2 we have 
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i) x1 + x2 - x1x2 ≥ 0 ⇒ x1(1- x2) ≥ - x2                 (L5.2.1) 
      However  
x2 ≥ 0 ⇒ - x2 ≤ 0                  (L5.2.2) 
and  
x2 ≤ 1 ⇒ 0 ≤ 1 - x2                   (L5.2.3) 
From (L5.2.2) and (L5.2.3), (L5.2.1) holds due to the fact that x1 and (1- x2) are 
individually equal to or greater than 0, and thus their product is equal to or greater 
than 0 and consequently greater than - x2, which is less than or equal to 0.  
ii) x1 + x2 - x1x2 ≤ 1 ⇒ x1(1- x2) ≤ 1 - x2 ⇒ x1(1- x2) – (1 - x2) ≤ 0 ⇒  
      (x1 - 1)(1 - x2) ≤ 0                  (L5.2.4) 
However  
x1 ≤ 1 ⇒ x1 - 1 ≤ 0                            (L5.2.5) 
From (L5.2.5) and (L5.2.2), (L5.2.4) holds due to the fact that (x1 - 1) is less than 
or equal to 0 while (1- x2) is equal to or greater than 0, and thus their product is 
less than or equal to 0.  
Thus the lemma holds for n=2.  
For n=k, we assume that the lemma holds or, equivalently, that 
0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } ≤ 1                (L5.2.6) 
Then, for n=k+1, the lemma can be proven as follows.  
ΣI ⊆{1,…,k+1} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } =  
=  ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } + xk+1 –  
    [ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi }] × xk+1              (L5.2.7) 
Assuming that X = ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi }, with 0 ≤ X ≤ 1from (L5.2.6), we 
have for (L5.2.7)  
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ΣI ⊆{1,…,k+1} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } = X + xk+1 – X × xk+1              
(L5.2.8) 
However, due to the fact that 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ xk+1 ≤ 1, as we have shown in the case 
n=2, it holds that 0 ≤ X + xk+1 – X × xk+1 ≤ 1.  
Thus, it holds that  
0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,k+1} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } ≤ 1  
♦  
 
Lemma 5.3: If ∀ i ∈ {1,2,…,n}, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, it holds that  
      0 ≤ Πi ∈ {1,…,n} xi  ≤ 1 
Proof: This lemma can be proven by induction on n. 
For n=2 we have 
i) The inequality x1x2 ≥ 0 holds due to the fact that x1 and x2 are individually equal 
to or greater than 0, and thus their product is equal to or greater than 0 as well.  
ii) x1x2 ≤ 1 ⇒ x1x2 ≤ x2 + 1 – x2 ⇒ x2(x1-1) ≤ 1 – x2               (L5.3.1) 
However  
x1 ≤ 1 ⇒ x1 - 1 ≤ 0                 (L5.3.2) 
 and 
 x2 ≤ 1 ⇒ 1 – x2 ≥ 0                  (L5.3.3) 
Due to the fact that x2 is equal to or greater than 0, and we have from (L5.3.2) that 
x1 – 1 is less than or equal to 0, the product x2(x1 - 1) is less than or equal to 0, and 
consequently less than 1 – x2, which is equal to or greater than 0 due to (L5.3.3). 
Thus, (L5.3.1) holds.  
Thus the lemma holds for n=2.  
For n=k, we assume that the lemma holds or, equivalently, that 
0 ≤ Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi  ≤ 1                  (L5.3.4) 
  
 190
Then, for n=k+1, the lemma can be proven as follows.  
Π i ∈ {1,…,k+1} xi = (x1x2…xk)xk+1  
  =  [Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi] × xk+1                (L5.3.5) 
However, due to the fact that we have from (L2.4) that 0 ≤ Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi  ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 
xk+1 ≤ 1, as we have shown in the case n=2, it holds that 0 ≤ [Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi] × xk+1 ≤ 1.  
Thus, it holds that  
0 ≤ Π i ∈ {1,…,k+1} xi ≤ 1  
♦ 
 
Lemma 5.4: If ∀ i ∈ {1,2,…,n}, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xi’≤ 1, and 0 ≤ xi +xi’≤ 1, it holds that  
       0 ≤  ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } + Π i ∈ {1,…,n} xi’ ≤ 1 
Proof: This lemma can be proven by induction on n. 
For n=2 we have 
i) x1 + x2 - x1x2 + x1’x2’≥ 0                 (L5.4.1) 
      However, as we have shown in Lemma 1, we observe that  
0 ≤  x1 + x2 - x1x2 ≤ 1                 (L5.4.2) 
and as we have shown in Lemma 2, we observe that  
0 ≤ x1’x2’≤ 1                         (L5.4.3) 
From (L5.4.2) and (L5.4.3), (L5.4.1) holds due to the fact that x1 + x2 - x1x2 and 
x1’x2’ are individually equal to or greater than 0 and less than or equal to 1, and 
thus their sum is equal to or greater than 0.  
ii) Before proving the inequality 
x1 + x2 - x1x2 + x1’x2’ ≤ 1                 (L5.4.4) 
we know that  
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  x1 + x1’ ≤ 1 ⇒ x1’ ≤ 1 - x1                 (L5.4.5) 
and also  
x2 + x2’ ≤ 1 ⇒ x2’ ≤ 1 – x2                 (L5.4.6) 
However, we observe from (L5.4.5) and (L5.4.6) that  
x1 + x2 - x1x2 + x1’x2’ ≤ x1 + x2 - x1x2 + (1 - x1)( 1 – x2)            (L5.4.7) 
Thus, we can prove (L5.4.4) by proving that  
x1 + x2 - x1x2 + (1 - x1)( 1 – x2)  ≤ 1                (L5.4.8) 
Indeed, we have for (L5.4.8) that  
x1 + x2 - x1x2 + (1 - x1)( 1 – x2)  ≤ 1 ⇒ x1 + x2 - x1x2 + 1 - x2 - x1 + x1x2 ≤ 1 ⇒  
⇒ 1 ≤ 1                   (L5.4.9) 
The inequality (L5.4.9) holds, consequently (L5.4.4) holds. 
Thus the lemma holds for n=2.  
For n=k, we assume that the lemma holds or, equivalently, that 
0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i ∈ I xi }+ Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi’ ≤ 1           (L5.4.10) 
Then, for n=k+1, the lemma can be proven as follows.  
ΣI ⊆{1,…,k+1} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } + Π i ∈ {1,…,k+1} xi’ =  
=  [ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } + xk+1 –  
    [ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi }] × xk+1] +     
    [{Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi’} × xk+1’]              (L5.4.11) 
Assuming that X = ΣI ⊆{1,…,k} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi }, with 0 ≤ X ≤ 1from Lemma 5.2, 
and X’ = Π i ∈ {1,…,k} xi’, with 0 ≤ X’≤ 1 from Lemma 5.3, we have for (L5.4.11) that  
ΣI ⊆{1,…,k+1} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } + Π i ∈ {1,…,k+1} xi’ =  
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= X + xk+1 – X × xk+1 + X’ × xk+1’                        (L5.4.12) 
However, due to the fact that the following inequalities hold 
0 ≤ X ≤ 1 
0 ≤ X’≤ 1  
0 ≤ xk+1 ≤ 1  
0 ≤ xk+1’≤ 1  
0 ≤ xk+1+ xk+1’≤ 1  
and also we have from (L5.4.10) that  
0 ≤ X+X’≤ 1  
Thus, as we have shown in the case n=2, it holds that  
0 ≤ X + xk+1 – X × xk+1 + X’ × xk+1’ ≤ 1 
Consequently, it holds that  
0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,k+1} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Π i∈I xi } + Π i ∈ {1,…,k+1} xi’ ≤ 1  
♦ 
 
Theorem 5.3: The evidence measure mGN defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where n = |U(e,TR)|, i.e., the number of the the matching recorded events of e, is a DS 
basic probability assignment with respect to frames of discerment θes and θesGN (see 
Definitions 5 and 8 repectively  in Section 5.4.6.1).  
Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), if P = Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), if P = ¬ Genuine(e,Uo,TR) 
1 - Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) - Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)), 
otherwise 
m
GN(P) = 
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Proof: To prove that mGN is a DS basic probability assignment it is sufficient that mGN 
satisfies the axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3 of DS Theory (see Section 3.4).  
(Axiom 1): Regarding θes, Axiom 1 is satisfied when:  
i) If P = GNs, then it must hold that 0 ≤ msGN(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1                         (T.5.3.1) 
From Theorem 5.2, we have that:  
Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) =  
= ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Πi∈I miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))}   (T.5.3.2) 
Thus, by using (T.5.3.2), we have equivalently for (T.5.3.1):  
0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Πi∈I miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))} ≤ 1        
(T.5.3.3) However, from Theorems 5.4, and 5.6, we have that miEX is DS basic 
probability assignment, and therefore, miEX satisfies Axiom 1 of DS Theory, or 
equivalently: 
∀i∈{1,…,n} , 0 ≤ miEX ≤ 1                (T.5.3.4)  
Therefore, from (T.5.3.4) and by substituting xi with miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) 
in Lemma 5.2, the inequality (T.5.3.3) holds. Thus, (T.5.3.1) holds. 
ii) If P = ¬GNs, then it must hold that 0 ≤ msGN(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1             (T.5.3.5) 
From Theorem 5.2, we have that:  
Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) =  
= Π
 i=1,…,n {miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR))}                        (T.5.3.6) 
Thus, by using (T.5.3.6), we have equivalently for (T.5.3.5):  
0 ≤ Π
 i=1,…,n {miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR))} ≤ 1                   (T.5.3.7)  
  
 194
However, from (T.5.3.4) and by substituting xi’ with miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR)) 
in Lemma 5.3, the inequality (T.5.3.7) holds. Thus, (T.5.3.5) holds. 
iii) If P ≠ GNs or P ≠ ¬GNs, then it must hold that 0 ≤ msGN(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))+Bel(∧i=1,…,n ¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1  
                          (T.5.3.8) 
From (T.5.3.2) and (T.5.3.6), we have equivalently for (T.5.3.8):  
0 ≤ ΣI ⊆{1,…,n} and I≠Ø(−1)|I|+1{Πi∈I miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR))}+Π i=1,…,n 
{miEX(¬Explainabe(ei,Uo,TR))}≤ 1               (T.5.3.9)  
However, from (T.5.3.4) and by substituting xi with miEX(Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) 
and xi’ with miEX(¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) in Lemma 5.3, the inequality (T.5.3.9) 
holds. Thus, (T.5.3.8) holds.  
Similarly, Axiom 1 is satisfied with respect to θesGN, for the cases that P = GNq, P = ¬ 
GNq, and P ≠ GNq or P ≠ ¬GNq. 
(Axiom 2): Regarding θes, Axiom 2 is satisfied by msGN since its focals GNs, GNs’ and GNs 
∪ GNs’ are non empty sets by definition of θes: 
GNs ={[Gs = True]} ≠ ∅,  
GNs’ ={[Gs = False]} ≠ ∅ and 
GNs ∪ GNs’= {[Gs = True or False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by msGN is msGN(∅) = 0  
Similarly, Axiom 2 is satisfied by msGN with respect to θesGN since its focals GNq, GNq’ 
and GNq ∪ GNq’ are non empty sets by definition of θesGN: 
GNq ={[G1,G2,…,Gr] | Gq = True}≠ ∅,  
GNq’ ={[G1,G2,…,Gr] | Gq = False} ≠ ∅ and  
GNq ∪ GNq’= {[Gq = True or False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by mqGN is mqGN(∅) = 0 
(Axiom 3): Regarding θes, Axiom 3 is satisfied since:  
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ms
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es
∑ = ms
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es and P ≠GNs and P ≠¬GNs
∑ + ms
GN (GNs) + msGN (¬GNs)  
= 1-Bel(∨i=1,…,nExplainable(ei,Uo,TR))-Bel(∧i=1,…,n¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) +      
    Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) + Bel(∧i=1,…,n¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) = 
=1 
Similarly, Axiom 3 is satisfied with respect to θesGN since:  
mq
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es
GN∑ = mq
GN (P)
P ⊆θ es
GN and P ≠GNq and P ≠¬GNq
∑ + mq
GN (GNq ) + mqGN (¬GNq )  
= 1-Bel(∨i=1,…,nExplainable(ei,Uo,TR))-Bel(∧i=1,…,n¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) +      
    Bel(∨i=1,…,n Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) + Bel(∧i=1,…,n¬Explainable(ei,Uo,TR)) = 
=1 
♦  
 
Theorem 5.4: The evidence measure miEX defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
where α1 is a value within 0 and 1, is a DS basic probability assignment with  respect to 
frame of discerment θesEX (see Definitions 6 in Section 5.4.6.1).  
Proof: To prove that miEX is a DS basic probability assignment it is sufficient to show 
that miEX satisfies the axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3 of DS Theory (see Section 
3.4).  
(Axiom 1): Axiom 1 is satisfied since:  
If P = EXi, miEX(P) = α1 where 0 < α1 < 1.  
a1, if P = Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
1 – α1, if P = ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
0, otherwise 
mi
EX
 (P) = 
  
 196
If P = ¬ EXi, miEX(P) = 1 – α1 with  0 < 1 – α1 < 1 since 0 < α1 < 1.  
If P ≠ EXi or P ≠ ¬EXi, miEX(P) = 0 by definition.  
(Axiom 2): Axiom 2 is satisfied by miEX since its focals EXi and EXi’ are non empty sets 
by definition of θes: 
EXi ={[Ei = True]} ≠ ∅ and  
EXi’ ={[Ei = False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by miEX is miEX(∅) = 0  
(Axiom 3): Axiom 3 is satisfied since:  
mi
EX (P)
P ⊆θ es
EX∑ = mi
EX (P)
P ⊆θ es
EX
and P ≠EX i and P ≠¬EX i
∑ + mi
EX (EX i) + miEX (¬EX i)
=0 + a1 +1− a1 =1
 
♦  
 
Theorem 5.5: If ei is an event and EXP(ei) is the set of the alternative explanations that 
are generated for ei, and it holds that EXP(ei)≠∅ with m = |EXP(ei)|, i.e. the number of 
the members of EXP(ei), the belief in the validity of at least one alternative explanation in 
EXP(ei), Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), and in the validity of none of the alternative 
explanations in EXP(ei), Bel(∧j=1,…,m ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), are measured by the 
following functions: 
Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) = 
= ΣJ ⊆{1,…,m} and J≠Ø(−1)|J|+1{Πj∈J mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))} 
     Bel(∧j=1,…,m ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))  = 
= Π
 j=1,…,m {mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))}  
where mjVL (j=1,…, n)  is the basic probability assignment associated with the alternative 
explanation Φj of ei.  
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Proof: The belief function Bel in the theorem must be obtained by combining the BPAs 
m1
VL
,…, mm
VL
 which are associated with Φ1, …, Φm. The combination of the basic 
probability assignments mjVL (j=1,…,m) requires their mapping on a common frame of 
discernment, i.e., a set of mutually exclusive propositions representing exhaustively the 
properties that mjVL assign belief to. This common frame of discernment has been defined 
as θesVL (see Definition 7) in Section 5.4.6.1. 
Given the assumptions about the construction of the frame of discernment θesVL, the 
focals VLj, ¬VLj and VLj ∨ ¬VLj of each of the basic probability assignments mjVL will 
correspond to the following subsets of θesVL: 
• VLj will correspond to {[V1, …,Vm] | Vj = True} referred to as VLj henceforth 
• ¬VLj will correspond to {[V1, …, Vm] | Vi = False} referred to as VL’ henceforth 
• VLj ∨ ¬VLj will correspond to {[V1, …, Vm] | Vj = True or Vj =False} which is 
equal to θesVL 
 
Thus, the core (see page 40 in [146]) of each mjVL will be Cj = VLj ∪ VLj’ ∪ θesVL = θesVL 
for all j (j=1,…, m) and:  
∩j=1,…,mCj = θesVL ≠ ∅                  (T5.5.1) 
Due to (T5.5.1) and Theorem 3.2 (see page 40 in [146]), it follows that the basic 
probability assignments mjVL (j=1,…, m) can be combined.  
Furthermore assuming that Sj
+
 represents the focal set VLj of the basic probability 
assignment mjVL, we observe that  
∀ J ⊆ {1,2,…, m} ∩jεJSj+ = {[V1, …, V|J|] | ∀ j ∈ J Vj=True} ≠ ∅ 
Similarly, assuming that Sj
-
 represents the focal set VLj’ of the basic probability 
assignment mjVL, we observe that  
∀ J ⊆ {1,2,…, m} ∩jεJSj- = {[V1, …, V|J|] | ∀ j ∈ J Vj=False} ≠ ∅ 
Finally, assuming that Sj
θ
 represents the focal set VLj ∨ ¬VLj of the basic probability 
assignment mjVL, we observe that  
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∀ J ⊆ {1,2,…, m} ∩jεJSjθ = θesVL ≠ ∅ 
Thus, in general, assuming that Sj represents one of the three possible focal sets of the 
basic probability assignment mjVL we will also have that 
∀ J ⊆ {1,2,…, m} ∩jεJSj ≠ ∅                 (T5.5.2) 
Subsequently from (T5.5.2), we have that: 
ΣiεI , jεI, i ≠ jΣSi ∩ Sj=Ø mi(Si) × mj(Sj) = 0                (T5.5.3) 
Therefore, according to Theorem 3.1 (see page 60 in [146]), the basic probability 
assignments mjVL can be combined using the rule of the orthogonal sum (defined by 
Axiom 9 in Section 3.4) which, since k0 = 0 due to (T5.5.3) above, is simplified to the 
following formula: 
mVL(P) = miVL⊕ mjVL(P) = Σ X ∩ Y = P miVL(X) × mjVL(Y)             (T5.5.4) 
Having established the common frame of discernment for combining m1VL,…, mmVL , and 
the simplified version of the rule of the orthogonal sum for obtaining the combination 
m1
VL⊕
 
m2
VL⊕…⊕mmVL, the theorem holds due to Lemma 5.1, by using the following 
substitutions in Lemma 5.1: S := EXP(ei), Li := Φj, Pi := Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR), ¬Pi = ¬ 
Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR), θ = θesVL, pi = Vj, and mi = mjVL. 
♦  
 
Theorem 5.6: The evidence measure miEX defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), if P = Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)), if P = ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
1-Bel(∨j=1,…,mValid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))-Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)),   
otherwise 
  mi
EX(P) = 
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where m = |EXP(ei)|, i.e., the number of alternative explanations of ei, is a DS basic 
probability assignment with respect to frame of discerment θesEX (see Definition 6 in 
Section 5.4.6.1).  
Proof: To prove that miEX is a DS basic probability assignment it is sufficient to show 
that miEX satisfies the axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3 of DS Theory (see Section 
3.4).  
(Axiom 1): Axiom 1 is satisfied when:  
i) If P = EXi, then it must hold that 0 ≤ miEX(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1                         (T.5.6.1) 
From Theorem 5.5, we have that:  
Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) =  
= ΣJ ⊆{1,…,m} and J≠Ø(−1)|J|+1{Πj∈J mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))}      
(T.5.6.2) 
Thus, by using (T.5.6.2), we have equivalently for (T.5.6.1):  
0 ≤ ΣJ ⊆{1,…,m} and J≠Ø(−1)|J|+1{Πj∈J mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))} ≤ 1        (T.5.6.3) 
However, from Theorem 5.9, we have that mjVL is DS basic probability 
assignment, and therefore, mjVL satisfies Axiom 1 of DS Theory, or equivalently: 
∀j∈{1,…,m} , 0 ≤ mjVL ≤ 1                (T.5.6.4)  
Therefore, from (T.5.6.4) and by substituting xi with mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) in 
Lemma 5.2, the inequality (T.5.6.3) holds. Thus, (T.5.6.1) holds. 
ii) If P = ¬EXi, then it must hold that 0 ≤ miEX(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1                       (T.5.6.5) 
From Theorem 5.5, we have that:  
Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) =  
= Π
 j=1,…,m {mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))}                          (T.5.6.6) 
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Thus, by using (T.5.6.6), we have equivalently for (T.5.6.5):  
0 ≤ Π
 j=1,…,m {mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))} ≤ 1                               (T.5.6.7)  
However, from (T.5.6.4) and by substituting xi’ with mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) 
in Lemma 5.3, the inequality (T.5.6.7) holds. Thus, (T.5.6.5) holds. 
iii) If P ≠ EXi or P ≠ ¬EXi, then it must hold that 0 ≤ miEX(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) + Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1  
                                      (T.5.6.8) 
From (T.5.6.2) and (T.5.6.6), we have equivalently for (T.5.6.8):  
0 ≤ ΣJ ⊆{1,…,m} and J≠Ø(−1)|J|+1{Πj∈J mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))} + Π j=1,…,m 
{mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))}≤ 1               (T.5.6.9)  
However, from (T.5.6.4) and by substituting xi with mjVL(Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) and 
xi’ with mjVL(¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) in Lemma 5.3, the inequality (T.5.6.9) holds. 
Thus, (T.5.6.8) holds.  
 (Axiom 2): Axiom 2 is satisfied by miEX since its focals EXi, EXi’ and EXi ∪ EXi’ are non 
empty sets by definition of θesEX: 
EXi ={[Ei = True]} ≠ ∅ 
EXi’ ={[Ei = False]} ≠ ∅ and 
EXi ∪ EXi’= {[Ei = True or False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by miEX is miEX(∅) = 0  
(Axiom 3): Axiom 3 is satisfied since:  
mi
EX (P)
P ⊆θ es
EX∑ = mi
EX (P)
P ⊆θ es
EX and P ≠EX i and P ≠¬EX i
∑ + mi
EX (EX i) + miEX (¬EX i)  
= 1- Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR))- Bel(∧j=1,…,m ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) +      
    Bel(∨j=1,…,m Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) + Bel(∧j=1,…,m ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) = 
= 1 
♦  
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Theorem 5.7: The evidence measure miEX defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where occurrenceTimes(ei)≥1 , i.e., the number of times that ei was reached as a 
consequence of alternative explanations of the same event es, and the values 
assessmentOf(Explainable(ei)) and assessmentOf(Explainable(¬ei)) are within 0 and 1, is 
a DS basic probability assignment with respect to frame of discerment θesEX (see 
Definition 6 in Section 5.4.6.1).  
Proof: To prove that miEX is a DS basic probability assignment it is sufficient to show 
that miEX satisfies the axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3 of DS Theory (see Section 
3.4). For this purpose, suppose that:  
β = assessmentOf(Explainable(ei))/occurrenceTimes(ei), and 
γ = assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei))/occurrenceTimes(ei),  
where 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1, and 0 < 1- β - γ < 1 
 (Axiom 1): Axiom 1 is satisfied since:  
If P = EXi, miEX(P) = β with 0 < β < 1.  
If P = ¬ EXi, miEX(P) = γ with  0 < γ < 1 since 0 < α1 < 1.  
If P ≠ EXi or P ≠ ¬EXi, miEX(P) = 1- β - γ  with 0 < 1- β - γ < 1.  
(Axiom 2): Axiom 2 is satisfied by miEX since its focals EXi, EXi’ and EXi ∪ EXi’ are non 
empty sets by definition of θes: 
EXi ={[Ei = True]} ≠ ∅  
assessmentOf(Explainable(ei))/occurrenceTimes(ei),                                     
if P = Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei))/occurrenceTimes(ei),                  
if P = ¬ Explainable(ei,Uo,TR) 
1-[assessmentOf(Explainable(ei))+assessmentOf(¬Explainable(ei)) 
/occurrenceTimes(ei))],   otherwise 
  mi
EX(P) = 
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EXi’ ={[Ei = False]} ≠ ∅ and  
EXi ∪ EXi’= {[Ei = True or False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by miEX is miEX(∅) = 0  
(Axiom 3): Axiom 3 is satisfied since:  
mi
EX (P)
P ⊆θ es
EX∑ = mi
EX (P)
P ⊆θ es
EX
and P ≠EX i and P ≠¬EX i
∑ + mi
EX (EX i) + miEX (¬EX i)
=1− β − γ + β + γ =1
 
♦  
 
Theorem 5.8: If Φj is an alternative explanation of ei and CONS(Φj,TR) is the set of the 
expected consequences that are identified for Φj, and it holds that CONS(Φj,TR)≠∅ with 
r = |CONS(Φj,TR)|, i.e. the number of the members of CONS(Φj,TR), the belief in the 
genuineness of at least one expected consequence in CONS(Φj,TR), Bel(∨q=1,…,r 
Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), and in the genuineness of none of the expected consequences in 
CONS(Φj,TR), Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), are measured by the following 
functions: 
Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) = 
= ΣQ⊆CONS(Φj,TR) and Q≠∅(−1)|Q|+1{Πq∈Q mqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))} 
     Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))  = 
=Πeq ∈ CONS(Φj,TR){ mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}  
where mqGN (q=1,…, r)  is the basic probability assignment associated with the expected 
consequence eq of the alternative explanation Φj of ei.  
Proof: The belief function Bel in the theorem must be obtained by combining the BPAs 
m1
GN
,…, mr
GN
 which are associated with e1, …, eq. The combination of the basic 
probability assignments mqGN (q=1,…, r) requires their mapping on a common frame of 
discernment, i.e., a set of mutually exclusive propositions representing exhaustively the 
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properties that mqGN assign belief to. This common frame of discernment has been defined 
as θesGN (see Definition 8) in Section 5.4.6.1. 
Given the assumptions about the construction of the frame of discernment θesGN, the 
focals GNq, ¬GNq and GNq ∨ ¬GNq of each of the basic probability assignments mqGN 
will correspond to the following subsets of θesGN: 
• GNq will correspond to {[G1, …,Gr] | Gq = True} referred to as GNq henceforth 
• ¬GNq will correspond to {[G1, …,Gr] | Gq = False} referred to as GNq’ henceforth 
• GNq ∨ ¬GNq will correspond to {[G1, …,Gr] | Gq = True or Gq = False} which is 
equal to θesGN 
 
Thus, the core (see page 40 in [146]) of each mqGN will be Cq = GNq ∪ GNq’ ∪ θesGN = 
θesGN for all q (q=1,…, r) and:  
∩q=1,…,rCq = θesGN ≠ ∅                 (T5.8.1) 
Due to (T5.8.1) and Theorem 3.2 (see page 40 in [146]), it follows that the basic 
probability assignments mqGN (q=1,…, r) can be combined.  
Furthermore assuming that Sq
+
 represents the focal set GNq of the basic probability 
assignment mqGN, we observe that  
∀ Q ⊆ {1,2,…, r} ∩qεQSq+ = {[G1, …, G|r|] | ∀ q ∈ Q Gq=True} ≠ ∅ 
Similarly, assuming that Sq
-
 represents the focal set GNq’ of the basic probability 
assignment mqGN, we observe that  
∀ Q ⊆ {1,2,…, r} ∩qεQSq- = {[G1, …, G|r|] | ∀ q ∈ Q Gq=False} ≠ ∅ 
Finally, assuming that Sq
θ
 represents the focal set GNq ∨ ¬GNq of the basic probability 
assignment mqGN, we observe that  
∀ Q ⊆ {1,2,…, r} ∩qεQSqθ = θesGN ≠ ∅ 
Thus, in general, assuming that Sq represents one of the three possible focal sets of the 
basic probability assignment mqGN we will also have that 
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∀ Q ⊆ {1,2,…, r} ∩qεQSq ≠ ∅                 
(T5.8.2) 
Subsequently from (T5.8.2), we have that: 
ΣiεI , jεI, i ≠ jΣSi ∩ Sj=Ø mi(Si) × mj(Sj) = 0                (T5.8.3) 
Therefore, according to Theorem 3.1 (see page 60 in [146]), the basic probability 
assignments mqGN can be combined using the rule of the orthogonal sum (defined by 
Axiom 9 in Section 3.4) which, since k0 = 0 due to (T5.8.3) above, is simplified to the 
following formula: 
mGN(P) = miGN⊕ mjGN(P) = Σ X ∩ Y = P miGN(X) × mjGN(Y)             (T5.8.4) 
Having established the common frame of discernment for combining m1GN,…, mrGN , and 
the simplified version of the rule of the orthogonal sum for obtaining the combination 
m1
GN⊕
 
m2
GN⊕…⊕mrGN, the theorem holds due to Lemma 5.1, by using the following 
substitutions in Lemma 5.1: S := CONS(Φj,TR), Li := eq, Pi := Genuine(eq,Uo,TR), ¬Pi = 
¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR), θ = θesGN, pi = Gq, and mi = mqGN. 
♦  
 
Theorem 5.9: The evidence measure mjVL defined as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where r = |CONS(Φj,TR)|, i.e., the number of expected consequences of the Φj, is a DS 
basic probability assignment with respect to frame of discerment θesVL (see Definition 7 in 
Section 5.4.6.1).  
Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), if P = Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) 
Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)), if P = ¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR) 
1-Bel(∨q=1,…,rGenuine(eq,Uo,TR))-Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)),   
otherwise 
  mj
VL(P) = 
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Proof: To prove that mjVL is a DS basic probability assignment it is sufficient to show 
that mjVL satisfies the axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3 of DS Theory (see Section 
3.4).  
(Axiom 1): Axiom 1 is satisfied when:  
i) If P = VLj, then it must hold that 0 ≤ mjVL(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1                         (T.5.9.1) 
From Theorem 5.8, we have that:  
Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))  =  
=ΣQ⊆CONS(Φj,TR)andQ≠∅(−1)|Q|+1{Πq∈QmqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}     
(T.5.9.2) 
Thus, by using (T.5.9.2), we have equivalently for (T.5.9.1):  
0 ≤ ΣQ⊆CONS(Φj,TR)andQ≠∅(−1)|Q|+1{Πq∈QmqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))} ≤ 1        
(T.5.9.3) However, from Theorem 5.1 and 5.3, we have that mqGN is DS basic 
probability assignment, and therefore, mqGN  satisfies Axiom 1 of DS Theory, or 
equivalently: 
∀q∈{1,…, r} , 0 ≤ mqGN ≤ 1                (T.5.9.4)  
Therefore, from (T.5.9.4) and by substituting xi with mqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) in 
Lemma 5.2, the inequality (T.5.9.3) holds. Thus, (T.5.9.1) holds. 
ii) If P = ¬VLj, then it must hold that 0 ≤ mjVL(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∧j=1,…,m¬Valid(ei,Φj,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1                       (T.5.9.5) 
From Theorem 5.8, we have that:  
Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) =  
=Πeq∈CONS(Φj,TR){mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}                     
(T.5.9.6) 
Thus, by using (T.5.9.6), we have equivalently for (T.5.9.5):  
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0 ≤ Πeq∈CONS(Φj,TR){mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))} ≤ 1                              (T.5.9.7)  
However, from (T.5.9.4) and by substituting xi’ with mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) 
in Lemma 5.3, the inequality (T.5.9.7) holds. Thus, (T.5.9.5) holds. 
iii) If P ≠ VLj or P ≠ ¬VLj, then it must hold that 0 ≤ mjVL(P) ≤ 1, or equivalently:  
0 ≤ Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) + Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) ≤ 1  
                                      (T.5.9.8) 
From (T.5.9.2) and (T.5.9.6), we have equivalently for (T.5.9.8):  
0≤ΣQ⊆CONS(Φj,TR)andQ≠∅(−1)|Q|+1{Πq∈QmqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}+ 
Πeq∈CONS(Φj,TR){mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))}≤1                                        (T.5.9.9)  
However, from (T.5.9.4) and by substituting xi with mqGN(Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) and 
xi’ with mqGN(¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) in Lemma 5.3, the inequality (T.5.9.9) holds. 
Thus, (T.5.9.8) holds.  
 (Axiom 2): Axiom 2 is satisfied by mjVL since its focals VLj, VLj’ and VLj ∪ VLj’ are non 
empty sets by definition of θesVL: 
VLj ={[Vj = True]} ≠ ∅ 
VLj’ ={[Vj = False]} ≠ ∅ and 
VLj ∪ VLj’= {[Vj = True or False]} ≠ ∅. 
Thus, the basic probability assigned to the empty set by mjVL is mjVL(∅) = 0  
(Axiom 3): Axiom 3 is satisfied since:  
m j
VL (P)
P ⊆θ es
VL∑ = m j
VL (P)
P ⊆θ es
VL and P ≠VL j and P ≠¬VL j
∑ + m j
VL (VL j ) + m jVL (¬VL j )  
= 1- Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))- Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR))+      
   Bel(∨q=1,…,r Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) + Bel(∧q=1,…,r¬Genuine(eq,Uo,TR)) = 
= 1 
♦ 
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Chapter 6: Experimental Evaluation of 
the Diagnostic Prototype  
6.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the experimental evaluation of the diagnostic prototype is discussed. In 
Section 6.2, we initially provide the experimental set up of laboratory simulations taken 
place for the evaluation of the diagnostic prototype. Particularly, an architectural 
overview of the EVEREST prototype and the diagnostic prototype that were used are 
provided. Having provided the designs of the prototypes used in our experiments, the 
target application of the evaluation is described with focus on its EC-Assertion formal 
monitoring specifications. It should be noted that the EC-Assertion formal monitoring 
specifications of the target application are a key point for our experimentation as they 
specify the monitoring theory (i.e., assumptions and rules formulas) as well as the events 
and fluents that are processed by the monitoring and diagnostic prototypes. Regarding the 
events that were used, Section 6.2 concludes with a discussion on the simulator deployed 
for the generation of events that could simulate the operation of the target application.  
In Section 6.3, a discussion about the diagnostic framework performance 
characteristics that the evaluation is focused on is provided. After introducing the 
performance characteristics, the metrics that were used for the analysis and the 
measurement of our diagnosis framework performance are presented.  
Having specified the significant performance characteristics for our evaluation, Section 
6.4 introduces the factors that we selected to experiment with. The selected factors were 
selected by taking into account hypotheses regarding their impact on the key performance 
characteristics of the diagnostic prototype, and therefore our diagnostic approach. 
Provided the overview on the factors that may affect the performance of the diagnostic 
prototype, Section 6.4 presents the set of selected experiments through an accumulative 
experiments table. Finally, in Section 6.5, we provide the experimental results through 
relevant tables and charts, and try to give plausible explanations for their occurrence. 
(Perhaps, we could have used our or another diagnostic prototype for the results 
explanation!).    
  
 208
6.2 Experimental Set Up of Laboratory Simulations  
6.2.1 Architecture of the EVEREST diagnostic prototype 
This section describes the design of the diagnosis prototype and its integration with the 
other components of the EVEREST framework. In particular, the diagnosis prototype 
consists of two separate tools, namely the event genuineness belief tool (referred as EGBT 
henceforth) and the violations diagnosis tool (referred as VDT henceforth).  The task that 
EGBT performs is to compute the genuineness belief range of events. On the other hand, 
VDT is responsible for generating diagnoses for any violation that the monitor of 
EVEREST detects. It should be noted that the VDT diagnosis results are generated by use 
of the genuineness belief ranges that EGBT computes for each violation observation.  
In the following, Section 6.2.1.1 gives the overall EVEREST design focusing on the 
diagnosis prototype components, while Sections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.3 detail the EGBT and 
VDT architectures respectively.  
6.2.1.1 Overall EVEREST design 
EGBT and VDT that consist the diagnostic prototype have been implemented as 
component of EVEREST framework. The framework uses EGBT to compute genuineness 
belief ranges of runtime events, and VDT to diagnose detected violations. Figure 6-1 
illustrates the overall design of EVEREST framework and the most relevant interactions 
between the event receiver component, monitor, EGBT and VDT. 
 
   
 209
 
Figure 6-1 – Overall EVEREST design with respect to diagnostic prototype 
When the framework receives an event e, the Event Receiver (ER) collects the event 
and stores it into the events database. Then, it notifies the monitor and EGBT of the new 
event. Upon this notification, EGBT computes a belief range in the genuineness of the 
event and stores it into the genuineness beliefs database whilst the monitor detects 
violations of all the monitoring rules that the event e can be unified with. Once a 
violation v is detected, the monitor stores it into the violations database and notifies VDT 
of violation v. Once notified, VDT analyzes violations v by extracting the violation 
observations, i.e., the events that were taken into account for the detection of violation v. 
For each violation observation, VDT requests their genuineness belief range from EGBT. 
Once the genuineness belief ranges b of the given violation observations are computed, 
EGBT stores b into the genuineness beliefs database and therefore VDT is able to read b 
from the aforementioned database. Finally, VDT generates a diagnosis for violation v by 
reasoning on b and updates the record of violation v in the violations database.    
The components of the framework have been designed based on the objective of 
having a loose coupling between them. To achieve this, most of the data exchanges 
among them are not realized through direct method calls, but through a shared database. 
Thus, EGBT and VDT have been implemented as threads, and have been designed in such 
  
 210
a way to store their results into relevant databases. This implies, for instance, that when 
VDT invokes EGBT, it does not need to wait for the result of EGBT, but continues to 
operate until notified with EGBT results. Once notified, VDT can retrieve the computed 
result directly from the shared database, i.e., the genuineness beliefs database in .  
It should also be noted that EGBT uses the events database for computing the 
genuineness belief ranges. EGBT needs to access the events database in read mode only 
as it only extract events from it in order to compute the belief range in the genuineness of 
an event. EGBT accesses the genuineness beliefs database in write mode because it needs 
to store in it the results of its computations. VDT accesses the genuineness database in 
read mode only as its computations do not require the modification of information stored 
in the genuineness beliefs database. In particular, when VDT needs an event genuineness 
belief range, VDT checks the genuineness beliefs database and if the required belief 
range is not stored in it, it calls directly EGBT to get the required information.  
6.2.1.2 Event Genuineness Belief Tool 
EGBT is composed by two main components: the Event Genuineness Belief Interface and 
the Event Belief Handler (EBH). The former component realizes and exposes the EGBT 
interface, whilst the latter computes event genuineness belief ranges. 
EGBT architecture has been designed to support the case in which the Event Receiver 
(ER) sends events to the EGBT with a rate that is faster than the rate at which EGBT can 
consume these events given the time that it needs to compute genuineness belief ranges 
for previous events. For instance, ER sends an event to EGBT every one second and 
EGBT takes two seconds for computing the corresponding genuineness belief range.  
The implementation is based on the Consumer/Producer design pattern, as shown in 
Figure 6-2. In this pattern, two processes, the producer and the consumer, share a 
common fixed-size buffer. The producer's task is to generate a piece of data, put it into 
the buffer and start again. At the same time the consumer is consuming data elements and 
removes them from the buffer (one element at a time). In EGBT, the producers are ER 
and VDT, whilst EBH plays the role of consumer. Once EBH computes the genuineness 
belief range for an event that it has removed from the buffer, it takes the next event from 
the head of the buffer and computes its own genuineness belief range. Thus, the event 
queue operates in FIFO mode. 
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Figure 6-2 – EGBT architecture 
6.2.1.3 Violations Diagnosis Tool 
Similarly, VDT is composed by two main components: the Violation Diagnosis Interface 
and the Violation Handler (VH). The former component realises and exposes the VDT 
interface, whilst the latter generates the diagnosis for given violations. VDT architecture 
supports the case in which the monitor sends violations to the VDT with a rate that is 
faster than the rate at which VDT can consume these violations given the time that it 
needs to generate diagnoses for previous violations.  
As in the case of EGBT, VDT implementation is based on the Consumer/Producer 
design pattern, as shown in 3. In this pattern, two processes, the producer and the 
consumer, share a common fixed-size buffer. In VDT, the producer is the monitor, whilst 
VH plays the role of consumer. Again, the violation queue operates in FIFO mode as 
once VH generates the diagnosis for a violation that it has removed from the violation 
buffer, it takes the next violation from the head of the buffer and generates a diagnosis for 
it.  
Figure 6-3 – VDT architecture 
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6.2.2 The monitored system 
To evaluate the diagnosis prototype, we used a Location Based Access Control System 
(referred to LBACS in the following) as the system to be monitored. The LBACS manages 
access to different resources of an organisation, through a combination of user 
authentication, device identification and device location detection capabilities. In LBACS, 
users entering and moving within the premises of an organisation, using mobile 
computing devices (e.g., a notebook or smart phone) may be given access to different 
resources, such as the enterprise intranet, printers or the Internet, depending on the 
credentials of these devices and their exact location within the physical space of the 
organization. Resource access is granted depending on policies, which determine when 
access to a particular type of resource is considered to be harmful or not. For instance, a 
policy may determine that an authenticated employee of the organization who is trying to 
access a printer via the local wireless network, whilst being in an area of the premises 
that is accessible to the public, should be granted access, whilst authenticated visitors 
should only be given access to printers when they are in one of the organization’s 
meeting rooms. The general architecture of LBACS is shown in  Figure 6-4.  
 
 
Figure 6-4 – LBACS architecture 
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As shown in the figure, LBACS is based on two servers: a location and an access 
control server. The control server polls the location server at regular intervals, in order to 
obtain the position of the devices of all the users who are currently authenticated in the 
system. To ensure the availability of accurate information about the location of mobile 
devices in LBACS, each device is expected to send signals to the location detection server 
periodically. The location of a device in LBACS is determined by the strength of signals 
sent from the device to the location server. In particular, a daemon in mobile devices 
sends signals to location server via location sensors. Based on the signals received from 
different sensors, the location server can calculate the position of a device with some 
accuracy measure.  
The effectiveness of the access control solution of LBACS depends on several 
conditions regarding the operation of the different components that constitute it at 
runtime including, for example: 
• The continuous availability of the location server (C1). The availability of these 
components is a prerequisite for the availability of device position, which is 
necessary for the access control system at runtime.   
• The liveness of signal daemons in mobile devices (C2). Each device that is known 
to the access control server should send signals to the location server periodically 
and the maximum period of not receiving a signal should not be less than m time 
units  
For the undertaken evaluation, the following operational scenario for LBACS was 
considered. A mobile device d is operable in the premises that are controlled by LBACS. 
The daemon of the device d broadcasts periodically signal to the location sensors of 
LBACS. As long as the location sensors receive signals from d, they forward the signals 
to the location server. While the device d is operable in the premises, the user of d may 
need to access to a resource r of the premises (e.g. a printer in some room). Thus, a 
request for access to the resource r is sent to the access control server by device d. In 
order to decide whether device d can access to resource r, the access control server needs 
information with regards to the location of device d. Therefore, the access control server 
interacts with the location server to get the location information of device d. The location 
server calculates the location of device d based on the forwarded signals from the 
location sensors and sends the location to the access control server. Since, the access 
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control server has received the location of the device d, it makes a decision on whether 
device d can have access to resource r and let device d know of the generated decision. In 
case that the decision of the access control server allows device d to access to resource r, 
device d can make use of resource r but should release r as long as device d tasks are 
over. On the other hand, in case that device d is not granted the access privilege, it can 
request again access to resource r.  
Moreover, as shown in  Figure 6-4, LBACS includes two wireless network 
controllers, the intranet and Internet routers namely. The operational scenario considers 
that intranet router provides access to the local wireless network for authenticated 
employees of the organization, whilst Internet router provides access to the Internet only 
for authenticated employees and visitors. However, the access control policy adopted in 
the scenario specifies a condition (C3) regarding the connection of authenticated devices 
to the routers that provide access to the organization intranet and Internet wireless 
networks. In particular, C3 specifies that no user should be allowed to login onto intranet 
and Internet routers simultaneously to reduce scope for masquerading attacks.  
6.2.2.1 Monitoring specifications 
In this section, the rules and assumptions that are used for monitoring LBACS are given. 
Condition C1 can be specified in the monitoring language of EVEREST framework as 
follows:  
LBACS.R1. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_LServerId ∈ LocationServers, 
∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_source.  
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-B,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source), t1, R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_LServerId,_ACServerId,REQ-A,locationResponse   
          (_deviceId),_source), t2, R(t1+1,t1+3000))  
The monitoring rule LBACS.R1 is violated in all cases where, povided that the access 
control server of LBACS requests location information for a device from the location 
server of LBACS, the location server does not provide such information within the next 3 
seconds after the corresponding request occurrence.  
Condition C2 can be checked by two rules that are specified as: 
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LBACS.R2. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_LServerId ∈ LocationServers, 
∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_receiver1∈Sensors, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source1), t1, R(t1,t1)) ∧  
¬Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source1), t2, R(0,t1-1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source2), t3, R(t1-2000,t1-1)) 
LBACS.R3. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, ∀_receiver1∈Sensors, 
∀_source1. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A, signal(_deviceId),  
          _source1), t1, R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source1), t2, R(t1+1,t1+2000))  
Rule LBACS.R2 checks when the first signal from a device should occur. In particular, 
the first signal from a given device is expected within the last two seconds before the first 
request for the device location made by the LBACS access control server. Once, a device 
sends its first signal, rule LBACS.R3 checks the periodical receipt of signals from the 
device, with maximum period of two seconds.  
Finally, condition C3 can be specified as:  
LBACS.R4. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀t3 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, 
∀_userId ∈ Users, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,intranetRouter,_deviceId,REQ-B,  
          loginAcknowledgment(_userId),_source1), 
          t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
Happens(e(_Id2,internetRouter,_deviceId,REQ-B,  
          loginAcknowledgment(_userId),_source2), 
          t2,R(t1+1,t2)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id3,intranetRouter,_deviceId,REQ-B,  
          logoutAcknowledgment(_userId)           
          _source1),t3,R(t1+1,t2-1)) 
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The monitoring rule LBACS.R4 is violated in all cases where a user known to LBACS 
logs into the Internet router of the system, while he is still logged into the LBACS 
intranet router by using in both cases the same device.  
 
 
Figure 6-5 – LBACS theory graph part I  
 
In the following, the LBACS assumptions are provided in the form of a directed graph, as 
shown in Figure 6-5 and Figure 6-6. More specifically, the graph in Figure 6-5 represents 
assumptions, which model LBACS intended behaviour with respect to device signalling, 
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resource access authorization and device location identification, as discussed in the 
operational scenario above. On the other hand, the graph in Figure 6-6 represents 
assumptions regarding the login and logout operations that can take place between 
LBACS devices and routers.  
 
Figure 6-6 - LBACS theory graph part II 
 
In the above graphs, a node represents observable and abducible events, i.e., events 
that can be captured by EVEREST captors at LBACS runtime and can be abduced by 
EVEREST diagnostic process, respectively. A directed edge (arrow) that connects two 
nodes represents the existence of an assumption that correlates the two events the 
connected nodes model. The direction of the edge shows the implication direction of the 
assumption, while labels on both edge ends show the relevant time ranges of the 
correlated events. For instance, LBACS.A1 in Figure 6-6 represents the following 
assumption expressed in EVEREST specification language: 
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LBACS.A1. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, ∀_receiver, 
∀_sender, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_sender,_receiver,REQ-A,operableInPremises     
                     (_deviceId),_source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
                  _source),t2,R(t1-2000,t1) 
In particular, assumption LBACS.A1 states that if a device is operable in premises at 
some time point t1, it is expected that a signal should have sent from the device within 
the last two seconds before t1. As shown in Figure 6-6, the operableInPremises event is 
abducible, while the signal event is observable. The EVEREST specifications of all the 
assumptions that the graphs in Figure 6-5 and Figure 6-6 represent are provided in 
Appendix A.  
6.2.3 The deployed simulator           
For the undertaken evaluation, a generic simulator, which was developed by members of 
software engineering group of City University, was used to simulate the operational 
LBACS scenario discussed in Section 6.2.2 and generate corresponding event sequences. 
The simulator is based on a common channel architecture, which connects all simulated 
components and is used for message exchange between the components. The output of a 
simulation is the messages exchanged between the simulated components, referred to as 
simulated events in the following. Each simulated event specifies the sender component 
(senderId), the receiver component (receiverId), the actual payload of the message, which 
is the operation that sender component calls and its parameters 
(operationName(parameters)), and a timestamp indicating the event generation time (t). 
Thus, the signature of a simulated event is as follows: 
e(senderId, receiverId, operationName(parameters), t) 
The simulator should be aware of the specifications of each simulated component. A 
simulated component specification includes the simulated events that the component can 
generate and the trigger conditions upon which the simulated event generation should be 
done. Such trigger conditions, for instance, can be the receipt of a message or the end a 
specific time period. For capturing the incoming and outgoing simulated events of a 
simulated component, an event captor might be specified and attached to the simulated 
component.  
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Moreover, the simulator should be fed with the initial simulated events types - called 
seed events henceforth - that can trigger other components to generate events, for starting 
the simulation. The simulator should also be notified with the total number of seed events 
that must be generated, as well as, a time range per seed event type, whose boundaries 
restrict the occurrence period of the generated seed events. In particular, assuming that 
[tsmax, tsmin] is the time range that restricts the generation period of seed events of es type, 
and esn is an es type event generated at tn, then esn+1 is generated at tn which is result of 
adding to tn a random number t within [tsmax, tsmin]. It should be noted that the simulator 
has a feature that enables the storage of seed events, which are generated during a 
simulation. By these means, a seed of each simulation is stored and, therefore, each 
simulation can be repeated. Once the seed events are generated, the simulator channel 
manager takes over the responsibility to dispatch the seed events to their specified 
recipient components. The recipient components, then, generate simulated events acting 
upon their specifications.  
However, to be able to evaluate the diagnostic process and, especially, assess whether 
the diagnostic process results i.e., the genuineness belief ranges and final diagnosis 
reports, are correct, the above simulator is extended to take into account components, 
which are not legitimate and authorised components of the simulated system, referred to 
as adversaries henceforth. Adversaries objective is to create conditions according to 
which the simulated system deviates from its intended behaviour. To do so, the simulator 
should be notified with the number and exact capabilities of adversaries. Therefore, the 
specifications of an adversary should detail which types of simulated events the adversary 
can intercept, i.e. specify the adversary position in the simulated components topology, 
and how can affect the events, i.e., the types of attacks the adversary can carry out. The 
types of attack that the simulator supports at the moment are as follows: 
• Delay of simulated events: The dispatch of the legitimate simulated events is 
carried out with some delay.  
• Block of simulated events: The simulated events do not reach their initial and 
legitimate recipient.  
Figure 6-7 pictures a UML model for a controlled simulation of LBACS based on the 
generic simulator discussed above.  
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Figure 6-7 – LBACS simulator UML model 
The above UML model can generate the LBACS model represented in Figure 6-8. More 
specifically, the model in Figure 6-8 represents the topology of LBACS simulated 
components and adversaries.  
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Figure 6-8 – LBACS simulated components topology 
As shown in Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8, the simulated LBACS components that have been 
taken into account are: a Device, a Sensor, a Location Server, an Access Control Server, 
an Intranet Router and an Internet Router. The LBACS simulator considers also an event 
captor for each one of the aforementioned simulated components except for Device. This 
decision was taken due to the generic case that a device is not equipped with an event 
captor. In fact, a device may be owned by a visitor of the organization premises protected 
by LBACS. A visitor’s device might not be equipped with an event captor that could 
intercept the incoming and outgoing message traffic.    
The models in above figures include also six types of adversaries. In particular, 
Adverary01 is able to intercept and affect events exchanged between Device and Sensor. 
Adversary02 can intervene and affect the message traffic between the Sensor and 
Location Server, whilst Adversary03 and Adversary04 are able to act similarly between 
Device and Access Control Server, and between Location Server and Access Control 
Server, respectively. Adversary05 and Adversary06, finally, intercept and affect the event 
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traffic between Device and Intranet Router, and Device and Internet Router, respectively. 
In a simulation, an adversary configuration specifies the number of instances of each 
adversary type, as well as, the details of the attack that each adversary instance can carry 
out.  
6.3 Evaluation criteria and metrics 
The aim of the diagnostic framework evaluation is the experimental assessment of the 
diagnostic prototype performance. In particular, the evaluation takes into account two 
performance characteristics of the diagnostic process. The first characteristic is the 
correctness of the belief ranges that the diagnostic process generates for the genuineness 
of events, as well as, the final diagnosis that the process generates for any given violation. 
This characteristic is measured by using the metrics precision and recall with respect to 
the genuineness belief ranges that event genuineness belief tool (EGBT) computes for any 
given event, and the final diagnosis that violations diagnosis tool (VDT) generates for any 
given violation.  
The second characteristic of interest is the diagnostic process responsiveness that is 
strongly related to two computational time periods of interest, namely the belief 
computational time and the diagnosis generation time. More specifically, the former 
refers to the time that elapses while the genuineness belief range of an event is computed 
by EGBT, whilst the latter is specified as the time that VDT takes to generate the final 
diagnosis for a given violation. Furthermore, due to EGBT and VDT architecture, which 
is based on the Consumer/Producer design pattern, as discussed in Section 6.2.1.2, the 
queue delay of both components is measured as a supportive metric for the assessment of 
the diagnostic prototype responsiveness. In particular, the EGBT queue delay is defined 
as the time interval between an event insertion to and withdrawal from the EGBT local 
events queue (see Figure 6-2). Similarly, VDT queue delay refers to the time interval that 
a violation remains stored in the VDT local violations queue (see 3).  
In Section 6.3.1, the metrics precision and recall that are used for evaluating the 
diagnostic prototype correctness are introduced, whilst the metrics regarding belief 
computational time, diagnosis generation time, and queue delays, which are used for the 
diagnostic prototype responsiveness assessment are given in Section 6.3.2.   
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6.3.1 Correctness metrics  
The evaluation of the diagnostic framework correctness is covered by the measurement 
of the recall and precision with respect to genuineness belief ranges that EGBT computes 
for any event, as well as, the final diagnosis that VDT generates for any violation. For 
being able to reason upon and eventually evaluate the diagnostic process correctness, the 
a priori knowledge of the genuineness of events used in the experimental evaluation is 
required. 
6.3.1.1 Genuine and fake event sets  
More specifically, the events used in the experiments are classified into two event sets, 
namely the genuine and fake events sets. Thus, assume that genuine events are events 
generated by legitimate components of the monitored system in accordance to monitored 
system intended behaviour. On the other hand, fake events are genuine events that have 
been captured and affected by not authorized components, adversaries, whose aim is to 
make the monitored system to deviate from its intended behaviour. As discussed in 
Section 6.2.3, for the undertaken evaluation, adversaries can delay or block intercepted 
genuine events.     
Upon the capabilities of adversaries, the evaluation of the diagnostic process takes 
into account three categories of fake events. The first category includes genuine events 
that are captured and delayed by adversaries. Particularly, the delay impact on the 
genuine events is the alteration of their occurrence time, i.e., their timestamp, as 
discussed in Section 6.2.3.  
Finally, the second category considers as fake events the events that are generated by 
legitimate components of the system being monitored, but are blocked by adversaries, 
and therefore EVEREST framework never receives them. However, in case that the 
specifications of monitoring rules that EVEREST uses to monitor the system include 
predicates that can be unified with such blocked events, their presence in violated rules 
instances is established by the principle of negation as failure when the expected event 
has not been seen in the EVEREST event log within the time range that it is expected to 
occur.  
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6.3.1.2 EGBT recall and precision 
The EGBT recall and precision are measured with respect to definite fake and genuine 
events. In particular, given a belief range [Bmin Bmax), EGBT recall with respect to fake 
events, referred to as EGBT_RecallF henceforth, expresses the ratio of definite fake 
events whose genuineness belief is bounded by [Bmin Bmax). Given again the belief range 
[Bmin Bmax), EGBT precision with respect to fake events, referred to as EGBT_PrecisionF 
in the following, is defined as the ratio of events, which correspond to eventual fake 
events, and their genuineness belief is within [Bmin Bmax).  
Similarly, given a belief range [Bmin Bmax), EGBT_RecallG, which refers to EGBT 
recall with respect to genuine events, is equal to the ratio of definite genuine events 
whose genuineness belief is within [Bmin Bmax). Given again the belief range [Bmin Bmax), 
EGBT precision with respect to genuine events, referred to as EGBT_PrecisionG 
henceforth, expresses the ratio of events, which correspond to eventual genuine events , 
and their genuineness belief is within [Bmin Bmax).  
In the undertaken expernimental evaluation, given a particular range of belief values 
[Bmin Bmax), EGBT_RecallF, EGBT_PrecisionF, EGBT_RecallG, and EGBT_PrecisionG 
are measured according to the following formulas: 
EGBT _ RecallF =
|WR ∩ F |
| F |                                (6.2.1.2.1) 
EGBT _ Pr ecisionF =
|WR ∩ F |
|WR |                                               (6.2.1.2.2) 
EGBT _ RecallG =
|WR ∩ G |
| G |                                    (6.2.1.2.3) 
EGBT _ Pr ecisionG =
|WR ∩ G |
|WR |                                    (6.2.1.2.4) 
where in a given experiment:  
• WR is the set of events whose genuineness belief computed by EGBT is within 
[Bmin Bmax)  
• F is the set of fake events  
• G is the set of genuine events, and  
• |X| is the cardinality of set X  
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EGBT recall and precision with respect to fake and genuine events were measured for 
ten different belief ranges. More specifically, the experimental evaluation took into 
account belief ranges from 0 to 0.1, 0.1 to 0.2, …, and 0.9 to 1. The use of different levels 
spanning the entire range of possible belief values, i.e., [0,1], enabled the evaluation of 
EGBT recall and precision when considering results at different belief ranges.  
6.3.1.3 VDT recall and precision 
Regarding the correctness of violations final diagnoses that are generated by VDT, it 
might be useful to recall that a final diagnosis of a violation is a report of the confirmed 
and unconfirmed violation observations i.e. events involved in the violation. More 
specifically, a violation observation P will be classified as a confirmed event if the belief 
in the genuineness of P is greater than or equal to the corresponding disbelief, i.e., 
Bel(Genuine(P)) ≥ Bel(¬Genuine(P)). It should be noted again that VDT recall and 
precision are measured with respect to fake and genuine events.  
Thus, VDT_RecallF, which refers to VDT recall with respect to fake events set F in the 
following, represents the ratio of definite fake events that are flagged as uncofirmed in 
corresponding final diagnosis reports. VDT precision with respect to F, referred to as 
VDT_PrecisionF henceforth, is defined as the ratio of events that are flagged as 
uncofirmed in final diagnosis reports generated by VDT and correspond to eventual fake 
events.  
Similarly, VDT_RecallG, which refers to VDT recall with respect to genuine events set 
G in the following, expresses the ratio of definite genuine events that are flagged as 
cofirmed in corresponding final diagnosis reports. VDT precision with respect to G, 
referred to as VDT_PrecisionG henceforth, is defined as the ratio of events that are 
flagged as cofirmed in final diagnosis reports generated by VDT and correspond to 
eventual genuine events.  
In the undertaken evaluation, the formulas used for measuring VDT_RecallF, 
VDT_PrecisionF, VDT_RecallG, and VDT_PrecisionG are as follows: 
VDT _ RecallF =
|UC ∩ F |
| F |                             (6.2.1.3.1) 
||
||Pr_
UC
FUC
ecisionVDT F
∩
=                                               (6.2.1.3.2) 
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VDT _ RecallG =
| CN ∩ G |
| G |                                                (6.2.1.3.3) 
VDT _ Pr ecisionG =
| CN ∩ G |
| CN |                                    (6.2.1.3.4) 
where in a given experiment:  
• UC is the set of events that were flagged as unconfirmed in final diagnosis reports 
generated by VDT  
• CN is the set of events that were flagged as confirmed in final diagnosis reports 
generated by VDT  
• F is the set of fake events  
• G is the set of genuine events, and  
• |X| is the cardinality of set X 
6.3.2 Responsiveness metrics  
The evaluation of the diagnostic prototype responsiveness is based on statistic analysis of 
the EGBT belief computational time and the VDT diagnosis generation time. In 
particular, the following statistic measures are used: 
• The mean, standard deviation/variance, and minimum and maximum EGBT belief 
computational time 
• The mean time, standard deviation, variance, minimum and maximum VDT 
diagnosis generation time  
To understand better the above measures, it may be useful to recall briefly the overall 
architecture of EVEREST framework (see Figure 6-1) and the interactions that take place 
between the event receiver (ER), the monitor, and the EGBT and VDT components. In 
EVEREST framework architecture, ER notifies the monitor and EGBT of new events 
sequentially. Also, once the monitor detects a violation, it notifies VDT of the new 
violation. Finally, VDT notifies EGBT of violation observations whose genuineness belief 
ranges are significant for generating violations final diagnoses. Since EGBT and VDT 
have been implemented as threads, and the monitor does not wait for any result from any 
of them, the computation time of the monitor is affected neither by EGBT belief 
computational time nor by VDT diagnosis generation time.  
   
 227
Regarding the first interaction, Figure 6-9 pictures the timelines of ER, monitor and 
EGBT components. As shown in the figure, ER notifies monitor and EGBT at times 
Tnmonitor and TnEGBT respectively of event ei. The notification of event ei that causes the 
initiation of monitor computations at Tsmonitor will subsequently trigger computations in 
EGBT at time TsEGTB. It should be noted that, as shown in the figure, EGBT may not 
process event ei immediately after notification, and therefore the overhead introduced by 
EGBT event queue is the time distance between TnEGBT and TsEGBT. Finally, even if the 
monitor terminates with the processing of the event ei, EGBT might still be performing 
computations upon the event. Thus, as shown in Figure 6-9, for instance, EGBT 
computations may continue after the end time of the monitor Te, with EGBT 
computational time for the event ei being equal to the distance between TsEGBT and 
TeEGBT. Analogously, DVT and EGBT components behave much the same with respect to 
their interaction. 
 
 
Figure 6-9 – ER, Monitor and EGBT timelines 
Regarding the interaction between the monitor and VDT component, Figure 6-10 
demonstrates the timelines of the monitor and VDT components. Once the monitor 
detects a violation vi at time Tdv, it notifies VDT of vi at time TnVDT. As shown in the 
figure, VDT may not process violation vi immediately after notification, and therefore an 
overhead equal to the distance between TnDVT and TsDVT is introduced by VDT violation 
queue.  
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Figure 6-10 - Monitor and VDT timelines 
6.4 Evaluation experiments design 
To evaluate the diagnostic framework, the experiments were designed to investigate and 
analyse the impact of factors – referred to as sensitivity factors henceforth - on the 
performance of the diagnostic process. A non-exhaustive list of sensitivity factors that we 
have identified is as follows: 
• Underlying monitoring theory characteristics like the number of assumptions being 
used during the abductive and deductive phases of our approach and the coverage 
of theory against the set of observed runtime events. 
• Diagnosis window 
• Constants α1 and α2 that are used in belief functions (see Section 5.4.6.2) 
• Characteristics of the event set 
To restrict the boundaries of the experimental evaluation presented in this thesis, we 
have decided to experiment with a specific set of experimental configurations regarding 
the sensitivity factors mentioned above. 
Therefore, the experimental evaluation of our diagnosis approach was undertaken by 
using two experimental configurations that generated two experiments sets. The objective 
of the first experimental configuration – referred to as experimentalConfiguration1 
henceforth - focuses on examining the sensitivity of our approach with respect to the 
relation that can be observed between the intended behaviour of the system and the 
diagnosis window. More specifically, experimentalConfiguration1 specifies experiments 
that expose how our prototype reacts on the utilization of different diagnosis windows, 
provided that the selected diagnosis windows have a mathematical relation with the time 
ranges of a common set of assumptions.   
   
 229
Having defined the objective of experimentalConfiguration1 above, we found equally 
interesting to examine the sensitivity of our approach against the relation that could be 
identified between different runtime behaviours of the simulated system and the intended 
behaviour of the system. Therefore, the objective of the second experimental 
configuration – referred to as experimentalConfiguration2 henceforth -highlights the 
sensitivity of our approach against different events sets provided that the generation of 
diagnosis results is based on a common monitoring theory. 
In the following, we provide a detailed description of the experimental configurations 
used and an accumulative table for all the conducted experiments.  
6.4.1 The LBACS simulations 
Having introduced the sensitivity factors that we experimented with, the details of the 
LBACS simulations that have been performed for sake of the undertaken experimental 
evaluation are given. In Section 6.4.1.1, details for the generations of the seed events set 
that was used for the performed simulations are discussed, whilst the specifications for 
the simulation of the rest of LBACS events are provided in Section 6.4.1.2. Finally 
Section 6.4.1.3 discusses the attacks that have been simulated and examined in the 
experiments.  
6.4.1.1 The LBACS simulations seed 
In all LBACS simulations conducted for the evaluation of the diagnosis process, a 
common set of seed events have been used. The decision of using a common set of seed 
events was taken for ensuring that the results of the different performed simulations are 
independent of the initial experimental input that in our case is the seed events set.  
The common set of seed events contain only events that the Device component of the 
LBACS simulator can generate. More specifically, the type of seed events that were 
generated for the undertaken evaluation are the ones corresponding to signalling 
operation, resource access request and resource release operations, login and logout 
operations. The following table summarizes the type of events that are included in the 
common set of seed events by displaying the operation name, the receiver component and 
the time range that restricts the generation period of each event type. 
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Table 6-1 – Types of seed events generated by LBACS Device 
Operation name Receiver component Generation period time range (sec) 
signal Sensor [2,2] 
accessTo Access Control Server [3, 3.5] 
resourceRelease Access Control Server [6, 7] 
login Intranet Router [10, 15] 
logout  Intranet Router [10, 15] 
login Internet Router [10, 15] 
logout  Internet Router [10, 15] 
It should be noted that the max generation period of signal events is 2 sec for complying 
with monitoring rule LBACS.R1. The generation periods of the rest seed events types 
were selected randomly. By feeding the LBACS simulator with a seed event set 
complying with the type of events specified in LBACS monitoring theory (see Appendix 
A), LBACS simulator is able to generate all the event chains that are shown in Figure 6-8.  
6.4.1.2 The LBACS simulation inter-event delays 
Regarding the rest LBACS events that are generated by the simulator triggered by the 
seed events we discussed above, the following table provides the delay - referred to as 
inter-event delay henceforth - that simulator introduces. Upon an incoming event, a 
simulated component generates the predefined response by introducing a delay that 
simulates the execution of the requested operation. Table 6-2 shows the inter-event 
delays for each pair of simulated and triggering seed events. For instance, once the 
LBACS sensor component receives a signal event at t, the sensor generates a 
forwardSignal event at t’, where t’ is equal to t plus a random delay value that was 
chosen from the range [0.5, 1.5]. 
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 Table 6-2 – Inter-event delay ranges for simulated events 
Simulated event  
operation name 
Triggerring seed  
event 
Inter - delay  
range (sec) 
forwardSignal signal [0.5, 1.5] 
accessToResponse accessTo [1, 3.6] 
loginAcknowledgment login [1, 3.6] 
logoutAcknowledgment logout [1, 3.6] 
One could observe that the above inter-event delay ranges are specified with 
significantly small time distance between their boundaries. There are two reasons to have 
such ranges. Firstly, we wanted to have inter-event delay ranges that could map to the 
operation of an LBACS system, as presented in Figure 6-8, in a realistic time frame. For 
instance, a forwardSignal event will be realistically generated within [0.5, 1.5] after the 
occurrence of a signal seed event.  
Moreover, it should be noted that for all simulated event types except forwardSignal, 
the chosen inter-event delay range is [1, 3.6]. One could observe that this repeated range 
has a median equal to 2.3 that was not randomly selected.  On the contrary, by examining 
the time ranges specified for the LBACS assumptions used for the presented experiments 
(see Appendix A), the average of the time ranges length is computed equal to 2.3 again. 
Therefore, the above time range was selected in order that the simulated events are 
generated according to the intended behaviour of LBACS, as specified by the LBACS 
assumptions.  
6.4.1.3 The LBACS simulated attack 
The LBACS simulated attack that was analyzed during the undertaken evaluation is 
described by one adversary configuration. As mentioned above (Section 6.2.3), an 
adversary configuration specifies the number of instances of each adversary type, as well 
as, the details of the attack that each adversary instance can carry out in a simulation  
The delay attack configuration specifies that there is one instance per each adversary 
type. Each adversary instance is randomly activated during the simulation, and randomly 
selects the event to affect from the events that can intercept. Also, all adverasies carry out 
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delay attacks. More specifically, the specifications of all adversaries include a predefined 
delay time range for each event type the adversaries can intercept and eventually affect. 
This predefined delay time range for a given event can guarantee a low genuineness 
belief for the event. During the simulation, the actual delay length for each affected event 
is selected randomly from the aforementioned predefined delay time range.  
6.4.2 Experimental configurations and evaluation experiments sets 
As discussed in the opening paragraphs of Section 6.4, the experimental evaluation of our 
diagnosis approach was undertaken by using two experimental configurations that 
generated two experiments sets. The objective of the first experimental configuration, 
experimentalConfiguration1, focuses on examining the sensitivity of our approach with 
respect to the relation that can be observed between the intended behaviour of the system 
and the diagnosis window. More specifically, experimentalConfiguration1 specifies 
experiments that expose how our prototype reacts on the utilization of different diagnosis 
windows, provided that the selected diagnosis windows have a mathematical relation 
with the time ranges of a common set of assumptions.   
On the other hand, with experimentalConfiguration2 we aim to examine the 
sensitivity of our approach against the relation that could be identified between different 
runtime behaviours of the simulated system and the intended behaviour of the system. 
Therefore, the objective of experimentalConfiguration2 highlights the sensitivity of our 
approach against different events sets provided that the generation of diagnosis results is 
based on a common monitoring theory. 
Both experimental configurations specify experiments sets with some common input. 
This common input refers to the underlying monitoring theory and the selected values of 
belief functions constants. Regarding the underlying monitoring theory used in all 
conducted experiments, we used a subset of LBACS assumptions discussed in Section 
6.2.2.1 and fully deployed in Appendix A. More specifically, we used assumptions 
LBACS.A1 to LBACS.A9 that model LBACS intended behaviour with respect to device 
signalling, resource access authorization and device location identification processes of 
the LBACS operational scenario. Regarding the belief functions constants α1 and α2, we 
have used common values for each conducted experiment. The constants α1 and α2 were 
set to 0.3 and 0.4 respectively. It should be noted that by setting the aforementioned 
values to the belief function constants, the diagnostic prototype is expected to assign a 
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higher degree of belief to cases that no consequences can be identified within the given 
diagnosis window than to cases that empty explanations sets are generated.     
6.4.2.1 First experimental configuration  
Besides the common assumptions set and the common couple of belief functions 
constants described above, we have used a set of events and a set of different diagnosis 
windows to achieve the objective of experimentalConfiguration1. More specifically, to 
conduct the evaluation experiments specified by experimentalConfiguration1, we 
generated a common event set with the LBACS simulator. The cardinality of the set is 
5000 and was generated by using the seeds events set and the inter-event delays presented 
in Sections 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.1.2 respectively. As the delay attack configuration specifies in 
Section 6.4.1.3, experimentalConfiguration1 experiments event set includes fake events 
that were generated by six adversaries. Each adversary was intercepting randomly and 
delaying the 20% of its incoming events by introducing a delay randomly selected from 2 
sec to 6 sec. The delay attack range was specified with the aforementioned boundaries in 
order to assure that indeed fake events could trigger violations for the monitoring rules 
LBACS.R1 to LBACS.R4 (see Appendix A). It should be noted that it is the violations 
generated for the aforementioned rules that are given as input to VDT, in order to check 
the performance characteristics of both VDT and EGBT. As discussed in Section 6.2.1.3, 
given a monitoring rule violation, VDT extracts the violation observations, i.e., events 
involved in the violation, and requests EGBT to compute their genuineness belief and 
plausibility values.   
Regarding the different values of diagnosis windows, we selected the following 
values: 1.5 sec, 2.3 sec, 2.5 sec, 5 sec, 7.5 sec, and 10 sec. The diagnosis windows were 
selected by taking into account the inter-event delays discussed in Section 6.4.1.2, and 
the time ranges of the underlying monitoring theory assumptions that were used. As 
mentioned in Section 6.4.1.2, for each type of simulated events, except for the 
forwardSignal event type, the inter-event delays (2.3 sec) were set equal to the average of 
the median of the time ranges specified in the assumptions. Therefore, the first diagnosis 
window (1.5 sec) is less than, the second diagnosis window (2.3 sec) is equal to, while 
the rest of windows as set greater than the given common inter-event delay. Our intuition 
is that our diagnosis performance would be optimal for diagnosis windows around the 
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common inter-event delay, whilst it would be decreasing as the diagnosis window 
increases and gets greater than the common inter-event delay.  
6.4.2.2 Second experimental configuration 
To achieve the objective of experimentalConfiguration2, three different event sets that 
have been generated by using a common seed events set and inter-event delays were 
used. More specifically, each set contains 5000 events generated by using the seeds 
events set and the inter-event delays presented in Sections 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.1.2 
respectively.  
The sets differ in the number of the contained fake and genuine events. For the 
generation of all three events sets, the delay attack configuration was used again. As 
discussed in Section 6.4.1.3, a simulation that runs according to delay attack 
configuration results in event sets containing fake events that are generated by six 
adversaries. Regarding the first event set – referred to as eventSet1 henceforth - each 
adversary was specified to intercept randomly and delay the 10% of its incoming events. 
Similarly, regarding the second event – referred to as eventSet2 henceforth – the 20% of 
the incoming events of each adversary was intercepted randomly and delayed, whilst the 
third event set was generated with adversaries intercepting and delaying the 30% of their 
incoming events. For all three events sets generation, adversaries were introducing a 
delay randomly selected within [2, 6] seconds. The delay attack range was specified as 
such in order to assure that indeed fake events could trigger violations for the monitoring 
rules LBACS.R1 to LBACS.R4 (see Appendix A).   
Regarding the diagnosis window, we have selected to set it equal to the average of the 
median of the time ranges specified in the assumptions, as discussed in Section 6.4.2.1. 
Therefore, the time window we used to conduct the experiments specified by 
experimentalConfiguration2 was set equal to 2.3 sec. 
6.4.2.3 Evaluation experiments sets 
Having given the exact specifications of experimentalConfiguration1 and 
experimentalConfiguration1, Table 6-3 presents the set of experiments we conducted for 
the evaluation of our approach. It should be noted that for each conducted experiment, we 
have given a unique id hoping that this will help the reader to associate experiments of 
different experimental configuration with its results given in the following section. 
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Table 6-3 – LBACS conducted experiments  
ExperimentalConfiguration2 Adversaries Capabilities 
 
 
Delay in  
10% of incoming 
events 
Delay in  
20% of incoming 
events 
Delay in  
30% of incoming 
events 
1.5  expConf1_1.5  
2.3 expConf2_10% expConf1_2.3 / 
expConf2_20% 
expConf2_30% 
2.5 expConf1_2.5 
5 expConf1_5 
7.5 expConf1_7.5 
 
 
Experimental 
Configuration1 
Diagnosis 
Window (sec) 
10 
 
 
 
 
expConf1_10 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Evaluation Experiments Results 
The results of the experimentalConfiguration1 and experimentalConfiguration2 are 
presented and discussed in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 respectively. The presentation 
structure specifies that for each explanation configuration and for each individual 
experiment, we provide tables and discuss the experimental observations regarding the 
EGBT and VDT correctness and responsiveness metrics as specified in Sections 6.3.1.2, 
6.3.1.3, and 6.3.2. For each experimental configuration, Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 
concludes with charts presenting an overall view of the individual experiments per 
configuration and a comparative discussion on the experimental observations against the 
objective of the relevant experimental configuration. 
Regarding the EGBT and VDT correctness metrics especially, to try to help the reader 
to read and understand the relevant given tables and charts, brief examples are given in 
the following. Assume that Table 6-4 presents experimental results for EGBT correctness 
metrics according to the formulas discussed in Section 6.3.1.2.  
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Table 6-4 – Example table of EGBT correctness results 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.00 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.74 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.25 0.38 0.10 0.62 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.78 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.92 
[0.9, 1] 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.85 
 A brief guide of how Table 6-4 can be read and interpreted is as follows:  
• EGBT_RecallF for a given belief range equals to the percentage of fake events 
whose belief values lie within the given belief range. For instance, the 
EGBT_RecallF for belief range [0, 0.1) that equals to 0.10 shows that the belief 
values of the 10% of the fake events lie within [0, 0.1). EGBT_RecallF values with 
respect to lower belief ranges should ideally be greater than 0.5, whilst the values 
with respect to higher belief ranges should be ideally less than 0.5. 
• EGBT_PrecisionF for a given belief range equals to the percentage of events that 
their belief values lie within the given belief range and happen to be fake. For 
instance, the EGBT_PrecisionF for belief range [0, 0.1) that equals to 1 shows that 
the 100% of the events whose belief values lie within [0, 0.1) are fake. 
EGBT_PrecisionF values with respect to lower belief ranges should ideally be 
greater than 0.5, whilst the values with respect to higher belief ranges should be 
ideally less than 0.5. 
• EGBT_RecallG for a given belief range equals to the percentage of genuine events 
whose belief values lie within the given belief range. For instance, the 
EGBT_RecallG for belief range [0.3, 0.4) that equals to 0.24 shows that the belief 
values of the 24% of the genuine events lie within [0.3, 0.4). EGBT_RecallG 
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values with respect to lower belief ranges should ideally be less than 0.5, whilst 
the values with respect to higher belief ranges should be ideally greater than 0.5. 
• EGBT_PrecisionG for a given belief range equals to the percentage of events that 
their belief values lie within the given belief range and happen to be genuine. For 
instance, the EGBT_PrecisionG for belief range [0.3, 0.4) that equals to 1 shows 
that the 100% of the events whose belief values lie within [0.3, 0.4) are genuine. 
EGBT_RecallG values with respect to lower belief ranges should ideally be less 
than 0.5, whilst the values with respect to higher belief ranges should be ideally 
greater than 0.5. 
• N/A cell value means that the corresponding value could not be computed as it 
maps to a fraction with zero denominator. For instance, the N/A value of 
EGBT_PrecisionG for belief range [0.2, 0.3) means that there no events whose 
belief values lie within [0.2, 0.3). It should be noted that rows with N/A cell values 
are not taken into account in our discussion, as they provide no experimental 
observations.   
• Light grey highlighted rows include the EGBT correctness results for belief ranges 
within [0.3, 0.7). According to our intuition, the values in light grey highlighted 
rows are excluded from the results analysis, as they might not be useful and 
enough indicative information to be taken into account by a recovery decision 
making process. 
Similarly, assume that the following table (Table 6-5) present experimental results of 
VDT correctness as specified in Section 6.3.1.3. Regarding the correctness of violations 
final diagnoses that are generated by VDT, it might be useful to recall that a final 
diagnosis of a violation is a report based on confirmation criterion discussed in Section 
5.5.1. Therefore, the final diagnosis of a violation reports the confirmed and unconfirmed 
violation observations i.e. events involved in the violation. More specifically, a violation 
observation P is classified as a confirmed event if the belief in the genuineness of P is 
greater than or equal to the corresponding disbelief, i.e., Bel(Genuine(P)) ≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)). 
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Table 6-5 Example table of VDT correctness results 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.35 0.17 0.59 0.79 
A brief guide of how the reader should read and interpret Table 6-5 is as follows:  
• VDT_RecallF equals to the percentage of fake violation observations that 
classified as unconfirmed. For instance, the VDT_RecallF that equals to 0.35 
shows that the 35% of the total fake violation observations have been classified as 
unconfirmed. Ideally, we would like to have VDT_RecallF values greater than 0.5.  
• VDT_PrecisionF equals to the percentage of the violation observations that 
classified as unconfirmed and happen to be fake events. For instance, the 
VDT_PrecisionF that equals to 0.17 shows that the 17% of the total violation 
observations that have been classified as unconfirmed are fake events. Ideally, we 
would like to have VDT_PrecisionF values greater than 0.5.  
• VDT_RecallG equals to the percentage of genuine violation observations that 
classified as confirmed. For instance, the VDT_RecallG that equals to 0.59 shows 
that the 59% of the total genuine violation observations have been classified as 
confirmed. Ideally, we would like to have VDT_RecallG values greater than 0.5.  
• VDT_PrecisionG equals to the percentage of the violation observations that 
classified as confirmed and happen to be genuine events. For instance, the 
VDT_PrecisionG that equals to 0.79 shows that the 79% of the total violation 
observations that have been classified as confirmed are genuine events. Ideally, 
we would like to have VDT_PrecisionG values greater than 0.5. 
6.5.1 ExplanationConfiguration1 Experiments Results  
In this section, the results of experiments expConf1_1.5, expConf1_2.3, expConf1_2.5, 
expConf1_5, expConf1_7.5, and expConf1_10 specified in Section 6.4.2.1 are presented. 
As a reminder, the results of the above experiments have been generated by running the 
monitoring and diagnosis prototype with the following common inputs:  
• a set of 5000 events that have been generated as discussed in Section 6.4.2.1  
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• the LBACS monitoring theory as described in Section 6.4.2, and 
• the belief functions a1 and a2 set to 0.3 and 0.4 respectively (see also Section 
6.4.2) 
6.5.1.1 expConf1_1.5 results 
The following results have been generated by setting the diagnosis window equal to 1.5 
sec. 
6.5.1.1.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-6 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf1_1.5, whilst Figure 6-11 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results.       
Table 6-6 – EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf1_1.5 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.00 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.74 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.25 0.38 0.10 0.62 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.78 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.92 
[0.9, 1] 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.85 
Observing the EGBT_RecallF results in above table, there is an undesired low 
percentage (10%) of fake events whose belief values lie within [0, 0.1), whilst the 
percentages of fake events in higher ranges are low and quite satisfying. 
EGBT_PrecisionF results are quite satisfying as all events, whose belief value computed 
within [0, 0.1), happen to be fake. Also, the percentages of events having belief values 
within belief ranges higher than 0.7 and being fake, are as low as ideally expected. 
  
 240
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are as expected due to none 
genuine event with belief value within [0, 0.3) found. However, the EGBT_RecallG 
results in higher belief ranges are not satisfying due to the fact that there are low 
percentages of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1]. Finally, the 
EGBT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying because none low belief valued events 
happened to be genuine, and the percentages of events having belief values greater than 
0.7 and being genuine are quite high.     
EGBT correctness results for expConf1_1.5
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Figure 6-11 – EGBT correctness results for expConf1_1.5 
6.5.1.1.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-7) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf1_1.5, whilst Figure 6-12 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
Table 6-7 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_1.5 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.35 0.17 0.59 0.79 
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Table 6-7 presents rather undesired VDT_RecallF and VDT_PrecisionF results. In 
particular, VDT has classified as unconfirmed events only the 35% of the total fake 
violation observations. Also, only the 17% of the total unconfirmed violation 
observations happened to be fake events.  
On the other hand, VDT_RecallG and VDT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying. 
More specifically, the 59% of the total genuine violation observations have been flagged 
as confirmed events by VDT. Finally, the 79% of the total confirmed violation 
observations happened to be genuine events. 
VDT correctness results for expConf1_1.5
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Figure 6-12 – VDT correctness results for expConf1_1.5 
6.5.1.1.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-8) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as specified 
in Section 6.3.2. 
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Table 6-8 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf1_1.5 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 
20.57 
 
11.51 
 
44.64 
 
0.74 
 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 
41.16 
 
22.74 
 
88.98 
 
0.00 
 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 20.57 sec in average, with a standard deviation 
of 11.51 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 44.64 sec and 0.74 sec 
respectively.  
The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 41.16 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation of 22.74 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 88.98 sec and 0 sec respectively.    
6.5.1.2 expConf1_2.3 results 
The following results have been generated by setting the diagnosis window equal to 2.3 
sec. 
6.5.1.2.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-9 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf1_2.3, whilst Figure 6-13 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
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Table 6-9 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf1_2.3 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.00 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.45 0.31 0.24 0.69 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.78 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.80 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.92 
[0.9, 1] 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.00 
Observing the EGBT_RecallF results in above table, there are undesired low 
percentages (15%, 0% and 0%) of fake events whose belief values lie within [0, 0.3), 
whilst the percentages of fake events in higher ranges are low as ideally expected. 
EGBT_PrecisionF results are quite satisfying. This is because all events, whose belief 
value computed within [0, 0.1), happen to be fake. Also, the percentages of events having 
belief values within ranges higher than 0.6 (20%, 8%, and 0%) and being fake, are as low 
as expected. 
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are quite satisfying as none 
genuine event with belief value within [0, 0.3) found. However, the EGBT_RecallG 
results in higher belief ranges are not satisfying as there are low percentages (14%, 14%, 
and 6%) of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1]. Finally, the 
EGBT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying as none event with low belief value 
happened to be genuine, and the percentages of events, whose belief values were 
computed greater than 0.7 and which happened to be genuine, are quite high (80%, 92%, 
and 100%). 
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EGBT correctness results for expConf1_2.3
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Figure 6-13 – EGBT correctness results for expConf1_2.3 
6.5.1.2.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-10) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf1_2.3, whilst Figure 6-14 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
Table 6-10 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_2.3 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.60 0.23 0.52 0.84 
Table 6-10 presents a quite satisfying VDT_RecallF result. In particular, VDT has 
classified as unconfirmed events the 60% of the total fake violation observations. On the 
other hand, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the fact that only the 
23% of the total unconfirmed violation observations happened to be fake events.  
VDT_RecallG and VDT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying. More specifically, the 
52% of the total genuine violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by 
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VDT. Finally, the 84% of the total confirmed violation observations happened to be 
genuine events.  
VDT correctness results for expConf1_2.3
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Figure 6-14 – VDT correctness results for expConf1_2.3 
6.5.1.2.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-11) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 6-11 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf1_2.3 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 
26.42 
 
14.34 
 
55.08 
 
0.19 
 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 
52.86 
 
28.42 
 
109.66 
 
0.00 
 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 26.42 sec in average, with a standard deviation 
of 14.34 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 55.08 sec and 0.19 sec 
respectively.  
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The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 52.86 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation of 28.42 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 109.66 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
6.5.1.3 expConf1_2.5 results 
The following results have been generated by setting the diagnosis window equal to 2.5 
sec. 
6.5.1.3.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-12 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf1_2.5, whilst Figure 6-15 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
Table 6-12 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf1_2.5 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.25 0.71 0.02 0.29 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.30 0.21 0.27 0.79 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.25 0.28 0.16 0.72 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.80 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.89 
[0.9, 1] 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.00 
Observing the EGBT_RecallF results in above table, there are undesired low 
percentages (25%, 0%, and 0%) of fake events whose belief values lie within [0, 0.3), 
whilst the percentages of fake events in higher ranges are low as ideally expected (15%, 
5%, and 0%). EGBT_PrecisionF results are quite satisfying. This is because the 71% of 
the events, whose belief value computed within [0, 0.1), happen to be fake. Also, the 
percentages of events having belief values within ranges greater than 0.7 and being fake, 
are as low as expected (20%, 11%, and 0%). 
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Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are quite satisfying as only 
the 2% of genuine events found with a belief value within [0, 0.1), and none genuine 
event found with a belief value within [0.1, 0.3). However, the EGBT_RecallG results in 
higher belief ranges are not satisfying as there are low percentages of genuine events with 
belief values within [0.7, 1] (14%, 10%, and 7%). Finally, the EGBT_PrecisionG results 
are almost satisfying as only the 29% of events with low belief value (within [0, 0.1)) 
happened to be genuine, and the percentages of events, whose belief values were 
computed greater than 0.7 and which happened to be genuine, are quite high (80%, 89%, 
and 100%). 
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Figure 6-15 – EGBT correctness results for expConf1_2.5 
6.5.1.3.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-13) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf1_2.5, whilst Figure 6-16 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
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Table 6-13 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_2.5 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.55 0.20 0.47 0.81 
Table 6-13 presents an almost satisfying VDT_RecallF result. In particular, VDT has 
classified as unconfirmed events the 55% of the total fake violation observations. On the 
other hand, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the fact that only the 
20% of the total unconfirmed violation observations happened to be fake events.  
VDT_RecallG result is rather undesired due to fact that only the 47% of the total 
genuine violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. On the 
contrary VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as the 81% of the total confirmed 
violation observations happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-16 – VDT correctness results for expConf1_2.5 
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6.5.1.3.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-14) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 6-14 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf1_2.5 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 
27.62 
 
14.35 
 
55.31 
 
0.19 
 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 
55.26 
 
28.46 
 
110.08 
 
0.00 
 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 27.62 sec in average, with a standard deviation 
of 14.35 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 55.31 sec and 0.19 sec 
respectively.  
The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 55.26 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation of 28.46 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 110.08 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
6.5.1.4 expConf1_5 results 
The following results have been generated by setting the diagnosis window equal to 5 
sec. 
6.5.1.4.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-15 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf1_5, whilst Figure 6-17 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
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Table 6-15 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf1_5 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.60 0.29 0.35 0.71 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.83 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.25 0.17 0.30 0.83 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.00 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.80 
[0.9, 1] 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
The EGBT_RecallF results in above table are quite satisfying. This is due to facts that 
the 60% of fake events found with belief values lying within [0, 0.1), and the percentages 
of fake events in higher ranges are low as ideally expected (5%, 5% and 0%). On the 
other hand, EGBT_PrecisionF results are rather undesired. Only the 29% of the events, 
whose belief value computed within [0, 0.1), happen to be fake. Also, another undesired 
result indicated that all events having belief values within [0.7, 0.8), were fake. Finally, 
only for the belief range [0.8, 0.9), EGBT_PrecisionF is quite low (20%) as expected. 
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are almost satisfying as the 
35% of genuine events found with a belief value within [0, 0.1). However, the 
EGBT_RecallG results in higher belief ranges are undesired as there are low percentages 
of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1] (0%, 5%, and 0%). Similarly, the 
EGBT_PrecisionG result for the low range [0, 0.1) is quite undesired as the 71% of events 
with such low belief values happened to be genuine. Also, there were no genuine events 
among the events, whose belief values within [0.7, 0.8). On the contrary, there is a 
satisfying observation with regards to events having belief values within [0.8, 0.9). In 
particular, the 80% of such events happened to be genuine. 
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Figure 6-17 – EGBT correctness results for expConf1_5 
6.5.1.4.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-16) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf1_5, whilst Figure 6-18 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results.   
Table 6-16 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_5 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.65 0.19 0.35 0.81 
Table 6-16 presents a satisfying VDT_RecallF result. In particular, VDT has classified 
as unconfirmed events the 65% of the total fake violation observations. On the other 
hand, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the fact that only the 19% of 
the total unconfirmed violation observations happened to be fake events.  
VDT_RecallG result is rather undesired due to fact that only the 35% of the total 
genuine violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. On the 
contrary VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as the 81% of the total confirmed 
violation observations happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-18 – VDT correctness results for expConf1_5 
6.5.1.4.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-17) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 6-17 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf1_5 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 
69.53 
 
51.66 
 
263.52 
 
0.19 
 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 
139.07 
 
103.46 
 
526.88 
 
0.00 
 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 69.53 sec in average, with a standard deviation 
of 51.66 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 263.52 sec and 0.19 sec 
respectively.  
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The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 139.07 
sec in average, with a standard deviation of 103.46 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 526.88 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
6.5.1.5 expConf1_7.5 results 
The following results have been generated by setting the diagnosis window equal to 7.5 
sec. 
6.5.1.5.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-18 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf1_7.5, whilst Figure 6-19 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
Table 6-18 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf1_7.5 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.70 0.25 0.51 0.75 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.77 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.75 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.9, 1] 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
The EGBT_RecallF results in above table are quite satisfying. This is due to the fact 
that the 70% of fake events found with belief values lying within [0, 0.1), and the 
percentages of fake events with respect to range [0.7, 1] are zero as ideally expected. On 
the other hand, EGBT_PrecisionF results are rather complicated. Only the 25% of the 
events, whose belief value computed within [0, 0.1), happen to be fake. On the contrary, a 
rather satisfying result indicated that all events having belief values within [0.7, 0.8), 
were no fake.  
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Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in the low belief ranges are rather undesired as 
the 51% of genuine events found with a belief value within [0, 0.1). Moreover, the 
EGBT_RecallG results in higher belief ranges are undesired as well. In particular there are 
very low (1%) and zero percentages of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1]. 
Similarly, the EGBT_PrecisionG result for the low range [0, 0.1) is quite undesired as the 
75% of events with such low belief values happened to be genuine. On the contrary, there 
is a satisfying experimental observation with regards to events having belief values 
within [0.7, 0.8). In particular, the 100% of such events happened to be genuine. 
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Figure 6-19 – EGBT correctness results for expConf1_7.5 
6.5.1.5.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-19) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf1_7.5, whilst Figure 6-20 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
Table 6-19 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_7.5 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.95 0.19 0.05 0.80 
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Table 6-19 presents a quite satisfying VDT_RecallF experimental result. In particular, 
VDT has classified as unconfirmed events the 95% of the total fake violation 
observations. On the other hand, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the 
fact that only the 19% of the total unconfirmed violation observations happened to be 
fake events.  
VDT_RecallG result is quite undesired due to fact that only the 5% of the total genuine 
violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. On the contrary 
VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as the 80% of the total confirmed violation 
observations happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-20 – VDT correctness results for expConf1_7.5 
6.5.1.5.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-20) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
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Table 6-20 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf1_7.5 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 
138.28 
 
115.87 
 
619.53 
 
0.19 
 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 
276.57 
 
231.04 
 
1237.75 
 
0.00 
 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 138.28 sec in average, with a standard 
deviation equal to 115.87 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 619.53 
sec and 0.19 sec respectively.  
The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was 276.57 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation equal to 231.04 sec. The max and min final 
diagnosis generation times occurred were 1237.75 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
6.5.1.6 expConf1_10 results 
The following results have been generated by setting the diagnosis window equal to 10 
sec. 
6.5.1.6.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-18 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf1_10, whilst Figure 6-21 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
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Table 6-21 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf1_10 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 1.00 0.24 0.75 0.76 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.9, 1] 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 
The EGBT_RecallF results in above table are quite satisfying. This is due to facts that 
all fake events found with belief values lying within [0, 0.1), and the percentages of fake 
events with respect to ranges [0.7, 1] are zero as ideally expected. On the other hand, 
EGBT_PrecisionF results are rather complicated. Only the 24% of the events, whose 
belief value computed within [0, 0.1), happen to be fake. On the contrary, a rather 
satisfying result indicated that all events having belief values within [0.9, 1], were no 
fake.  
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the result with respect to range [0, 0.1) is undesired as the 
75% of genuine events found with a belief value within [0, 0.1). On the contrary, the 
EGBT_RecallG results in belief range [0.1, 0.3) are satisfying, as no genuine event having 
a belief value within the aforementioned range. The zero and very low (1%) percentages 
of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1] are totally undesired observations. 
Similarly, the EGBT_PrecisionG result for the low range [0, 0.1) is undesired as the 76% 
of events with such low belief values happened to be genuine. On the contrary, there is a 
totally satisfying experimental observation with regards to events having belief values 
within [0.9, 1]. In particular, the 100% of such events happened to be genuine. 
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Figure 6-21 – EGBT correctness results for expConf1_10 
6.5.1.6.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-22) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf1_10, whilst Figure 6-22 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
Table 6-22 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_10 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 1.00 0.20 0.01 1.00 
Table 6-22 presents a totally satisfying VDT_RecallF experimental result. In 
particular, VDT has classified as unconfirmed events all of the fake violation 
observations. On the other hand, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the 
fact that only the 20% of the total unconfirmed violation observations happened to be 
fake events.  
VDT_RecallG result is quite undesired due to fact that only the 1% of the total genuine 
violation observations has been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. On the contrary 
VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as all of the confirmed violation observations 
happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-22 – VDT correctness results for expConf1_10 
6.5.1.6.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-23) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 6-23 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf1_10 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 
323.56 
 
348.40 
 
2106.11 
 
0.19 
 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 
647.13 
 
665.56 
 
3679.74 
 
0.00 
 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 323.56 sec in average, with a standard 
deviation equal to 348.40 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 
2106.11 sec and 0.19 sec respectively.  
The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was 647.13 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation equal to 665.56 sec. The max and min final 
diagnosis generation times occurred were 3679.74 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
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6.5.1.7 ExplanationConfiguration1 overall charts and discussion 
In this section, we present charts that accumulate and compare the results of the 
individual explanationConfiguration1 experiments. Based on the aforementioned charts, 
discussion on the experimental observations against the objective of the relevant 
experimental configuration follows. 
6.5.1.7.1 EGBT correctness results charts and discussion  
The following sections include charts and discussion on the overall 
experimentalConfiguration1 results for each EGBT correctness metric i.e., 
EGBT_RecallF, EGBT_PrecisionF, EGBT_RecallG, and EGBT_PrecisionG. For each 
aforementioned metric, we provide charts with respect to low belief ranges, i.e., ranges 
within [0, 0.3), and high belief ranges, i.e., ranges within [0.7, 1]. It should be noted that 
results found within [0.3, 0.7) have been excluded from these charts and the following 
results analysis, as they might be considered as non useful and enough indicative 
information to be taken into account by a recovery decision making process. 
6.5.1.7.1.1 EGBT_RecallF 
Regarding the overall experimental EGBT_RecallF results, Figure 6-23 and Figure 6-24 
present the experimental EGBT_RecallF behaviour against different diagnosis windows. 
More specifically, Figure 6-23 illustrates EGBT_RecallF behaviour with respect to low 
belief ranges, i.e., ranges within [0, 0.3). Similary, Figure 6-24 shows EGBT_RecallF 
behaviour with respect to belief ranges within [0.7, 1].  
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EGBT RecallF results for different diagnosis windows with respect to low 
belief ranges
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Figure 6-23 – EGBT_RecallF results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
low belief ranges 
By observing the chart of Figure 6-23, EGBT_RecallF seems to increase as the 
diagnosis window increases. It should be noted that, EGBT_RecallF should ideally have 
values much greater than 0.5 in low belief ranges. Therefore, although there are undesired 
low EGBT_RecallF values for diagnosis windows less than 5 sec, EGBT_RecallF 
increases quite satisfyingly as the diagnosis window is increased. Therefore, EGBT seems 
to compute belief values for fake events more correctly in case where long diagnosis 
windows are given and therefore more evidence is available, rather than when shorter 
diagnosis windows are given, and consequently less evidence is available.  
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EGBT RecallF results for different diagnosis windows with respect to high 
belief ranges
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Figure 6-24 - EGBT_RecallF results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
high belief ranges  
Regarding belief ranges within [0.7, 1], it is expected that EGBT_RecallF values 
should be quite low, i.e., much less than 0.5. For all explanationConfiguration1 diagnosis 
windows, Figure 6-24 illustrates that indeed values are quite satisfying, as the max 
EGBT_RecallF value is 0.25. Finally, one can observe that EGBT_RecallF values are 
improving while the diagnosis window is increased.  
As an overall observation about sensitivity of EGBT with respect to the belief values 
of fake events, we could say that the longer the given diagnosis window is, the greater 
probability is that EGBT would compute the fake events belief values within low ranges, 
Therefore, EGBT operates as expected with respect to fake events when long diagnosis 
windows are given.  
6.5.1.7.1.2 EGBT_PrecisionF 
The charts regarding the overall experimental EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to 
low and high belief ranges are presented in Figure 6-25 and Figure 6-26 respectively.  
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EGBT PrecisionF results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
low belief ranges
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Figure 6-25 - EGBT_PrecisionF results for different diagnosis windows with respect 
to low belief ranges 
Regarding belief ranges within [0, 0.3), EGBT_PrecisionF should ideally be much 
greater than 0.5. For all explanationConfiguration1 diagnosis windows, Figure 6-25 
illustrates that EGBT_PrecisionF values are quite satisfying only for the shortest 
diagnosis windows we have been experimenting with, as the min EGBT_PrecisionF value 
for time windows 1.5, 2.3 and 2.5 sec. is 0.7. On the other hand, one can observe that 
EGBT_RecallF values are rather undesired for diagnosis windows greater or equal to 5 
sec. It seems that EGBT computes correctly low belief values for events that happen to be 
fake in cases that the given diagnosis windows are quite close to the inter-event delay and 
the time ranges medians average of the underlying monitoring theory. More specifically, 
for diagnosis windows around 2.3 sec, EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to low 
belief ranges are optimal. It should be recalled that both the inter-event delay and the time 
ranges medians average of the underlying monitoring theory we have used for the series 
of experimentalConfiguration1 experiments are both equal to 2.3 (see also Section 
6.4.2.1).  
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EGBT PrecisionF results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
high belief ranges
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Figure 6-26 - EGBT_PrecisionF results for different diagnosis windows with respect 
to high belief ranges 
Ideally, EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to high belief ranges should be much 
less than 0.5. By observing the chart illustrated in Figure 6-26, EGBT_PrecisionF results, 
except the result with respect to range [0.7, 0.8) and diagnosis window equal to 5 sec, 
seem quite satisfying. Also, one can observe that EGBT_RecallF values are minimized 
while the diagnosis window is increased and is set equal to or greater than 7.5 sec.  
As an overall observation about EGBT_PrecisionF presents sensitivity with respect to 
the inter-event delay and the time ranges medians average of the underlying monitoring 
theory. More specifically, the closest the time window is to the inter-event delay and the 
time ranges medians average of the underlying monitoring theory, the higher the 
probability is to have EGBT computing belief values less than 0.5 for fake events.   
6.5.1.7.1.3 EGBT_RecallG  
The charts regarding the overall experimental EGBT_RecallG results with respect to low 
and high belief ranges are presented in Figure 6-27 and Figure 6-28 respectively. 
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EGBT RecallG results for different diagnosis windows with respect to low 
belief ranges
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Figure 6-27 – EGBT_RecallG results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
low belief ranges 
The chart in above figure (Figure 6-27) illustrates that EGBT has not correctly 
computed low belief values for genuine events, as expected, in cases that diagnosis 
windows were set to values within [1.5, 5]. More specifically, the percentage of genuine 
events found to have belief values within [0, 0.3) is almost zero for time windows of 1.5, 
2.3, and 2.5 sec, while this percentage increased to 35% when the time window was set to 
5 sec. On the other hand, we got some low belief values for genuine events as the time 
windows increased. Half of the genuine events found to have belief values within [0, 0.1] 
for time window equal to 7.5 sec, while this percentage increased to 70% when the time 
window increased to 10 sec.   
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EGBT RecallG results for different diagnosis windows with respect to high 
belief ranges
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Figure 6-28 - EGBT_RecallG results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
high belief ranges 
Regarding belief ranges within [0.7, 1], EGBT_RecallG should ideally be much 
greater than 0.5. For all explanationConfiguration1 diagnosis windows, Figure 6-28 
illustrates that EGBT_RecallG values are quite undesired for all the time windows we 
have been experimenting with. 
As an overall observation of the EGBT recall sensitivity with respect to genuine 
events, we could say that EGBT operated as expected only in cases that the time window 
was set to values around the inter-event delay and the time ranges medians average of the 
underlying monitoring theory, with respect only to lower belief ranges.  
6.5.1.7.1.4 EGBT_PrecisionG 
The charts regarding the overall experimental EGBT_PrecisionG results with respect to 
low and high belief ranges are presented in Figure 6-29 and Figure 6-30 respectively. 
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EGBT PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
low belief ranges
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Figure 6-29 - EGBT_PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows with respect 
to low belief ranges 
By observing the chart of the above figure (Figure 6-29), EGBT precision with 
regards to genuine events was as low as expected only for the shortest time windows we 
have used in the current series of experiments. More specifically, the EGBT_PrecisionG 
max value was 0.3 for the cases where diagnosis window was set to 1.5, 2.3, 2.5, and 5 
sec. On the other hand, EGBT_PrecisionG results are quite undesired for longer diagnosis 
windows, as the percentage of genuine events whose belief values were computed within 
[0, 01) is greater than 70% for both diagnosis windows of 7.5 and 10 sec.  
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EGBT PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows with respect to 
high belief ranges
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Figure 6-30 - EGBT_PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows with respect 
to high belief ranges 
Regarding belief ranges within [0.7, 1], it is expected that EGBT_PrecisionG values 
should be quite high, i.e., greater than 0.5. For all explanationConfiguration1 diagnosis 
windows, Figure 6-30 illustrates that indeed values are quite satisfying, as the min 
EGBT_ PrecisionG value is 0.78.  
As an overall observation about sensitivity of EGBT with respect to the belief values 
of genuine events, we could say that EGBT_PrecisionG found to have a rather 
unsatisfying behaviour regarding long (i.e., greater than 5 sec) diagnosis windows and 
with respect to low belief ranges. For any other case, EGBT_PrecisionG results were 
satisfying.    
6.5.1.7.2 VDT correctness results charts and discussion 
Similarly to above charts and discussion regarding EGBT correctness, the following 
sections include charts and discussion on the overall experimentalConfiguration1 results 
for each VDT correctness metric i.e., VDT_RecallF, VDT_PrecisionF, VDT_RecallG, and 
VDT_PrecisionG. 
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6.5.1.7.2.1 VDT_RecallF 
The charts regarding the overall experimental VDT_RecallF results are presented in 
Figure 6-31. 
VDT Recall F values for different diagnosis windows
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Figure 6-31 - VDT_RecallF results for different diagnosis windows 
From the above chart (Figure 6-31), we could say that VDT_RecallF results are quite 
satisfying. As it is expected, VDT_RecallF were greater than 0.5, except for the case that 
the diagnosis window was set equal to 1.5 sec. Also one could observe that VDT_RecallF 
was improving while the diagnosis window was being increased. Therefore, VDT seems 
to classify correctly fake events as unconfirmed, especially in cases with long diagnosis 
windows.  
6.5.1.7.2.2 VDT_PrecisionF 
While the VDT_RecallF experimental results were quite satisfying, the VDT_PrecisionF 
results are rather undesired, as they are presented in Figure 6-32.   
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VDT Precision F values for different diagnosis windows
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Figure 6-32 - VDT_PrecisionF results for different diagnosis windows 
More specifically, while it is expected to have VDT_PrecisionF high values (i.e., 
ideally much greater than 0.5), our VDT_PrecisionF experimental results are quite low for 
all different diagnosis windows, with max value equal to 0.25. That means that VDT 
prototype classified unsuccessfully as unconfirmed events mostly genuine events rather 
than fake ones. 
6.5.1.7.2.3 VDT_RecallG 
The charts regarding the overall experimental VDT_RecallG results are presented in 
Figure 6-33. 
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VDT Recall G values for different diagnosis windows
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Figure 6-33 - VDT_RecallG results for different diagnosis windows 
From the above chart (Figure 6-33), we could say that VDT_RecallG results are rather 
undesired; except for the cases that diagnosis window was set equal to 1.5 sec and 2.3. As 
it is expected, VDT_RecallG is greater than 0.5 only in the aforementioned cases. For the 
rest of the diagnosis windows we experimented with, VDT_RecallG was declining as the 
diagnosis window was being increased. Therefore, VDT seems to classify correctly 
genuine events as confirmed only in cases with diagnosis windows having values around 
the common inter-event delay and the time ranges medians average of the underlying 
monitoring theory, while it fails to do so as diagnosis window is being increased.  
6.5.1.7.2.4 VDT_PrecisionG 
While the VDT_RecallG experimental results are rather undesired, the VDT_PrecisionG 
results are quite satisfying, as they are presented in Figure 6-34.   
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VDT Precision G values for different diagnosis windows
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Figure 6-34 - VDT_PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows 
More specifically, our VDT_PrecisionG experimental results values are quite high for 
all different diagnosis windows, as ideally expected. The above results show that VDT 
prototype classified successfully as confirmed events the genuine ones. 
6.5.1.7.3 EGBT and VDT responsiveness results charts and discussion 
In this section, we present charts regarding the EGBT and VDT responsiveness as 
occurred throughout the explanationConfiguration1 experiments series. It should be 
noted that the charts in the flowing figures (Figure 6-35 and Figure 6-36) focus only on 
the mean EGBT and VDT computational times.  
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EGBT belief computational mean times for different diagnosis windows
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Figure 6-35 – EGBT belief computational mean times for different diagnosis 
windows 
VDT diagnosis generation mean times for different diagnosis windows
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Figure 6-36 - VDT belief computational mean times for different diagnosis windows 
From both charts, we can observe that the mean computational times for both EGBT 
and VDT are increasing exponentially while the diagnosis window is being increased. 
The behaviour of both EGBT and VDT computational times against the increment of 
diagnosis window is expected. This is because the increment of diagnosis window 
implies the increment of the event set EGBT should take into account as evidence pool. 
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Therefore, the larger event set EGBT takes into account, the longer time EGBT needs to 
compute the belief and plausibility of a given event.  
Regarding VDT, it should be recalled that given a violation, VDT requests the belief 
values of violation observations to be computed by EGBT. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
observe the VDT final diagnosis generation time depending on the given diagnosis 
window. Also, it should be noted that the VDT computational times are quite high as the 
analysis of the events in a diagnosis window of 10 seconds takes more than 8 minutes, 
and even in the case of a window of 1.5 seconds the computational time needed is about 
one minute. These quite high values occur due to the number of events a violated 
monitoring rule that VDT analyzes includes, the number of assumptions EGBT uses to 
compute the genuineness belief of the violation observations and finally the volume of 
evidence that is taken into account and depends analogously to the diagnosis window. 
Due to the fact that none of the above factors can be restricted in a real life scenario, the 
EGBT and (therefore) VDT computational times could be improved by the introduction of 
an extra step in our diagnostic process. More specifically, as discussed below in Section 
7.2, a premature thought of a static analysis of the monitoring theory assumptions in 
order to generate explanations and consequences trees at symbolic level for each event 
included in the theory before the analysis of occurred violations could improve the EGBT 
and VDT computational times.      
6.5.2 ExplanationConfiguration2 Experiments Results 
In this section, the results of experiments expConf2_10%, expConf2_20%, and 
expConf2_30% specified in Section 6.4.2.2 are presented. As a reminder, the results of 
the above experiments have been generated by running the monitoring and diagnosis 
prototype with the following common inputs:  
• a diagnosis window set equal to 2.3 sec as discussed in Section 6.4.2.2  
• the LBACS monitoring theory as described in Section 6.4.2, and 
• the belief functions a1 and a2 set to 0.3 and 0.4 respectively (see also Section 
6.4.2) 
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6.5.2.1 expConf2_10% results 
The following results have been generated by using a set of 5000 events that have been 
generated by six adversaries. Each adversary was specified to intercept randomly and 
delay the 10% of its incoming events by introducing a delay capable to cause violations 
for the monitoring rules LBACS.R1 to LBACS.R4 (see Appendix A). 
6.5.2.1.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-24 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf2_10%, whilst Figure 6-37 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
Table 6-24 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf2_10% 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.00 0.00 0.19 1.00 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.00 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.00 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.00 0.00 0.28 1.00 
[0.9, 1] 1.00 0.33 0.04 0.67 
 
Observing the EGBT_RecallF results in above table, we could say that EGBT failed 
totally to compute low belief values for the fake events of expConf2_10%, as all the fake 
events found to have belief values within range [0.9, 1], while there is an undesired zero 
percentage of fake events whose belief values lie within [0, 0.3). On the other hand, 
EGBT_PrecisionF results are more encouraging, as only the 33% of the events whose 
belief values ranged within [0.9, 1] happened to be fake.  
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are quite satisfying as none 
genuine event with belief value within [0, 0.1) found. However, the EGBT_RecallG 
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results in higher belief ranges are not satisfying due to the fact that there are low 
percentages (11%, 28%, and 4%) of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1]. 
Finally, the EGBT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying because all events that found to 
have a belief value within [0.7, 0.9] were also genuine events. Also, the 67% of the 
events that found to have belief values within [0.9, 1] were genuine events as well. 
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Figure 6-37 – EGBT correctness results for expConf2_10% 
 
6.5.2.1.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-25) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf2_10%, whilst Figure 6-38 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
Table 6-25 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_10% 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.96 
Table 6-25 presents a rather undesired VDT_RecallF result. In particular, VDT has 
classified as unconfirmed events none of the fake violation observations. Similarly, the 
VDT_PrecisionF result is again rather undesired due to the fact that none unconfirmed 
violation observation happened to be fake event.  
VDT_RecallG result is rather satisfying due to fact that the 55% of the total genuine 
violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. Similarly and 
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evenly better, VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as the 96% of the total confirmed 
violation observations happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-38 - VDT correctness results for expConf2_10% 
 
6.5.2.1.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-26) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 6-26 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf2_10% 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 24.55 14.38 50.64 0.17 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 50.23 28.19 100.77 0.00 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility of an event was 24.55 sec in average, with a standard deviation 
of 14.38 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 50.64 sec and 0.17 sec 
respectively.  
The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 50.23 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation of 28.19 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 100.77 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
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6.5.2.2 expConf2_20% results 
The following results have been generated by using a set of 5000 events that have been 
generated by six adversaries. Each adversary was specified to intercept randomly and 
delay the 20% of its incoming events by introducing a delay capable to cause violations 
for the monitoring rules LBACS.R1 to LBACS.R4 (see Appendix A). 
6.5.2.2.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-27 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf2_20%, whilst Figure 6-39 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
Table 6-27 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf2_20% 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.00 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.45 0.31 0.24 0.69 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.78 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.80 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.92 
[0.9, 1] 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.00 
 
The EGBT_RecallF experimental results in above table show that EGBT failed to 
compute low belief values for the fake events of expConf2_20%, as only the 15% of the 
fake events found to have belief values within range [0, 0.1). On the other hand, it is 
rather satisfying result to have only the 20% (i.e. 15% and 5%) of the fake events found 
to have belief values within range [0.7, 0.9). Similarly, EGBT_PrecisionF results are quite 
encouraging. In particular, all events that found to have belief values within [0, 0.1) were 
fake as well. In addition to that, only the 9.3% in average of the events found with belief 
values ranged within [0.7, 1] happened to be fake too. It should be noted that the above 
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9.3% in average was computed by measuring the average of the EGBT_PrecisionF results 
for the belief ranges [0.7, 0.8), [0.8, 0.9) and [0.9, 1] which were 20%, 8% and 0% 
respectively.  
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are quite satisfying as none 
genuine event with belief value within [0, 0.3) found. However, the EGBT_RecallG 
results in higher belief ranges are not satisfying due to the fact that there are low 
percentages (14%, 14%, and 6%) of genuine events with belief values within [0.7, 1]. 
Finally, the EGBT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying because the 91% in average of 
events that found to have a belief value within [0.7, 1] were also genuine events. It should 
be noted that the above 91% in average was computed by measuring the average of the 
EGBT_PrecisionG results for the belief ranges [0.7, 0.8), [0.8, 0.9) and [0.9, 1] which 
were 80%, 92% and 100% respectively. 
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Figure 6-39 – EGBT correctness results for expConf2_20% 
 
6.5.2.2.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table ( 
Table 6-28) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf2_20%, whilst Figure 6-40 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results.   
  
 280
 
Table 6-28 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_20% 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.60 0.23 0.52 0.84 
 
Table 6-28 presents a rather satisfying VDT_RecallF result. In particular, VDT has 
classified as unconfirmed events the 60% of the total fake violation observations. On the 
contrary, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the fact that only the 23% 
of the unconfirmed violation observations happened to be fake events.  
VDT_RecallG result is almost satisfying due to fact that the 52% of the total genuine 
violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. Similarly and 
evenly better, VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as the 84% of the total confirmed 
violation observations happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-40 - VDT correctness results for expConf2_20% 
6.5.2.2.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-29) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
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Table 6-29 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf2_20% 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 26.42 14.34 55.08 0.19 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 52.86 28.42 109.66 0.00 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility values of an event was 26.42 sec in average, with a standard 
deviation of 14.34 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 55.08 sec and 
0.19 sec respectively.  
The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 52.86 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation of 28.42 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 109.66 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
6.5.2.3 expConf2_30% results 
The following results have been generated by using a set of 5000 events that have been 
generated by six adversaries. Each adversary was specified to intercept randomly and 
delay the 30% of its incoming events by introducing a delay capable to cause violations 
for the monitoring rules LBACS.R1 to LBACS.R4 (see Appendix A). 
6.5.2.3.1 EGBT correctness results 
Table 6-30 contains the results for the EGBT correctness metrics for experiment 
expConf2_30%, whilst Figure 6-41 illustrates a representative chart of the given 
experimental results. 
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Table 6-30 - EGBT correctness results for experiment expConf2_30% 
Belief Range EGBT_RecallF EGBT_PrecisionF EGBT_RecallG EGBT_PrecisionG 
[0, 0.1) 0.24 0.90 0.01 0.10 
[0.1, 0.2) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.2, 0.3) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.3, 0.4) 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.00 
[0.4, 0.5) 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.70 
[0.5, 0.6) 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 
[0.6, 0.7) 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.83 
[0.7, 0.8) 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.81 
[0.8, 0.9) 0.16 0.46 0.08 0.54 
[0.9, 1] 0.11 0.50 0.05 0.50 
 
The EGBT_RecallF experimental results in above table show that EGBT failed to 
compute low belief values for the fake events of expConf2_20%, as only the 24% of the 
fake events found to have belief values within range [0, 0.1). On the other hand, it is 
rather satisfying result to have only the 38% (i.e. 11%, 16% and 11%) of the fake events 
found to have belief values within range [0.7, 1]. Similarly, EGBT_PrecisionF results are 
quite encouraging. In particular, the 90% of events that found to have belief values within 
[0, 0.1) were fake as well. In addition to that, only the 19% of the events found with 
belief values ranged within [0.7, 0.8) happened to be fake too. Finally, the 
EGBT_PrecisionF results regarding events found to have belief values ranged within [0.8, 
0.9) and [0.9, 1] are not that optimal. More specifically, a rather high and almost 
undesired percentage (46%) of the events found to have belief values within [0.8, 0.9) 
happened to be fake. Also, we can observe similar behaviour for the events found to have 
belief values within [0.9, 1]. The percentage of such events that happened to be fake as 
well was quite high too (50%). 
Regarding EGBT_RecallG, the results in low belief ranges are quite satisfying as only 
the 1% of the genuine events with belief value within [0, 0.3) found. However, the 
EGBT_RecallG results in higher belief ranges are not satisfying due to the fact that there 
are quite low percentages (20%, 8%, and 5%) of genuine events with belief values within 
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[0.7, 1]. On the contrary, the EGBT_PrecisionG results with respect to low belief ranges 
are quite satisfying because only the 10% of events found to have belief values within [0. 
0.1) happened to be genuine events. Also, the 81% of events that found to have a belief 
value within [0.7, 0.8) were also genuine events. Finally, the EGBT_PrecisionG results 
regarding events found to have belief values ranged within [0.8, 0.9) and [0.9, 1] could 
have been better. More specifically, a rather low percentage (54%) of the events found to 
have belief values within [0.8, 0.9) happened to be genuine. Also, we can observe similar 
behaviour for the events found to have belief values within [0.9, 1]. The percentage of 
such events that happened to be genuine events as well was quite low too 
(50%).
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Figure 6-41 – EGBT correctness results for expConf2_30% 
6.5.2.3.2 VDT correctness results 
The following table (Table 6-31) accumulates the results of VDT correctness metrics for 
experiment expConf2_30%, whilst Figure 6-42 illustrates a representative chart of the 
given experimental results.   
Table 6-31 - VDT correctness results for experiment expConf1_30% 
Confirmation 
criterion 
VDT_RecallF VDT_PrecisionF VDT_RecallG VDT_PrecisionG 
Bel(Genuine(P)) 
≥ 
Bel(¬Genuine(P)) 0.51 0.33 0.55 0.72 
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Table 6-31 presents a rather neutral VDT_RecallF result. In particular, VDT has 
classified as unconfirmed events the 51% of the total fake violation observations. On the 
contrary, the VDT_PrecisionF result is rather undesired due to the fact that only the 33% 
of the unconfirmed violation observations happened to be fake events.  
VDT_RecallG result is almost satisfying due to fact that the 55% of the total genuine 
violation observations have been flagged as confirmed events by VDT. Similarly and 
evenly better, VDT_PrecisionG result is quite satisfying, as the 72% of the total confirmed 
violation observations happened to be genuine events.  
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Figure 6-42 - VDT correctness results for expConf2_30% 
6.5.2.3.3 Responsiveness results 
The following table (Table 6-32) presents the results of responsiveness metrics as 
specified in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 6-32 - EGBT and VDT responsiveness results for experiment expConf2_20% 
Computational 
time types 
Mean (sec) Standard deviation (sec) Max (sec) Min (sec) 
EGBT belief 
computational 
time 29.22 13.78 68.36 0.19 
VDT diagnosis 
generation time 59.19 26.20 136.67 0.00 
According to the results presented in above table, the time EGBT needed to compute 
the belief and plausibility values of an event was 29.22 sec in average, with a standard 
deviation of 13.78 sec. The max and min computational times occurred are 68.36 sec and 
0.19 sec respectively.  
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The time VDT consumed to generate a final diagnosis for a violation was is 59.19 sec 
in average, with a standard deviation of 26.20 sec. The max and min final diagnosis 
generation times occurred were 136.67 sec and 0 sec respectively. 
6.5.2.4 ExplanationConfiguration2 overall charts and discussion 
In this section, we present charts that accumulate and compare the results of the 
individual explanationConfiguration2 experiments. Based on the aforementioned charts, 
discussion on the experimental observations against the objective of the relevant 
experimental configuration follows. 
6.5.2.4.1 EGBT correctness results charts and discussion  
The following sections include charts and discussion on the overall 
experimentalConfiguration2 results for each EGBT correctness metric i.e., 
EGBT_RecallF, EGBT_PrecisionF, EGBT_RecallG, and EGBT_PrecisionG. For each 
aforementioned metric, we provide charts with respect to low belief ranges, i.e., ranges 
within [0, 0.3), and high belief ranges, i.e., ranges within [0.7, 1]. It should be noted that 
results found within [0.3, 0.7) have been excluded from these charts and the following 
results analysis, as they might be considered as non useful and enough indicative 
information to be taken into account by a recovery decision making process. 
6.5.2.4.1.1 EGBT_RecallF 
Regarding the overall experimental EGBT_RecallF results, Figure 6-43 and Figure 6-44 
present the experimental EGBT_RecallF behaviour against different diagnosis windows. 
More specifically, Figure 6-43 illustrates EGBT_RecallF behaviour with respect to low 
belief ranges, i.e., ranges within [0, 0.3). Similarly, Figure 6-44 shows EGBT_RecallF 
behaviour with respect to belief ranges within [0.7, 1].  
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EGBT RecallF for low belief ranges [0, 0.3)
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Figure 6-43 – EGBT_RecallF results for different delayed events percentages with 
respect to low belief ranges 
The chart in Figure 6-43 illustrates that even though EGBT_RecallF is quite low in 
general, it seems to increase as the percentage of randomly delayed (fake) events 
increases. It should be noted that, EGBT_RecallF should ideally have values much greater 
than 0.5 in low belief ranges. Therefore, we could say that EGBT seems to converge to its 
intended behaviour, i.e., computing low belief values for fake events, as long as the 
number of fake events increases. 
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EGBT RecallF for low belief ranges [0.7, 1]
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Figure 6-44 - EGBT_RecallF results for different delayed events percentages with 
respect to high belief ranges 
Regarding belief ranges within [0.7, 1], it is expected that EGBT_RecallF values 
should be quite low, i.e., much less than 0.5. Analyzing expConf2_10% experiment, 
where the percentage of randomly delayed (fake) events was 10%, Figure 6-44 illustrates 
that EGBT behaved rather undesirably, as all fake events found to have belief values 
within [0.9, 1). On the contrary, the other two experiments, expConf20% and 
expConf30%, where the percentage of delayed (fake) events was 20% and 30% 
respectively, EGBT behaved as expected, as the max EGBT_RecallF value was less than  
0.20.  
As an overall observation about sensitivity of EGBT with respect to the belief values 
of fake events, we could say that the larger the fake event set we introduce, the greater 
probability is that EGBT would compute the fake events belief values within low ranges, 
Therefore, EGBT operates as expected with respect to fake events when more fake events 
occur and are taken into account.  
6.5.2.4.1.2 EGBT_PrecisionF 
The charts regarding the overall experimental EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to 
low and high belief ranges are presented in Figure 6-45 and Figure 6-46 respectively.  
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EGBT PrecisionF for low belief ranges [0, 0.3)
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Figure 6-45 - EGBT_PrecisionF for different delayed events percentages with 
respect to low belief ranges 
Regarding belief ranges within [0, 0.3), EGBT_PrecisionF should ideally be much 
greater than 0.5. Figure 6-45 illustrates that EGBT_PrecisionF result with respect to the 
case we had the 10% of events delayed is undesired, as was found equal to zero. On the 
other hand, the EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to higher percentages of delayed 
events, namely 20% and 30%, are quite satisfying, as were found equal to 0.9 and 1, 
respectively. A meaning to the above observations could be that, while the number of 
fake events was increasing, more events that found to have belief values within [0, 0.3) 
happened to be fake.  
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EGBT PrecisionF for high belief ranges [0.7, 1]
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Figure 6-46 - EGBT_PrecisionF results for different delayed events percentages with 
respect to high belief ranges 
Ideally, EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to high belief ranges should be much 
less than 0.5. By observing the chart illustrated in Figure 6-46, EGBT_PrecisionF results 
seem almost satisfying. While EGBT_PrecisionF results with respect to 10% and 20% 
delayed events configurations are quite low ranging within 0.08 and 0.32, there is a rather 
undesired high EGBT_PrecisionF value (0.5) regarding the case we had 30% of the 
events delayed and the belief range [0.9, 1]. The EGBT_PrecisionF result regarding the 
same case and the belief range [0.8, 0.9]) found quite high (0.46) as well.  
As an overall observation we could say that EGBT_PrecisionF presents sensitivity 
with respect to the delayed events percentages. More specifically, EGBT_PrecisionF 
seem to increase as the percentages of the delayed events are increasing, independently to 
the belief ranges we might use for analysis. Therefore, provided that the number of fake 
events is increasing, we might get EGBT_PrecisionF values with respect to low belief 
ranges, which would be, as ideally desired. However, the corresponding values with 
respect to high belief ranges would be undesirably high as well.   
6.5.2.4.1.3 EGBT_RecallG  
The charts regarding the overall experimental EGBT_RecallG results with respect to low 
and high belief ranges are presented in Figure 6-47 and Figure 6-48 respectively. 
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EGBT RecallG for low belief ranges [0, 0.3)
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Figure 6-47 – EGBT_RecallG results for different delayed events percentages with 
respect to low belief ranges 
The chart in above figure (Figure 6-47) illustrates that as ideally expected EGBT has 
not computed low belief values for genuine events in all three cases of different delayed 
events percentages. More specifically, the percentage of genuine events found to have 
belief values within [0, 0.3) is almost zero for all three cases.  
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Figure 6-48 - EGBT_RecallG results for different delayed events percentages with 
respect to high belief ranges 
On the contrary, Figure 6-48 illustrates that EGBT_RecallG values with respect to 
high belief ranges are quite undesired for all three cases of delayed events we have been 
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experimenting with. While, EGBT_RecallG values should ideally be much greater than 
0.5, the experimental results we got were quite low, with a max EGBT_RecallG value less 
than 0.3.  
As an overall observation of the EGBT recall sensitivity with respect to genuine 
events, we could say that EGBT failed to compute belief values greater than 0.5 for 
genuine events.  
6.5.2.4.1.4 EGBT_PrecisionG 
The charts regarding the overall experimental EGBT_PrecisionG results with respect to 
low and high belief ranges are presented in Figure 6-49 and Figure 6-50 respectively. 
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Figure 6-49 - EGBT_PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows with respect 
to low belief ranges 
By observing the chart of the above figure (Figure 6-49), EGBT precision with 
regards to genuine events was as low as expected for all three cases of delayed events. 
More specifically, the EGBT_PrecisionG max value we got was equal to 0.1 for the case 
where the 30% of events were delayed. 
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EGBT PrecisionG for low belief ranges [0.7, 1]
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Figure 6-50 - EGBT_PrecisionG results for different diagnosis windows with respect 
to high belief ranges 
Regarding belief ranges within [0.7, 1], it is expected that EGBT_PrecisionG values 
should be quite high, i.e., greater than 0.5. For all explanationConfiguration2 
experiments, Figure 6-50 illustrates that indeed values are quite satisfying, as the min 
EGBT_ PrecisionG value is 0.5.  
As an overall observation about sensitivity of EGBT_PrecisionG with respect to the 
percentage of delayed events, we could say that EGBT_PrecisionG found to have no 
particular sensitivity.  
6.5.2.4.2 VDT correctness results charts and discussion 
Similarly to above charts and discussion regarding EGBT correctness, the following 
sections include charts and discussion on the overall experimentalConfiguration2 results 
for each VDT correctness metric i.e., VDT_RecallF, VDT_PrecisionF, VDT_RecallG, and 
VDT_PrecisionG. 
6.5.2.4.2.1 VDT_RecallF 
The charts regarding the overall experimental VDT_RecallF results are presented in 
Figure 6-51. 
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VDT RecallF for different percentage of delayed events
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Figure 6-51 - VDT_RecallF results for different percentages of delayed events 
From the above chart (Figure 6-51), we could say that VDT_RecallF results are quite 
satisfying. As it is expected, VDT_RecallF were greater than 0.5, except for the case that 
the 10% of the events were delayed. Therefore, VDT seems to classify correctly fake 
events as unconfirmed, especially while the number of fake events increases.  
6.5.2.4.2.2 VDT_PrecisionF 
While the VDT_RecallF experimental results were quite satisfying, the VDT_PrecisionF 
results are rather undesired, as they are presented in Figure 6-52.   
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Figure 6-52 - VDT_PrecisionF results for different percentages of delayed events 
More specifically, while it is expected to have VDT_PrecisionF high values (i.e., 
ideally much greater than 0.5), our VDT_PrecisionF experimental results are quite low for 
all different percentages of delayed events, with max value equal to 0.32. That means that 
VDT prototype classified unsuccessfully as unconfirmed events mostly genuine events 
rather than fake ones. 
6.5.2.4.2.3 VDT_RecallG 
The charts regarding the overall experimental VDT_RecallG results are presented in 
Figure 6-53. 
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VDT RecallG for different percentage of delayed events
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Figure 6-53 - VDT_RecallG results for different percentages of delayed events 
From the above chart (Figure 6-53), we could say that VDT_RecallG results are rather 
satisfying. As it is expected, VDT_RecallG is greater than 0.5 for all three different cases 
we experimented with. Therefore, VDT seems to classify correctly genuine events as 
confirmed independently to the number of fake events the event set might contain.  
6.5.2.4.2.4 VDT_PrecisionG 
VDT_PrecisionG results are quite satisfying, as they are presented in Figure 6-54.   
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Figure 6-54 - VDT_PrecisionG results for different percentages of delayed events 
More specifically, our VDT_PrecisionG experimental results values are quite high for 
all different percentages of delayed events, as ideally expected. However, one can 
observe that while the percentage of delayed events is increasing the precision value 
decreases. Therefore, the above results show that VDT prototype classified successfully 
as confirmed events the genuine ones, but with a declining rate while the percentage of 
delayed events was increasing. 
6.5.2.4.3 EGBT and VDT responsiveness results charts and discussion 
In this section, we present charts regarding the EGBT and VDT responsiveness as 
occurred throughout the explanationConfiguration2 experiments series. It should be 
noted that the charts in the flowing figures (Figure 6-55 and Figure 6-56) focus only on 
the mean EGBT and VDT computational times.  
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Figure 6-55 – EGBT belief computational mean times for different percentages of 
delayed events 
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Figure 6-56 - VDT belief computational mean times for different percentages of 
delayed events 
From both charts, we can observe that the mean computational times for both EGBT 
and VDT are increasing almost linearly while the percentage of events randomly delayed 
is being increased. The behaviour of both EGBT and VDT computational times against 
the increment of the percentage of delayed events is as expected. This is because, given a 
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common diagnosis window, the increment of events randomly delayed implies the 
increment of the time ranges EGBT should take into account when it computes the belief 
values of events. Consequently, for the belief computation of a given event, the longer 
the time ranges EGBT should take into account, the more events should be processed by 
EGBT.  Therefore, the more delayed events there are, the longer time EGBT needs to 
compute the belief and plausibility of a given event.  
Regarding VDT, it should be recalled that given a violation VDT requests the belief 
values of violation observations to be computed by EGBT. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
observe VDT final diagnosis generation time depending on the percentage of delayed 
events. 
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Chapter 7: Open Research Issues and 
Future Work 
7.1 Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with some of our insights regarding the 
open issues that emerged from our work in diagnosis of security and dependability 
violations, and we would like to put research effort on, hopefully, the near future.  
The reason we would like to put extra research effort to improve the performance and 
extend the capabilities of the diagnostic prototype, as discussed in the rest of this chapter, 
is due to the significance of the role diagnostic mechanisms could play in the evolution of 
systems from a security perspective. EVEREST, and subsequently its diagnostic 
extension presented in this thesis, has already been used as the monitoring framework of 
the SERENITY project [146, 154]. Briefly, one of the key objectives of SERENITY has 
been the support of systems which operate in dynamic environments to configure, deploy 
and adapt mechanisms for realising S&D Properties dynamically. In particular, 
SERENITY project has produced a runtime framework, known as SERENITY Runtime 
Framework (SRF), enabling the dynamic selection, configuration and deployment of 
components that realise S&D Properties according to S&D Patterns. An S&D Pattern in 
SERENITY specifies a reusable S&D Solution for realising a set of S&D properties. It 
also specifies the contextual conditions under which this solution becomes applicable, 
and invariant conditions that need to be monitored at runtime in order to ensure that the 
solution described by the pattern behaves correctly. EVEREST has been used as a service 
to the SRF and when an S&D Pattern is activated it undertakes responsibility for 
analysing and checking conditions regarding the runtime operation of the components 
that implement the pattern. Runtime analysis was complemented by the diagnosis 
mechanism, described in this thesis, which deduces belief metrics for the plausible 
reasons for a mismatch between service/component modelling and actual behaviour. 
Further work on the limitations of our diagnostic approach could improve the 
performance of the process itself and the quality of the generated diagnostic information 
by aiming to provide sufficient information for preserving the evolvable systems users’ 
privacy and security. 
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By analyzing the evaluation results, presented in Chapter 6:, one of the first lines of work is 
the optimization of our diagnostic approach. Some premature thoughts for optimization are 
discussed in Section 7.2.  
Another interesting line of future work refers to further experimentation with our 
approach and is discussed in Section 7.3. The objective of this line of work is to provide 
us with an extended view of the potential and weaknesses of our diagnostic approach. To 
this direction, it would be interesting to explore the sensitivity of the diagnostic approach 
against factors and experimental configurations that we have not experimented with so 
far. In particular, future work plans, discussed in Section 7.3.1, aim in experimentation 
with an extended variation of adversaries capabilities and simulated attacks besides the 
delay attack used for the experimental evaluation of this thesis (see Section 6.2.3). Also, 
investigating the sensitivity of our approach against an extended set of values for our 
approach belief functions constants α1 and α2 (see Section 5.4.6.2) is another line of 
further experimentation work and is discussed in Section 7.3.2. The results of such 
experimentation could be also analyzed on theoretical basis to study the relation of the 
constants values and the uncertainty interpretations that could be generated. Finally, 
another line of further experimentation work, discussed in Section 7.3.3, is to investigate 
the sensitivity of our diagnostic approach against some characteristics of the underlying 
monitoring theory like the number of assumptions and the coverage of theory against the 
set of observed runtime events.  
From a security perspective, the generation of notifications that would indicate faulty 
system components or components sensors could be valuable to the recovery action 
decision making process. In particular, Section 7.4 discusses some of our premature 
thoughts regarding a notification scheme that could generate notification reports, 
indicating the likelihood of system components or components sensors to be faulty, based 
on the diagnosis results of detected violations our diagnostic approach produces. It should 
be noted that the present version of out diagnostic approach generates diagnostic results, 
which flags events involved in detected violations as confirmed or confirmed by taking 
into account belief metrics in the event genuineness.  
Finally, Section 7.5 introduces briefly other interesting lines of work and open 
research questions emerged during our work on diagnosis.   
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7.2 Optimization of the diagnostic prototype 
The results of our diagnostic prototype experimental evaluation presented in Section 6.5 
reveals some weaknesses that would concern us as a line of future work. More 
specifically, from an EGBT and VDT correctness (see Section 6.3.1) point of view, it 
would be interesting to investigate the reasons for having rather undesired results for our 
tools precision with respect to fake events (see definitions of EGBT_PrecisionF and 
VDT_PrecisionF in Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3 respectively) and recall regarding 
genuine events (see definitions of EGBT_RecallG and VDT_RecallG again in Sections 
6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3 respectively). Of course, one reason to cause such results could be the 
event set that was used for the evaluation included in the present thesis. Therefore, 
rechecking how the event set was generated by our simulator, and the characteristics of 
the used event set would be one of the first tasks of this optimization line of future work.      
From an EGBT and VDT responsiveness (see Section 6.3.2) perspective, it would be 
desired to have lower belief values and diagnosis generation computational times (see 
Sections 6.3.2). A premature thought to improve these computational times can be the 
introduction of an extra step to our approach after the diagnosis prototype is notified with 
the selected monitoring theory assumptions and diagnosis window. During this step the 
monitoring theory assumptions would be statically analyzed to compute and store all the 
possibly generated explanations and consequences trees at symbolic level. Particularly, 
for each predicate specified in a given theory assumptions, an explanation and 
consequences tree would be computed; however no specific values would be assigned to 
the involved predicates parameters, timestamps and time ranges. Therefore, when a 
diagnosis result would be required at runtime for some monitoring rule violation, our 
diagnostic approach could make use of the explanation and consequences trees generated 
during the static analysis. More specifically, for each violation observation the 
corresponding explanations and consequences tree could be retrieved and instantiated 
with the actual runtime values of the observation itself and other available runtime 
recorded events that could be unified with the predicates of the retrieved tree. The gain of 
the assumptions static analysis phase would be the reduction of time consumed at runtime 
by invocating multiple times the processes implementing the algorithms Explain and 
Derive_AE_Consequences (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1 respectively) to compute sets of 
possible explanations and expected consequences of events that are modeled by the same 
predicate at symbolic level.       
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7.3 Further Experimentation 
7.3.1 Extended adversaries capabilities experiments  
It would be interesting to investigate how various adversaries capabilities and therefore 
simulated attacks may affect the performance of our approach. As a reminder, it should 
be noted that the delay attack simulated for the present thesis experimental evaluation 
specified adversaries implemented to intercept randomly events of a set of predefined 
event types and introduce a delay to events dispatch time stamp (see Sections 6.2.3 and 
6.4.1.3). Another attack, we would like to experiment with, would specify adversaries 
implemented to intercept randomly and block events of a set of predefined event types. 
Our intuition is that this block attack should affect the performance of our approach 
prototype by reducing the event set and therefore the potential evidence our approach 
uses to compute belief values and deciding whether observations involved in a violation 
are confirmed or unconfirmed, according to the criterion introduced in Section 5.5.1.  
Two more complicated and interesting simulated attack would specify adversaries 
implemented to have memory. The first of these attacks specify adversaries having 
memory and being capable of replicating events intercepted in the past, and dispatch 
random numbers of replicated events with an updated timestamp. The effect of such 
replicating attack would be the increment of number of events with same payload (if 
events are considered as messages) but different time stamps. Our intuition is that 
especially for long diagnosis windows the diagnostic prototype would take into account 
the events generated by this attack as genuine events. Therefore, the prototype 
performance would not be that optimal in such circumstances.  
The second attack that could use adversaries with memory could specify adversaries 
implemented to alter the content and context information of the events. It should be noted 
that, as specified in Section 3.3.1, the event signature arguments could be considered as 
the event content, whilst context information could be considered the event parameters 
_sender, _receiver, _status, and _source. It would be interesting to evaluate the 
performance of our diagnostic approach with such altered events, as at the moment there 
is no specific insight regarding the performance of our approach under such events 
conditions. 
Whilst experimental evaluation taking into account the above adversary models 
individually is interesting to investigate, the experimentation with simulated attacks that 
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specify the orchestration of multiple instances of different adversary models is intriguing 
due to the fact that at the moment we cannot foresee the performance of our approach 
against such attacks. Such orchestration attacks could specify adversaries orchestration to 
cause undesired effects on different components of the simulated system, like a combined 
denial of service attack on two key components of the simulated system. In the same 
direction, the usage of an operation trace, which has been used for benchmarking 
intrusion detection systems like the DARPA data set [27], could be another alternative to 
evaluate our approach against attacks occurred and recorded at real time system 
operations.              
7.3.2 Extended belief function constants experiments  
Another alternative line of further experimentation refers to evaluation of our approach 
against an extended set of values for constants α1 and α2 that are used in the belief 
functions of our approach. As discussed in Section 6.4.2, we used only a couple of 
constants values for the experimental evaluation included in the present thesis. Future 
plans presume an extended set of values within range [0, 0.4] and a number of possible 
combinations of values for the two constants. It should be noted that the above range is 
specified with relatively low valued boundaries due to the fact that α1 and α2 constants 
are used as the actual masses assigned to events for which no consequences can be 
identified (by using α2) and no explanations can be generated (by using α1). Therefore, as 
discussed in Section 5.4.6.2, such cases with no identified consequences or generated 
explanations should result with low belief values. 
Besides the examination of our approach sensitivity against the belief functions 
constants, analysis of the experiment results generated from a range of constants values 
combinations could also be worthy to study on theoretical basis the relation between the 
two belief function constants against the uncertainty interpretations that would be 
generated for a common set of events. It should be noted that, as discussed in Section 
5.4.6.2, α2 should be greater than α1 to favor cases where no consequences can be 
identified within a given time window against cases where no explanations can be 
generated. However, it would be interesting to examine cases where constants are equal 
or α1 is greater than α2. Examining and comparing the results of such cases, we might get 
indications of the means that the relation between the constants affects the interpretation 
of the uncertainty an event set could carry. Of course, the uncertainty interpretations 
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would only be expressed in terms of belief metrics in the genuineness of the examined 
events. 
7.3.3 Extended underlying monitoring theory experiments 
Two are the monitoring theory characteristics whose impact on our diagnostic prortotype 
performance seems quite interesting for extended investigation. More specifically, the 
number of assumptions, which are used during the diagnostic process abductive and 
deductive phases, as well as, the theory coverage against the set of the observed runtime 
events may affect the diagnosis result, according to our intuition. 
From an abductive process-wise point of view, the more assumptions we have for a 
specific type of event, the more explanations can be generated for it. From a deductive 
perspective, the more assumptions there are to identify the effects of a type of event, the 
more consequences are generated. Due to the fact that our event genuineness belief 
assessment scheme is based on additive functions, and therefore compute belief values 
analogously to the cardinality of sets taken into account, our intuition is that a theory A 
with relatively bigger number of assumptions than theory B will generate higher belief 
values. Of course, the frequency of recorded events that could be taken into account as 
matching recorded events by our process as well as the values of constants α1 and α2 that 
are used in belief functions could play significant role to the diagnosis outcome. 
Moreover, the number of assumptions of a theory is likely to affect the responsiveness of 
the diagnostic process by introducing analogously computational delays.       
The theory coverage against the set of the observed runtime events is another 
characteristic that could play significant role in the performance of our diagnostic 
process. More specifically, the higher coverage a theory has against the set of the runtime 
and recordable events, the higher possibility there is that we entail with high belief values 
and belief computational times. As a counter example that makes our intuition stronger, 
assume the explanation generation process for an event e. In case that there are no 
assumptions formulas containing e in their head, no explanations for e can be generated 
and effectively according to belief function miEX (see Definition 10 in Section 5.4.6.2), e 
belief value is set instantly equal to α1.     
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7.4 Combining Diagnosis Results 
From a security perspective, a significant research question that we have pointed out is 
whether and how reasoning on diagnosis results of multiple monitoring rules violations 
could generate indications (containing perhaps likelihoods) for faulty components or 
components sensors. It should be noted that the diagnosis results generated by the current 
version of our diagnostic approach contains only belief metrics in the genuineness of the 
events involved in monitoring rules violations. It is these belief metrics that perhaps an 
administrator of the monitored system should take into account in order to initiate 
recovery actions after detection of violations. What we are suggesting as future line of 
work in the present section is a notification scheme that includes indications for faulty 
system components or sensors. 
The notification scheme should specify a reasoning module that should take into a 
predefined number of monitoring rules violations and their diagnosis results within a 
predefined time window. The notification reasoning module would then reason on the 
belief values included in the diagnosis results and generate notification reports about the 
likely faulty components and sensors involved in the examined violations. It should be 
noted that the notification scheme should specify a structured notification report schema 
that would allow the communication of notification reports among the relevant parties. 
More specifically, the notification reasoning module should generate notification reports 
according to the notification schema in order that a recovery action decision making 
process or a security administrator could be able to use the reports to decide for and 
initiate the appropriate recovery actions. 
To illustrate our premature thoughts, please consider the following example. Assume 
that during a given time window and for a given threshold of detected violations, the 
framework that monitors and diagnoses violation occurred in LBACS, generates a 
number of violations that exceeds the predefined threshold for rules LBACS.R1 and 
LBACS.R2 as are specified below. 
LBACS.R1. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_LServerId ∈ LocationServers, 
∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, ∀_source.  
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source), t1, R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_LServerId,_ACServerId,REQ-A,locationResponse   
          (_deviceId),_source), t2, R(t1+1,t1+3000))  
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LBACS.R2. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_LServerId ∈ LocationServers, 
∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_receiver1∈Sensors, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source1), t1, R(t1,t1)) ∧  
¬Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source1), t2, R(0,t1-1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source2), t3, R(t1-2000,t1-1))         
The monitoring rule LBACS.R1 is violated in all cases where, provided that the 
access control server of LBACS requests location information for a device from the 
location server of LBACS, the location server does not provide such information within 
the next 3 seconds after the corresponding request occurrence. Therefore, a violation of 
LBACS.R1 contains: 
- an occurrence of a locationRequest event at R1.t1 – referred to as 
locationRequest@R1.t1 henceforth – and  
- a negated locationRequest event time-stamped at R1.t1+3000 – referred to as 
¬locationRequest@R1.t1+3000, which is generated by negation as failure and indicates 
that no locationRequest event occurred within [R1.t1+1, R1.t1+3000] .  
It should be noted that all events specified in LBACS.R1 are captured from the receiver 
side sensors, as all predicates status is set to REQ-A. The REQ-A predicate status value 
signifies that the event represented by the given predicate is captured after request from 
receiver’s sensor (see Section 3.3.1).  
Rule LBACS.R2 checks when the first signal from a device should have occurred. In 
particular, the first signal from a given device is expected within the last two seconds 
before the first request for the device location made by the LBACS access control server. 
A violation of LBACS.R2 contains: 
- an occurrence of a locationRequest event at R2.t1 – referred to as 
locationRequest@R2.t1 henceforth; 
- a non occurrence of a locationRequest event at R2.t1-1 - referred to as 
¬locationRequest@R2.t1-1 henceforth – indicating that no locationRequest occurred 
within [0, R2.t1-1], and  
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- a negated signal event time-stamped at R2.t1-1 – referred to as ¬signal@R2.t1-1- 
that is generated by negation as failure and indicates that no signal event occurred 
within [0, R2.t1-1].   
It should be noted again that all events specified in LBACS.R2 are captured from the 
receiver side sensors, as all predicates status is set to REQ-A. 
Moreover, assume that in the most of the final diagnosis results the diagnosis module 
generates for rule LBACS.R1 violations, event ¬locationRequest@R1.t1+3000 is 
flagged as confirmed, whilst event locationRequest@R1.t1 is flagged as unconfirmed. 
Also, by taking into account the average of the belief values for the involved events for 
all examined LBACS.R1 violations, assume that the average of belief in genuineness of 
the event locationRequest@R1.t1 is quite lower that the corresponding belief value of the 
event ¬locationRequest@R1.t1+3000. According to above diagnosis results and belief 
metrics, the occurrence of locationRequest@R1.t1 seems less plausible from the 
occurrence of ¬locationRequest@R1.t1+3000. Therefore, a notification that the 
component that generates or the sensor that captures the event locationRequest@R1.t1 is 
faulty can be made. 
By reasoning on diagnosis results of rule Chapter 1: violations, the above notification 
might be enhanced. This could happen in case that initially there is a Chapter 1: 
violations number that exceeds the predefined violation threshold. Moreover, in the most 
of the Chapter 1: violations diagnosis results, event locationRequest@R2.t1 should be 
flagged as unconfirmed, whilst the events ¬locationRequest@R2.t1-1 and 
¬signal@R2.t1-1 should be flagged as confirmed. Finally, in the examined Chapter 1: 
violations, events locationRequest@R2.t1 should have a lower average of belief values 
than the average belief values of events ¬locationRequest@R2.t1-1 and ¬signal@R2.t1-
1. By these means, events  locationRequest@R2.t1 seems again less plausible than the 
events ¬locationRequest@R2.t1-1 and ¬signal@R2.t1-1, enhancing our hypothesis that  
the component that generates or the sensor that captures the event 
locationRequest@R1.t1 is faulty.  
Of course, the above notification might not be totally accurate; however, it can be 
taken into account as an indication during the recovery action decision making process. 
To try to ameliorate the notifications accuracy, research effort should be put on the 
business logic of the reasoning notification module, i.e., how the reasoning module 
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reasons on a set of diagnosis results. For instance, in the above example, we have 
mentioned a comparison on the average of the belief values of the events involved in a set 
of detected violations of the same rule. Also, the factors that might affect the accuracy of 
such notifications like the predefined violation threshold, and the time window, which 
examined violations lie within, might be of significance importance. On the other hand, 
regarding the notification report schema, it should be designed carefully to meet 
requirements regarding the support of recovery action decision making process.   
7.5 Other open research issues   
This section discusses briefly other open research questions emerged with our diagnosis 
oriented work. More specifically, other open issues we have pointed out are as follows: 
• Quality assessment and update of underlying monitoring theory assumptions. Our 
diagnosis process could be extended to keep track of the number of times a 
monitoring theory assumption is used during the abductive and deductive phases. 
Premature thoughts presume that the generated assumption usage frequencies 
could be used to rank the monitoring theory assumptions and provide indications 
for the quality of the monitoring specifications. Having as reference research work 
on Bayesian networks, which are graphical models for encoding causal and 
probabilistic relationships among variables of interest of a given knowledge 
domain [84, 85, 123, 124, 125, 126], and especially Bayesian inference and 
learning techniques like approaches presented by Heckerman [76], monitoring 
theory assumptions with lower frequency could be reconsidered or restructured to 
generate new assumptions. The newly generated assumptions could then specify 
events correlations that have not been specified within the initial monitoring 
theory.  
• Extensive comparison between Dempster Shafer theory of evidence (DS theory) 
[146] and Bayesian reasoning [84, 85, 123, 124, 125, 126] for handling 
uncertainty. Having been aware of approaches that handle uncertainty by using 
Bayesian networks as the approach by Pan et al. [121], an interesting theoretical 
line of research is a comparison of our present diagnostic process that is based on 
DS theory to a similar diagnostic process based on Bayesian reasoning. To this 
direction, another version of our diagnostic approach based on Bayesian reasoning 
would be necessary. To obtain such a diagnosis approach, the foreseen challenges 
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might be faced should refer to the theoretical and practical differences between DS 
theory and Bayesian reasoning. For instance, an issue might emerge regarding the 
specification of prior probabilities that are required by the Bayesian reasoning in 
order to function. Of course, we have faced something similar during the design of 
the present diagnosis approach when it was required to assign preliminary masses 
that reflect the initial knowledge of the examined system. The results of an 
extensive comparison between these two uncertainty handling frameworks against 
a common use case could provide the basis for a discussion on the relative merits 
and demerits, as the ones pointed out in [96, 151, 152]. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Overview 
The final chapter of the present thesis provides an overview of the research work resulted 
in the diagnosis approach, which was presented through out the previous chapters. 
Besides the overview, the present chapter points out the diagnosis approach main 
novelties and the contributions that our research has made to the state of the art. Our 
claims are founded on a comparison with other diagnostic approaches. Finally, the 
diagnostic approach limitations are given. 
8.2 Summary of the research work 
Designed as an extension of EVEREST monitoring framework [109, 153, 155], the 
diagnostic framework this thesis presented aims to the identification of possible 
explanations for the violations of S&D properties specified as EVEREST monitoring 
rules. To design the diagnostic framework, we have specified some extensions in EC-
Assertion language that EVEREST monitoring rules and assumptions are specified. These 
extensions were made to support the basic formulation of the diagnosis problem as 
discussed in Section 4.2.   
As a mechanism of trying to find possible causes of the runtime events that have 
caused a violation of an S&D monitoring rule, abductive reasoning [122] is used. More 
specifically, to generate the possible explanations of S&D violations, we devised an 
abductive algorithm for generating explanations for events that are involved in the 
detected violations discussed in Section 5.2. This algorithm generates a list representing 
the alternative explanations for a particular event by taking into account the intended 
behaviour of the monitored system as it is specified in EC-Assertion assumptions. It 
should be noted that the aforementioned algorithm treats any occurring time constraint 
satisfaction problem as linear programming problem by using the Simplex method [63].  
After the generation of the possible explanations for the events involved in the 
violation of a rule, the diagnosis process identifies the expected effects of these 
explanations and uses them to assess the plausibility of the explanations. The assessment 
of explanation plausibility is based on the hypothesis that if the expected effects of an 
explanation match with events that have occurred (and recorded) during the operation of 
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the system that is being monitored, then there is evidence about the validity of the 
explanation. To identify therefore any effects of the generated explanations, a deductive 
algorithm that generates all the possible derived observations from the abductive 
explanations by using the system assumptions has been devised. The consequences 
identification algorithm presented in Section 5.3 treats again any occurring time 
constraint satisfaction problem as linear programming problem by using the Simplex 
method [63].  
Having identified the expected effects of the abductive explanations of the violation 
observations, the diagnosis mechanism assesses the genuineness of violation 
observations.  Based on the hypothesis mentioned above, i.e. if the expected effects of an 
explanation match with observations that have occurred (and recorded) during the 
operation of the system that is being monitored, then there is evidence about the validity 
of the explanation, there is the possibility that we would not be able to confirm or 
disconfirm the validity of the explanation at the time that diagnostic process searches for 
evidence. To deal with this uncertainty, the diagnosis mechanism advocates an 
approximate reasoning approach which generates degrees of belief in the membership of 
observations in the log of the monitor and the existence of some valid explanation for it 
rather than strict logical truth values. These degrees of belief are computed by functions 
founded in the axiomatic framework of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [146] 
(see also Section 5.4.6).  
Finally, we have provided a scheme for final diagnosis reports of detected S&D 
violations. Based on the beliefs computed for the genuineness of the individual events 
involved in an S&D violation (i.e. violation observations), the scheme generates as a final 
diagnosis for the given violation a report of the confirmed and unconfirmed violations 
observations. As discussed in Section 5.5, a violation observation P will be classified as a 
confirmed event if the belief in the genuineness of P is greater than or equal to the 
corresponding disbelief, i.e., Bel(P) ≥ Bel(¬P)7. A negated violation observation ¬P, will 
be classified as a unconfirmed predicate if Bel(P) ≤ Bel(¬P). 
                                               
7 Bel(P) and Bel(¬P) represent the proposition Bel(Genuine(e,Uo,TR)) and Bel(¬Genuine(e,Uo,TR)) respectively. 
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8.3 Main novelties   
To generate explanations for the violations of S&D properties specified as EVEREST 
monitoring rules, the diagnostic mechanism uses abductive reasoning [122] that takes 
into account the temporal aspects of the violation observations (i.e. time stamps) and the 
underlying monitoring rules and assumptions (i.e. time ranges have been specified to 
indicate the intended behaviour of the monitored system).  In other temporal abduction 
approaches [28, 41, 42, 53, 140], temporal knowledge can be expressed as temporal 
constraints, which are associated to the rules of the underlying domain theory. Such 
temporal constraints must be satisfied by the temporal information associated to the 
generated explanations. On the other hand, our temporal abductive approach that is based 
on reasoning on events and formulas specified in EC-Assertion whose formal foundations 
are based in Event Calculus, temporal knowledge can be represented as information 
embedded in the underlying theory formulas. As mentioned in Section 8.2, our abductive 
mechanism treats any occurring time constraint satisfaction problem as linear 
programming problem by using the Simplex method [63]. Therefore, our approach draws 
upon work on temporal abductive reasoning [28, 41, 42, 53, 140] and its applications to 
diagnosis [52, 130], but is based on a newly developed algorithm for abductive search 
with Event Calculus that generates all the possible explanations of a formula (unlike [53, 
140]).  
Due to the fact that uncertainty is an inherent feature of abductive reasoning, the 
likelihood of abducible explanations truthness, can play significant role in the selection of 
the most preferable abductive explanation. Thus, probabilistic models and, in particular, 
Bayesian models  have been used to identify the most plausible abductive explanation 
[50, 83, 90, 97, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 132, 140]. The use of Bayesian models imposes 
some limitations in the generality of logic-based abductive reasoning. In particular, the 
set of possible hypotheses must be determined in advance. Moreover, an a priori 
probability must be assigned to each of the possible hypothesis in advance, as well as, the 
conditional probabilities of consequences, given particular assumptions, must be 
predetermined. When these prerequisites are met, the Bayes’ theorem can be applied in 
order to compute the conditional probabilities of the predefined possible hypotheses, 
given the observations to be explained. Based on the outputs of the Bayes’s rule, the most 
possible combination of hypotheses, which jointly explain the observations, is selected. 
Our approach also uses a probabilistic explanation assessment approach. However, our 
   
 313
approach is not based on Bayesian abduction. The reason for this is to avoid the need to 
elicit the a-priori and conditional probability measures which are required by this 
approach. Furthermore, the choice of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [146] as 
the framework for calculating the likelihoods of abduced explanations has been dictated 
by the need to represent the uncertainty regarding the confirmation of the consequences 
of these explanations as discussed Section 5.4 and reason in the presence of this 
uncertainty. 
8.4 Limitations 
The diagnosis approach for S&D properties violations we have presented in the thesis 
happens to have some limitations. These limitations are enlisted below:  
• The property specification language of EVEREST, and therefore of our diagnostic 
framework, is expressive enough to support a wide spectrum of S&D properties. 
However, the use of the language for the specification of such properties may be 
difficult for users who are not familiar with formal languages. 
• The diagnostic prototype as it is presented in Section 6.2.1 does not implement the 
function that computes the basic probability assignment in the genuineness of an 
event e for the 2.i case of Definition 9 (see Section 5.4.6.2). More specifically, the 
aforementioned case refers to circumstances that: 
o no recorded events matching with e were found in the event log, and  
o the last known value of the clock of Captor(e), i.e., the timestamp of the 
last event in the log that has produced by Captor(e), at the time of the 
search is greater than the upper boundary of the time range that is 
specified for e.  
At such cases, events occurred within the upper boundary of e and the last time 
stamp of Captor(e) are used to compute the basic probability assignment in the 
genuineness of e.  
• As discussed in Section 7.2, the results of our diagnostic prototype experimental 
evaluation presented in Section 6.5 reveal some weaknesses that would concern us 
as a line of future work. More specifically, from an EGBT and VDT correctness 
(see Section 6.3.1) point of view, it would be interesting to investigate the reasons 
for having rather undesired results for our tools precision with respect to fake 
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events (see definitions of EGBT_PrecisionF and VDT_PrecisionF in Sections 
6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3 respectively) and recall regarding genuine events (see 
definitions of EGBT_RecallG and VDT_RecallG again in Sections 6.3.1.2 and 
6.3.1.3 respectively). 
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Appendix A: Location Based Access Control System 
Monitoring Theory 
LBACS.R1. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_LServerId ∈ LocationServers, 
∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_source.  
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-B,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source), t1, R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_LServerId,_ACServerId,REQ-A,locationResponse   
          (_deviceId),_source), t2, R(t1+1,t1+3000))  
LBACS.R2. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_LServerId ∈ LocationServers, 
∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_receiver1∈Sensors, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source1), t1, R(t1,t1)) ∧  
¬Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source1), t2, R(0,t1-1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source2), t3, R(t1-2000,t1-1)) 
LBACS.R3. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_receiver1∈Sensors, ∀_source1. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A, signal(_deviceId),  
          _source1), t1, R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source1), t2, R(t1+1,t1+2000))  
LBACS.R4. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀t3 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, 
∀_userId ∈ Users, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,intranetRouter,_deviceId,REQ-B,  
          loginAcknowledgment(_userId),_source1), 
          t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧  
Happens(e(_Id2,internetRouter,_deviceId,REQ-B,  
          loginAcknowledgment(_userId),_source2), 
          t2,R(t1+1,t2)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id3,intranetRouter,_deviceId,REQ-B,  
          logoutAcknowledgment(_userId)           
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          _source1),t3,R(t1+1,t2-1))  
LBACS.A1. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, ∀_receiver, 
∀_sender, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_sender,_receiver,REQ-A,operableInPremises     
                     (_deviceId),_source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source),t2,R(t1-2000,t1))  
LBACS.A2. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_resourceId ∈ 
Resources, ∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_sender, 
∀_receiver, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_sender,_receiver,REQ-A,operableInPremises     
                     (_deviceId),_source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
     Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId_ACServerId,REQ-A,accessTo  
               (_deviceId, _resourceId), _source), t2,  
               R(t1-2000,t1)) 
LBACS.A3. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_resourceId ∈ 
Resources, ∀_receiver1 ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_receiver2 ∈ 
Sensors, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_deviceId,_receiver1,REQ-A,accessTo(_deviceId,  
                     _resourceId),_source1), t1, R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_receiver2,REQ-A,signal(_deviceId),  
          _source2), t2, R(t1-2000,t1)) 
LBACS.A4. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_resourceId ∈ 
Resources, ∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_receiver ∈ 
LocationServers, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_receiver,REQ-B,locationRequest 
          (_deviceId), _source1), t1, R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_ACServerId,REQ-A,accessTo  
          (_deviceId,_resourceId),_source2),t2,R(t1-5000,t1)) 
LBACS.A5. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_resourceId ∈ 
Resources, ∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_deviceId,REQ-B,accessToResponse 
          (_deviceId,_resourceId),_source), t1, R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_ACServerId,REQ-A,accessTo  
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          (_deviceId,_resourceId),_source),t2,R(t1-5000,t1)) 
LBACS.A6. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_LServerId ∈ 
LocationServers, ∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, 
∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_LServerId,_LServerId,REQ-B,locationResponse   
          (_deviceId),_source), t1, R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_ACServerId,_LServerId,REQ-A,locationRequest  
          (_deviceId),_source), t2, R(t1-2000,t1)) 
LBACS.A7. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_ACServerId ∈ 
AccessControlServers, ∀_resourceId ∈ Resources, ∀_LServerId 
∈ LocationServers, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_ACServerId,_deviceId,REQ-B,accessToResponse 
          (_deviceId,_resourceId),_source1), t1, R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_LServerId,_ACServerId,REQ-B,locationResponse  
          (_deviceId),_source2), t2, R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACS.A8. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_deviceId ∈ 
Devices, ∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, ∀_resourceId ∈ 
Resources, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _sender, _receiver, REQ-B,  
          accessControlServerIsRunning(_ACServerId), 
          _source1), t1, R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_ACServerId,_deviceId,REQ-B,accessToResponse 
          (_deviceId,_resourceId),_source2),t2,R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACS.A9. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_LServerId ∈ 
LocationServers, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _sender, _receiver, REQ-B,  
          locationServerIsRunning(_LServerId),_source1),t1, 
          R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_LServerId,_LServerId,REQ-B,locate   
          (_deviceId),_source), t2, R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACS.A10. ∀t1 ∈ Time, ∃t2 ∈ Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_LServerId 
∈ LocationServers, ∀_ACServerId ∈ AccessControlServers, 
∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _sender, _receiver, REQ-B,  
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          locationServerIsRunning(_LServerId),_source1),t1, 
          R(t1,t1))⇒ 
Happens(e(_Id2,_LServerId,_ACServerId,REQ-B,locationResponse  
          (_deviceId),_source2), t2, R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A1. ∀t1∈Time,∃t2∈Time,∀_sender,∀_receiver,∀_deviceId∈Devices,
∀_routerId∈Routers, ∀_userId∈Users, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_sender,_receiver,REQ-A,operableInPremises     
                       (_deviceId),_source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-A,login(_userId,  
           _deviceId,_routerId),_source),t2,R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A2. ∀t1∈Time,∃t2∈Time,∀_deviceId∈Devices, ∀_routerId∈Routers, 
∀_sensorId∈Sensors, ∀_userId∈Users, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
 Happens(e(_Id1,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-A, login(_userId,  
           _deviceId,_routerId),_source1),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_sensorId,REQ-A, signal  
     (_deviceId),_source2),t2,R(t1-2000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A3. ∀t1∈Time,∃t2∈Time,∀_routerId∈Routers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_userId∈Users, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _routerId, _deviceId, REQ-B,  
          loginAcknowledgment(_deviceId,_routerId), 
          _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-A,login(_userId,  
           _deviceId,_routerId),_source),t2,R(t1-5000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A4. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_routerId∈ 
Routers, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _sender, _receiver, REQ-A,  
          routerIsRunning(_routerId),_source),t1, 
          R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-B,  
           loginAcknowledgment(_deviceId,_routerId), 
           _source),t2, R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A5. ∀t1∈Time,∃t2∈Time,∀_sender,∀_receiver,∀_deviceId∈Devices,
∀_routerId∈Routers, ∀_userId∈Users, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
Happens(e(_Id1,_sender,_receiver,REQ-A,operableInPremises     
                       (_deviceId),_source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
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 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-A,logout(_userId,  
           _deviceId,_routerId),_source),t2,R(t1-1000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A6. ∀t1∈Time,∃t2∈Time,∀_deviceId∈Devices, ∀_routerId∈Routers, 
∀_sensorId∈Sensors, ∀_userId∈Users, ∀_source1, ∀_source2. 
 Happens(e(_Id1,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-A,logout(_userId,  
           _deviceId,_routerId),_source1),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_sensorId,REQ-A, signal  
          (_deviceId),_source2),t2,R(t1-2000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A7. ∀t1∈Time,∃t2∈Time,∀_routerId∈Routers, ∀_deviceId∈Devices, 
∀_userId∈Users, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _routerId, _deviceId, REQ-B,  
          logoutAcknowledgment(_deviceId,_routerId), 
          _source),t1,R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-A,login(_userId,  
           _deviceId,_routerId),_source),t2,R(t1-5000,t1)) 
LBACSNT.A8. ∀t1∈Time, ∃t2∈Time, ∀_sender, ∀_receiver, ∀_routerId∈ 
Routers, ∀_deviceId ∈ Devices, ∀_source. 
Happens(e(_Id1, _sender, _receiver, REQ-A,  
          routerIsRunning(_routerId),_source),t1, 
          R(t1,t1)) ⇒ 
 Happens(e(_Id2,_deviceId,_routerId,REQ-B,  
           logoutAcknowledgment(_deviceId,_routerId), 
          _source),t2, R(t1-1000,t1)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
